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INTRODUCTION
GOVERNING, GOVERNANCE, AND
GOVERNABILITY*
Je ne crois pas aux choses
mais aux relations entre les choses.
- Georges Braque
Over the past 10 years, I have worked on the problems raised by the governing,
the governance, and the governability of complex organizations and socio-eco-
nomic-political systems. This terrain has been explored by many researchers.
Indeed, over the last 10 years, these themes have become the centre of
important debates on every continent (Kumon 1992; Kooiman 1993; Castells
1996). However, governance studies are still in their infancy. Although many
interesting approaches and perspectives have been proposed, there is still no
consensus on the best way to handle these issues, nor is there agreement on a
lexicon or vocabulary for formulating these questions.
This compendium of papers is a progress report on work that strives to
generate new responses to these problems. These studies are unified by the
choice of a particular strategy for dealing with governance problems. It is not
intended to be le dernier mot on these matters, but only a premier effort to clarify
the issues, using a method that has proved useful — the social learning
approach.
CHANCE EVENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
The research program on which this volume is based originated in 1988-89
during a sabbatical leave from the University of Ottawa, but the original plans
evolved as a consequence of many chance events and help from friends and
colleagues at certain junctures.
The first chance event was an invitation from Rod Dobell, president of the
Institute for Research on Public Policy, to spend my sabbatical at the Institute.
* This chapter contains excerpts from "States, Communities and Markets: The Distributed
Governance Scenario." In Courchene, T.J. (editor), The Evolving Nation-state in a Global Information
Era: Policy Challenges. Kingston: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, 1997,
pp. 25–46.
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At the time, the Institute was very much a forum interested in exploratory
thinking. My work there was entirely curiosity-oriented, but I had an oppor-
tunity to discuss the results of my first analyses with Peter Dobell, Rod Dobell,
Jeffrey Holmes, Steven Rosell, and Walter Stewart. Each of these colleagues
forced different perspectives on these issues of governance on me, and they
all had an impact on the reflections that stemmed from my sojourn at the
Institute.
The second chance event was David Zussman's invitation to present a
paper on these issues at the Aylmer Conference of the Liberal Party of Canada
in November 1991. This was an opportunity for a synthesis of work that, at
that point, remained somewhat scattered and issue-oriented. Preparing a
synthetic piece on the Strategic State was an occasion to refine my approach
considerably and to sketch, however roughly, a research program that is still
unfolding. A fragment of this paper was published in the proceedings of the
conference early in 1992; a three-part document covering the same terrain
much more thoroughly was published in Ciencia Ergo Sum (Paquet 1996a,
1997a,b). The latter version is included in this volume (Chapter 11).
A third determining event was an invitation to become a senior research
fellow at the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD) in
1992. This opportunity, offered by Ralph Heintzman, who was then vice-prin-
cipal (research) at CCMD, together with my extensive involvement with the
teaching faculty at the Centre, at the request of Lise Pigeon, provided an
extraordinarily rich cauldron in which these ideas could be stirred, debated,
and further distilled. From 1993 on, various working papers were used in the
classroom at the Centre; in them, the ideas were tested and polished through
discussion with hundreds of senior executives in the federal public service. A
number of papers emerged from this extremely rich experience at CCMD; a
few have been collected here.
The final important event was the creation of PRIME (Program of Re-
search in International Management and Economy), which John de la Mothe
and I pressed into existence in 1993 with the support of Dean Jean-Louis
Malouin. This organized research unit brought together a number of col-
leagues (Robert de Cotret, Georges Henault, Luc Juillet, David Large, Paul
Laurent, Morris Miller, Christian Navarre, Jeffrey Roy, Robert Shepherd, Chris
Wilson, and others) and a number of associates from the private, public, and
civic sectors. The PRIME group has produced a stream of papers and books,
in which we have all become more and more concerned with problems of
governance.
The success of the PRIME experience — both in terms of the interest
it generated in the community and the financial support it elicited from
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Industry Canada,
Statistics Canada, etc. — prepared the way for our 1997 petition to the
University of Ottawa for the creation of the Centre on Governance. The
Centre is an umbrella organization for a variety of programs of research
and organized research units with an interest in governance issues. The
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support of Vice-Rectors Howard Alper and Gilles Patry and of Deans
Caroline Andrew (Social Sciences) and Jean-Louis Malouin (Administra-
tion) was most important in efforts to create the Centre and to assure
sustained funding for its development phase.
The purpose of the Centre is not only a certain mise en visibilite of the
research personnel of the University of Ottawa and their partners, affiliates,
and associates, but also, more importantly, the development of a particular
maniere de voir — an approach to governance issues that holds the promise of
revealing important dimensions hitherto not accorded the attention they
deserve, of leading to explorations of novel sorts of governance, and of
providing opportunities to develop clinical interventions to ensure greater
effectiveness for a number of organizations and sociotechnical systems.
UNE MANIERE DEVOIR
Since the early 1970s, it has been my view that the overly simplistic and
mechanistic ways of examining the problems of coordination and govern-
ance in modern socioeconomies are grossly inadequate (Paquet 1971). The
triumphant belief— still in good currency in the 1960s — that the simple
modeling of rational economic actors (with their target-and-instruments-
type policymaking) could cure all ills had been all but discredited by the
1970s. But this view is still living on, even though the intervening years have
revealed that most coordination and governance problems are "wicked" —
the goals are ill-defined and uncertain and the means-ends relationships
unstable and unreliable. It has become clear that neither the market mecha-
nism nor rational policymakers (neither presumed perfect competition nor
presumed perfect computation) can ensure that the socioeconomic system
will be governed perfectly. An alternative way of looking at the coordination
problem was needed.
A major alternative to the mechanistic models of the 1960s and 70s was
the systems approach, which emphasized the dynamics of interaction and
interrelationships among actors. General systems theory, in particular,
proposed a holistic way of thinking. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a former
faculty member at the University of Ottawa, was a most important voice
preaching the systems approach gospel against the mechanistic stimu-
lus-response view of the world that was in vogue. But his perspective was
not taken very seriously. Indeed, many opinion molders regarded it as
suspect because of its link to discredited theories of vitalism, which held
that organisms and organizations were directed from within by a soul-like
force (von Bertalanffy 1968; Davidson 1983).
Yet, von Bertalanffy's perspective was never vitalistic. It focused on organi-
zations as open systems and on a reality best represented as a many-layered
architecture of organizational entities. It searched for laws (progressive inte-
gration, differentiation, mechanization, centralization, etc.) that might apply
to every layer of the system, from cell to biosphere. But this gambit was perhaps
4 GOVERNANCE THROUGH SOCIAL LEARNING
too ambitious, for, in the 1960s and 70s, the systems approach seems to have
lacked sufficient heuristic power to shake off the seduction of the language of
management science.
The management science approach to governing presumed that public,
private, and civic organizations were strongly directed by leaders who had a
good understanding of their environment, of the future trends in the environ-
ment if nothing were done to modify it, of the inexorable rules of the game
they had to put up with, and of the goals pursued by their own organization.
Those were the days when the social sciences were still Newtonian and
pretended to explore a world of deterministic, well-behaved mechanical proc-
esses where causality was simple because the whole was the sum of the parts.
The coordination-governance challenge was relatively simple: building on the
well-defined goals of the organization, it was to design the control mechanisms
likely to get the organization where its leaders wanted it to be.
Many issues were clearly amenable to this approach, and many still are.
But as the pace of change accelerated and the issues grew more complex,
private, public, and civic organizations were confronted more and more with
"wicked problems" (Rittel and Webber 1973). In dealing with such problems,
inquiry can only mean "thinking and acting that originates in and aims at
resolving a situation of uncertainty, doubt and puzzlement" (Schon 1995: 82).
This calls for a new way of thinking about governance. At best, one can hope
for pattern causality: the gradual construction of a "causal" story on the basis
of background knowledge of the system that is often tacit, and "working back,"
as plumbers do when tracing a leak to its source. In this quantum world, there
is no objective reality, the uncertainty principle looms large, events are at best
probable, and the whole is a network of synergies and interactions that is quite
different from the sum of the parts (Becker 1991).
Three important forces have played a central role in generating this
quantum world: the rise of the international, flexible production system, the
accelerating pace of technological change, and the new global financial struc-
ture. As a result of these, governments and state authorities have lost much of
their dominion over national economies and societies, and there has been a
decline in state legitimacy (Morales 1994; Strange 1996).
This erosion of the power and legitimacy of the state has had two important
impacts: first it shifted attention to the nonstate authority, to the other loci or
sources of power; and, second, it brought nonpurposive action and unintended
consequences to the centre of the stage (Galston 1998). A number of important
studies have explored these different sites of power and tracked down the ways
in which much of the state authority has become diffused to nonstate agents
in economy, polity, and society (Horsman and Marshall 1994; Held 1995;
Strange 1996). This phenomenon has given rise to a new distributed and not
entirely purposeful governance shared among the different stakeholders as the
new emerging social technology.
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The Boulding Triangle
Even in the old world of governance, the boundaries between the economic,
political, and civic spheres were never well-defined either conceptually or
statistically; they did not correspond to a rigid frontier, but rather to a wavering
and evolving fracture zone between subsets of organizations and institutions
integrated by various mechanisms. This has become even more true in the new
world of governance.
Economists have explored this terrain for quite some time. Francois
Perroux (1960) and Kenneth Boulding (1970) proposed a simple conceptual
map. Both identified three generic ensembles of organizations dominated
more or less by a different mechanism of integration: quid pro quo exchange
(market economy), coercion (polity), and gift, solidarity, or reciprocity (community
and society). These mechanisms had been explored by Karl Polanyi (1957) as
dominant features of the concrete socioeconomies of the past. Perroux and
Boulding fleshed out the idea and applied it to the modern context.
In this approach (Figure 1), the organizational terrain is roughly divided
into three domains where the rules or mechanisms of coordination are based
on different principles: the economic/market domain (B) where the forces of
supply and demand and price mechanisms are the norm; the state domain (C)
where the rules are based on coercion and redistribution; and civil society (A)
where cooperation, reciprocity, and solidarity are the integrating principles.
This corresponds roughly to the partitioning of human organizations into
economy, polity, and society (Wolfe 1989).
A careful survey of many advanced sociopolitical economies reveals that
society, economy, and polity each occupy approximately one-third of the
terrain and that the central point is a rough approximation of the centre of
gravity of the organizational triangle. This does not correspond to the
figure 1. A modified version of Boulding's triangle,
mapping the organizational terrain based
on three mechanisms of integration.
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statistical portrait emerging from official agencies, mainly because zone-A
activities are grossly underreported; activities in the home, within not-for-
profit associations, and in general beyond the market and the state are poorly
recorded and remain largely underground (Paquet 1989a).
These three sectors have not always had equal valence and need not have
similar weight. A century ago in Canada, the state portion was quite limited
and the scene was dominated by the other two sets of organizations. From the
late 19th century to the 1970s, government grew in importance to the point
where probably half of measured activities fell into the general ambit of state
and state-related activities. The boundaries have been displaced accordingly
over time. More recently, a vigorous counter-movement of privatization and
deregulation has caused a reduction in the state sector and a reverse shift of
the boundaries (Chapter 11).
In parallel with these swings, there has been a tendency for the new
socioeconomy to trigger the development of an ever-larger number of mixed
institutions, blending the different mechanisms to some extent (market-based
public regulation, public-private-social partnering, etc.) to provide the neces-
sary signposts and orientation maps in a new confused world. In the recent
past, this has translated into a much denser filling in of the Boulding triangle.
Mixed institutions have been designed that are capable of providing the basis
for cooperation, harmonization, concertation, and even co-decision-making
involving agents or organizations from the three sectors (Leroy 1990; Burelle
1995; Laurent and Paquet 1998).
Heterarchy and Co-evolution
A modification of the governance process necessitates some rearrangement of
the role of each sector and, therefore, entails a shift of the boundaries between
A, B, and C. Any such shift corresponds to a new division of labour among the
three sectors, but there is not necessarily a hierarchy among those sectors.
Indeed, the great weakness of most analyses of the scope of government
has been that they ascribe to the state either a dependent and somewhat
secondary role vis-a-vis the market or a domineering role vis-a-vis economy
and society. In the first case, the state is required to attend to matters only when
neither the market nor civil society is able to take care of it; in the second case,
the state is imposing hegemonic constraints on the other sectors. Both these
positions are misleading ideologic stands. In reality, the relationships among
sectors are heterarchical: it is a world without a pecking order. Heterarchy
introduces "strange loops" of authority "under conditions of time and place"
very much like the "game of paper, rock, and scissors where paper covers rock,
rock crushes scissors, and scissors cut paper" (Ogilvy 1986-87). Any sector may
at times have dominion over the others; indeed, the three sectors co-evolve.
The ecological concept of co-evolution is an apt way to synthesize the links
among these three universes. Co-evolution in biology refers to an evolutionary
process based on reciprocal responses of closely interacting species. Reference
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has been made to the co-evolution of the beaks of hummingbirds and the shape
of the flowers they feed from. The concept can be generalized to encompass
feedback processes among interacting systems (social, economic, political)
going through a reciprocal process of change. The process of co-evolution
becomes a form of organizational learning, that is, of joint learning and interad-
justment of economy, society, and state (Norgaard 1984).
The central characteristics of this jointly evolving process are resilience (the
capacity for the economy-polity-society nexus to spring back undamaged from
pressure or shock through some minor rearrangements that do not modify the
nature of the overall system) and learning (the capacity to improve present
performance as a result of experience through a redefinition of the organiza-
tion's objectives and a modification of behaviour and structures as a result of
new circumstances). These governing relations are in creative tension (resilience
calls for preservation, while learning means change) and must be balanced.
This does not call for a rigid division of labour among the spheres, but rather,
for a capacity to switch to a greater or lesser dependence on one family of
integrative mechanisms or another as circumstances change.
One may identify a variety of mixes of political, social, and economic
mechanisms (and different modes of interaction among government, business,
and society) in different parts of the world. The Anglo-American system
(Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and South
Africa) is prone to ascribing a dominant valence to the market mechanism, to
the point of belittling the scope of state and civil society. Other parts of the
world (Western Europe, Asia, etc.) have chosen to assign a much greater role
to the state, but also to community, culture, citizenship, and social cohesion
(Dahrendorf 1995).
In this process of co-evolution, adjustments are not the result of the
workings of some invisible hand. The state has an important role in maintain-
ing healthy communication in the forum and workable competition in the
market. It also has an important intelligence function if it is to act as catalyst
in an innovative learning process (Wilensky 1967; Lundvall 1992).
"Glocalization" and Dispersion of Power
To cope with a turbulent environment, organizations must use the environment
strategically, in much the same way a surfer uses a wave: to learn faster, to adapt
more quickly. This calls for noncentralization, for an expropriation of the power
to steer held by the top managers in an organization. This is very different
from a unilateral decentralization that can be rescinded. There must be
constant negotiation and bargaining with partners. Managers must exploit all
favourable environmental circumstances and the full complement of imagina-
tion and resourcefulness in the heart and mind of each team player; they must
become team leaders in task-force-type projects, quasi-entrepreneurs capable
of cautious suboptimizing in the face of a turbulent environment (Leblond and
Paquet 1988).
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This sort of strategy calls for lighter, more horizontal and modular
structures, for the creation of networks and informal clan-like rapports (Bres-
sand et al. 1989). This is the case not only in the public sector; in the private
sector, the "virtual corporation" and the "modular corporation" are now the
new models of governance (Business Week 1993; Tully 1993).
These new modularized private, public, and civic organizations cannot
impose their views on their clients or citizens. The firm, very much like the
state or civic organizations, must consult. Deliberation and negotiation are
everywhere, moving away from goals and controls and deeply into intelli-
gence and innovation. A society based on participation, negotiation, and
bargaining has more and more replaced one based on universal rights. The
strategic organization has to become a broker, a negotiator, an animateur;
and, in this network, a consultative and participative mode obtains among
the socioeconomy, the firm, the state, and communities (Paquet 1992a,
1994a; Cassells 1996).
All this triggers a paradoxical outcome that has been analyzed by Naisbitt
(1994) and christened "glocalization" by Courchene (1995). As globalization
proceeds, economic integration increases, and the component parts of the
system become more numerous. The central question is how to organize for
faster learning. And it would appear, according to Naisbitt, that the game of
learning is going to generate more innovation if those components confronted
with different local realities are empowered to make decisions on the spot.
Thus, globalization has led to localization of decision-making, to empower-
ment, to the dispersion of power, and to a more distributed governance
process.
DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE
In times of change, organizations can only govern themselves by becoming
capable of learning both what their goals are and the means to reach them as
they proceed. This is done by tapping the knowledge and information that active
citizens possess and getting them to invent ways out of the predicaments they
are in.
This leads to a more distributed governance that deprives the leader of
his or her monopoly on directing the organization. For the organization to
learn quickly, everyone must take part in the conversation and contribute each
bit of knowledge and wisdom that he or she has that has a bearing on the issue
(Paquet 1992a; Webber 1993; Piore 1995).
Distributed governance does not mean only a process of dispersion of
power toward localized decision-making within each sector. It also entails a
dispersion of power over a wide variety of actors and groups within the
Boulding triangle, because of the fact that the best learning experience in a
context of rapid change can be brought about through decentralized and
flexible teams woven by moral contracts and reciprocal obligations negotiated
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in the context of evolving partnerships (Nohria and Eccles 1992; de la Mothe
and Paquet 1994).
A Triangle-wide Governance System
Distributed governance is embedded in a set of organizations and institutions
built on market forces, the state, and civil society. But it is most importantly
nested in transverse links relating these three families of institutions and
organizations and allowing them to be integrated into a sort of neural net.
These transversal links neither echo the traditional, functional top-down
organization nor the matrix form of organizations, where vertical-functional
and horizontal-process rapports are supposedly keeping one another in check.
Rather, in a transversal world, processes are dominant, and the reaction to
external challenges is for the different stakeholders to coalesce laterally to
create informal links and multifunctional teams capable of promoting faster
and more effective learning (Tarondeau and Wright 1995).
Under ideal circumstances, this multifunctional esprit de corps provides a
most fertile ground for social learning. It is based on the existence of a social
capital of trust, reasonableness, and mutual understanding that facilitates the
debates and generates a sort of basic pragmatic ethic likely to promote
interaction and synergies among the many potential partners in each of the
three families of organizations. But this entails mobilization of all participants
through a wide array of coordination maps and institutions all over the
Boulding triangle, and this may prove much more difficult to realize than is
usually presumed. Indeed, not all social learning is feed-forward in nature,
and, consequently, the neural net arrangements may encompass only a portion
of the Boulding space, may link the various components only loosely, and may
also generate "low" learning.
In these forums that cut across bureaucratic hierarchies and vertical lines
of power, fraught with overlapping memberships, personal ties, temporary
coalitions, and special-task organizations, "the organizational structure of the
future is already being created by the most as well as the least powerful" within
the new paradigm (Hine 1977). Indeed, to the extent that middle-range
regional and transnational networks are cutting across the usual structures, the
interactions distill, in an evolutionary way, an always imperfectly bounded
network (Strange 1996).
Transversal Governance and Meso-innovation Systems
Our exploration of the evolution of the governance process suggests that this
new pattern tends to evolve in two directions: its centre of gravity shifts
downward toward the subnational level with a pattern of power distributed
more broadly along the supra- to infra-nation-state axis; and its area spans a
broader terrain involving a larger number of institutions and coordinating
maps from the economic, political, and civic sectors.
10 GOVERNANCE THROUGH SOCIAL LEARNING
The addition of a major component of associative governance to the more
traditional state and market governance mechanisms triggers a major quali-
tative change. It introduces the network paradigm within the governance
process (Cooke and Morgan 1993; Castells 1996, 1997), and this paradigm not
only dominates the transactions of the social sector, but also permeates the
operations of both the state and market sectors (Amin and Thrift 1995). For
the network is not, as is usually assumed, a mixed form of organization existing
halfway along a continuum ranging from market to hierarchy. Rather, it is a
generic name for a third type of arrangement, built on very different integrat-
ing mechanisms: networks are consensus or inducement-oriented organiza-
tions and institutions (Kumon 1992; Acs et al. 1996).
Networks have two sets of characteristics: those derived from their
dominant logic (consensus and inducement-oriented systems) and those
derived from their structure. The consensus dominant logic does not abolish
power, but means that power is distributed. A central and critical feature of
networks is the emphasis on voluntary adherence to norms. Although this
voluntary adherence does not necessarily appear to generate constraints, per
se, on the size of the organization, it is not always easy for a set of shared
values to spread over massive disjointed transnational communities: free
riding, high transaction costs, problems of accountability, etc., impose extra
work. So the imperatives of leanness, agility, and flexibility have led many
important multinationals to choose neither to manage their affairs as a global
production engine nor as a fully decentralized system, but as a multitude of
quasi-independent units working in a loose confederated structure (O'Toole
and Bennis 1992; Handy 1992).
The structural characteristics of the network nicely complement the col-
laborative and adaptive network intelligence (Kelly 1994: 189). The network
externalities and spillovers are not spreading in a frictionless world; they cast
much more of a local shadow than is usually presumed: "Space becomes ever
more variegated, heterogeneous and finely textured in part because the
processes of spatial reorganization... have the power to exploit relatively
minute spatial differences to good effect" (Harvey 1988). So a network does
not extend boundlessly; instead, it tends to crystallize around a unifying
purpose, mobilizing independent members through voluntary links, around
multiple leaders in overlapping and superimposed webs of solidarity. This
underscores the importance of "regional business cultures" and the relative
importance of networks of small and medium-sized enterprises as a source of
new ideas (Putnam 1993; Lipnack and Stamps 1994).
Reciprocity, based on voluntary adherence, generates lower costs of coop-
eration and, therefore, stimulates networking as social capital accumulates with
trust. Not only do the networks generate social capital and wealth, they are
also closely associated with a greater degree of progressivity in the economy,
that is, with a higher degree of innovativeness and capacity to transform
because networks cross boundaries. Indeed, boundary-crossing networks are
likely to ignite considerable innovativeness because they provide an opportu-
nity for reframing. In the face of placeless power in a globalized economy,
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seemingly powerless places, with their own communication code on a histori-
cally specific territory, are fitful terrains for local collaborative innovation
networks (Acs et al. 1996).
Renaissance-style Interdependency
In the transition period from the current nation-state-dominated era to the
newly emerging era of distributed governance and transversal coordination,
there will be a tendency for much devolution and decentralization of decision-
making, i.e., for the meso-level units in polity, society, and economy to become
prominent and for the rules of the game of the emergent order to be couched
in informal terms. Moreover, the emergent properties of the new order (be it
a public philosophy of subsidiarity or another set of workable guiding princi-
ples) are likely to remain relatively unpredictable (Ziman 1991; Norgaard
1994; Paquet 1993a, 1995).
This multilayered structure is something very like a neural net of the kind
found in a living brain: a layered system of many signal-processing units
interacting in parallel within and between layers. This sort of system can learn
(i.e., transform) in reaction to external stimuli and develop a capacity for
pattern recognition and for adaptation through experience. Indeed, the
resiliency of the neural net (in the brain or in an organization) is due to the
redundancy of connections that allows the information flow to circumvent any
hole or lesion.
The new form of transversal coordination now in the making may not
suffer as much as some fear from the loss of central control and the weakening
of the national state imperium. A different sort of imperium, adapted to the
age of networking, is emerging — reminiscent of the Roman empire under
Hadrian, where the institutional order was a loose web of agreements made
to ensure compatibility among open networks (Guehenno 1993).
ADDITIONS TO THE LEXICON
To analyze this drift in the governance process, it is important to develop a
lexicon capable of differentiating the various aspects of the transformation.
Borrowing to a large extent from systems analysis, we must first distinguish
between, on the one hand, the organization as an open system and, on the
other, its environment and recognize that there is continuing interaction
between them.
The environment of the organization may be characterized in broad terms
by its texture. And the texture of the environment has an impact on the system
itself. Depending on whether the environment is placid, randomized, clus-
tered, disturbed reactive, or frankly turbulent, organizations will have to vary
and transform themselves in different ways to cope effectively with these
challenges (Emery andTrist 1965). The texture of the environment has become
much more complex, diverse, and dynamic over the last while, and it has
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changed much more rapidly than it used to. Problems are more often than not
the result of a confluence of different factors, knowledge is dispersed over many
actors, and there is much uncertainty and dissent about the nature of the
objectives pursued. This has created new pressures on the organization as an
open system.
The governing activities of any single actor have become rather ineffective.
Purposeful action by stakeholders is likely to encounter resistance from highly
organized groups in these complex, dynamic, and diverse environments.
Unintended consequences, external economies and diseconomies, and feed-
back of all sorts are likely to ensure that the intended outcomes will not be
achieved. The interaction and composition effects, the coordination and
"collibration" (co-equilibration) efforts, and the important degree of integra-
tion, differentiation, and hierarchization that are likely to materialize, are
bound to generate a pattern of governance that may have little to do with the
original plans.
Indeed, the pattern of governance is likely to emerge rather than being
crafted.
Governing and governance are subjected to a permanent process of mutual
interaction. Actors who govern, or try to govern, also influence the govern-
ance structure.... Some (more powerful) actors have the possibility to rewrite
some "rules of the game" but no one has complete control. There is always
some intended and unintended change, which creates maneuvering space for
actors willing to change the existing pattern. [Kooiman 1993: 258-259]
We are entering an era where the governance process is a game without a
master. This raises the question of whether such systems are governable.
Governability is a measure of the organization's capability to govern itself
within the context of broader systems of which it is part, and the environment
within which it is nested. Governability makes no sense in a static context; it
corresponds to the organization's capacity to transform, its capacity to modify
its structure, its process, and even its substantive guidance mechanism and
orientation. To ensure governability, some balance must be maintained be-
tween autonomy and responsibility. Moreover, there must be some match between
the needs and potentialities of the required organizational resources for the
governability dynamics to be viable. Finally, governability requires substantial
equilibration between effectiveness and legitimacy (Kooiman 1993: 259-260).
Governing, governance, and governability are obviously in continuous
interaction: the gaps between governing needs and capabilities are likely to
modify governing behaviour and transform the governance pattern. This is
likely to trigger the emergence of a fitful degree of centralization, differentia-
tion, and self-governance; to give rise to a variety of partnerships and joint
ventures to respond to the challenges posed by knowledge dispersion, moti-
vation, and implementation problems; and to correct some of the important
side-effects of the existing governance structure.
The emerging institutional order may not correspond to one ensuring
optimal governability, for it is not determined on the sole basis of efficiency;
the most important dimensions are legitimacy, fairness, ethics, learning, etc.
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The overall objective is to maintain enough coherence over time to maintain
the organization as a bundle of coordination mechanisms, but not so much
that it would prevent the organization from developing new instruments, new
perspectives, and new purposes (Laurent and Paquet 1998).
This subtle search for the right degree of coherence calls for a new political
language to replace the traditional engineering language in the world of
governance. The dynamic new realities of alliances, power, influences, and
constituencies have replaced the old static realities of property, structure,
planning, and control. In a world where the new assets are intangibles and
mainly in the control of stakeholders, the challenge of governability is the
challenge of transforming mercenaries, owing loyalty only to themselves, into
members of a community interested in and capable of allegiance and reciprocal
commitment (Handy 1998).
This calls for significant modification in the form of our organizations.
First, it confirms the need for modular and federal structures better able to
mobilize loyalty. Second, it requires that trust be nurtured, as it must be in the
bloodstream of the organization for it to be effective even though it is only
loosely structured.
This does not eliminate the responsibility of the state for "the infrastruc-
ture of life" (Handy 1998: 223) in the new governance. Without it, governabil-
ity is in doubt. This new strategic role of the state is bound to be more modest
than it has been in the last 50 years, but it is a most fundamental role in
providing help to ensure that appropriate organizations can evolve, that
citizens connect themselves better with the market, and that civic engagement
and entrepreneurship are rekindled through permissive and supportive
framework interventions (Handy 1998; Paquet 1999).
SOCIAL LEARNING
In the dynamic, innovative, and cooperative environment of the learning
economy, the capacity to learn increasingly determines the relative position of
individuals, firms, and national systems. New modes of production of knowl-
edge and new modes of collegiality, alliances, and sharing of knowledge have
evolved (Gibbons et al. 1994; Lundvall and Johnson 1994).
The learning economy is the source of wealth creation and is rooted in a
social or collective mobilization of knowledge: learning is harnessing the
collective intelligence of the team as a source of continuous improvement
(Florida and Kenney 1993). This, in turn, commands a degree of cooperation
to take advantage of positive externalities, economies of scale and scope, and
strong cumulative experience-learning processes (Jacquemin 1995). But this
process does not necessarily work perfectly.
Although much know-what and know-why has been ever more effectively
codified and can be produced and distributed as a quasi-commodity, know-how
and know-who have remained tacitly and socially embedded (Foray and
Lundvall 1996). Consequently, the production and distribution of these latter
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forms of knowledge have been more problematic; they depend a great deal on
social cohesion and trust, on much trespassing and cross-fertilization among
disciplines and on the development of networks capable of serving as two-way
communication links between tacit and codified, private and shared knowl-
edge, between passive efficiency-achieving learning and creative-destructive
Schumpeterian learning (Boisot 1995). There are ample possibilities for
coordination failures that can slow down the process of learning (de la Mothe
andPaquet 1997).
Interaction and Conventions
Interaction is necessary to generate effective learning. It focuses on the
desirable form of imperfect competition or mixes of competition and coop-
eration characterized by product-based learning. Learning entails "the mutu-
ally consistent interpretation of information that is not fully codified, and
hence not fully capable of being transmitted, understood, and utilized inde-
pendently of the actual agents who are developing and using it" (Storper 1996:
259). It is of central importance because of the fact that knowledge is dispersed
and exists in a form that is not fully codified. This calls for conventions or
relational transactions to define mutually coherent expectations and common
guideposts. These conventions differ from sector to sector: they provide the
requisite coherence for a common context of interpretation and, for some,
"cognitive routinization of relations between firms, their environments, and
employees" (Storper 1996: 259).
Such coherence results in nimbleness in the network economy. Yet, a good
learning network must not be too coherent: the nodes should not be too similar
nor the ties too strong or too routinized. This is the sense in which one may
speak of "the strength of weak ties" (Granovetter 1973); a certain degree of
heterogeneity and, therefore, social distance, might foster greater potential for
innovation because the different parties bring a more complementary body of
knowledge to the "conversation." More fruitful synergies ensue.
Ideal-types of Transaction Structures
To analyze the different types of transaction structures, Max Boisot (1995) has
suggested a three-dimensional space — information space — which identifies
an organizational system in terms of the degree of abstraction, codification, and
diffusion of the flow of information within it (Figure 2). This three-dimensional
space defines three continua: a vertical axis indicating increasing codification
of the information (i.e., the more its form is clarified, stylized, and simplified);
an eastward-pointing axis along which information is more widely diffused and
shared; and a westward-pointing axis measuring increasing abstraction of the
information (i.e., the more general the categories in use) (Boisot 1995).
To illustrate the use of the information space, Boisot has identified several
transaction structures corresponding to different loci. First, he identifies as
"fiefdoms" the type of organization where information is very concrete and is
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figure 2. The three dimensions of the flow of information
in organizations. Source: Boisot (1995).
Figure 3. The social learning cycle. Source: Boisot (1995).
Note: Phases I and II are each made up of three steps: s, scanning the environ-
ment; p, stylizing the problem; at, abstraction; d, diffusion; ar, absorption; and i,
impact
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neither much codified or widely diffused because of the fact that the core
transactions are based on the savoir-faire and personal authority of the leader.
Second, he characterizes the world of bureaucracy: information is more
abstract (monthly reports, etc.) and codified in precise rules, but available only
on a need-to-know basis within the organization and, therefore, not shared
much. Third, is the market organization, where price information is very
abstract, highly codified, and widely diffused. Finally, Boisot labels as "clans"
some organizations based on shared values and personal contacts: in the clan,
information is concrete, noncodified, and widely diffused.
In each of these subspaces, governing and governance connote rather
different realities. In fiefdoms and bureaucracies, governing is based on
top-down command and governance is rather hierarchical; in markets and
clans, governing is much more a lateral endeavour, and the pattern of govern-
ance much more horizontal and transversal.
The Learning Cycle and Learning Blockages
Within the cube, Boisot has attempted to stylize the operations of the social
learning cycle to capture the different phases of the processes of production
and diffusion of information in organizational learning. This cycle is presented
in two phases with three steps in each phase (Figure 3): phase I emphasizes
the cognitive dimensions of the cycle, phase II the diffusion of the new
information.
Learning begins in phase I with some scanning of the environment and of
the concrete information that is widely known and diffused (s) so as to detect
anomalies and paradoxes. In step 2, one is led to stylize the problem (p) posed
by the anomalies and paradoxes in a language of problem solution. The third
step purports to generalize the solution of the specific issue to a broader family
of problems through a process of abstraction (at).
In phase II, the new knowledge is diffused (d) to a larger community of
people or groups. Step 5 is a process of absorption (ar) of the new knowledge
by the population and its assimilation so that it becomes part of the tacit stock
of knowledge. In step 6, the new knowledge is not only absorbed but has an
impact (i) on the practices and artefacts of the group or community.
Boisot also notes the possibility of blockages at each step in the learning
cycle. For example, in phase I, cognitive dissonance in s may prevent the
anomalies from being noted, epistemic inhibitions of all sorts in p may stop
the process of translation into a language of problem solution, blockages
preventing the generalization of the new knowledge because of the problem
definition being encapsulated within the hie et nunc (at) may keep the new
knowledge from acquiring the most effective degree of generality. In phase II,
the new knowledge may not be diffused appropriately because of property
rights (d), certain values, or very strong dynamic conservatism which may
generate a refusal to listen by those most likely to profit from the new
knowledge (ar) or because of difficulties in finding ways to incorporate it (i).
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It is important to note that the social learning cycle does not pertain only
to the search of new means to reach well-defined ends. It is double-looped in
the sense that as the learning proceeds, anomalies and paradoxes are gener-
ating the redefinition not only of the means but also of the ends (Argyris and
Schon 1978).
Interactivity
Social learning is organization-based and interactive. It stems from creative
interactivity. Interactivity is a form of dialectical relations among agents and
their evolution through time. It connotes the process through which four
aspects of organizations become harmonized: the various capabilities or com-
petences (technical, organizational, strategic, learning) of organizations; the
particular capacities of the different organizations (to solve problems, to absorb
knowledge, to innovate and experiment, and to incorporate new knowledge
in its functions); the interactions with the environment and with other organi-
zations; and the degree of dynamic increasing returns for organizations in
learning by learning.
Interactivity brings some sort of cumulative process of learning built on
externalities of all sorts, with great potential for irreversibility and inflexibilities
of all sorts (Le Bas 1993: 13). But it mostly provokes the genesis of institutions:
a set of guideposts, the locus for the memorization and transmission of routines
and tacit knowledge through conventions, contracts, and contraptions that
form a cognitive framework that guides the learning process and constrains
the nature of the exploration and exploitation of new knowledge: they orient
the directions of learning (March 1991; Llerena 1997).
The nature of the ethos and of the culture can have an important impact
on the shape of the learning cycle. One might find the learning cycle jammed
in a narrow band close to the abstraction-codification plane on the left when
learning is restricted only to a very limited community, or the learning cycle
may rotate almost exclusively within the bureaucratic world or the market
world, or it may be disjointed into several separate or quasi-separate loops
within the Boisot cube.
New types of relationships have developed in this new context: new open
self-elective communities transcending borders and generating new bonds of
a nonnational sort have emerged. But there has also been much stunting of the
existing pluralistic relationships: the rise of reactive exclusionist "identity
groups" defined by a total allegiance to a single club — be it tribe, race, gender,
ethnicity — that can only lead to the politics of divisiveness and the prevention
of the sort of ongoing conversation that leads to social learning (Piore 1995).
Design Rationality
In this new fluid setting where precarious new associative relationships de-
velop, not only is the citizen somewhat uprooted, but the whole process through
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which the sociopolitical system learns and gets transformed becomes ill-de-
fined as it is pulled at the same time toward the supranational and the
subnational levels, and coordination tends to become much more complex as
it becomes based less on hierarchies and more on associative networks of
cooperation (Paquet 1997c,d).
These looser forms of coordination may rise organically, but not necessar-
ily. It is not always easy for a set of shared values to spread over massive
communities. There are organizational diseconomies of scale. This is why
networks do not extend boundlessly, and why their development often depends
on shocks (the moral equivalent of a war or the sociological equivalent of a
defeat that sometimes provides the requisite esprit de corps) or on crises
revealing a lack of trust, a lack of the requisite amount of social capital, and
the erosion of communities.
These looser forms of coordination build much on tacit knowledge, and
tacit knowledge and incomplete knowledge create difficulties and bottlenecks.
But it can be argued that excessive codification may well also be a source of
inertia and deceleration in the process of learning and change (Foray and
Lundvall 1997). Mode 2 production of knowledge is the world of "delta
knowledge," i.e., of practical transdisciplinary knowledge as a result of reflec-
tion-in-action (Gilles and Paquet 1991). This sort of knowledge is not new, but
it has become immensely more important in the recent past, as the intensity
and complexity of interactions between actors in organizations has increased.
The pressure to organize, learn, and innovate has generated the emer-
gence of value-creating partner systems in which core competencies are often
embodied in forms of knowledge that are idiosyncratically synergetic, i.e., in
some form of connoisseurship or practical wisdom, or savoir-faire, that remains
largely tacit but is fundamental nonetheless. This form of knowledge has been
so neglected and the more traditional form of technical and codified knowl-
edge has been so celebrated that very little has been done to uncover the ways
in which delta knowledge is produced and diffused. Even if the capabilities on
which this sort of connoisseurship is built are highly regarded, they are often
considered as inimitable and noncontestable, so little is known about ways to
augment them.
The accumulation of reservoirs of tacit knowledge emerges from a conver-
sation with the situation and from a process of exploration and learning driven
by design rationality (Schon and Rein 1994). Such a process embraces error as
the only way to learn, as the way to fuel creative deliberations. This process of
learning through a conversation with the situation and as a result of errors (the
difference between what is expected and what happens) is at the core of the
learning organization, but it is also a quagmire that few have explored seriously.
Consequently, we often count on the forces of instrumental rationality and
logical processes only because of the fact that these are regarded as the only
source of valuable knowledge. Only when the full array of different types of
knowledge becomes legitimate and when we have probed the way in which
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nonlogical processes can be fully tapped can we hope to make the greatest and
best use of mode 2 knowledge production.
PROPOS D'ETAPE
The essays in this volume were written over some 10 years, and they do not
form a systematic study of governance, as they lack the sustained argument of
a monograph. However, the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Together,
they convey an understanding that separately would be missing. This is the
rationale behind my decision to publish them in this form.
Part I contains two chapters that act in lieu of a fully developed conceptual
framework. Chapter 1 develops more fully the argument presented in this
introduction. Chapter 2 presents, in a succinct way, the social learning ap-
proach I have elected to use as our compass and makes passing references to
a number of papers presented in part II as an illustration of the heuristic power
of this approach.
Part II is a collection of papers in which the social learning approach is
used as the analytical framework that is most likely to serve as a set of useful
organizing ideas.
• At the international level, this approach covers a vast terrain: a deconstruc-
tion of the free trade debate, and an outline of what a science and
technology policy might be under free trade.
• At the national level, the social learning approach is used to study the
aborted process from which an energy policy might have emerged, and
the treacherous problems raised by the environment-energy interface.
• At the social level, the social learning approach is used to examine two
thorny policy areas: multiculturalism and liberal education. These areas
are ill-structured and poorly understood; my hope was, at best, to provide
a provisional lay of the land.
• At the administrative level, I have examined two areas — public service
commissions and granting councils — where extraordinary opportunities
have been missed as a result of a systematic underestimation of the power
of administrative mechanisms as a basis for reform.
Part III attempts to draw some conclusions from these preliminary studies.
It sketches the contours of the emerging strategic state, explains the impor-
tance of moral contracts in the new governance, and explores the way in which
distributed governance and transversal leadership may materialize.
The conclusion raises the question of the burden of office of citizens and
officials alike in the new governance, examines the central issues of account-
ability and ethics at the core of social learning, and identifies the sort of
connoisseurship necessary to survive in this world of 360-degree accountability.
Finally, I would like to thank Vicki Bennett, Sandra Garland, and Marie
Saumure for their help in getting this manuscript through the production
process.
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CHAPTER 1
NEW PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE*
C'est pas toujours le capitaine
qui voit premier venir le vent.
- Gilles Vigneault
The globalization of production, the dematerialization of economic activity,
and a wave of democratization, together with sweeping demographic changes
and much social upheaval have generated growing complexity, turbulence, and
interdependence in the world's socioeconomic environment. This has led to a
loss of the stable state. The foci and substance of the governance process have
been modified dramatically (Schon 1971).
Yet, despite these major developments, some features of the governance
system have endured. The nation-state is 200 years old, and it would appear
to be in very good health. The purposes for which it was invented (to organize
and use social violence, to express a sense of political and social identity, to
write and then execute the rules by which a society chooses to govern itself, to
organize economic life) are still paramount in the consciousness and high
among the values and beliefs of citizens (Economist 1990). Indeed, one might
even speak of a convulsive in-gathering of nations these days: nation-states are
becoming more and more centres of identification and adherence. Therefore,
the problem of governance by nation-states continues to be of central concern.
In Canada, the problem of governance is posed with particular acuity. In
a survey published in The Economist, John Grimond (1991) suggests that
Canada is "the first post-modern nation-state, with a weak centre acting as a
kind of holding company." Therefore, hierarchical and centralized control is
no longer workable, and there is a real danger of anarchy and chaos if the
forces of entropy were to make the nation-state rudderless. What then is the
pattern of governance in such a context? In what direction is it drifting?
Governance is about guiding. It is "the process whereby an organization
or society steers itself (Resell 1992: 21). This process is complex and changing,
* This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the Canadian Centre for Management
Development's (CCMD) annual university seminar inTouraine (Quebec) on 18 February 1993.
This work has benefited from discussions with the participants at CCMD's Advanced Management
Course in 1991-92, participants at the seminar, suggestions from Ralph Heintzman, and con-
versations with Lise Pigeon.
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but it hinges on the dynamics of communication and control. Consequently,
in a globalized, democratic, and knowledge-based society, the pattern of
governance is different from what it was in a closed, authoritarian, and
natural-resource-based society: the nation-state may have endured but the
governance process and the precise way in which the state plays its role in it
have evolved and will continue to evolve.
Because a number of important changes in the sociopolitical environment
and in the guiding values are already detectable, some have argued that the
contours of the governance system in advanced socioeconomies in the 21 st
century — in the private, public, and civic sectors — may be surmised in a
general way, that already a new set of rules is in the process of crystallizing:
complexity is the new reality and perplexity the new frame of mind.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Those attempting to read the auspices or search for directions are confronted
with competing paradigms. A paradigm is a "cluster of fundamental principles
guiding the perception and organization of data... a widely shared system of
assumptions and beliefs operating at a basic, almost unconscious level of
experience" (Ogilvy 1986-87). The most popular categorization of paradigms
pertaining to the governance of the nation-state suggests three scenarios: the
dominant hierarchical paradigm, the also popular minimal government para-
digm, and the emerging heterarchical paradigm of decentralized planning
(scissors cut paper/paper wraps stone/stone breaks scissors) (Ogilvy 1986-87).
This categorization, though suggestive, provides neither a sufficiently
detailed description of the terrain nor a sufficiently rich heuristic. The diffi-
culty with these simple paradigms is that they quickly run into paradoxes and
dilemmas as soon as one uses them. Such anomalies or insoluble puzzles are
signs that the paradigm is unable to explain what is happening. A paradigm
shift or a reframing is then probable. But shifting back and forth from one of
these paradigms to another is a game that has not proved very fruitful.
To produce a diagnosis and to be able to design new systems of governance
in the post-modern state requires a guiding analytical framework. In the
language of Harvey Leibenstein (1976), an analytical framework is "a set of
relationships that do not lead to specific conclusions about the world of events
(but constitute) ... the mold out of which the specific theories are made." A
conceptual framework is much more in the nature of an approach, of a
preliminary way to organize objects of the inquiry. Such a framework is not
easy to construct, for it must build on a synthesis of work done in isolation in
the fields of industrial organization, strategic management, the contractual
theories of organization, etc. (Charreaux et al. 1987; Alt and Shepsle 1990;
Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Each group celebrates its own interpretation of
reality with little or no reference to the work done by the other groups.
Our approach may not offer the ideal synthesis but it allows for a degree
of syncretism and might prove to be a powerful heuristic.
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Information and Organization
A wide array of models and theories provide guidance for discussion of
governance and organizations. Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985), who has done
some of the most interesting work in this area, uses a framework emphasizing
the cost of transacting. Other groups single out property rights as a guidepost.
Others suggest that one can dissolve the organization into a web of explicit or
implicit contracts, and still others postulate that the organization emerges from
complex dynamic and somewhat implicit interdependencies. Whatever the
model, a basic feature remains constant: organizations may be regarded as a
way of structuring and sharing information. In that sense, one may x-ray
organizations via their informational dimensions without any a priori commit-
ment to any of the causal explanations in good currency (Ouchi 1980; Boisot
1987; Stinchcombe 1990).
One of the simplest presentations of this approach is the synthesis of Max
Boisot (1987) (developed from the work of William Ouchi and others) in which
he suggests that organizations might be mapped in a two-dimensional culture
space which defines the extent that information is codified and diffused: the
farther from the origin on the vertical axis, the more codified is the information
(i.e., the less ambiguous, the less fuzzy, the more stylized the code, the more
structured the information), and the farther from the origin on the horizontal
axis, the more readily diffused is the information (i.e., the more widely the
information is shared). Boisot partitions that culture space into four subspaces
(Figure 4) in which is a reduced form of Figure 2.
This partitioning carves out different families of organizational arrange-
ments where
• transactions are based on personal knowledge and authority imposing a
sort of dominion in a fiefdom where information is not very codified or
diffused (lower left quadrant);
Figure 4. Organizations in a two-dimensional culture space.
Source: Boisot (1987).
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• transactions are based on well-codified, proprietary knowledge not gener-
ally available outside the organization and hierarchically coordinated
transactions in bureaucracies (upper left quadrant);
• transactions are based on impersonal information and knowledge very
neatly codified in the form of price signals and widely diffused in market-
type organizations (upper right quadrant); and
• transactions based on shared values, personal contacts, and implicitly-con-
ducted negotiations among peers in clans (lower right quadrant).
Evolution of Governance
Boisot (1987) uses this simple tool to sketch the evolution of the firm: from
the fiefdom of the small family firm dominated by its authoritarian owner, to
the more bureaucratic forms of management in large firms; from bureaucra-
cies to the multidivisional or holding-company administrative forms that have
emerged, introducing some form of market coordination as the centre acts as
a sort of capital allocation mechanism among units dominated by bottom-line
considerations; and from these quasi-market organizations to the loosely
coupled organisms regarded by Peter Drucker (1988) as the "coming new
organization."
This template may be used to explore a number of hypotheses about the
dynamics of information and organization. For instance, one may use it to
stylize the diverse corporate culture of the various departments within a firm:
the research and development department might be organized as a fiefdom,
the production department as a bureaucracy, the sales department as a market,
and the board as a clan. One may also use this approach to examine certain
hypotheses about the structuring of organizations, for instance, the hypothesis
put forward by Arthur Stinchcombe (1990: 6) that "the structure of organiza-
tions [is] determined by their growth toward sources of news, news about the
uncertainties that most affect their outcomes"; one may gauge whether the
crystallization of an organization's form can be ascribed to this major force.
Such a template also helps us make sense of the new organizational forms that
have been much celebrated in the recent past (many forms of highly decen-
tralized and less formal networks) which would be located roughly in the
right-hand quadrants (Leblond and Paquet 1988; Davidow and Malone 1992;
Peters 1992).
One might even conjecture, on the basis of ethnographic evidence, that,
both in the private and the public sectors, there has been a systematic drift
away from bureaucracy toward forms of organizations that are based on more
diffused information, because they are more effective in getting the news. This
dispersive revolution in private, public, and civic organizations has often been
celebrated as forms of "privatization" and "deregulation." What has not been
heralded is the fact that this quasi-disintegration of bureaucracies has been
paralleled by a quasi-reintegration using very different instruments: moral
contracts and other clan-type ligatures (Badot and Paquet 1991; de la Mothe
and Paquet 1994).
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In a nutshell, our hypothesis is that the governance system of the different
sectors is in the process of moving to an organizational form characterized by
a less-codified information structure and more diffuse information sharing,
i.e., toward the lower right quadrant in Boisot's model.
CRITIQUE OF THE STANDARD PARADIGMS
OF GOVERNANCE
Even though fiefdoms have not disappeared entirely, bureaucracies and mar-
ket-type organizations are the standard forms in the public and private sectors.
Indeed, at times, much of the current debate on governance appears to revolve
around the different ways in which private and public bureaucracies might be
freed from their arteriosclerosis through some marketization: closer links with
the customers, more competition, total quality imperatives, etc.
These debates have revealed that the simple introduction of market
incentives and competition will not suffice to meet the challenges at hand.
Market-type mechanisms have been shown to be relatively inefficient com-
pared with negotiated arrangements, and competition much less effective than
presumed in both the public and private sectors (Cova and Cova 1991). So the
traditional bureaucratic governance system is under siege, and nothing less
than a radical departure from the hierarchical model (more or less enriched
by market paraphernalia) seems to be called for.
External Pressures
External pressures on domestic firms and governments have originated first
and foremost from one major nexus of interconnected forces: the emergence
of a knowledge-based and technologically sophisticated global economic or-
der. Innovation has become the determining source of economic advantage;
the globalization process has introduced a fair degree of fuzziness in the very
notions of "domestic firm" and "national economy" (Paquet 1990a). Both these
forces have triggered a new strategy of coordination and control and a
metamorphosis of the rules of the game.
On the one hand, heightened competition and the search for competitive
advantage generated by the process of international integration have de-
manded maximum mobility, fluidity, and flexibility in the process of continu-
ous adaptation by both government and business. On the other hand, the
centrality of knowledge and information has set in place a new logic: new types
of technological ensembles built on "untraded interdependencies" or syner-
gies among sectors, technologies, and firms have constrained the possibilities
of recombination, generated the need for new compacts, and created focusing
devices and guideposts that have greatly influenced firms and governments.
Accelerated change has forced them to become multiterritorial, to cope
with fierce time-competition, and to experiment with networking and strate-
gic alliances not only with clients, suppliers, venture capitalists, or research
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laboratories, but also even with governments. In this process, centralized
insensitive Taylorian structures are a strategic handicap: such structures do not
learn fast nor grow toward the source of news. This was IBM's fate: "It grew
complacent and failed to innovate" (Stewart 1993).
The emerging transnational-technological context has imposed new
strategically crucial tasks on national governments while considerably limit-
ing the scope of independent policies that national governments can pursue
(at least without major social costs). The complexity of the issues facing
governments generates more and more "wicked problems" in policy forma-
tion: unclear and uncertain objectives, given the general turbulence and
interdependence, and a great uncertainty and instability in the means-end
relationships at least with reference to standard policy tools. In the face of
"wicked problems," simple rules are no longer available; governments must
learn as much about their goals as about the means likely to help them achieve
them (Rittel and Webber 1973).
In this context, governance has ceased to be a matter of defining organ-
izational targets and designing simple control mechanisms to ensure their
attainment. When the ground is in motion, governments and firms have to
rely much more on intelligence and innovation, to develop smarter ways and
strategic alliances, and to promote innovation.
Simply injecting competition into the governance system is not enough.
More competition has broughtsome benefits (Barzelay 1992), but the intricacies
of the "virtual corporation" and "virtual government" (i.e., the new types of
sophisticated networks coming together quickly to exploit fast-changing op-
portunities) require a high degree of cooperation and trust, and the market
mechanism by itself does not nurture sufficient cooperation.
As a result, there has been a shift from a narrow celebration of compe-
tition (as a government-free environment), to concerns for competitiveness
(which encompasses the broader sociopolitical context of cooperation), to
insistence on development power, as it has become amply clear that many
features of the competitive advantage of firms and nations flow from active
private and public entrepreneurship, from government policies, and from
new forms of partnerships between governments and firms (Dahmen 1988;
D'Cruz and Rugman 1992).
Internal Constraints
At a time when governance systems are strained by external pressures, a family
of sociodemographic and ideological-legal pressures has emerged from within
nation-states, considerably weakening their power bases. New demands by
citizens and clients whose expectations know no bounds have revealed both
the extraordinary weaknesses in the bureaucratic paradigm's ability to cope
with these heightened demands and the serious difficulties raised by the loss
of legitimacy of that state and the rigidities introduced by charters of rights
and misdirected accountability (Marquand 1988).
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In Canada, these questions have been and are important. Seven million
Canadians were born between 1950 and 1966. This "baby boom" is the most
important social phenomenon of our time, and the "boomers" have changed
the face of the nation. A "new kind of people" has been produced: more sharply
differentiated, more demanding, more alienated, more balkanized, and with
a greater capacity for violence (Kettle 1980). In the last 20 years, the sharp
increase in immigration has brought "new faces in the crowd" and a much more
polyethnic and multicultural country. The nature of the demands on govern-
ment and business has become more variegated and has contributed to some
attenuation of the solidarities and of the consensus on which the old govern-
ance system had come to depend (Hardin 1974).
Ideologies can energize and motivate, but they can also paralyze the
nation-state. On the one hand, we witness heightened expectations on the
part of the citizens and less willingness to accept centrally controlled organi-
zations using Taylorian methods to extract their contribution as suppliers.
This has created a growing tension as the requirement to provide a larger
quantity and a higher quality of service has come more and more sharply into
conflict with less malleability of the workforce. The failure to live up to
expectations has raised important questions about the efficacy and even the
legitimacy of the state.
On the other hand, the post-modern ideology has challenged the legiti-
macy of existing institutions and organizations. Indeed, post-modernism
questions all the major interpretative schemes: it raises questions about the
destructive effects of the rationalization of society under the influence of the
managerial state and of bureaucracies in general; it also generates the emer-
gence of new guiding values and social movements (women, ecologists, trans-
culturalism, etc.) that offer alternative interpretations of society. Everything
becomes contestable and unanimity disappears. As a result, the modern state
has imploded: contested and balkanized, it has lost its guiding legitimacy.
Moreover, social relations have grown tense and the degree of litigiousness
has increased, as we observe a shift in power from the legislative and executive
branches of government to the judiciary and as precise methods focused on
rules enforcement and centralization are less and less effective. Even when
market-related arrangements (such as user fees or merit rating) have been
added to the panoply of instruments used by bureaucracies, the fundamental
intent to control and enforce responsibility is ever present. Governance has,
therefore, become more and more unwieldy, and bureaucratic organizations
(even when they have been gingered by market-driven contraptions) are
increasingly unable to cope effectively with the tasks at hand without going
beyond authority, rules, procedures, and administrative systems.
Anomalies and Paradoxes
The real test of modern organizations is their capacity to meet the new
challenges from without and the new constraints from within, i.e., their
capacity to read and understand the environment and to respond swiftly and
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creatively to the challenges of the new context. The old hierarchical, centrally
controlled organizations are inefficient at that sort of adaptation for, as was
noted in connection with IBM's difficulties in the recent past, they "suppress
innovation, crush aspirations and retard productivity" (Mills 1993).
The large hierarchical private and public organizations suffer from a form
of arteriosclerosis that prevents them from taking steps to resolve their prob-
lems. Indeed, the way out of the present predicament calls for paradoxical and
seemingly contradictory strategies for which such organizations are rather
ill-equipped: organizing/focusing on one hand and disorganizing/de-integrat-
ing on the other, to be both smaller (as firms break up) and bigger (as their
networks grow), to have more autonomy and power but to form more partner-
ships (Peters 1992).
Successful organizations are those that find ways to accommodate and
resolve these contradictory needs — promoting competitive pressure and
network cooperation at the same time. These countervailing pressures raise
the question of the source of the requisite amount of trust, unrequited transfers,
and the like that are necessary for such islands of cooperation to be built in a
sea of competition.
Such anomalies and paradoxes call for a reframing of the very way in which
we think about public and private organizations. The new forms of organiza-
tion require more than mere tampering with structures; they cannot simply be
quasi-disintegrated and quasi-reintegrated in a more modular or decentral-
ized form according to the old rules of social architecture and using the old
materials. The very notion of effective governance has to be rebuilt on an
entirely new set of principles and values. It is not simply a weighted average
of markets and hierarchies. The degree of turbulence and the speed of change
is such that innovation, motivation, and speed of response are the new norms.
Moreover, coordination cannot be accomplished successfully through the
simple magic of stylized signal prices or the utterance of commands. It must
be effected through the development of shared values and shared under-
standing. This is the only way to achieve the right balance between delegation
and control. This calls for new styles of organization and new managerial
competencies (Morgan 1988).
A new evolutionary model of organization is needed: one providing an ap-
proach to coordination through voluntary adherence to uncodified norms,
which can best serve as guideposts because of their informal nature, and of the
"jurisprudence" allowing them to evolve as circumstances dictate and new
contexts command.
THE ORGANIZATION AS CLAN
The road to a pattern of governance that is less heavy-handed and more
flexible, less directive and more participative, more diffuse and less techno-
cratic may appear at best somewhat Utopian and at worst a hybrid form of
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organization that might unleash the most ungodly exclusive coalitions. These
objections have been voiced in a very articulate way, yet neither is warranted.
Clan-type networks exist in the private, public, and civic sectors, which should
be enough to rid us of the label of impractical idealist. Moreover, successful
clan-type networks are open, inclusive, pluralist, and coherent, which should
dispel the fear that clans must degenerate into conspiracies (Hine 1977;
O'Toole and Bennis 1992).
This new evolutionary model of organization — under a number of labels —
has "emerged" in the private and public sectors, but also within a wide range
of social "movements" as the most effective governance system. Anthropologist
Virginia Hine (1977) has used the clumsy phrase "segmented polycephalous
network" (SPN) and emphasized the central role of the "ideological bond" or
"the power of a unifying idea" as adding the sort of glue necessary to make the
organization live and prosper. To underline this key dimension, Hine has
labeled the new form of organization SP(I)N where I stands for ideology.
The organization chart of an SP(I)N/clan would look like "a badly knotted
fishnet with a multitude of nodes and cells of varying sizes, each linked to all
the others directly or indirectly." Examples might be the Audubon Society, the
Sierra Club, ABB (Asea Brown and Boveri), or the Confederaziun Helvetica
(Hine 1977; O'Toole and Bennis 1992).
A central and critical feature of the notion of clan is the emphasis on
voluntary adherence to norms. Although this voluntary adherence does not
necessarily generate constraints on the size of the organization (as some of the
examples mentioned above indicate), it is not always easy for a set of shared
values to spread over massive disjointed transnational communities: high
transaction costs, problems of accountability, etc., impose extra work. So the
benefits in terms of leanness, agility, flexibility are such that many important
multinationals have chosen not to manage their affairs as a global production
engine, but as a multitude of smaller quasi-independent units coordinated by
a loose federal structure, because of the organizational diseconomies of scale
in building a clan (O'Toole and Bennis 1992; Handy 1992).
This nonhierarchical constellation of units is glued together by a common
vision, a covenant that binds the allegiance of the units to the basic purpose.
The clan (1) is working on a project that has a hologram function (i.e., each
part contains a perception of the whole project and of its place in it) and (2) is
capable of learning through dialogue, networking, feedback, and self-organi-
zation (Serieyx 1993).
The same generic language can be used to analyze the new process of
governance of the state and the new form of corporate governance: in each
case, the form/design and the content/strategy of the organization is dramati-
cally modified as it acquires clan status. Indeed, this new organization form is
characterized by a different anatomy and physiology, and a different form of
organizational glue, leadership, and ethics.
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Anatomy
The new form of organization, in the private, public, and civic sectors, is a
result of contradictory forces: the word federal is often used to characterize the
ongoing tensions between big and small, global and local, noncentralized and
coordinated, pluralist and coherent, etc. It is also modest, suppletive, and
fundamentally designed according to the subsidiarity principle (Handy 1992;
Millon-Delsol 1992).
The word "subsidium" means "reserve army": this is the source of help
when needed. The subsidiarity-based organization is designed to help those
in need. It does not derive its authority from basic or primary rights of
individual citizens or clients, but from an assessment of their incapacity (if left
to themselves) to contribute effectively to the common good and of the
consequent need to help the citizens or clients through the intervention of the
level of "authority" that is closest to the citizen or client — family, locality,
region, etc. — a responsibility being delegated upward only when it is impos-
sible to do the work at a lower level (Millon-Delsol 1992).
The notion of subsidiarity (and its insistence on needs) raises questions
about the ideology of egalitarianism that underpins the concept of universal
and generalized programs without any attention paid to the capacity of
individuals to deal with the underlying problem. With reference to the private
sector, it raises parallel questions about the wisdom of mass production in the
face of personalized demands. Conversely, subsidiarity would appear to legiti-
mize a sort of "devoir d'ingerence" that is both precise and limited, but might
appear to violate the independence and autonomy of citizens. In this refrained
version of the organization, a number of basic features stand out (Paquet
1993b).
Scheming virtuously: The need to cope with a turbulent environment
forces the organization to adopt a design that enables it to use the pulsations
of the environment the way the surfer uses the wave: organizations must use
the environment strategically to develop more actively plausible scenarios, to
learn faster, to adapt more quickly. This calls for noncentralization, for expro-
priation of the steering power from the top leaders of the organization. We are
very far from unilateral decentralization that can be rescinded. There must be
constant negotiation and bargaining with nature and partners. Managers must
exploit all favourable environmental circumstances and the full complement
of imagination and resourcefulness in the heart and mind of each team player.
They must become team leaders in taskforce-type projects, quasi-entrepre-
neurs capable of cautious suboptimizing in the face of a turbulent environment
(Emery and Trist 1965; Leblond and Paquet 1988).
Modular structures: This sort of strategy calls for lighter, more horizontal
and modular structures, networks and informal clan-like rapports (Bressand
et al. 1989) in units freer from procedural morass, empowered to define its
mission and its clienteles more precisely, and to invent different performance
indicators. This is not only the case in the public sector: in the private sector,
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the "virtual corporation" and the "modular corporation" are now the new
models (Business Week 1993; Tully 1993).
"Modular" should not convey a sense that the organization chart is a linear
set of blocks. This new organization is patterned after neural networks incor-
porated into flexible and evolutionary structures of relations andJUieres. These
structures are in a process of continuous self-reorganization. This is happening
in government with the proliferation of executive agencies, commissions of
inquiry, i.e., all sorts of "temporary networks" getting together to solve urgent
issues, very much as it is going on in the private sector to exploit fast-changing
opportunities.
Interactive meso-forums: Modularized private and public organizations
cannot impose their views on clients or citizens in a Taylorian way. The firm,
much like the state, must consult. Deliberation and negotiation are everywhere:
away from goals and controls and deep into intelligence and innovation. A
society based on participation, negotiation, and bargaining is replacing one
based on universal rights. The strategic organization has to become a broker,
a negotiator, an animateur; in this network socioeconomy, the firm and the
state are always in a consultative and participative mode (Navarre 1986; Paquet
1992a; see also Chapter 11).
In these forums that cut across bureaucratic hierarchies and vertical lines
of power and are fraught with overlapping memberships, personal ties,
temporary coalitions, special-task organizations, "the organizational structure
of the future is already being created by the most as well as the least powerful"
within the new paradigm (Hine 1977). Indeed, to the extent that middle-range
regional and transnational networks and forums are cutting across the usual
structures, the interactions distill in an evolutionary way the always imperfectly
bounded network.
Partnerships and moral contracts: The networks are consolidated by part-
nerships and moral contracts that must be based on a few basic, shared
assumptions. Rigid rules are not useful, as the environment is evolving rapidly
and new directions are always in the process of being crafted and recrafted.
Protocols cannot be stylized, routined, or written down. In such a multinodal
neural network, the density of interchange is maximized, redundancy of
connections is the rule, and communication is protocol-free. This is the way
the brain resolves problems and also the way clan-type networks operate.
Physiology
At the core of the physiology of the clan-type organization is a process of social
learning. The efficacy, resilience, and usefulness of the new organizational
pattern stem from its capacity to learn. Organizational learning occurs when
Members of the organization act as learning agents for the organization,
responding to changes in the internal and external environments of the
organization by detecting and correcting errors in organizational theory-in-
use, and embedding the result of their inquiry in private images and shared
maps of the organization. [Argyris and Schon 1978]
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Organizational learning occurs through flexible networks held together
by moral contracts based on reciprocal negotiated obligations. Nothing is black
or white: all is grey. The moral contracts contribute to the solution of the
potential prisoner's dilemma that might plague clan-type networks by defin-
ing, often tacitly, the corridor or boundaries within which one must stay to
honour the agreed-on expectations (Paquet 1991-92a).
There are many definitions of the learning organization (Friedmann and
Abonyi 1976; Senge 1990), none of which covers the whole range of learning
mechanisms and activities. One can describe organizational learning very
simplistically:
• the process of acquisition of new information is enhanced by the promo-
tion of experimentation, the use of planned, temporary systems-like
taskforces;
• the process of retention and use of the new information is improved by
teamwork, mutual respect, good communication, and sharing of experi-
ences; and
• the capacity for continued learning and self-renewal of the organization is
ensured through mechanisms to evaluate experiences and orderly discard-
ing of dysfunctional ways.
The process of organizational learning itself is acquiring particular charac-
teristics in the face of complexity. The environment is turbulent, the ground
is in motion, uncertainty is omnipresent, and the policy/strategy problems are
ill-structured and/or wicked. Three main principles appear to drive the learn-
ing process under these circumstances (Morin 1990):
• The dialogic principle posits the coexistence of contradictory logics at the
very core of the problem definition. Social learning in the clan occurs
through the maintenance of complementary/antagonistic forces. This is
the only way to tackle a world marred by paradoxes, anomalies, and
contradictions: for example, the tension between organizing and focusing,
disorganizing and deintegrating, accountability and teamwork, autonomy
and partnership, smaller and larger that confront all organizations at
present (Peters 1992). Maintaining these contradictions is inherent to the
"federal principle" and it is seen as crucial to the functioning of organiza-
tions like ABB (divided into some 1200 companies with an average of 200
employees and subdivided into some 4500 profit centres with an average
of 50 employees, but with only 100 professionals at the Zurich headquar-
ters). To its CEO, Percy Barnevik, "ABB is an organization with three
internal contradictions. We want to be global and local, big and small,
radically decentralized with centralized reporting and control" (O'Toole
andBennis 1992).
• The organizational feedback principle establishes that the clan produces not
only output, but also itself. On a given day, the members of clans are
different from what they were the day before: they have sharpened their
roles, the technology has drifted ever so slightly, the self-image or theory
of the organization has improved or deteriorated, and in the process the
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functioning and governance system has evolved. The clan is a self-organ-
izing form in which simultaneously the clan shapes its members and the
members shape the clan.
• The hologram principle echoes the neural nature of the network: the
quasi-totality of the information contained in the whole clan may be
accessed through any member of the clan. It is a way to transcend the
dichotomy between fixation on the whole or on the parts. In the brain,
learning gets incorporated into neural nets, and even if a portion of the
brain is destroyed the information can be retrieved. In the same manner,
social learning proceeds in a two-way process of enrichment of the whole
by the parts and vice-versa (Morgan 1986).
These three principles are interactive: they represent a way to approach
complexity that challenges the Manichean casts of mind that suggest that only
one logic must underpin an organizational form, that organizations are pro-
grammed by a "syndrome" that is not evolving but self-reinforcing, and that
the duality between whole and parts must be resolved instead of being
self-reinforcing.
The Ideological Glue
One fundamental dimension of the clan-type network is the syndrome of
images/theory/values that gives it unity, stability, and dynamism. This bond is
defined in a variety of ways but is always presented as a central glue — a
common appreciative system, a shared vision, or a common set of values.
Jane Jacobs (1992) reminds us that "syndrome" comes from the Greek,
meaning "things that run together." She boldly proposes that different ethical
or theoretical glues bind together different types of organizations and divide
them under two general headings: the guardian moral syndrome underpin-
ning the hierarchical system, and the commercial moral syndrome underpin-
ning market-type organizations.
Jacobs sketches the main features of these two syndromes. The guardian
syndrome shuns trading, exerts prowess, adheres to tradition, hierarchy,
discipline, ostentation, largesse, honour, fortitude, and deception. The com-
mercial syndrome shuns force, celebrates voluntary agreements, adheres to
collaboration, competition, industriousness, thriftiness, and dissent. Jacobs
then declares, on the basis of a rather unpersuasive argument based largely on
anecdotes, that any attempt to mix the two syndromes can only lead to
"monstrous hybrids." Indeed, much of her book is a relentless declaration that
when one syndrome encroaches on the other, "crazy things happen." In
principle, Jacobs is willing to entertain the possibility that syndrome-friendly
inventions and adaptations of one syndrome in the direction of the other are
possible and that flexibility on this front may produce good results, but her
main thrust is a forceful assertion that these two "systems of survival" do not
lend themselves to much beneficial mixing.
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Jacobs' Manichean approach is wrong-headed. It is built on much misun-
derstanding of the paradoxical realities of modern society. Monstrous hybrids
are often the result of a hypocritical mask or rhetoric borrowed from one
syndrome being slapped on a reality that is clearly defined by the other (Serieyx
1993: 274). Contrary to Jacobs, our argument is that symbiosis between
syndromes can occur and does occur without corruption. This is not only
possible, it is mandatory and essential in the modern context. Indeed, such
mixing constitutes the major challenge for the implantation of the new pattern
of governance.
A clan requires a system of survival that combines the two appreciative
systems underpinning hierarchy and market. Only such a combination can
elicit a mixed system that has the capacity to overcome the hegemony of
vertical linkages (imposed by hierarchical arrangements) and of horizontal
linkages (embedded in market mechanisms) to promote the dominion of
transversal linkages weaving together the network-type clan.
This new "mixed" syndrome (calling, for instance, for the capacity to play
the market game when it is called for while recognizing the necessity of playing
the guardian game in the face of crises) corresponds to the imperatives of the
new reality. In a complex world, one cannot rely on simple radar, based on
permanent rules. The key decisions have to be taken in full cognizance of
changing and turbulent circumstances. Indeed, one needs not only to elicit
transparent ways to mix these syndromes or to establish mechanisms through
which one can switch at the right time between syndromes, but to develop the
capacity for the mixed syndrome to evolve as circumstances change.
Already, some work on animal collectivities and on sophisticated social
organizations has revealed that one may identify communities where the dual
syndrome is in place and performs most effectively; although swift and radical
guardian-type interventions are made during a crisis to secure the collective
survival, the commercial syndrome takes over as soon as the crisis dissolves.
Indeed, Japan is referred to as having found a particularly effective and
idiosyncratic way to solve this very problem with great success (Vertinsky 1987).
But this may not be sufficient. Nothing less than a syncretic meta-syndrome or
a meta-set of rules is necessary.
The reason for this is rather simple. If one is interested in change or in
changing rules, one must be in a position to discuss the rules about changing
rules. In a legal framework, laws, rules, and regulations are established. The
rules about defining rules are defined in the constitution — the constitution
being a meta-rule. If one wishes to change the constitution (i.e., the rules about
changing rules), one must shift the debate to a higher plane: the rules about
changing rules about changing rules. In many countries, this requires a
referendum. In the case at hand, what is needed to arbitrate and finalize the
appropriate mix of syndromes and/or the switching mechanism between
syndromes are some basic values that might act as meta-rules (Orgogozo and
Serieyx 1989).
NEW PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE 37
What might serve as meta-rules appears to be rooted in an emerging
ideology of participation. Until now, liberal democracies have emphasized
rights and negative freedom (i.e., protection against interference with individ-
ual choices). This has led to an expropriation of the central ruling work of the
citizens. Participation emphasizes positive freedom (i.e., the person being able
to do this or be that and the duty to help others in that respect). In a rights
society, the dignity of the individual comes from the fact that he has rights; in
a participation society, freedom and efficacy come from the fact that the
individual has a recognized voice. This participatory model obviously presup-
poses a "strong sense of community" (Taylor 1985). "The segmented organ-
izational pattern that emerges involves individual participation in more than
one segment. Participants... interact with several different nodes in the net-
work" (Hine 1977).
This ideology of participation will bolster the clan as a pattern of govern-
ance and help spread it like wildfire. It is still en emergence, but it is in the
making. It is embodied in an evolving pragmatic ethic that establishes a
corridor within which the language of rights, individualism, and markets
prevail, map the area beyond the corridor where the language of good would
supersede it, and work out a language of problem solution for border issues:
a pragmatic compromise of communicative procedures (commercial syn-
drome) and communitarian substance (guardian syndrome) that binds the
multitude of participants in the sociocultural system in a sort of transversal
neural network (Paquet 1991-92b).
THE NEW COMPETENCE
The new pattern of governance demands that managers have competencies
quite different from those required in the past, and this has an important
impact on the mix of education, training, and personal development likely to
enable leaders and managers to be ready for the future. Because the new
organization has to become a learning organization, the new "federal" leader
or manager cannot ordain or command any longer: he or she must consult,
negotiate, act as coach, animateur, designer, advocate, etc.
Families of New Competencies
The competencies that are going to be essential in this new world have not
been fully documented yet, and there would be much disagreement in any
discussion about what should be on any priority list. But one can draw up a
provisional list from the work of Donald Michael (1980, 1988a,b) and Gareth
Morgan (1988). The new competencies appear to fall into four general groups:
contextual competencies; interpersonal and enactment skills; creating an
effective corporate climate; and systems values.
Contextual competencies: This group consists of a number of important
competencies and tools that are unlikely to be developed in management
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programs: acknowledging uncertainty, recognizing the full implications of the
fact that there is no reliable theory of social change, the capacity to entertain
two logics at the same time, embracing error, building bridges and strength-
ening links, reframing problems to explore new solutions, and the capacity to
prospect the regulation though values and norms.
Interpersonal and enactment skills: This group contains the whole range
of communication skills and tools that are going to be required in a variety of
contexts: consultation, negotiation, deliberations, conflict resolution, facilita-
tion, action as a broker, a preceptor, an educator, an animateur. There is also
the capacity to adopt new roles and attitudes.
Creating an effective corporate climate: In this group, one might retain
the central importance of facilitating a shift toward perceiving the organi-
zation as a learning system; this requires a capacity to enable and truly
empower individuals and a culture of productivity, responsiveness, creativ-
ity, and learning.
Systems values: This group focuses on the new ethic driven by the new
reality of interconnectedness and interdependence: "our values still emphasize
rights and autonomy while the actual circumstances of life make imperative
the acceptance of obligations and interdependence" (Michael 1988a). This
ethic is one that forces a redefinition of leadership: away from leaders as
generals to leaders as leaders of leaders — those removing obstacles that
prevent followers from making creative and effective decisions themselves
(O'Toole and Bennis 1992).
Experiential and Action Learning
These new competencies cannot be acquired solely through a bookish mode
of instruction or solely through action. One is not simply attempting to develop
a broader knowledge base, or a few particular skills (although much of that is
also happening) but to promote personal development. Indeed, as David Kolb
(1984) would put it, in a true sense, learning is "the process whereby develop-
ment occurs." This relatively novel way of looking at learning denies the
cleavage between learning and personal development, between learning and
experience. It calls for ways to effect this learning by going through all of the
steps of the "wheel of learning": questioning, theory, action/experience and
reflection (Handy 1990).
The current debates on management education have revealed its extraor-
dinary weaknesses (Fry and Pasmore 1983; Porter and McKibbin 1988; Paquet
1992a). It has become clear that the educational establishment tends to break
down experience or action into bits and pieces and write off too quickly the
knowledge that can only result from one's own experience. As a result, it has
failed to provide the sort of learning that is required. The need to change the
paradigm has been captured by the new emphasis on leadership, a word that
may fail to connote something very precise, and indeed has a protean quality,
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but captures very well what Vickers and others have been grasping for since
the postwar period.
In leadership, what is at stake is "the ability to stay the course while rocking
the boat, to enhance organizational readiness and competitiveness in an
unpredictable environment" (Vicere 1992). This ability cannot be imparted
effectively except through experiential and action learning. This form of
intelligence — metis as the Greeks called this complex but coherent set of
mental attitudes and intellectual behaviour that combines "le flair, la sagacite,
la prevision, la souplesse d'esprit, la feinte, la debrouillardise, {'attention vigilante, le
sens des opportunites" and is applied to "des realties fugaces, mouvantes, deconcer-
tantes, ambigues, qui ne se pretent ni a la mesure precise, ni au calcul exact, ni au
raisonnement rigoureux" (Detienne and Vernant 1974) — cannot be imparted in
any other way.
The links between leadership and metis and the intricate links between these
concepts and the concept ofphronesis ("union entre unjugement sain et I'acte qui
est I'expression correcte de cejugement") is a terrain that Aristotle explored in some
details. Contrary to Plato who condemned this sort of intelligence tdtonnante,
Aristotle celebrated it as the result of a dialogue with the situation that
transforms, with experience, into incorporated prudence and vigilance (Paquet
1992b).
One can design programs likely to improve those needed competencies,
and much experience has been gained in the design of such programs by the
executive leadership team at CCMD. Such a program is profoundly inspired
by the experiential learning theory of development that builds on the four
learning modes:
Affective complexity in concrete experience results in higher-order senti-
ments, perceptual complexity in reflective observation results in higher-order
observations, symbolic complexity in abstract conceptualization results in
higher-order concepts, and behavioral complexity in active experimentation
results in higher-order actions. [Kolb 1984]
But this amounts to "reinventing education" (Handy 1990), to put in place
an educational organization providing services, as tailor-made and individu-
alized as possible (to the extent of designing individual contracts for each
learner), but also emphasizing the development of the many types of "intelli-
gences" (not only the analytical skills measured by IQ tests) and the need to
build much more explicitly on the possibility of educational credits being
granted for all sorts of experiences that are now neglected or ignored when
formally appraising the status of learners (Handy 1990; Authier and Levy
1992).
CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, new patterns of governance have evolved in the public
and private sectors to meet the challenges posed by this new complex,
turbulent, and interdependent world. Side by side with the dominant bureauc-
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racies and market-type organizations, clan-type networks have evolved. They
have proved rather flexible and effective. Fluid alliances have woven "virtual"
organizations and temporary networks in both sectors that are in a process of
continuous self-reorganization and self-reconfiguration.
We have identified some of the anatomical and physiological features of
this new type of organization, and probed into the nature of the mixed
ideological bond or glue necessary to provide this new organization form with
unity, stability, and dynamism. Moreover, because such organizations require
new sorts of competencies in their executives, we have looked at the new ways
in which such competencies might have to be acquired.
Geoffrey Vickers (1965) anticipated much of this new state of affairs in his
classic book on the art of judgment. He showed how much depends on mental
skills, institutional processes, a capacity for reflection-in-action, and dynamic
interaction with context — all elements that can be constructed. So the new
patterns of governance may not be all that new. Indeed, it may be that we are
in the process of rediscovering a new form of intercreation and leadership
within organizations that have been allowed to disappear because of our
excessive confidence in the efficiency of markets and hierarchies.
In a discussion of the particular qualities of Gildardo Magana (who took
over the Mexican Revolution after the assassination of Zapata), John Womack
(1969) echoes the workings of a good forum and the aptitudes and qualities
of an official carrying the burden of office well, i.e., having become himself the
locus of effective argumentation:
What he had learned was to mediate: not to compromise, to surrender
principle and to trade concessions, but to detect reason in all claims in
conflict, to recognize the particular legitimacy of each, to sense where the
grounds of concord were, and to bring contestants into harmony there.
Instinctively, he thrived on arguments, which he entered not to win but to
conciliate.
This may well correspond to the model of the new leader in a system of
governance resembling evolving neural networks.
CHAPTER 2
TACKLING WICKED PROBLEMS*
The expert as expert... cannot by
his nature learn anything new, because
then he wouldn't be an expert.
- Donald N. McCloskey
There have been many important changes in the socioeconomics of advanced
nations over the last decades and they have had a significant impact on the
role of the state and on the nature of the policy process.
First, the globalization of production has generated new worldwide net-
works and greatly increased global competition. Few national economies have
escaped some fracturing as a result of these external pressures, as their exposed
and sheltered sectors have crafted quite different strategies and followed
disparate paths. Such modifications in the fabric of the socioeconomy have
added to the menu of problems that governments must address both domes-
tically (coordination, redistribution, etc.) and transnationally through con-
certed action at the global level (environmental issues, urbanization processes,
technological change) (OECD 1979).
Second, the dematerialization of economic activity, i.e., the shift from
goods-oriented production to the dominance of services, information, and
knowledge, has also relaxed some of the geotechnical constraints. Because
information and knowledge are not handled well as simple commodities, the
need for nonmarket and state coordination grew considerably with the devel-
opment of the information economy (Paquet 1987a).
Finally, a wave of democratization has forced all organizations to become
more sensitive to a number of sociocultural dimensions — gender, employee
rights, race, etc. The workplace has been transformed; we are no longer living
in a Taylorian world. This has also led to a growing involvement of states and
governments in matters of culture and values, as new rights and sensitivities
and varied forms of affirmative action have emerged: administration has
become more and more philosophy-in-action (Hodgkinson 1983).
* Material in this chapter is based on "Policy as Process: Tackling Wicked Problems." In
Courchene, T.J., Stewart, A.E. (editors). Essays on Canadian Public Policy. Kingston: Queen's
University School of Policy Studies, 1991, pp. 171-186.
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These three nexuses offerees — among others — have generated growing
complexity, turbulence, and interdependence in the global socioeconomic
environment and led to loss of the stable state. In such a turbulent environment,
it is no longer possible to regard the state as a simple policeman enforcing
certain rules, acting as protector and provider, as was the case when the
environment was placid. Such functions persist but governments have had to
develop additional capacities to act as animators, facilitators, and negotiators.
With accelerating change and related uncertainty, circumstances have evolved
in such a way that no simple rule will do: judgment is called for (Emery and
Trist 1965;Vickers 1965).
One of the important consequences of this remue-menage has been that the
state has had to confront more ill-structured problems, and as a result, the foci
and substance of public policy as process have been modified dramatically. In
place of the old state, content with housekeeping and offset functions, a strategic
state (Navarre 1986) has invaded new realms, pursued new polymorphous and
often ill-defined goals, targeted new objectives, and evolved in new ways. Yet,
the prevailing model of policy analysis does not appear to have been adjusted
accordingly. Policy research has remained trapped in the models that evolved
in the decades following the Second World War.
The main message of this paper is that policy research must be taken in
for repairs. In the following sections, some of the inadequacies of the standard
models are outlined and an alternative approach is suggested.
POLICY AS PROCESS
First, a few definitions are called for. Policy connotes a course of action, a
pattern of actions. As such, it is different from individual decisions or actions
performed by some official. Policy agenda refers to a set of topics or issues
that receive policymakers' attention. Policymaking consists in maintaining or
modifying the actual course of affairs in line with certain norms or governing
relations. By policy process, I mean the procedures through which problem
identification leads to a place on the policy agenda, and then to the formu-
lation of proposed courses of action to deal with the problem, but also the
manner in which such courses of action are legitimized or authorized, then
implemented in an interactive way by the administrative "machinery"(Buch-
holz 1985).
Policymaking is a rather complex, messy, and poorly understood process
that evolves through time as participants, perspectives, situations, and base
values change. It is embodied in institutions and organizations that influence
our processes of recognizing and classifying situations and issues, and consti-
tutes an ongoing way to regulate the social system, i.e., to set and reset norms
and standards in line with the underlying appreciative system and in response
to changing circumstances (Vickers 1965; Lasswell 1971).
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The Standard Models of Policymaking
Whether it has been presented as the outcome of "elitist planning" or "pluralist
exchange," the best known stylizations of public policymaking are very close
to the technocratic model propounded most eloquently by economists and
based fundamentally on a notion of instrumental rationality (Stokey and
Zeckhauser 1978; Manzer 1984). They are outcome-oriented and rooted in an
explicit statement of a preference function (either derived from the priorities
of the elite or of the citizenry), in a careful exposition of the constraints limiting
the realm of possibilities and of the alternative actions open to the policymaker.
By relating these constraints and actions to the preferences, an efficient choice
among the alternatives ensues. This is a characterization that is very close to
what Graham Allison (1971) has called the rational actor model.
The notion of policymaking underpinning this stylization is rooted in the
presumption of a guiding macro-rationale and of a set of priorities (objectives
and actions) developed from it. A policy or a plan is stylized as the outcome of
a well-behaved process defined by five sets of statements summarizing (1) the
state of nature, (2) the future state of nature in the absence of any action, (3)
the rules of the game, (4) the goals pursued, and (5) the actions called for to
attain (4), given (1), (2), and (3). Policy research in this context is designed as
a process of clarification of each of these components.
This stylization has been widely criticized: the state of nature may never
be fully describable; the future state of nature is at best guessed at; the rules of
the game are many-layered and evolving; the goals are unknown, ambiguous,
or in conflict; and the means-ends relationships are highly uncertain and
unreliable, so no unambiguous set of actions can be chosen. Moreover, as it is
impossible to determine a priori the appropriate ends of public policymaking,
one cannot avoid facing the problems of the legitimacy of policies for the
community and of the extent to which these policies satisfy or fail to satisfy
basic needs (Manzer 1984).
As a result of criticism of the rational actor model, a loosely defined
incrementalist countermodel has evolved under diverse names. These alter-
native formulations have in common an effort to relax some or many of the
strictures inherent to the technocratic model and to place at centre stage a set
of procedures likely to approximate more aptly the process of policymaking
observed in real socioeconomies.
Whether the emphasis is on organizational process (focusing entirely on
bureaucratic procedures), governmental politics a la Allison (1971), muddling
through a la Lindblom (1959) (focusing on an essentially incremental —
leaderless, remedial, fragmented — process in which all the stakeholders
mutually adjust), emergent strategies a la Mintzberg (1985), or the more
extreme case of the "garbage can model" (Cohen et al. 1972) in which
everything floats randomly, all these alternative models add much messiness,
but not necessarily much enlightenment for they are all trying to escape from
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the limitations of the rational actor model without proposing explicit and
programmatic alternatives.
The contrast between the instrumental rationality of the econocrats —
those "terribles simplificateurs" — and the administrative rationality of the situ-
ationologists — with decision-making occurring almost by a process of fer-
mentation — has been such that, despite the hopes expressed by practitioners,
no satisfactory synthesis has yet been produced. To prepare the ground for
such a synthesis, the very different rationalities underpinning these broad
families of models must be examined more closely. Although I use the labels
econocrats and situationologists, Hartle I and Hartle II might also do if a
classification with a Canadian twist is required, for Douglas Hartle (1978) has
probably best described the conversion from econocrat to situationologist on
the Canadian federal public policy scene.
Econocrats Versus Situationologists
Econocrats: This is what Torgerson (1986) calls the first face of policy analysis:
an echo effect in this field of the positivist craze. It represents a tradition that
reached its peak in the 1960s in Canada (French 1980). It is the world of
Zweckrationalitat, i.e., of instrumental rationality (Weber, in Ramos 1981). In
this world, knowledge is supposed to replace politics.
Econocrats are blinded to political reality, to values, to the intricate process
of legitimation and implementation. They attempt to extend the naive model
of rational choice developed at the psychological level to situations where it
would appear to focus "on the wrong unit of analysis" or to deal with "an
inaccurate characterization of the preferences involved" (March 1978). This
extension of calculating rationality has failed to provide public administration
with anything more than a solution to trivial problems — not unimportant but
trivial — like routing interlibrary loans or locating facilities for meals on
wheels.
Such a Hobbesian notion of rationality (Ramos 1981) presumes that public
policy is connected consciously and meaningfully to knowledge about goals
and future outcomes and it completely ignores both the extraordinary com-
plexity of the interrelated games (electorate, politicians, bureaucrats, special
interest groups, media) that generates public policy and the dynamics of
unintended consequences that often takes over (Trebilcock et al. 1982). More-
over, it endows public policy decisions with "a certain deliberate quality, a
relative permanence... an objective character which decisions do not possess"
(Majone 1980).
Situationologists: Situationologists give priority to politics over knowledge
and offer a broad array of alternatives, all more or less based on some "systemic
rationality." James March (1978) has formulated the problem aptly:
Suppose we imagine that knowledge, in the form of precepts of behavior,
evolves over time within a system and accumulates across time, people, and
organizations without complete current consciousness of its history. Then
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sensible action is taken by actors without comprehension of its full
justification.
March shows that "there is intelligence in the suspension of calculation"
and searches for the location of these "precepts of behavior."
One possible location is in the sociocultural underground of the "collective
game" — "where interdependence is strong, the group is more efficient as a
decision-making body than individuals acting in isolation" (Hirsch 1976). The
sociocultural underground might best be described in the language of Geoffrey
Vickers (1965) as "an appreciative system" — "a set of readinesses to distin-
guish certain aspects of the situation rather than others and to classify and
value these in this way rather than that."
The notion of systemic rationality resembles what Max Weber calls Wertra-
tionalitat — substantive rationality determined "independently of its prospect
of success" (Ramos 1981). But the recognition that there is such a thing as a
basic systemic rationality and that governing relations may guide the process
cannot suffice; one requires a clear statement of where they are located and
how they operate. Allison's (1971) models II and III or even the emergent
policy a la Mintzberg (1985) do not provide much of a framework for devel-
oping a policy analysis. At best, they provide ways to describe ex post facto how
a policy process has unfolded.
The Search for a Third Way
In this search for a third way, a guiding light has been policy problems as they
are, i.e., as practical problems calling for a mix of formalization, judgment, and
craft for their resolution and most certainly calling on both prudential and
moral reasoning (Manzer 1984). However, one feature of the new problems
facing public policymakers has been of paramount importance in the design
of that third way: a recent recognition of the extent to which important policy
issues pose ill-structured problems — wicked problems to policy analysts and
policymakers. Once this central issue has become clear, a refraining of the
challenge facing policy analysts is in order. For policy problems are seen as
having two major characteristics most of the time: (1) the goals are not known
or are very ambiguous and (2) the means-ends relationships are highly
uncertain and poorly understood (Rittel and Webber 1973).
To deal with ill-structured problems, policy analysts must learn on the job
about both the configuration of facts and the configuration of values. They
must also manage to learn from the stakeholders at the core of the policy game
and from the many groups at the periphery who are in possession of important
local knowledge: without their participation, no policy can be implemented. A
third way must then synthesize, reconcile, and transcend the ways of the
econocrat and of the situationologist by setting the issues within a dialogue of
the policymaker with the situation and with the clients.
A number of new trails have been opened up in this general field and most
of them deserve some attention. Only a few papers are referred to explicitly to
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illustrate the directions being taken. Three approaches have the merit of being
somewhat complementary and may well add up, as a whole, to a promising
alternative. What they have in common is that they are somewhat constructivist,
i.e., they suggest that we are unavoidably bringing about what appears to be
happening, that we are not only observers but also participants. Moreover, they
suggest to different degrees that policymaking is both a matter of craft and a
matter of transforming communications and perceptions.
A clinical approach: Archibald (1970) has suggested a fruitful avenue
inspired somewhat by the work of the Palo Alto School, especially Erving
Goffman (1969). For her, policy analysis focuses on organizational, i.e., infor-
mational, problems, and policymakers approach the issue very much like an
agent of change facing a client system. This clinical approach borrows from
the work of psychotherapists and their patients and builds on participatory
decision-making, on the acceptability of the decision within the organization,
and on the realization of some sort of "social rationality." In all this, the
policymaker is a proactive agent of change at the level of perceptions and
communication to resolve conflicts.
Because of the importance this approach places on implementation and
acceptability of policies by clients, it is likely to initiate much organizational
change that was not planned, as the situation is reframed. It is also likely to
make extensive use of values, creativity, and innovation in the dialogue
between expert and clients. However, the approach — at least the version
suggested by Archibald (1970) — remains somewhat vague and most certainly
not programmatic.
A social learning approach: Friedmann and Abonyi (1976) proceed one
step further. They suggest that social experimentation, practice, and learning
are the principal methods for public intervention. For them, social learning
can only occur in the context of social practice, and they suggest a process —
an open-ended exploration as a way to recast the problem and the image of
reality into a more desirable form.
Very much like Archibald, Friedmann and Abonyi insist that policymaking
must include interaction with the clients and focus on perceptions, "images"
a la Boulding. For them, social practice is an experiment in which core images
of reality are substantially reorganized through experiential learning. They are
daring and precise in their recommendations: they propose nothing less than
an epistemology of practice to replace the standard epistemology in academic
work and a precise and detailed strategy to initiate the process of social
learning likely to generate the "new reality."
A radical practice approach: More recently, in papers developed inde-
pendently from earlier work and based on entirely different perspectives,
Manzer (1984) and Torgerson (1986) among others have revived the central
idea of policymaking as "practical reasoning." Manzer has suggested ways to
rebalance prudential and moral considerations in policymaking by reshaping
institutions; Torgerson has illustrated the necessity of dialogue between ex-
perts and citizens in the realization of the practical task of policymaking using
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the Berger inquiry as a model. In both cases, if in a somewhat subdued manner,
social learning becomes not only a way to create a new reality or to suggest a
reframing of reality, but a mode of emancipation, a way to recover the political
community and civil society and to effect a contextual reorientation.
This work illustrates the broad drift that has occurred in the perception
of policymaking over the last decades. John Friedmann (1987) has reviewed
this evolution in a recent book. Although we have not attempted to synthesize
these new currents into a final integrated version of what policy might be in
this ideal third way, in the next section we suggest nothing more than a gambit
that builds on the work of Friedmann and Abonyi. Its programmatic content
has been developed relatively more fully than has been the case for the other
versions available, and it has proved more powerful heuristically and more
capable of accommodating other components in a provisional synthesis.
The Paradigm of Social Practice
Friedmann and Abonyi (1976) have stylized a social learning model of policy
research to deal with wicked problems. It combines a detailed analysis of four
subprocesses: (1) the construction of appropriate theories of reality, (2) the
formation of social values, (3) the gaming that leads to the design of political
strategies, and (4) collective action. These four interconnected subprocesses
are components of a social learning process: any change in one affects the
others (Fig. 5).
Block B is the locus of dominant values that provide normative guidance
either in the transformation of reality or in the selection of strategies for action.
Theory of reality (block A) refers to a symbolic representation and explanation
of the environment. Political strategy (block C) connotes the political game
that generates the course of action chosen. Social action (block D) deals with
Figure 5. A paradigm of social practice in policy research.
Source: Friedmann and Abonyi (1976: 88).
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implementation and the interaction with the peripheral groups. Together
these four subprocesses come to life in concrete situations.
Traditional approaches to policy research focus on attempts to falsify
hypotheses about some objective reality according to the canons of scientific
experimentation. This is too narrow a focus when the ground is in motion. For
the social practitioner, what is central is an effort "to create a wholly new,
unprecedented situation that, in its possibility for generating new knowledge,
goes substantially beyond the initial hypothesis" (Friedmann and Abonyi 1976:
938). The social learning paradigm is built on reflection-in-action, dialogue,
mutual learning by experts and clients, i.e., on an interactive or transactive style
of planning (Schon 1983):
The paradigm makes the important epistemological assumption that action
hypotheses are verified as "correct" knowledge only in the course of a social
practice that includes the four components of theory (of reality), values,
strategy and action. A further epistemological commitment is to the creation
of a new reality, and hence to a new knowledge, rather than in establishing the
truth-value of propositions in abstraction from the social context to which
they are applied. [Friedmann and Abonyi 1976: 938]
When dealing with broad policy issues like multiculturalism, one must be
aware of the limits of existing tools: one cannot hope to produce anything
more than incomplete answers. In the words of Alvin Weinberg (1972), in
policy research we need a "trans-science": we are confronted with trans-sci-
entific questions that cannot be answered by science, that transcend science.
Engineering (physical and social) and many of the policy sciences are plagued
with such questions: answers may be unpractically expensive, the subject
matter too variable for scientific canons to apply, moral and esthetic judgment
may be involved, etc. What is required is a new understanding built on "usable
ignorance," for "by being aware of our ignorance, we do not encounter
disastrous pitfalls in our supposedly secure knowledge or supposedly effective
technique... institutions should be designed with the ignorance factor in
mind, so that they can respond and adapt in good time" (Collingridge 1982;
Ravetz 1986).
Coping with ignorance requires a more transactive and transparent policy
process, a deliberate dialogue designed to tap local knowledge and, therefore,
a change in the way in which policy research is carried out. It has been argued
that the transaction costs of running such a system are higher, but the outcome
is more than proportionately improved.
SOCIAL LEARNING AS A TOOL
The tradition of social learning has deep roots in the works of John Dewey
and, as a result, shares a number of shortcomings with them: a certain
rationalistic bias and the presumption that there is a high degree of commu-
nicative competence guiding the process of social learning toward a consensual
state. This is probably somewhat Utopian. In fact, there is a need to add some
dimensions to social learning: an explicit macrosocial theory to underpin its
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action, a recognition that people and groups have differential access to social
power and that social communication may be distorted, and a realization that
social learning is a highly normative field (Friedmann 1987). Many of the
adjuncts to the basic Friedmann and Abonyi approach suggested by Palo Alto
inspired clinical work or by attempts to institutionalize or serialize social
learning have been designed to enrich the basic approach and to make it more
effective.
The case for the paradigm of social learning might have been developed
in a variety of ways. We have attempted to illustrate how it can help answer
four basic questions: (1) how social learning can effectively mix prudential and
moral reasoning, (2) how it can show the limits and perversions of the policy
process, (3) how it can serve as a diagnostic tool and help trigger Pygmalion
effects, and (4) how it can serve as a guide in the process of social architecture.
Practical Reasoning
David Gauthier's (1963) analysis of practical reasoning and its use in analyzing
public policymaking (Manzer 1984) provide the lead here. These works help
us to understand the full extent to which the econocrats put exclusive emphasis
on prudential reasoning and the situationologists on moral reasoning, while a
good picture of public policymaking as practical judgment involves both
considerations. The paradigm of social practice recognizes that social learning
need not result in integrative action that would give all components the same
weight. At times, what is feasible (A) will dominate, at others what is morally
acceptable (B), what is politically generated stability (C), or what is collectivel
implementable (D). Policymaking as a learning process allows for conflicts and
strains between these components.
Table 1: Characterization of public policy institutions.
Predominant approach to Predominant approach to practical reasoning
problem-solving
Incremental-reactive
Comprehensive-anticipatory
Moral
Judicial
policymaking
Commission
policymaking
Prudential
Budget policymaking
Ministry
policymaking
Source: Manzer (1984: 589).
In that sense, social learning gives appropriate consideration to both
moral and prudential reasoning. It can most certainly serialize the use of each
set of norms as policymaking represents, of necessity, a diachronic or develop-
mental activity involving many kinds of decisions (Manzer 1984). Moreover, it
allows also — as suggested by Manzer — the crystallization of subinstitutions
predominantly dominated by one or the other component of practical reason-
ing given the nexus of constraints that are operating.
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Manzer has identified a few public policy institutions characterized pre-
dominantly by moral or prudential reasoning and by incremental-reactive or
comprehensive-anticipatory problem-solving (Table 1). This configuration of
institutions was arrived at as a result of a process of historical social learning
and indicates the extent to which social practice may underpin a variety of
organizational forms.
Critical interpretation
If social learning serves extremely well in the rational reconstruction of the
strategies of different policy organizations, it also enables one to appraise
critically the process through which the policy was researched, crafted, and
elaborated, and it may serve to show where and when it went afoul. In that
context, the Friedmann and Abonyi model is essentially a checklist, an organ-
izing principle to ensure that all aspects are appropriately dealt with.
A fair example of this use of the framework is provided in the analysis of
the energy options inquiry carried out in Canada in the late 1980s (see
Chapter 5). It is possible to synthesize the strategies of the different stakehold-
ers and to identify why they have been led to adopt partial and limiting
approaches to the energy problem. The energy options inquiry was originally
designed as an effective social learning process, but it is fairly easy, using the
social learning framework, to show how the process was derailed. In the
Friedmann-Abonyi language, Block A issues came to dominate the scene
completely and poor coverage of blocks B, C, and D led to a virtual suppression
of these dimensions in the final report.
In the same manner, it has been possible to analyze a complex policy
field like multiculturalism using the Friedmann and Abonyi scheme to
unveil the extent to which it had evolved perversely as a result of a
dominance of block C issues to the point where block A, B, and D issues
were systematically downplayed and the dynamics of intercultural relations
very poorly understood and managed (Laurent and Paquet 1991; Paquet,
this volume, Chapter 7).
Diagnostic Approach
The Friedmann-Abonyi scheme not only allows one to effect the appropriate
mix of prudential and moral reasoning or provide a checklist for a critical
analysis of imperfect policies, it can also guide the analyst toward a diagnosis
within the clinical relationship between experts and clients and suggest direc-
tions for reframing the situation. This aspect is much emphasized by Archibald
(1970) and is central in the socio-intervention that is meant to create a new
reality.
The scheme has proved useful in designing a new national policy on
entrepreneurship in Canada. It has suggested ways to transform perceptions
of people and groups and, through such a change, get them to become more
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entrepreneurial. Interventions of this sort have also worked well at the com-
munity level: perceptions have been reframed in much the same manner as
Palo Alto psychotherapists reframe the perceptions of their clients. Nothing
less than a Pygmalion effect at the community level has often ensued (Watz-
lawick 1978; Paquet 1989b; Errens and Paquet 1990).
The idea that the Friedmann-Abonyi approach might act as a mobilization
device represents a way to overcome the limitations of the social learning
approach as perceived by Friedmann (1987) in his auto-critique. Clinical inter-
pretation of the social learning framework by revealing a capacity to reframe
deliberately the sociocultural context opens the door to effecting the sort of
catharsis likely to generate a new sort of behaviour or a new form of policy
context.
Design Capability
The Friedmann-Abonyi scheme is also a useful guide in social architecture; it
is likely to guide the sort of dialogue necessary for a useful exercise of building
public institutions with the requisite variety and qualities (Perlmutter 1965)
and to serve as a radar in an inquiring system trying to design them.
The process through which the new institutions are going to be crafted
may benefit much from the guidance of such a scheme (Paquet 1989c, 1990b).
It might improve practical reasoning to such an extent that a more appropri-
ate social architecture might ensue. Indeed, the usefulness of the scheme as
a guide in the design of improved institutions for the year 2000 has been
demonstrated (see Chapters 9 and 10).
CONCLUSION
The poor state of policymaking cannot be entirely ascribed to the poor state
of policy analysis or to the slowness of governments, bureaucrats, and citizens
in recognizing that policymaking is a form of social learning. But a good
portion of the problem may indeed be a result of these factors. This calls for
a new competence and for a reframing of policy analysis: the organization of
public policymaking has to become a learning organization (Michaels 1980).
For this reframing to occur, a revolution is required in the mind of policy
analysts. The few illustrations mentioned above were only meant to whet the
appetite of interested parties. If the argument appears to be persuasive and
there is a wish to transform policymaking in this way, the first stage in the
acquisition of the new competence has been completed. At the individual level,
this is equivalent to the decision to visit a psychotherapist. The next phase calls
for much experimentation with the social learning scheme, in the context of
ongoing public policy debates, to develop some sort of connoisseurship — a sort
of expert knowledge in the precise experience of specific contexts. Some of
the exercises mentioned above, and others developed more fully in Part II of
this book, may be useful in this apprenticeship for it is impossible to impart
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connoisseurship without reflection in action. It is only later that one can hope
to produce a blueprint for a procedure likely to guide the policymaker's steps
in the design of a meaningful social learning exercise in the context of social
practice. Such a procedure would not provide a mechanical contraption
applicable to all cases, but simply a guide in the practical use of such tools as
search conferences and other instruments of this type (Williams 1979).
But fundamentally, reflection in action requires first and foremost a
willingness to act. In the words of Heinz von Foerster (1988: 69), "si tu veux
voir, apprends a agir."
PART II
SOCIAL LEARNING IN ACTION:
A- INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
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CHAPTER 3
ELEGANT BUT NOT HELPFUL
TO NAVIGATION: SOCIAL SCIENCES
RESEARCH AND THE FREE TRADE
DEBATE*
"Beware of the man who works hard to learn something, learns it,
and finds himself no wiser than before," Bokonon tells us. He is full
of murderous resentment of people who are ignorant without
having come by their ignorance the hard way.
- Kurt Vonnegut
From time to time, major issues of public interest provide an opportunity for
social scientists to unpack their gear and show what new insights their "outillage
mental" can generate and what new solutions their analyses suggest for tackling
urgent and complex social issues. Such moments are always greeted with
enthusiasm by practising social scientists as an occasion to prove their social
usefulness; however, it is fair to say that most of those challenges have turned
out to be somewhat catastrophic for the reputation of the social sciences when
such "insights" and "solutions" have been assessed with a bit of hindsight.
Such failures are not so much ascribable to the incompetence of the
practitioners as to the fact that social sciences in Canada and elsewhere have
promised more than they could possibly deliver: they have been living beyond
their means. Nowhere is this more evident than when social scientists leave
their ivory tower to go to the forum.
In this chapter, it is suggested that one of the major sources of this failure
of the social sciences may be traced back to the positivist revolution that led
social scientists to ape the postures of their colleagues in the physical sciences
in the hope of achieving respectability by following the recipes physical
scientists were using. The social sciences input into the free trade debate is
critically reviewed, and its limited usefulness is revealed. We speculate on the
* This chapter also appeared in Maslove, A.M., Winer, S.W. (editors). Knocking at the Back Door
The Political Economy ofCanada-U.S. Free Trade. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy,
1987, pp. 165-198.1 am grateful to Allan Maslove and Stan Winer for offering me an opportunity
to explore the implications of this work in the context of the free trade debate. The assistance of
A. Burgess, G. Kippin, and H. Nicoll is gratefully acknowledged.
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likely contours of refurbished social sciences and on what such an "outillage
mental" might be able to contribute to the free trade debate. In conclusion,
some hopes for refurbished social sciences are shown to be less unrealistic than
might first appear.
SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH:
A GENERAL DIAGNOSIS1
Although there has been much dissatisfaction with the drift of the social
sciences into positivism, there has also been considerable praise for this
development. Consequently, the social science community has been split into
two factions: one group betting on the form of explanation propounded by
positivism, the other defending a mix of explanation and understanding as the
only warranted strategy for a sound social scientist (von Wright 1971). Most
practitioners have chosen positivism; a minority is on the other side.
Syntax Versus Semantics
Much of the success of positivism in the social sciences is ascribable to the
success of the physical sciences in explaining much of what is observed in
nature through mechanical cause-effect connections. The machine model of
reality worked well in the physical sciences and, since the 19th century, has
slowly come to be regarded as more or less the only acceptable model in the
social sciences as well.
But to explain a phenomenon, in the physical sciences sense, one must
presume it has coherent identity and is repeated (Latouche 1984). But social
phenomena are rarely, if ever, truly recurring or identical. Consequently, social
phenomena must be reified, i.e., be given definite content and form, for
explanations to take hold.
As a consequence of this process of reification (perpetrated on social
phenomena to make them amenable to explanation), the social sciences have
drifted further and further from the original questions that led to inquiry into
social phenomena (Monnerot 1946; Schrag 1980). They have come to focus
more exclusively on method and methodological procedures instead of on
content and meaning. The social world has been reduced to a set of facts and
knowledge made exclusively synonymous with the output of certain method-
ologic procedures. Epistemology has been reduced to simple methodology and
methodology itself to certain procedures that were successful in the physical
sciences (Habermas 1971; Paquet 1988a). A hypertrophy of syntax in the social
sciences has ensued, much to the detriment of semantics. The social sphere
has been reified, physicalism and analytical methods have become hegemonic,
a polytechnician attitude prevails, and unrealistic ambitions have flourished
within the social sciences community (von Hayek 19522).
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Parsimony, Normalization, Regulation
The drift toward positivism has permeated social sciences over the last 40 years.
Originally, positivism had been only one of many research strategies or
approaches, but it has slowly become a set of norms imposed on the practice
of social science and then the basis for a control apparatus to ensure the
hegemony of those norms. There has been a progressive sociologization of
positivism. Positivism is a parsimonious way to look at social reality. It con-
structs a collapsed, flattened, and shriveled version of the social world, a
reduction to a single order, a single true version of the world — an order that
positivism is supposedly best equipped to investigate (Hirschman 1985).
This parsimonious attitude would have been of little consequence, were it
not that the social sciences of the 19th century had the tendency to respond
to accusations of practical irrelevance or theoretical failures in a bizarre way.
They were not so much led to take a less parsimonious view of reality, but rather
to neutralize such criticisms by efforts to normalize and regulate the practice
of the social sciences. This is the purpose behind the production of rules of
method codifying the only way to acquire meaningful knowledge.
But every time a rule defining a norm — what is normal and what is not
in the practice of any activity — is made, there must be reference to a regula-
tory power with the capacity to separate the normal from the abnormal. There
is a need for a regulator. The dynamic of construction of regulatory instruments
has been spelled out succinctly by Katouzian (1980: 119-122). He ascribes the
emergence of the rigid paradigms in good currency in the practice of the social
sciences to the growth of professionalism: the growth of a population of
full-time mental workers operating in discipline-bound fields. There, narrow
disciplinarian leaders rule through their control not only of the instruments
of publication and dissemination of ideas but also of the mechanisms of
research funding. In such a world, being normal translates into a higher
probability of being hired and promoted, i.e., into a probability of survival in
academe.
This enforced balkanization of the social sciences into fragmented disci-
plines has had important consequences for their usefulness. There has been a
tendency toward a high degree of hyper-specialization, toward the concentra-
tion of the effort of full-time mental workers on the solution of real or
imaginary problems defined by the leadership of the disciplinary professions,
and toward a proliferation of publications for the sake of publications, i.e.,
much printed material with comparatively little addition to knowledge (Beam
1983; Paquet 1978a, 1985a).
In practice, this perversion has resulted in the social sciences' developing
a predilection for small questions, an unmistakable theoretical twist, and a
tendency to follow "in the footsteps of Monsieur Pangloss and Dr Bowdler"
(Andreski 1974; Gordon 1970, 1975). The smoke screen of jargon has grown
exponentially, and analytical/tautological developments have mushroomed to
the point where Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief has gone on record as
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deploring the drift away from relevance and meaningfulness of much of the
work in current journals in economics. The methods used to maintain intel-
lectual discipline in the most important departments of economics, says
Leontief (1982), "occasionally remind one of those employed by the marines
to maintain discipline on Parris Island."
The Need for Interpretation
These trends in the current practice of the social sciences are well known even
though they are not always appropriately acknowledged. Some continue to
argue that positivism is the only way to make the social sciences truly scientific;
however, a view that is becoming more widely held is that only through a more
judicious mix of interpretation and explanation can we hope to extract the
social sciences from their present crisis of confidence.
Daniel Bell (1984) has argued that a "turn to interpretation, in the broadest
cultural sense, signifies the turn of the social sciences — or of those practition-
ers of this art — from the models of the natural sciences and their modes of
inquiry, to the humanities."
Interpretation is an ancient method of inquiry. It was the traditional
method in vogue among scholars until the physical sciences developed and
imposed their model on the production of knowledge in all areas. What makes
interpretation a necessary ingredient in the social sciences has to do with the
nature of the human sciences. The difference between mechanical or animal
societies and human societies mainly rests with the fact that human action is
based on plans, i.e., on mental constructs elaborated before the action is
effectively carried out. It is not really possible to reduce all human activities to
such plans (which are often not carried through) or to the perception or
significance such plans might have for the main actors, but it is not possible
either to exorcize those dimensions from any meaningful effort to understand
such actions.
This qualitative difference between the human sciences and the physical
sciences commands a different methodological strategy. It focuses mainly on
institutions as instruments of coordination of activities for human agents, as
rules of the game, as social armistices likely to reveal the meaning of such
actions.
Institutions are the fabric of World 3 in Karl Popper's (1972) parlance: a
sort of efficient reconciliation of the pressures emanating both from World 1
(the world of material realities) and from World 2 (the world of plans, values
and "fails de conscience"} (Lachmann 1971; Shapiro and Sico 1984). World 3 is
a complex "text" that the human sciences must interpret in order to under-
stand it. This sort of interpretation would not be unlike a close interpretation
of a collective agreement to reveal the texture of conflicts that it has refereed.
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THE FREE TRADE DEBATE
The free trade debate between Canada and the United States is a multilogue
among various groups on both sides of the border about the number of
impediments to trade between the two countries that should be tolerated. As
such, it should be analyzed like a multifaceted conversation. The instruments
used for such analysis must obviously draw on the body of theories and
techniques in vogue in the study of rhetoric. For what is involved in this debate
are attempts to persuade and, in assessing those attempts, rhetorical norms
are in order. Indeed, much of science is rhetoric: "What distinguishes good
from bad in learned discourse... is not the adoption of a particular methodol-
ogy, but the earnest and intelligent attempt to contribute to a conversation"
(McCloskey 1985: 27).
In such a context, the central question has to do with the standards of
persuasiveness: whether the conversation about free trade is working well,
whether the arguments put forward are persuasive. Our general point will be
that the conversation about free trade is not working well, and that social
scientists as persuaders have failed miserably in that debate.
Anatomy of the Free Trade Debate
One of the basic difficulties that might explain the poor performance of social
scientists as persuaders in this debate may have to do with the confusion among
three interrelated questions, all subsumed generally under the same rubric:
free trade as an idea, free trade as a bout of negotiations, and free trade as construction
of a new socioeconomic space. These are quite different issues, although obviously
interconnected, but they have been debated interchangeably without taking
care to specify which issue was addressed.
Free trade as an idea does not refer to the design of a free trade arrangement.
It pertains to the inception of the idea of a free trade arrangement as a source
of opportunities for business. As such, it is a potent economic force, even
though it may never be realized. New opportunities are entertained and the
prospective and plausible futures are significantly altered by the sociopsy-
chological setting created by the beginning of a "conversation" about free
trade.3
Because one might speculate on many different ways in which this idea
might be implemented, everything is plausible, for the idea of free trade
embodies what Leland Jenks (1944) would call "the dream of developing
communities, regions, the continent." Corresponding to any number of dif-
ferent social partitionings of the community, one may identify clusters of
groups grappling with the idea, speculating on whether the costs and benefits
are of comparable magnitude or not for them. This is the paradise of simulators,
i.e., those who have a simulacrum of the socioeconomy on which they are
willing to play, for a fee, any imaginative scenario one might fantasize or build
on this free trade idea. The simulacrum may be a simple supply-and-demand
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scheme, an "issue-machine," or an elaborate econometric caricature of the
socioeconomy, but the process is largely of the same nature: a mechanical
analogue of the socioeconomy is used to forecast growth in various allocations
and distributional impacts.4
Whether these simulations are anchored in a "realistic" model is not the
issue. As any mechanical analogue is a reification of the socioeconomy — even
if behavioural reactions and policy triggers are built in — such a construct is
unlikely to generate very persuasive results. Indeed, the wide variability of
"results" developed through those simulations has provided their consumers
with very little in the form of robust persuasion. The main reason is that too
much of the reality of the socioeconomy as instituted process is expurgated
from even the most sophisticated simulations. An additional reason is that any
built-in forecast of the reactions of different groups Lo changes in the rules of
the game in matters such as our trade relations with the United States is
unlikely to be gauged reasonably well by a simple rule. Consequently, most of
the results generated by such exercises are not very robust when they are not
simply tautological.
One cannot expect much better results from social science analyses of the
free trade debate as a bout of negotiations. Modeling such an interactive process is
so difficult that most analysts have been satisfied with simple general descrip-
tions. To perform a meaningful simulation of a game of negotiations, much is
required: (1) an explicit set of actors together with their domains of possible
actions, (2) a clear specification of mutual interdependencies, and (3) a correct
gauging of the extent of consciousness of each group of actors and (4) of the
degree to which any group is aware that all groups are aware of each other's
perceptions and of their interdependencies.
Leif Johansen (1979) asserts that standard social sciences do not admit of
most of those points: in general, analyses considerably emasculate (2) and (3),
do not deal with (1) very well and fail altogether to take (4) into account. There
have been some efforts to develop the game paradigm, but the results to date are
not very promising when one is confronted with complex non-zero-sum games
with more than a few actors. The great merit of that paradigm has been to
throw some light on the essential social character of the social sciences and on
some of the requirements that status imposes on the practice of social sciences
(Coddington 1968; Cross 1969; Shubik 1982; Schellenberg and Druckman
1986).
The contribution of the social sciences to the process of bargaining in the free
trade debate has been rather limited. Although a certain amount of intelli-
gence is necessary in such a process, the Macdonald Commission (1985) report
noted that there is a significant gap in the expertise of Canadian academics
about the structure of the American political system and its behaviour. There-
fore, whatever contribution might have been legitimately expected from the
social sciences in ascertaining what our trade partners are all about has not
been provided. Although this is partly ascribable to a lack of expert personnel,
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it is not entirely clear that their contribution (if it had materialized) would have
been that significant, largely because of the limits of their tools.5
As for free trade as construction of a new socioeconomic space, the process is so
full of unforeseen and unintended consequences that social scientists have a
rather limited ability to grasp its full scope. Attempts to gauge such broad
transformations in the social architecture of socioeconomies have been at-
tempted through the use ofcounterfactuals, i.e., alternative versions of the world
to ascertain the net effect of a particular transformation or feature. Counter-
factuals have to be reasonably precise to be of use. A common weakness of most
general equilibrium analyses of counterfactuals is that they leave so much
unspecified that nothing categorical can be stated with certainty from com-
parisons between the "world as it is" and the counterfactual version of it.
A good example, again taken from economic history, is the comparison
made by Robert Fogel (1964) between a world with and without railroads in
the United States. One is hardly persuaded by simple quantifications of the
"social savings" generated by railroads, when they are based on a naive
comparison of the costs of transportation by rail with the costs of transporting
the same goods to the same places using the pre-existing mode of transporta-
tion. The assumption is that the same goods will be transported to the same
places before and after the introduction of railroads. But if anything is clear,
it is that railroads have triggered a complete transformation of the matrix of
transported goods (Fogel 1964, 1979). Therefore, the comparison is really
meaningless and the notion of social saving thus defined somewhat spurious.
The same general weakness plagues all attempts by social scientists to gauge
the effects of the long-run adjustment to a "reality of free trade."
A sweeping transformation of the tariff arrangements between two coun-
tries is likely to promote efficiency, but this is not certain. It may also promote
economic growth through the expansion of trade, but it is not certain exactly
how the benefits emanating from such a transformation will be shared by the
different segments of the new socioeconomic space. Depending on the assump-
tions one makes about reactions, adjustments, etc. one may obtain dramatically
different although not necessarily inconsistent results. Moreover, many have
expressed doubts about the wisdom of this policy initiative as a mechanism to
solve Canada's economic problems: tariffs are not the issue any more,
The real issue is non-tariff barriers, such as regional tax incentives, govern-
ment procurement policies, the treatment of foreign-owned firms, and the
setting of currency exchange rates. These are the tools used in advanced
industrial countries to pursue industrial strategies.... These tools are central
to the economic power of the modern state, the key to sovereignty in the late
twentieth century, just as tariffs were in the nineteenth. [Laxer 1986: II]6
Because social sciences can throw no uncontroversial light on the impact
of the "idea" of enhanced trade arrangements between Canada and the United
States, nor on the best way to bargain for it, nor on the efficiency, economic
growth, and wealth redistribution the new socioeconomic space is likely to
trigger, nor even on the wisdom of such a policy initiative, it is hardly surprising
that rhetoric has played such an important role in this debate. What has been
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accomplished in terms of public awareness and in terms of persuasion is not
so much a result of arguments soundly based on thoroughly persuasive social
sciences research as rhetorical devices. Rhetoric may be inescapable, but even
the conversation about free trade might be conducted more persuasively with
the use of an enriched "outillage mental"
Some Paradoxes
Three paradoxes illustrate the degree to which social science research is
bogged down in terms of illuminating the current debate.
Second-best results: One of the depressing results of economic analysis of
the post Second World War period has been the development of second-best
theorems in economics. This disquieting feature of general equilibrium analy-
sis may be summarized as follows: there are many conditions to ensure welfare
maximization in an economy; if for any reason, one of the conditions is
unobtainable, it may be necessary to depart from other welfare-maximizing
conditions. Because of the fact that perfect competition rarely exists (govern-
ments intervene via all sorts of taxes and subsidies, external economies and
diseconomies exist in production and consumption, etc.), it cannot be assumed
that all marginal social costs and benefits are equal in every segment of the
economy. Because this means that some welfare-maximizing conditions are
not met at some point in the economy, it becomes impossible to know with
certainty whether a policy designed to remove a restriction to free trade
(supposedly to bring the socioeconomy closer to the point of maximum welfare
for all) will leave members of the community economically better off.7
This shattering result has not received the broad diffusion it required.
Second-best is still regarded as an advanced subject and is not discussed in
most intermediate textbooks. Yet, one may infer from it that there are very few
a priori propositions that economists may offer to policymakers. Obviously,
the more we know about the facts of the economy, the more we are in a position
to compute ad hoc second-best optima. However, as the number of violations
of efficiency conditions increases and as the complexities of interdependence
grow, computing such second-best solutions is both difficult and, of necessity,
based on disputable assumptions.
In the great debate that surrounded the decision by Britain to join the
European Economic Community, economists were very divided, and even free
trade defenders like Harry Johnson (1971) campaigned against Britain joining
the EEC on the ground that "the obvious economic benefits to Britain of
joining are negligible and the obvious economic costs are large" (Hutchison
1977: 181). Other economists took a quite different stand, and their view
prevailed; however, the force of their argument was much more rhetorical than
substantive. The same conundrum faces experts when asked whether Canada
should enter into a free trade agreement with the United States.
The broad consequence of this predicament is that there is no agreement
among economists a priori about the desirability of free trade even as an idea.
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When confronted with facts that can be read in a variety of different ways, one
is faced with very different viewpoints. The full extent of the confusion can best
be summarized by saying that it no longer appears inconsistent for an econo-
mist to say that even if economic integration is likely to generate more
efficiency and growth, it cannot be presumed that economic disintegration is
likely to generate inefficiency and slower growth.8
The framing of decisions: A second major paradox has emerged from the
experimental work of Tversky and Kahneman (1981): if one modifies the
framework of presentation within which a decision is made, one may dramati-
cally transform the nature of the decision. For instance, their studies have
shown that medical personnel may be led to choose diametrically opposed
strategies for treatment if the "objective" information is cast in terms of
probability of death instead of probability of survival.
This work raises fundamental questions about the predictability of deci-
sions by groups and, therefore, about the reliability of simulacra, as it would
appear that "objective" conditions are not the determining factor in decision-
making. This increases even more the importance of the rhetorical elements
in debates such as the one about free trade. For the activities of the "definisseurs
de situation" will trigger continuous "refraining" of the decision context, and
consequently a modification of the decisions. In the case of complex issues, it
is futile to model decisions and strategies anchored in "objective" conditions.
This casts a shadow on much work based on rational man and his predictable
behaviour.
In the free trade debate, much is based on presumptions and assumptions,
and the complexity of the choices proposed are of such a magnitude that the
framing dimensions are even more determining than they might be in labo-
ratory circumstances. Consequently, there is little hope of developing an
objective database on which to construct a sound simulation of decisions to be
expected from different groups. Not only are the knowledge and database that
are necessary for good social science work nonexistent, but also, even if they
could be established, nothing would lead us to believe that the objective facts
would have a determining impact on real decisions. In this world, interventions
by opinion molders using the instruments of rhetoric have more chance of
being determinant than the so-called basic facts of the case.
Balkanization and multistability: The efficiency, growth, redistribution
effects of a freer trade arrangement are unclear, but the relative weights of
these performance indicators in a dynamic socioeconomy existing through
extremely rapid change and transformation are not clear either. Departure
from the world of perfect competition does not only deprive economists of
simple rules for policy advice, it also imposes a different set of weights on those
different performance dimensions. In a world of perfect competition, it is
argued that "there is an optimal amount of instability and inequity; this is the
one that makes the human economy as efficient as possible in the broadest
sense."9
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This may be questionable even in a world of perfect competition, but it is
clearly neither warranted nor reasonable in a world that departs from the
competitive ideal. In such a context, the whole notion of performance indica-
tors has to be "reframed," and the problem must be addressed by a decision
to "select a set of targets or objectives for the economy and then analyze the
performance of particular sectors of the economy in terms of whether or not
this performance aids or impedes the achievement of these overall goals"
(Herendeen 1975: 230). De facto, the pursuit of equity and stability (or of
growth/employment objectives, the construction of a particular socioeconomic
structure, or the achievement of some cultural goals) overrides the concern for
efficiency (Paquet 1978b: 46).
This shift in emphasis in evaluating performance has not always been given
sufficient recognition in the practice of social scientists, despite important work
recasting the image of the economic system as a non-zero-sum game in which
the parts devise rival strategies taking into account conjectures about what
other parts might do and the interactions between strategies. Such work has
shown our capitalistic socioeconomies to be dynamically inefficient and, there-
fore, call for the use of other performance indicators (Lancaster 1973).10
What makes this shift to other gauges of performance fundamentally
important in the free trade debate is the fact that as soon as efficiency
considerations cease to be dominant, there is little or no agreement on alter-
native gauges. Moreover, optimizing in other directions seems condemned to
violate blatantly the efficiency norms. For instance, a fragmented, fractured
economic system may be shown to be multistable, i.e., to have a relatively greater
ability to adapt than a fully integrated one. Through the fragmentation of an
economic system into "sub-systems subject to slightly different rules and
interacting incompletely or only through the mediation of specific chan-
nels,"one can ensure that an adjustment in some key or essential variables is
"delegated, so to speak, to a partial system enabling the overall process to
adjust to important shocks in the environment in a manner which would have
been either impossible or very time-consuming had the overall process been
forced to adjust in toto" (Paquet 1977, 1978b: 52)."
This might lead one to argue that although an expanded zone of freer
trade might generate efficiency benefits, it might also reduce the capacity to
transform of a socioeconomic system. It is possible to argue along the same
lines on the basis of some fundamental social objective like theprimacy of culture
or the preservation of sovereignty: this leads to a situation in which no technical
advice based on simple efficiency norms can ever be persuasive, for the ground
has been shifted to moral choices and one cannot replace a fundamentally
moral basis for decision with a technical argument.12
It is far from evident, therefore, that social science research can produce
unambiguous answers to the questions of the day. The combination of second-
best and framing-of-decisions constraints, together with the possibility that
static and dynamic contexts or narrow and broader contexts might call for
different policy initiatives, have led social scientists to make many statements
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in general (and, therefore, on the basis of the most extremely reductive
assumptions) but to contribute little except some interesting rhetoric — noth-
ing that might be regarded as providing solutions to the practical problems
facing the community.
Anamorphosis of the Free Trade Debate
Over the last 2 years, an extensive literature has been triggered by the free
trade debate in Canada. I do not wish to review that literature; I have only
sampled it to identify some of the major strands of argument, to illustrate the
interesting rhetorical ploys used, and to show the general unpersuasiveness of
the social science contributions to that debate. Because the free trade issue has
a dominant economic flavour, the place of economists in this anamorphosis
may be larger than life. I have also tried to gauge what filtered down to people
from the social sciences community through the press.13
Because I claim that rhetoric has played a dominant role in the free trade
debate, an anamorphosis through the prism of the four tropes that have so
generously spiced the economic discourse in the past has appeared useful.14
Those figures of speech (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony) have
played a crucial role in the free trade debate. The pro-free-trade participants
have tried to persuade by making use of them. Their opponents, in turn, have
often used figures of speech in lieu of proofs. The rationale for such posturing
is simple: neither side is really able to prove much.
Trade as synecdoche: A socioeconomy as an instituted process cannot be
reduced to the process of trade: this is a synecdoche, i.e., taking a part for the
whole. The manner in which the economic process gets instituted at different
places and times invests that process with unity and stability and defines the
nature of specific human economies (Polanyi 1968). A socioeconomy is
fundamentally an organizational-institutional reality, of which trade is only a
portion.
Any analysis of an economy partitions it into subprocesses. This reveals
the extent to which trade is only a small part of the picture. One such
partitioning that has proved particularly useful in analyzing the Canadian
socioeconomy is based on six subprocesses — demographic, financial, produc-
tion and exchange, distribution, and the state subprocesses, and the ecology
of groups and their motives) (Paquet 1980).
By making trade relations the fabric of the economy, some social scientists
have reduced the complex process of private, social, and public production,
consumption, cooperation, and exchange to simple trading relations. This is
a bold synecdoche.15 In fact, one is led to postulate a frictionless world in
which monads trade relentlessly in all dimensions and where any trade
impediment generates waste in preventing the realization of best solutions in
all dimensions.
This elevation of trade relations to absolute eminence has meant that all
other dimensions have been either occluded (except for their trade-related
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traits) or at least emasculated to a great extent. For instance, the whole
production process and its technological dimensions are naively simplified to
a problem of scale economies.16
The mythical 100-million-consumer market: The trade bias leads naturally
to an interesting metonymy — a procedure through which a thing associated
with the matter under discussion becomes a symbol for it. The whole produc-
tive dimension of national economies has simply been subsumed under the
rubric of scale. All the complexities of modern economies are reduced to one
feature: the size of the market. Consequently, all problems of productivity and
competitiveness are ascribed to lack of opportunity to gain access to a market
of 100 million.
This is the foundation on which the Macdonald Commission builds its
argument in favour of freer trade: without such a market, it is presumed that
a socioeconomy cannot really achieve efficiency and, therefore, competitive-
ness. Yet there is more to the making of our daily bread (as McCloskey would
say) than scale economies, and there is plenty of evidence that small open
economies have succeeded in doing extremely well even without full access to
a market of 100 million.17
This reduction of the whole productive side of the human economy to
economies of scale and, therefore, the size of the market, has been challenged
by most opponents to free trade as bogus. They argue that there is plenty of
evidence that viable economies based on small domestic markets, but skilled
productive capacity and good marketing strategies, have established a strong
international presence in the world economy (de Wilde 1985; Drummond
1986). But the figure of speech has a great resiliency and it has had an
extraordinary impact on the citizenry, as can be seen in the popular and
financial presses, which have reproduced this argument hundreds of times.
This is so despite the fact that the same financial press (Business Week 1984)
has also shown unambiguously that economies of scale alone will no longer
guarantee an advantage in manufacturing. Shorter product cycles and reliance
on computer design and manufacturing have "made it economical to turn out
products in small customized batches."
The metaphorical flavour of the basic argument: By focusing exclusively
on trade and the extent of the market, pro-free-trade participants infer that
from competition in a large market flows efficiency, and from efficiency flows
welfare. This pivotal reliance on efficiency enables the pro-free-trade argument
to stand; however potent the forces of competition may be, they cannot by
themselves eliminate "natural protection" bestowed by transportation costs or
"unnatural protection" bestowed by collusion, cartels, price manipulation, and
other such techniques. Moreover, the surge of employment and per capita
income purported to ensue from free trade (on the grounds that efficiency is
the key to prosperity) depends on a large number of factors about which we
know little. What about investment? What about the independence of Cana-
dian policymaking? What about the differential institutions that characterize
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Canada in comparison to the USA? On those matters, we can speculate, but
we know little.
The trick of the free-trade promoters has been to force the argument on
the grounds of competitiveness and efficiency and to presume that employ-
ment, growth, and welfare are necessary consequences flowing from efficiency.
In fact, efficiency may promote growth, but it is hardly sufficient to ensure
growth. Indeed, "inefficiencies" like tariffs appear to have been associated
historically with periods of rapid growth in Canada (Drummond 1986).18 The
basic argument linking large markets-competitiveness-efficiency-growth to
employment and welfare may hold as a perfectly competitive world metaphor but
it does not capture the essence of real socioeconomies.
The thrust behind the basic argument is that the optimal amount of
protection is zero. The counter-argument is that it is not so, that there is a
"scientific tariff' (Johnson 1960) that may well be significant if one is intent on
achieving certain social objectives like economic growth, the creation of jobs,
or the pursuit of certain objectives of political sovereignty or cultural develop-
ment. The counter-argument adds that there is an "imperialism of free trade"
as present today as it was in the middle of the 19th century. Free trade as
panacea or free trade as economic and cultural genocide are rhetorical stands
that one cannot buttress with persuasive arguments.19
The use of irony in the free trade debate: Irony is the most sophisticated of
the rhetorical techniques. It uses humorous or slightly sarcastic expressions in
which the intended meaning is the direct opposite of their usual sense. The
trade literature in Canada has always had a strong ironic strand: some may
remember the famous Bladen Plan, a proposal to reduce tariffs on the import
of auto parts but retain them on whole cars, which, even though designed to
increase protection for local assembly plants, was billed as a step toward free
trade.20
For instance, to defend his belief in a more aggressive and forceful effort
toward a complete liberalization of trade, Ron Shearer (1986) characterizes
the more careful suggestion of the Macdonald Commission to liberalize trade
in industrial products only as "a new face of Canadian mercantilism."
In the face of attacks on the free trade initiative as a threat to Canadian
independence, Simon Reisman (1985) refers to studies that supposedly show
that "there is not much to worry about on the independence issue in a free
trade context that we don't already worry about." This is an argument that
Anthony Westell (1984: 22) also uses, although Westell reserves his most biting
words for those "romantics" who keep referring to the "national character"
and the "national identity." There is also something suave about the U.S.-Israel
free trade agreement being proposed as a model for Canada. Or about the
suggestion by the prime minister (in his television address of June 1986) that
the growing protectionism in the United States (Fortress U.S.A.) is putting our
markets in peril and the only way out is to negotiate a trade deal. The rest of
the year showed how little the ongoing negotiations would affect the dynamic
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of countervails and how vulnerable Canadian sovereignty over its own policy
instruments turned out to be!
The other side has shown itself capable of irony as well. James Laxer (1986)
handled this trope exceedingly well, when he accused "economists of harbour-
ing dark feelings about Canada" and he understood "that Canada is the scene
of heinous outrages against economic theory." Mel Hurtig (1985) is also a
master of irony in his many speeches and articles in which he uses variations
on the theme of the famous blind leap of faith through the window of
opportunity into the cold shower of international competition, ending up on
a cement floor.
The final irony about the free trade debate is that the very notion of free
trade connotes and has been made to connote explicitly in the mind of the
public some sort of reduction of the importance of the state in trading relations.
We are told that free trade, deregulation, and privatization constitute a trinity
of policies designed to reduce the role of government in the socioeconomy. In
fact, as Bruce Doern (1986) has shown, free trade is bound to mean expanded
activities by the state (Baldwin 1986). In this context, it is enlightening to read
the briefing document outlining the communications strategy of the Canadian
government to sell free trade to the Canadian public. It shows clearly that the
intent was not so much to educate the general public as to bamboozle the
citizenry by emphasizing the free in free trade.21
It is hardly surprising that the free trade debate has generated more heat
than light. Throughout, the notion of free trade has maintained a certain
strategic vagueness nurtured carefully by all participants in the debate. At-
tempts to promote other versions of the notion (freer trade, enhanced trade)
have been perceived as decoys for the real thing and never did take hold. This
strategic vagueness compounded by a certain tactical imprecision regarding
the coverage of any possible free trade arrangement (industrial production a
la Macdonald or a wider coverage including services, agriculture, culture, etc.)
and the shifts among free trade as an idea, as a game of negotiations, and as
a redesigning of the socioeconomic space of North America have kept the
debate out of reach of most Canadians.
The lack of focus of the conversation about free trade is obviously partly
strategic, but it is also largely ascribable to the lack of rigour of the language
of problem-solution provided by the social sciences. Otherwise, much of this
mumbling would have been exposed forcefully much earlier. But as very little
of substance can be generated from general social-scientific rules, debaters
have been forced to construct ad hoc policy recommendations derived from
analyses of second-best or third-best possibilities. The framing of decisions has
become such a key variable that the same "objective" information is now seen
as capable of triggering quite diverse reactions depending on the way it is
presented: rhetoric is queen. This is nowhere more transparent than in the
communications strategy document revealed on 20 September 1985. Govern-
ment would appear intent on shaping the framework for decisions rather than
attempting to deal with so-called "objective" dimensions of the issue.
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The multilogue is fundamentally flawed: on a bold synecdoche of a socio-
economy fully defined by trading relations, academics and bureaucrats have
attached the metonymy that the only operative force in the productive process
is economies of scale. This has served as a foundation for a metaphorical chain
rooted in the extent of the market and leading to an efficiency-seeking policy
recommendation that had to be free trade; an occlusion of key substantive
features of the socioeconomy as instituted process ensued. Appropriately
spiced with irony, all this could be tonic, but not enlightening.
WHAT REFURBISHED SOCIAL SCIENCES MIGHT
CONTRIBUTE
An alternative practice of the social sciences might be able to go further and
deeper in making sense of the free trade debate. In this section, a general
sketch of what refurbished social sciences might look like is presented, together
with the sort of new model for policy research that should ensue. This might
carry the debate on free trade into more promising directions.
This is quite a voyage, deep into terra incognita. It cannot be certain,
therefore, that we can deliver as much as we would like to promise. The
intent at least should be clear: we wish to map out this new terrain in a
preliminary way.
The Nature of the Repairs22
Refurbished human sciences must take a turn toward interpretation, and the
fundamental sodality of the social sciences must become the central dimension
of interest. To explore sociality, a new methodological strategy focused on
institutions is necessary. This strategy calls for a reconstruction of the institu-
tional schemata (as social armistices and parameters of possible actions) and
for a recreation of their genesis; the central concern is not to explicate the
reified social context from without, but to try to understand from within the
unity, complementarities, consistency, permanence, and development of the
institutional texture of World 3 (Bourdieu 1972; OECD 1979; Thompson
1981: 173).
But this cannot be done without some effort to go beneath the historical
traditions to the real forces determining their shape. This is where hermeneu-
tics comes in. It considers human social life as text-analogue calling for
interpretation in the same manner as old incomplete and fragmented texts
from past ages used to be interpreted. The contexted traditions are almost of
necessity interpreted overtly by different actors or groups of actors in a biased,
ideological way. This is why depth interpretation is in order.23
What is called for is not unlike a Freudian-type interpretation looking for
unsuspected patterns of distorted communication, beneath the observed
speech pattern of ordinary life, resulting from the repression of needs and
wants. What appear to be forms of neurotic symptoms in the individual may
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transpire as forms of "false consciousness" and ideology in societies. Habermas
(1971) suggests that in the same way Freud penetrated beneath the surface to
underlying forces by methodical interpretation of dreams, behaviour, speech,
etc., one can interpret societies' pathologies and unearth what might account
for the false consciousness of groups in society.24 Bringing out the latent
repressed significance of the patient's life history leads the patient to place new
significance on those repressed areas; Habermas hopes to apply the same
therapy in social life. By revealing the preconditions of power and domination
that gave rise to distorted communication, one might improve the degree of
communicative competence within a socioeconomy and come closer to realiz-
ing a less imperfect community.
To do so, one needs a better decoder than the language of problem
solution — the language of progress. This language of progress is based on freedom
as an absolute and on a blind faith in continuing progress through the use of
instrumental reason and technology. This has been the decoder used to analyze
our societies. The language of progress is not capable of throwing any light on
the essential sociality of human communities, on their intersubjective fabric or
on the various ways in which communication can be and is systematically
distorted within human communities (Ramos 1981). It decomposes the insti-
tutional fabric of our societies into reified rights and, thereby, dissolves it into
a contractual texture that gives no voice or reality to those who have no
contracting power: marginals, nonconformists, the unborn, etc. It cannot take
into account fundamental categories like goodness or justice.
What is required is a language rooted in what makes us human rather than in
what makes us free. Michael Ignatieff (1985) has proposed one such language
— a language of the good, a language of needs — more capable of appreciat-
ing fully our essential sociality and consequently also the relevant deformations
of the social space, i.e., deviations vis-a-vis situations promoting the good and
the just (Schick 1984). Such a language rooted in civil society recognizes the
centrality of good society, good polity, good economy, and strives to eliminate
impediments standing in the way of their realization, i.e., a socioeconomy that
meets not only efficiency standards, but also standards of reciprocity and
stability.25
Toward a New Model of Policy Research
In most policy research on big questions, goals are ambiguous or in conflict
and means-ends relationships are highly uncertain. It is hardly surprising that
policy research should be of little use. Researchers have a great latitude to
specify unreasonably narrow or naive goals or to presume some deterministic
link between means and ends when there is at best a remotely possible one.
However cleverly one may wish to package the results of such policy research,
it is bound to be irrelevant.
This often leads to deception, but most of the time it results in some
conniving between the producer of the metaphorical research and the policy-
maker who has paid for it. The rationale for this connivance comes from the
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fact that such policy research is of no consequence: it leaves the policymaker
entirely free to follow the strategy that proves electorally expedient. David
Slater (1950) was not challenged when he wrote that little in the successes or
failures of economic policy in the post-war period in Canada could be ascribed
to economic research.26
The only way to generate policy research of import is to renounce scientism
and develop policy research in the full context of social practice. This in turn
calls for a simultaneous taking into account of four interactive subprocesses:
"the formulation of a theory of reality, the articulation of relevant social values,
the selection of an appropriate political strategy, and the implementation of
practical measures or social action" (Friedmann and Abonyi 1976).27 John
Friedmann (1978: 86) has proposed one such model in which
Cognition is linked to the world of events via social action (SA) and the results
of that action. The adequacy of the theory of reality (TR) and/or the political
strategy (PS) is, therefore, dependent on the results of action (SA) and the
extent to which these results satisfy the given social values (SV). Such knowl-
edge is useful in solving social problems, but it is not formally cumulative
knowledge. Indeed much of the knowledge obtained may leave no visible
traces of itself; it is experiential or tacit knowledge.28
Such a policy research model incorporates normative assertions explicitly
instead of "smuggling" them in; it is based on a transactive style of planning
that boldly accepts the underlying conflictive process implied in the political
system. It is also based firmly on the belief that social learning must be promoted
at all possible locations within a social system and that social experimentation
should be promoted wherever possible. Indeed, it would appear to lead exactly
to the converse of the current manipulative strategies hinted at in footnote 21.
In a world freed from the totalitarianism of the knowledgeable elite, there is a
"commitment on the part of the policy-maker to the idea of social experimen-
tation, practice, and learning as the principal methods for public intervention"
(Friedmann and Abonyi 1976: 939; on how one might implement such
transactive planning, see Friedmann 1973).
Dimensions of Interdependence
The remaining question is whether refurbished social sciences might throw
some new light on the free trade debate. I think it would. An attempt to
examine the Canadian socioeconomy as a text-analogue and to socioanalyze it
to unearth the foundations of the various ideological discourses we hear might
indeed reveal a large amount of false consciousness in the Canadian political
economy. Moreover, a model of policy research taking explicitly into account
the sociocultural and the sociopolitical dimensions of the free trade arrange-
ment might significantly redirect the thrust of the debate.
Many "deformations of the social space" might serve as revelateurs: Canada
is a small, open, dependent, and balkanized socioeconomy living in the shadow
of the United States but intent on preserving a separate and different cultural
identity and social fabric. Whatever the rectitude of this view, the coherence
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and permanence of the existing Canadian social order is perceived as jeopard-
ized by an economic rapprochement with the United States. Richard Lipsey
(1986: 235) has labeled this sort of opposition to free trade "visceral rather
than intellectual."
There are widespread concerns about free trade because it would seem-
ingly lead irreversibly to a complete submission of the operations of the
Canadian socioeconomy to the imperatives of the market. The strictly com-
mercial dimension of the arrangement has already become hegemonic in all
discussions. Culture, which for Canadians used to mean a profoundly different
"program" in the sense that computer scientists use the word, i.e., a different
way of life, a significantly different way to tackle issues and solve problems, is
in the process of becoming synonymous with cultural industries. Social pro-
grams, that used to connote the style of society Canadians had chosen, are now
referred to as forms of export subsidies.
If the free in free trade has been used to market the idea that Canadians
could have their cake and eat it too, for other Canadians, the abandonment of
their life-styles to the whims of the free market makes no sense. In many ancient
societies, the market mechanism was used for the allocation of widgets, but
banned in relation to food and essential goods, because it was believed that
the free market might not allocate such essential commodities ideally (i.e.,
fairly and appropriately). The same might be said about such important
intangibles as culture and social mores. Free trade has, therefore, been a major
source of fear.
The only way to incorporate fully the social and cultural dimensions (but
also the regional, distributional, technological, financial, human, political, and
demographic objectives) into the discussion about trade is to recast the debate
in terms of fair trade (Megrelis 1980). This would ensure that, in the process of
bargaining over trading arrangements, the collective goals that Canadians
have chosen would be kept in perspective and explicitly brought forward in an
attempt to negotiate a fair deal with the United States.
Fair trade is an expression which is likely to generate negative reactions
from those who feel that fairness is not a sound enough basis to serve as a
benchmark. Yet for years, courts have refereed cases on the basis of such criteria
without too much difficulty. This is most certainly better than the "leap of faith"
that might simply end up in a process of "Ukrainization" of Canada (Varzeliotis
1985: preface).
The fair trade scenario poses many important challenges to Canada. Such
negotiations would have to be developed on the basis of the Charter of the
Economic Rights and Duties of Nations approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1974. The 34 articles of this charter (including the right to
control foreign investment, the right to share in the advantages that result from
technological and scientific innovations, the duty to cooperate to ensure fair
terms of trade, etc.) were approved by a majority of 120 votes to 6, but the
United States voted against the charter. Consequently, it is not certain that
efforts to negotiate a fair commercial, technological, financial, and social deal
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with the United States would either be welcome or feasible. But is anything
less than such an arrangement simply another form of "imperialism of free
trade"? And if so, do Canadians really want it?
A social science research program intent on examining the new trading
relations with the United States within the context of a model of social learning
might reveal that, as it has been mentioned by some observers, free trade as
an idea is not such a good one, that Canada may have been imprudent in
jumping into such negotiations without the necessary preparatory work at the
provincial and grassroots levels, and that the economic benefits from such a
new trading space are doubtful (while triggering irreversible social, cultural,
and political consequences). It might also dispel those fears and help prepare
the documentation necessary for the negotiation of a fair deal.
Such a research program does not exist. Many intelligent appraisals of the
situation have been put forward, but they are mostly speculations and opinions
couched in different figures of speech. Little has been done to analyze the
"deformations" of our social space, to dispel the high degree of false conscious-
ness that inhabits the debate, or to hasten social learning about the price
Canadians might be willing to pay to maintain "their good society." And when
such analyses have been put forward, they have been ignored or disparaged
as "nationalist" or "socialist." This has not helped the conversation about what
a fair deal with the United States might be. Canadians have been bombarded
with messages from many Cassandras and many Candides, or they have been
simply dis-informed. What they need is an orderly framework for their
thought. Only a refurbished social sciences can help in this construction.
CONCLUSION
It may be unduly optimistic to believe that, after a century of positivistic
indoctrination, one might feel that a turn to interpretation is likely to bring a
breath of some fresh air into the social sciences. Yet there are many signs that
we are entering a crucial transition period. The disciplinary guilds have been
led to excesses in their regulation and there has been "a crisis of abstraction"
in the 1970s. As a result, it can be argued that the social sciences have become
more disconnected from the original questions that led to their creation than
ever in the past.
According to Katouzian (1980), no amount of moral suasion or sporadic
dissent and no sermons will provoke the needed change, "only a combination
of public consciousness and the growing proximity of the abyss" will do the
job. Those two forces may be at work. A crisis of confidence has developed over
the last 15 years within the social science community. It has been echoed within
the broader social context as practical irrelevance and theoretical failures
showed up more and more frequently. Consequently governments and patrons
have become less willing to fund the activities of the social scientists. The
matching grants policy of the Mulroney government should bring that crisis
to a head.29
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While not determinant in this process, the free trade debate may have
exposed social scientists more than they would have liked. There seems to be
a convergence of developments (both in current philosophical thinking and
in the demands by society) that would appear to promote the development of
"an epistemology of practice which places technical problem solving within a
broader context of reflective inquiry, shows how reflection-in-action may be
rigorous in its own right, and links the art of practice in uncertainty and
uniqueness to the scientist's art of research" (Schon 1983: 69). An alternative
to positivism now exists and there is a demand for it.
At a time when those who gave us positivism — the physicists — apply
terms like colour and charm to the quark — this elusive and invisible ultimate
element — it may be time for social scientists to recognize at last that they
should cease to be slaves to some defunct physicist (Jones 1983).
NOTES
1. The diagnosis put forward in this section has been developed more fully in Paquet
(1987b).
2. This is probably the most vehement denunciation of this perversion of the social
sciences. Von Hayek (1952) shows how, from Francis Bacon to Auguste Comte, there
have been efforts to reduce the human sciences to the status of natural sciences of man.
Although there is much merit in this approach in many subareas of the study of man,
it is unacceptable, says Hayek, to reduce all of social sciences to this subsegment.
3. In economic history, it is often argued that tariffs are not unlike "negative railroads,"
as the impediments to trade that they generate are the exact obverse of the facilitation
of trade generated by the introduction of railroad transportation. L.H. Jenks (1944)
has analyzed the impact of railroads on American development under three rubrics:
railroad as an idea, railroad as a construction enterprise, railroad as a producer of
transportation services. We have adopted a somewhat similar approach.
4. These mechanical analogs might be almost entirely unspecified (Culbertson 1986),
although one may easily gather from the analysis what sort of model Dr Culbertson
carries in the back of his head; or it might be a very elaborate econometric construct
as in the case of the work of R.G. Harris and D. Cox (1985) or in the many simulations
performed by management consultants like Informetrica for a variety of clients. Such
elaborate constructs need not be economic in nature (Braybrooke 1974).
5. It is interesting to note that in many instances the "social scientists" who have been
making the most interesting contributions to this debate have been those least con-
strained by the trappings of the traditional disciplines: journalists, situationologists, or
leading academics. The first two groups have provided debroussaiUages, guided some-
what by social-scientific frameworks but not trapped in it. As for the prominent senior
academics, freed to some extent from the need to abide by the rules of the discipline,
they would appear to adopt a style and a form of analysis that is not without reminding
those adopted by journalists and situationologists. An example of the journalistic pieces
might be Blouin (1986) or McLean (1986). For a very lucid piece by a prominent
academic economist, see Lipsey (1986); for a good piece by a situationologist, see Doern
(1986) and on the notion of situationologist, see Paquet (1982) or Chapter 2 in this
volume.
6. Laxer (1986) argues that a market-driven approach is not appropriate; he suggests that
a business-government partnership is required to rebuild Canada's socioeconomy. See
also Rotstein (1984).
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7. This phenomenon has been known for quite some time, but it was analyzed carefully
only in the postwar period. James Meade (1955), the Nobel laureate, coined the phrase.
The fact that a best solution is ruled out by the existence of imperfections in one sector
means that a second-best solution has to be found. Such a solution has to be derived
from an examination of the particulars of the case. It cannot be inferred from the use
of a general rule like the equalization of marginal costs and benefits. Obviously such a
line of reasoning may be used to justify the existence of trade restrictions.
8. In Canada, the debates at the time of the Quebec referendum of 1980 and in the years
preceding it, together with those that have been going on about free trade in the 1980s,
have provided numerous examples of such apparently contradictory statements. In fact,
most of the time there is no inherent contradiction: as soon as they stray away from
tautologies or truisms, practitioners can hardly answer any question pertaining to the
world of facts (as perceived by the citizenry) except by saying "it depends," and many
of the conclusions that follow are simply an echo effect of the assumptions on which
they have built their argument.
9. This is the view upheld by neoclassical economists, and their policy advice is anchored
in the assumption that the standard rules in force in the ideal competitive world should
be used whatever their inappropriateness. For a critique of this view and some suggested
alternative approaches to the gauging of performance, see Paquet 1978b).
10. Lancaster (1973) presents capitalism as a differential game and demonstrates the sub-op-
timality of this regime because of its built-in coordination failures. Social waste ensues. In
the face of such inefficiency, it is futile to argue for a return to competition (and therefore
freer trade) as a way out. Such a focus on efficiency criteria is not only unwarranted but
assumes away too many of the complexities, uncertainties, and strategic dimensions of the
real game that underpins the human economy.
11. In Paquet (1977) an argument is developed showing that to the extent that federalism
fragments a socioeconomy, it may improve its capacity to adapt. To the extent that
regulation and other nonmarket mechanisms balkanize the socioeconomy, the same
argument may be made that regulation promotes multistability.
12. Such attempts to persuade the population that the technical has replaced the moral have
been dubbed "a methodological or epistemological coup" (Wiley in Paquet 1977: 296)
perpetrated by social scientists on the population. It has proved effective but only in
the short run. Questions of sovereignty or culture, for instance, would appear to be almost
ultra vires for traditional social sciences. It is easier for some, like Westell (1984: 22),
simply to occlude such dimensions from their analysis or to transmogrify them: "To be
a Canadian citizen does not signify a way of life, or a set of values beyond attachment
to the community and loyalty to the national state. So the fear that closer association
with the United States will erode a Canadian identity in the making or abort a Canadian
culture about to be born is unfounded." In the same spirit, he argues that free trade
would entail "no sovereignty loss"; it is simply that "both governments would have to
look very carefully before implementing domestic policies" (Westell 1984: 18).
13. Given the publication lag and the insensitivity of much of the academic community to
current issues, it has been important to sample journals and magazines with a stronger
interest in current policy issues. We have scanned a number of publications without any
intention of being exhaustive. In alphabetical order they are: Alberta Report, The Business
Quarterly, Canadian Business, The Canadian Business Review, Canadian Dimension, Canadian
Forum, Canadian Labour, Canadian Public Policy, International Perspectives, Queen's Quar-
terly, Policy Options, and The Idler.
14. McCloskey (1985: 83) has analyzed the prose of Robert Solow and others and shown
that figures of speech have played a great role in "scientific" arguments.
15. For a more realistic look at the fabric of real economies, see Williamson (1985).
16. Harris (1985) has underlined the fact that the comparative advantages are not inherited
from nature but made largely through institutional build-ups and structures. Even
though he underlines the limitations of the classical approach to international trade,
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his entry barriers approach still focuses unduly on the trade side of the economy and
ignores the institutional fabric except as it generates barriers to trade.
17. The 100 million market as a necessary basis for achieving economies of scale is an
argument one finds everywhere in the free-traders' prose. It was already there in the
1982 report of the Senate's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs (Vol. III). It is
repeated by Sarna (1985: 302), but also by Lipsey (1986: 225), and by a large number
of participants in the free trade debate.
18. There have been many challenges to this representation of free trade as a neces-
sary/sufficient condition to ensure efficiency and of the suggestion that efficiency is a
necessary/sufficient condition for increased welfare. Some have argued that free trade
is not sufficient (Harris 1985; Proulx 1986). Others have challenged the link between
efficiency and welfare, claiming that other goals are more clearly correlated with the
welfare of the population. The priorities may differ among those opponents to free
trade — the need to preserve our independent use of policy instruments (}. Laxer),
the need to design an industrial strategy (S. Smith), the need to combat unemploy-
ment and poverty (E. Kierans), cultural objectives (B. Anthony)—but they agree that
efficiency considerations cannot be regarded as sufficient to lead to increased welfare.
19. Economic history provides ample evidence of both imperialism through protection and
through free trade. Hirschman (1945) has shown how Nazi Germany used trade
relations and protection to dominate and penetrate southeastern Europe and else-
where. Gallagher and Robinson (1953) have shown how one of the most common
political techniques of British expansion in the 19th century was "the treaty of free trade
and friendship made with or imposed upon a weaker state." Therefore, one cannot
necessarily associate free trade with benefits and protection with costs. Each country
must design the mix of free trade and protection that suits its priorities. In the free
trade debate of the last few years, this simple truth has seemingly been forgotten.
20. For a critical examination of this sort of economic sophistry conveniently putting aside
the well-known principle that reducing the tariff on an input increases effective
protection, see Johnson (1963).
21. This document was published in the Toronto Star on 20 Sep. 1985. Excerpts are telling:
"The popular interpretation of free trade appears to be keyed to the word 'free.' It is
something for nothing — a short cut — to economic prosperity. It is bigger markets for
Canadian products, more jobs, more of everything. It is, as Terrence Wills of the Gazette
puts it, having your cake and eating it too.... The strategy should rely less on educating
the general public than on getting across the message that the trade initiative is a good
idea. In other words, a selling job." Late in 1986, this document was reprinted in a book
of readings attempting to collect a representative sample of the documents generated
by the free trade debate (Cameron 1986). Varzeliotis (1985: 296) has described the
strategy document as an invitation to "keep the people ignorant, impact upon them
false impressions, prevent the opposition from exposing myths, encourage apathy and
rule the society."
22. Some of the material in this section has been developed more fully in Paquet (1987b:
sections 4 and 5).
23. For a simple introduction to hermeneutics and a sketch of the manner in which Jurgen
Habermas has used it in a manner parallel to Freudian analysis, see Anderson et al.
(1986: 76-81). We have drawn from their presentation in the next few paragraphs.
24. For a lucid analysis of the parallel between neurosis and schizophrenia in the individual
and ideology and false consciousness at the social level, see Gabel (1962).
25. For a sense of what these concepts refer to see Friedmann (1979) and Kolm (1984). Any
major departure from those norms would constitute a "deformation of social space"
(Lachmann 1971: 83). One may regard in this context policymaking as elimination of
misfits or the search for a good fit (Alexander 1971).
ELEGANT BUT NOT HELPFUL TO NAVIGATION 77
26. One might make the same argument about social policy or social change in general. A
case in point of a fundamental change in which social scientists played little or no role
is the civil rights movement in the United States (King 1968).
27. The "paradigm of social practice" is stylized as a process of intercreation between the
following four subprocesses: theory of reality, political strategy, social values, social
action. "These processes come to life only in the context of a concrete situation, and
they are so connected that a change in any one of them will necessarily affect all others,
either producing a substantive change or confirming the existing practice" (Friedmann
andAbonyi 1976).
28. For those schooled in positivism, such a statement may appear rather vague and all
encompassing. It should be clear, however, that the exploration of those dimensions is
more apt to generate useful knowledge than the attitude that leads one to declare not
answerable and, therefore, irrelevant the questions intractable with their disciplinary
tools.
29. This is a policy that imposes a sort of market test on the funding of research by the
federal government. The granting councils will get additional money only to match
funding by the private sector. This should put the demand for social science research
through a market test from which social scientists should emerge somewhat humbled.
For the details of that policy, see Strengthening the Private Sector/University Research
Partnership — The Matching Policy Rules (Canada 1986).
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CHAPTER 4
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
UNDER FREE TRADE*
We should not be swayed by our theories
to give up common sense too easily.
- Karl Popper
The structure of the national output of advanced economies has changed
dramatically since the Second World War: it has shifted more and more away
from the production of material goods toward the production of services and
information. Knowledge and information have become both a dominant form
of output and a separate factor of production: knowledge differentials have
come to be regarded as the new basis of comparative advantage and speciali-
zation in the world economy (Perroux 1970; Jussawalla and Cheah 1984).
This new knowledge/information economy as an instituted process is
substantially different from the previous incarnations of our economy. When
land was its centre of gravity, the network of institutions used to coordinate
economic activities had much to do with bargaining over rent; with the growth
of commercial capitalism, the market became the core institution and the key
bargain was overprice; and with the emergence of the industrial world bargain-
ing focused on wages. Now that the central feature of our socioeconomy is
information/knowledge, the key bargain between the different stakeholders is
over the control of the forum (Tussman 1977; Paquet 1987a). The whole
architecture of our coordinating institution has been or is in the process of
being reshaped to deal with this new central reality.
The notion of forum is used here not to refer to a particular place, but in
a more general way — as we speak of "the market" — to refer to a "whole range
of institutions and situations of public communication... [a] system of oppor-
tunities and protections" (Tussman 1977). These institutions have to do with
the production, allocation, distribution, and regulation of awareness, cognitive
energy, symbolic resources, research, knowledge, and information.
In the forum, research, science, and technology raise the question of the
production of new knowledge. But knowledge and information are not simple
* This paper also appeared in Technology in Society 1989, 11 (2), 221-234. The assistance of Denis
Jubinville and Marc Racette has been invaluable.
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private commodities, and this poses a problem to the private enterprise system.
Knowledge is costly to produce and the production of new knowledge (which
is the outcome of research) is a high-risk activity, often with only a long-term
payoff. Yet new knowledge, once produced, is in the nature of a public good.
It can be used by one person without precluding use by others. Consequently,
it appears beneficial to make it widely available at a nominal cost. But, if this
is done, there will be little incentive for anyone to invest important and scarce
resources in the production of new knowledge (Paquet and Taylor 1986).
To resolve this problem, governments have designed many techniques
(from temporary monopoly on new knowledge by its private producer, to
public subsidy and tax breaks for private producers, to government-managed
research). All these techniques are meant to alleviate the chronic problem of
underinvestment in the production of new knowledge in a market economy.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
Science is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as systematic and formulated
knowledge, and technology as the science of the industrial arts (Tisdell 1981).
One can imagine a continuum of overlapping domains ranging from pure
science, to applied science, to technology. However, it is important to realize
that this continuum is not a one-way street: pure science may never give rise
to technical advance; technical advance may on the other hand occur by trial
and error without science, and new scientific knowledge may also be triggered
by questions raised at the technology and practice level (Feibleman 1961;
Schon 1983; Paquet 1988b).
The sort of questions that an economist is likely to pose about science and
technology (S&T) are simple: Who ought to conduct research? How should
they be compensated for their effort? What problems should they work on?
How many and what kinds of strategies should be pursued in tackling these
problems? And how should resources be allocated among research strategies
and problems? The key challenge has to do with the setting up of coordinating
mechanisms to answer these questions.
One solution readily suggested by economists is that the market should
provide the answers to these questions. But there are reasons to believe that
the market solution is likely to be incorrect. Knowledge as a commodity has
characteristics that make it rather special:
• It is a public good.
• There are strong economies of scale in its production and use.
• Uncertainty is acute in its use and production (Dasgupta and Stoneman
1987).
• Waste results from duplication of search efforts in a simple competitive
system.
• Social failures occur in the transmission and diffusion of technical knowl-
edge.
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• External industry-wide economies of development exist that individual
and isolated decision-making might be led to ignore (Tisdell 1981; Kahn
1966).
An additional complication can be ascribed to the fact that the production
of new scientific and technological knowledge is the work of social communities
and organizations that have quite distinct attitudes toward the output of
research. At one end of the spectrum, science views knowledge as a good for
public consumption, while at the other end, technology regards it as a private
capital good (Dasgupta and Stoneman 1987). This triggers different ethos and
different norms and rules of conduct: the scientist's reward comes from being
the first to come up with and fully disclose new results, while the technologist's
reward comes from capturing rents from new findings on which proprietary
rights are exercised (Dasgupta and David 1987). In both cases, however, the
premium on being first is such that it may lead to undue haste, duplication of
efforts, and waste.
A final complication comes from the fact that the notion of knowledge in
the whole range from science to technology is often presented in simplistic
terms, as a blueprint or a recipe. Tacit skill, training, and communication are
also involved in acquiring new knowledge or in implementing a technology.
Individual traits and idiosyncrasies are also significant. In all likelihood, these
elements of the tacit and of the idiosyncratic mean that there is no one best
way always and for everyone. "Knowing how to produce a product is as much
experienced tacit skill as articulable knowledge. And contrary to the implicit
general theory, the tacit skills of one 'skilled in the art' are not interchangeable;
who works with the recipe makes a difference" (Rosenberg 1982; Murnane and
Nelson 1984; Dosi et al. 1988; Paquet 1989d).
From this cluster of arguments flows the presumption that the market
system may not automatically produce the optimal amount of new knowledge
in the forum and may not produce it optimally. One possibility is that too little
may be invested in such activities because of the fact that the costs are largely
internal to the firm, whereas a substantial portion of the benefits are external
to the firm; or because myopic decisions may not lead to taking full advantage
of intertemporal scale economies or industry-wide external economies; or
because the high degree of uncertainty may discourage a sufficient research
effort because of imperfect capital markets. A second possibility is that too much
may be invested in R&D because of fixation on the reward mechanism of being
first: this inevitably leads to duplication, overcrowding of promising paths, and
often neglect of long shots as a valuable hedge from society's viewpoint
(Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980). A third possibility is that the new knowledge
produced may be generated ineffectively, inefficiently, and uneconomically
both because of excessive competition triggered by the winner-takes-all reward
system and because of a lack of understanding and concern for the tacit and
the idiosyncratic in the diffusion and implementation of this new knowledge.
All these factors point to the need for government intervention, for a S&T
policy. But such a policy should not be simply couched in terms of additional
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funding for R&D in the hope that technical advance will ensue. Although
popular in government circles, this sort of strategy is unlikely to solve the
problem and may even lead to instances of "government failures" that would
not necessarily correct the existing "market failures" (Dosi et al. 1988). What is
needed is an answer to the five economic questions posed above: who? what?
how? etc. This in turn requires a politics of cognitive energy and a better forum:
experimentation with quick feedback is the only way to learn if one is concerned
about guiding the evolution of the socio-technologic-economic system through
good use of the forum and government as a learning system (Schon 1971).
In general, most governments (in large or small economies) have taken
note of the challenges posed by S&T. Each country has at least an implicit
science policy (concerned with education, the stock of knowledge, its availabil-
ity and use, and R&D) and a de facto technology policy (concerned with the
adoption and use of techniques — innovation, diffusion of techniques, and
their replacement) (Tisdell 1981). Although this de facto policy is often
nothing more than ritualized adhocery, it represents some basic choices: more
or less relative emphasis on the science end or on the technology end of the
spectrum, more emphasis on production of new knowledge as opposed to the
diffusion of existing knowledge, greater reliance on public or private produc-
tion, more or less competitive or complementary routes in the production of
knowledge, etc. For instance, some countries like the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France have focused relatively more on the science end to realize
certain radical innovations needed to reach goals of national importance.
Other countries like Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden have focused on the
diffusion of technology at the other end of the spectrum to facilitate the
ongoing and incremental adaptation of their economies to change (Dasgupta
and Stoneman 1987).
But there have been broad trends in the action of governments on this
front over the last decades. First, S&T policy has become more explicit. Second,
it has evolved more or less in step in the various countries: in general, S&T
policy in the post Second World War period was geared to economic growth;
in the 1960s to the mid-1970s, quality of life and environmental concerns
generated a series of questions about S&T and the emergence of a defensive
policy stand; more recently, concerns about national competitiveness in the
international arena and about international spillovers of development based
on S&T have generated a renewed interest in a proactive S&T policy.
In general, governments now have a sense that they should intervene in
the forum to ensure a leadership "that enlightens, teaches, and forces us to
attend to the necessary agenda" (Tussman 1977). However — and this is a
third trend — vast amounts of resources have been spent in pursuit of creation
of new knowledge, much less for the dissemination of existing knowledge —
a strategy that would appear especially well suited for small countries.
Fourth, governments have generally based their policy actions on a rather
ill-founded model of the innovative process: it is not sufficient to spend more
money on R&D to generate innovation. There is much that is tacit and
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idiosyncratic about innovation and about the diffusion of new technology.
Transfer of new instrumentalities between sectors depends much on these
factors. Yet governments have made little effort to develop such a knowledge
base (Cairncross 1972; Bonin and Desranleau 1988; Paquet 1989d).
Finally, it appears clear that experimentation with government policy
designed to identify who should do what in what manner and with what public
support has not generated any golden rule readily applicable everywhere;
indeed some have expressed skepticism about the possibility of eliciting such
general guiding principles (Pavitt and Soete 1981).
These modest accomplishments do not suggest that government action is
not warranted to ensure that additional resources are allocated to the produc-
tion of new knowledge or to facilitate the diffusion of this new knowledge
among sectors or to design a better fit between S&T and the national sociocul-
tural underground. Structural features may also be in need of repair: govern-
ment laboratories may have taken on too large a share of research in certain
countries, transfer of new knowledge may be unduly difficult from government
laboratories to industrial plants, and formulation of explicit priorities without
rigid commitments may increase flexibility and speed of reaction to new
circumstances. But it would be unwise to expect that, in this evolutionary
process of change where goals are complex and ambiguous and where
means-end relationships are highly uncertain and poorly understood, gov-
ernment policy will be able to do anything more than ensure that the requisite
variety of experimentation is conducted, that feedback information becomes
available a bit faster, and that the unintended consequences of S&T develop-
ments are assessed more vigilantly.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The technical literature on the interface between S&T, on one hand, and
international trade, on the other, suggests that international differences in
technological levels and innovative capabilities are beginning to be the major
forces shaping trade flows and the international division of labour.
Three thrusts of forces are at work in three interlocking subsystems: an
evolutionary technological system dominated by the logic of science and
technique in the sense of Jacques Ellul (1954); an evolving system of multina-
tional enterprises covering the world with a number of managerial nets and
internal trading systems; and a mosaic of nation states intent on designing
policies maximizing benefits to nationals via subsidies and regulation of the
forum.
The Technological Paradigm
S&T constitute a techno-economic system that has a dynamic of its own: a
"technological paradigm" defining contextually "the needs that are meant to
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be fulfilled, the scientific principles utilized for the task, the material technol-
ogy to be used" (Dosi et al. 1988). This paradigm exists at the transnational
level and from it evolve technological trajectories: progress along the techno-
logical and economic trade-offs defined by the paradigm. The combustion
engine or microelectronics are examples of such paradigms gridlocking firms
and industries throughout the world economic system. For the behaviour of
firms and industries is influenced by the macro-technological regime that
defines the rules of the game. This regime shapes the focusing devices or
guideposts used by firms to organize their search for better technologies.
The technological paradigm is based on public knowledge shared by all
actors involved in a family of activities — publications, etc. — and a structured
set of technological externalities or synergies among sectors, technologies, and
firms. This driving force often has unintended and irreversible outcomes, as
in Silicon Valley. By following the path, industries enjoy dynamic increasing
returns and are in some way locked into particular technologies.
There remains a tacit firm-specific or country-specific form of knowledge
that will explain why some firms, some countries, or some firms in some
countries have more or less success, and their choice of techniques may be
influenced through inducement mechanisms (emerging either from autono-
mous changes in relative prices or from some manipulation of policy variables),
but all this develops within the boundary defined by the technological paradigm
(Dosi et al. 1988). For Dosi and colleagues, the technology establishes "un-
traded interdependencies" or "synergies" between sectors, technologies, and
firms. Even those who have been critical of the evolutionary paradigm ex-
pounded by Dosi and others have acknowledged the importance of this nexus
of technological forces (De Bresson 1987).
Multinational Enterprises and Technology Transfer
The race to be in the lead technologically has been based on the belief that
the control of new technology entails the control of markets for new products
and progressive industries. Indeed, it has been shown that large U.S. compa-
nies expect to draw close to one-third of the returns on their R&D projects
from overseas markets via all marketing channels — subsidiaries, licensing,
and export of innovative goods (Caves 1982). But this technological lead is
always precarious, and there is imitation after a lag period. Therefore, the
innovative firm is always torn between two temptations: trying to maintain a
monopoly on existing knowledge in the country of origin to control lucrative
export markets; or transferring the technology and profiting via licensing or
foreign investment. The shareholders demand that the right trade-offs be
struck.
The futility of efforts to prevent the transfer of technology in the long run
has led to the development of increasingly effective modes of international
technology transfer to take advantage of the lead while it lasts. The most
effective vehicle in this process has turned out to be the multinational enter-
prise — not only because of the difficulty of trading information and knowl-
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edge on markets, but also because of the tacit and the idiosyncratic elements
attached to technology. Both transfer costs that are more significant when the
transfer is at arm's length than when it is through a firm. After a detailed
examination of technology transfer in the electrical industry, Harold Crookell
(1973) concludes that
The transmission of technology within an administrative unit is more efficient
— in terms of speed, cost and scope — than transmission across the open
market.... Managing the transmission process is an extraordinarily complex
and sensitive affair. Insecurity, risk and rapid change abound, and demand
an adaptive system with major constraints aimed at controlling relevance.
Multinational enterprises have become so important that a substantial
portion of international trade is now intrafirm trade, i.e., via nonmarket or
quasi-market channels. Moreover, the multinational enterprise has not only
been used to transfer technology from the home country to the host country,
but also to tap inventiveness and innovative activities there. In fact, in many
cases, multinational enterprises have become vehicles of "reverse technology
transfer" from the host country to the home of the multinational enterprises
(Cheng 1984).
National Government Policies
National governments have their own priorities, and they differ from those of
the shareholders in the multinationals: they wish to maximize benefits to
nationals. At first, regulatory strategies were designed to prevent technology
from flowing out, but they proved futile except in the short run. The quasi-rents
earned from gaining the lead are quickly eroded by international diffusion of
the technology. Consequently, governments have come to realize that a suc-
cessful policy would have to interfere with the whole innovation process and
implement rules that are likely to generate a larger continuous stream of new
ideas, to ensure that such ideas are transmitted more quickly to potential users,
and to encourage domestic firms to exploit more fully their technological lead
internationally.
Governments have chosen different strategies depending on the size of
the country and the degree of technological sophistication of their socioecono-
mies. Large countries like the United States have emphasized the production
side or new knowledge, through procurement and subsidies; smaller ones like
Sweden have emphasized the diffusion side. Advanced countries have ex-
ploited their advantage through foreign investment, licensing, and exports;
less advanced host countries have attempted to encourage the transfer of
laboratories overseas by offering various tax holidays or simply protection and
subsidies for certain segments of their industries with the hope of limiting their
technological dependence or even altering the existing technological leader-
ship (Cheng 1984).
The effectiveness of these policy initiatives has been limited, but they have
had a steering effect. Segments of the forum have been strengthened and
expertise has been built up in certain fields, whereas other areas have been
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allowed to deteriorate. Deliberate policies designed to spread knowledge have
entailed a redistribution of resources that so-called centres of excellence have
complained about. The result has been an allocation of cognitive energy in
various countries according to very different patterns; more important, maybe,
has been the politics of awareness and the mobilization of the citizenry in
support of such choices. Almost every country can boast of slogans like "virage
technologique" or "innovaction" — to use Canadian labels — as marketing de-
vices for some brand of S&T policy.
As a result of the relative inefficiency of the market in this domain, the
major players are likely to be governments and multinationals trying to take
advantage of the evolutionary inertia of technique: the governments through
subsidies, procurement, discrimination, regulations, and controls, and the
multinationals by building on synergies and "untraded interdependencies."
Those nonmarket hierarchies may not act entirely without constraints, as the
technological paradigm constrains them, but their action is bound to affect the
paradigm in an evolutionary way.
As a result of these strong nonmarket forces dominating the weak
price-quantity adjustments between sectors and between countries, the
major adjustment mechanism in the world economy has been world market
shares: the gains in market shares ascribable to country-specific absolute
advantages, i.e., country-specific conditions of technological learning based
on degree of innovativeness related to "[i] science-related opportunities, [ii]
country-specific and technology-specific institutions which foster/hinder the
emergence of new technological paradigms, and [iii] the nature and intensity
of economic stimuli" (Dosi et al. 1988). Technological leadership has re-
placed factor endowment as the main force shaping trade flows.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY UNDER
FREE TRADE
The establishment of a free-trade area first entails tariff reductions and
increased trade in finished products, i.e., in embodied technology, and less
transfer of technology per se. Existing firms are more likely to bet on econo-
mies of scale at existing plants and less likely to need to license technology
when there is no incentive to overcome tariff barriers (Bell and Vickery 1988).
But multinationals are not only tariff-jumpers. They often seek proximity to
markets, market niches, and cost advantages that a host country can offer. To
the extent that these other forces are at work, tariff reduction will be a
less-powerful trade creator.
In a world dominated by the three sets of nonmarket forces identified
above (technological, multinational, government), the elimination of tariff
barriers will not make a great deal of difference. The technological paradigm
is still evolving, the multinationals are still active, and governments have not
lost their rationale for supporting R&D (i.e., underinvestment because of
market failures and externalities) and crafting a S&T strategy. Therefore, the
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impact of any free-trade arrangement will only have a major impact to the
extent that nontariff barriers are overhauled and the rules of the "economic
war" between nations are altered.
The objective of developing a level playing field may be invoked, but
governments do not readily agree to abandon national privileges or pretend
to legislate away particularly apt synergies generating absolute advantages.
Therefore, S&T policies will continue to be built on a structure of government
subsidies, on various property laws, on limited access to government-spon-
sored research by foreign firms, on discriminatory public procurement, and
on various overt and covert devices for taking advantage of national circum-
stances and synergies.
For example, Canada's decision to eliminate intellectual property from
free-trade discussions with the United States can be interpreted as a decision
either to impose a nonmarket coordinating mechanism for dealing with such
issues in the national interest or to reserve judgment in this area for future
policymaking. In either case, the challenge remains clear: the need to define
the optimal S&T policy in the face of free trade (i.e., the one promoting
competitiveness and larger market shares in strategic sectors). And even
though some people are very pessimistic about the possibility of ever develop-
ing general principles for the design of such policies (Pavitt and Soete 1981),
this should not be construed as an invitation for governments to abandon the
instruments at their disposal to craft such policies. We are simply in the
beautiful world of the second-best.
In a world of increasing returns to scale, unaided markets cannot be
expected to regulate world trade effectively. Normally when demand falls,
output is reduced, average costs fall, and prices decrease. Lower output leads
to more efficiency and lower prices. However, with increasing returns to scale,
a decline in demand leads to a reduction in the level of output with consequent
increases in average costs and prices. The price increase triggers a further
decline in demand and a cumulative self-reinforcing downward movement in
economic activity. Thus an increasing-returns-to-scale economy is much more
unstable and much more sensitive to disturbance.
In a knowledge-based economy subject to accelerating change, new tech-
nologies generate increasing returns to scale and this has costs as well as
benefits: the central cost is that it reduces the ability of the economy to adjust
smoothly to a changing environment. Under these circumstances, free trade
and its implicit reliance on markets is no panacea. What is needed, instead, is
an aid to the market, i.e., managed trade. "In an international economy with
increasing returns situations, all the gains from free trade may accrue to just
one trading partner, with the others possibly even being net losers. Active
management of trade may be required to ensure market clearing and Pareto
efficiency" (Chichilnisky and Heal 1986). Managed trade is, therefore, neces-
sary on the grounds of both efficiency and distribution.
In these circumstances, any S&T policy based on substantive but carefully
selected trade restrictions geared to support, build, or bolster some national
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advantages may indeed generate more trade than no restriction at all. Japan
provides such a case. The central question is to determine what sort of planned
objectives are being pursued and how they can be reached at minimal social
cost. This is the purpose of an industrial policy: "cherry pick" (Harris 1985).
How can one arrive at a definition of such a useful S&T policy well rooted
in Canadian circumstances and values? It cannot be done unilaterally from the
centre by technocrats. They have only a small amount of the necessary
information. Consequently, this sort of approach is bound to fail as it has many
times, in many places. In the information socioeconomy, participatory design
of such a policy is the only path likely to be successful (Masuda 1982).
This suggestion does not flow from any ideological fix: it is a consequence
of the ill-structured nature of the question at hand. In case of ill-structured
problems, analysts must learn on the job about both the configuration of facts
and the configuration of values, but they must also manage to learn from the
stakeholders in the policy game and from the many groups at the periphery
who are in possession of important local knowledge, for without their participa-
tion no meaningful policy can be implemented.
Friedmann and Abonyi (1976) propose a social learning model of policy
research to deal with these problems. It combines a detailed analysis of four
subprocesses: (1) the construction of appropriate theories of reality, (2) the
formation of social values, (3) the gaming that leads to the design of political
strategies, and (4) the carrying out of collective action. These four intercon-
nected subprocesses are components of a social learning process: any change in
one affects the others. This paradigm of social practice in policy research is
depicted in a graph by Friedmann and Abonyi that is reproduced in Figure 5
(Chapter 2).
The social learning paradigm is built on reflection-in-action, dialogue,
mutual learning by experts and clients, i.e., on an interactive or transactive style
of planning: "The paradigm makes the important epistemological assumption
that action hypotheses are verified as "correct" knowledge only in the course of
a social practice that includes the four components of theory (of reality), values,
strategy, and action. A further epistemological commitment is to the creation
of a new reality, and hence to a new knowledge, rather than in establishing the
truth-value of propositions in abstraction from the social context to which they
are applied" (Friedmann and Abonyi 1976; Schon 1983; Paquet, this volume,
Chapter 3).
This is a way to develop an S&T policy that suits national circumstances,
values, and synergies, a way to launch a major social experiment that would
elicit the appropriate role of government in the affairs of the mind in any
country that would care to embark on such an experiment. This is an occasion
to reflect on the stock of knowledge available, on the uses made of it, on the
education system, on the pattern of research effort, on the idiosyncratic nature
of the innovative process, and on the diffusion of innovation, but also more
broadly on awareness, symbolic resources, and cognitive energy.
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Free trade does not mean that national governments should forego im-
portant levers and freedom of action to manage trade to the national advan-
tage; it only means that such actions are now somewhat constrained. If a
government were forced to forego the possibility of crafting an S&T strategy
as a result of a free-trade agreement, it could only be regarded as an immense
price to pay for the arrangement.
It has been argued that such is the case with the Canada-United States
Free-Trade Agreement. By progressively raising the threshold on direct
acquisitions from $5 million to $150 million, articles 1602 and 1607 suppos-
edly exempt such acquisitions from investment review and, thus, from R&D
performance requirements. On the other hand, the United States retains the
policy power on this front on both their mammoth defense budget and the
provisions for a small-business component of government expenditures
(McCurdy 1988; McCurdy and Lenihan 1988; Steed 1988). Such a loss of
margin of maneuverability is obviously of significance on the S&T front.
So free trade does not make S&T policy less important but gives it greater
valence. In an information economy, knowledge is a central input and the
production of knowledge, a pivotal activity. Governments are responsible for
ensuring that cognitive energies are effectively deployed in the pursuit of
knowledge. Such policies at this time are the equivalent of railroad construc-
tion and other transportation ventures in the 19th century.
There is no reason to believe that the "natural" outcome of the techno-
logical paradigm and of multinationals' activities will correspond to the
optimal situation for nationals. Indeed, there is a possibility that just as free
trade was an instrument of economic conquest for Britain in the 19th century
— some have labeled that strategy "the imperialism of free trade" — it might
be the same for large efficient economies in the 20th century. Managing our
trade might be a way out but it can only be done if powerful instruments can
be mustered.
During the debate on the free-trade arrangement between Canada and
the United States, there was a claim that sectors overtly protected by nontariff
barriers amounted to 34% of the market for American manufacturers; the
comparable figure for Canada appeared to be 10% (Science Council of Canada
1986). Given these figures, some people wonder why the Canadian govern-
ment appears to have abandoned so many levers on the S&T front: they would
appear to be most important in crafting an effective strategy. But governments
only echo, however inadequately, the sentiments of the citizenry. A 1985 survey
of senior executives in many countries revealed that "43% of Canadian man-
agers see innovation as an important management issue — an astoundingly
low figure compared to the world average of 90%" (Science Council of Canada
1986). It would appear that Canadians who have received their technology as
"manna" from the multinationals for a long period — two-thirds of Canadian
manufacturing is foreign controlled — do not yet see the central importance
of this variable and the need to explore alternatives. On this count, the
government appears to be in tune with the country's senior executives. I know
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of no single fact that underlines better the need to design a S&T policy in the
manner suggested above, i.e., though awareness-raising and transactive plan-
ning. Canada may be an extreme case but it is far from unique.
CONCLUSION
There is not likely to be a major change in the attitudes of Canadians vis-a-vis
S&T in the next while, unless something is done to raise their awareness. But
the existence of this blind spot reveals something more serious: a lack of
sensitivity to and concern for the new realm of policy areas that have become
central in a knowledge-based economy. The whole range of issues from
education, to the stock of knowledge, to innovation are only some aspects of
the workings of the forum. An information policy would provide a framework
on which to graft specific strategies on matters pertaining to education,
science, innovation, and the like.
The simple parachuting in of such a policy through some sort of episte-
mological coup d'etat would be futile, because the citizens of most Western
countries have not yet fully understood the importance of such issues in the
new economy. S&T policy is simply a policy about the production and distri-
bution of certain types of knowledge. It is only a part of a broader domain of
knowledge ranging from the artistic and the cultural to the political and the
technical. Without a national information policy (Nanus 1982) spelling out the
way in which the forum should be managed to be fair and adequate, it is not
possible to know what importance should be assigned to scientific and techno-
logical knowledge or to determine what should be produced, by whom, and in
what manner.
"The community has a great stake in the condition of its knowledge-cre-
ating and transmitting institutions, in its institutions for informing, discussing,
deliberating, deciding" (Tussman 1977). Yet citizens are not persuaded that
matters of the mind are important in a managerial sense for the public
household. To the extent that debates for freer trade succeed in revealing the
limits of market liberalization in a knowledge-based economy, it might be a
unique occasion to renew the multilogue on S&T policy that has been some-
what muted for the last decade.
PART II
SOCIAL LEARNING IN ACTION
B - NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
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CHAPTER 5
A SOCIAL LEARNING FRAMEWORK
FOR A WICKED PROBLEM:
THE CASE OF ENERGY*
The way to regulate well in times of great uncertainty is by learning
rather than controlling. Not learning the answers to known questions
that serve the intent to control but learning what questions about
balancing and optimizing now merit asking and then learning how
those questions might be answered provisionally — until the
present moment emerges into a new context of questions.
- Donald N. Michael (1983)
Mathematics and dogma often "serve as a substitute for the usually arduous
task of coming to grips with the actual phenomena" (Kapp 1960; Georgescu-
Roegen 1975). In the world of energy, there has been a flurry of dogma and
mathematical models, most often built on mechanical definitions of crises —
limited stocks of resources failing to meet unbounded wants. As might be
expected, this sort of analysis has triggered simplistic responses.
In Canada, energy issues have been styled in somewhat schizophrenic
terms. A dominant version of the problem has been perpetrated by economists:
it is couched in terms of shortages, pricing issues, supply/demand vagaries,
and efficiency losses when the market solution does not prevail. A parallel and
subsidiary sociopolitical version is also popular: it is couched in terms of needs,
rights, rent-sharing, etc.
Energy policy is both broader in scope and more complex than those two
interpretations suggest. It poses what has been called a wicked problem (Rittel
and Webber 1973). Wicked problems have two characteristics: the goals are
not known or are ambiguous, and the means-ends relationships are highly
uncertain and poorly understood. Solutions are not true-or-false but good-or-
bad. A meaningful response to the concerns raised by energy policy entails the
definition of legitimate and widely accepted rules capable of dealing effectively
(in physical, economic, social, and cultural senses) with future energy prob-
lems. This in turn requires a fuller understanding of what makes energy so
different as a commodity and of why it should require special rules.
* This paper also appeared in Energy Studies Review 1989, 1(1), 55-69.
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In the spring of 1987, the Energy Options Process (EOF) — initiated by
Marcel Masse, the federal minister of energy, mines, and resources — tried to
take an imaginative look at energy policy. Under the stewardship of Thomas
Kierans, this process culminated in a report tabled in Parliament in the
summer of 1988 (Kierans et al. 1988). The report was based on broad
consultation with the Canadian population; efforts were made to take into
account Canadian values, Canadian institutions, and even dimensions of the
Canadian psyche in the analysis. The resulting report made many specific
recommendations, but, more important, it put forward seven basic principles
that were meant to provide the foundation for a Canadian guidance system in
energy matters.
Many have disagreed with the outcome of this process and with the
recommendations that have emerged from it, but few would deny that the
process itself held promise of a new style of policy research adapted to wicked
problems. Some have labeled this new approach a social learning framework
(Friedmann and Abonyi 1976); it stresses learning and a transactive style of
planning.
In this chapter, the foundations of this social learning approach are
examined, and the four components of the social learning paradigm are
scrutinized, within the energy context, to show how easily one component
might come to dominate the policy analysis entirely, but also how well the four
components fit into an integrated framework. The extent to which the EOP
may be said to have been patterned on the sort of strategy suggested by that
integrated framework is discussed, and in conclusion, it is suggested that the
social learning approach might be applicable to a whole family of wicked
problems haunting policymakers and policy researchers.
TOWARD A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH
Construction of a Meta-rule
Defining a policy means establishing the basis for selecting certain procedures
or adopting certain strategies in the face of various plausible sets of environ-
mental circumstances. These procedures or strategies may be aimed at modi-
fying reality, perceptions, or preferences.
Defining an energy policy for Canada amounts to defining a meta-rule
likely to be useful in dealing with a variety of "futurs possibles" or futuribles. This
is akin to the development of guiding principles in the management of
projects. For instance, in the case of a major project like the construction of
the Trans-Manche Link — the tunnel between France and England — the key
guiding principles are contained in a 44-page project manual. Most firms
managing large projects have such simple compendia of meta-rules meant to
help in the crafting of the required rules of the game as the game unfolds.
What is needed in the energy field is something equivalent to a project manual.
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The poliq^ research underpinning the design of such a manual is particu-
larly challenging in cases like energy: the problem is wicked, i.e., ill-structured
(Ansoff 1960) and, therefore, standard policy research does not provide much
help. Friedmann and Abonyi (1976) have proposed an approach to deal with
these wicked problems. It is based on the analysis of four subprocesses (Figure 5
in Chapter 2): the construction of appropriate theories of reality (block A), the
formation of social values (block B), the gaming that leads to the design of
political strategies (block C), and the carrying out of collective action (block
D). These four interconnected subprocesses are components of social learning;
any change in one affects the others (Friedmann 1979).
Energy as Revelateur
Energy, some have argued, has a special importance in a northern country like
Canada because of its cold climate. For others, the federal-provincial quagmire
of rent-sharing and conflict resolution mechanisms, and the no-risk proclivities
of Canadians and their reluctance to accept costly adjustments in the face of
unstable markets have much to do with the priority given to energy on the
political agenda (Courchene 1980; Aharoni 1981; Trebilcock 1985).
Fundamentally, energy is creating a social risk in Canada or at least it is
perceived as such. As a result, it acts as a revelateur of Canadian culture. For
risk is a cultural concept: existing institutions select problems and risks worth
taking, they do the recognizing and the classifying (Douglas and Wildavsky
1982; Douglas 1986). Thus, energy cannot simply be analyzed within a market
context (in Friedmann and Abonyi's (1976) block-A-style) occluding other
dimensions buried in values, strategy, and action: all these dimensions must
be processed through an all-encompassing issue-machine. However, existing
institutions may be unwilling to recognize problems that threaten accepted
values or that might deconstruct hegemonic institutions. This explains their
structural amnesia (Clark and Munn 1986).
Nexus of Interconnected Problems
Energy raises many problems:
• allocative efficiency (pricing, finances, substitutability between energy
types/sources/uses and technologies, choices between domestic and for-
eign consumption, market failures);
• equity (regionally for consumers and governments, between nationals and
foreigners, on the upside and the downside of fluctuating prices, distribu-
tional impact on social groups);
• sociopolitical context (treaty obligations, constitutional and regulation-
induced constraints, differential adjustment costs and consequent diffe-
rential social burdens, security of supply, organizational failures, global
competition);
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• environment (broad and restricted contexts, secondary and tertiary use of
energy, exergy);
• industrial strategy (use of natural resources, including energy, as an
instrument of economic development and industrial location);
• public acceptance (sense of fairness, paranoias, learning, framing of
decisions).
The role of a framework is to impose some order on this nexus of problems,
to suggest institutional armistices between the world of physical realities and
constraints and the world of values, social concerns, political constraints, and
priorities. The meta-rules are a guide in this exercise of social architecture.
The framework sorts out what dimensions should play a leading role in the
definition of meta-rules. But no framework can be chosen on the basis of
objective criteria: the policymaker may either craft his own strategy (Mintzberg
1987) or defer to the stakeholders with their interest-based frameworks or to
the scientists with their disciplinary dogmas. In any case, the governance of
the policy research process is fundamentally dependent on some normative
input.
What may be expected from a meaningful consultation process is a
dialectic between the various stakeholders and the social architects (Perlmutter
1965). Under ideal circumstances, such dialectics should affect the emergence
of an integrative framework, the one that has the greatest heuristic power, that
generates the most social learning.
Useable Ignorance
When dealing with broad policy issues like energy, one cannot hope to produce
anything but incomplete answers. In the words of Alvin Weinberg (1972), in
policy research we are confronted with trans-scientific questions that cannot
be answered by science, they transcend science. Engineering and much of
policy science are plagued with such questions: answers may be unpractically
expensive, the subject matter too variable for scientific canons to apply, moral
and esthetic judgment may be involved (Weinberg 1972). What is required is
a new understanding built on "useable ignorance" for "by being aware of our
ignorance, we do not encounter disastrous pitfalls in our supposedly secure
knowledge or supposedly effective technique... institutions should be designed
with the ignorance factor in mind, so that they can respond and adapt in good
time" (Collingridge 1982; Ravetz 1986).
Coping with ignorance requires a more transactive and transparent policy
process and, therefore, a change in the way in which policy research is carried
out. It has been argued that the transaction costs of running such a system are
high. This is true but unavoidable. Moreover, when compared with the costs
of inappropriate responses based on inappropriate policies, these transaction
costs may not appear unduly high.
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ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS
The selection rule for a framework is simple: the one chosen should have the
maximum heuristic and learning power. This is the least objectionable way to
choose normatively in the policy field. Yet, it is not a criterion that prevails in
most academic discussions on energy. Economists have hijacked the energy
problem. If energy is an ordinary commodity, one may count on the market,
so the argument goes, to allocate it as efficiently as possible, and there is no
need for an energy policy. However, to the extent that energy is not an ordinary
commodity, that it has external and asymmetric effects on the rest of the
socioeconomy of such a magnitude that it has to be regulated for socioeco-
nomic reasons, then frameworks other than strict allocative efficiency schemes
have to be used.
In our socioeconomies, efficiency is not a widely accepted goal: there are
other values that society holds in higher esteem, and the political system
responds much better to the strongly held viewpoint of powerful interest
groups than to the anonymous and diffuse unease of the masses. This is the
key to re-election. Any meaningful policy research must, therefore, be rooted
in an integrated approach capable of accommodating to a great extent these
other dimensions to be politically effective and widely accepted socially.
Efficiency Frameworks
To economists, energy is a commodity that, despite particular characteristics,
may be analyzed through the usual market framework (Gordon 1981). Suppli-
ers and demanders are operating in a matrix of markets for different forms of
energy. It is argued that these markets, left to themselves, would allocate energy
efficiently between competing uses. As supporting evidence, it is argued that
price increases in the 1970s have generated a drop in consumption directly,
but also through the switch to energy-economizing technologies. All scenarios
indicate that this is to continue into the 1990s (Barney et al. 1981: 98-121;
CEPII, 1984: Chapter 6). On the production side, scale economies and fixed
costs arguments have been used to argue that some regulation may be neces-
sary. But these arguments have been shown to be not as powerful and as easily
generalizable as had been first suggested. Consequently, many have argued
that the competitive system is working and that whatever problems there are
can often be ascribed to ill-inspired government policy interventions.
The only legitimate challenges in this context are the identification of
market failures, and the only legitimate energy policies are those crafted to
attenuate them or compensate for them. These policies have been directed at
production rates (directly through public ownership, regulation, or decrees,
or indirectly through tax benefits), the control of imports, regulation of prices
(either directly or through subsidies), and energy consumption patterns (either
directly through rationing or through moral or financial incentives).
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Issues like self-sufficiency, public acceptance, long-run global change,
province-building, etc., are characterized as aberrations and styled as impedi-
ments to the smooth working of the allocative efficiency machine. Policy
analysis in this context recedes to the level of advanced plumbing.
Dominant Value Frameworks
Here, energy is a very special commodity: an ingredient in the socioeconomic
system that contributes significantly to the pursuit of some value-based objec-
tives — equity, environmental imperatives, regional/sectional pursuits, etc.
The dominant values, whatever they are, frame the energy problem: energy-
related issues are reordered in a manner derived from them.
No dominant value framework can claim to be a guidance system in
studying energy issues, or in sorting out energy policy options unless one can
persuasively argue that there is a clearly demonstrable link between energy
and the dominant value, but also that such a value is of primary importance
for the population, that there is a close link between the dominant value or
values and the energy welfare of individuals, and that there are some needs
that have to be met. The concept of needs is not easy to use in policy analysis.
It always appears tainted by some paternalism because needs are often defined
by experts, externally. They are also fluid, clumsy, difficult to ascertain. But it
is a central concept in dominant value frameworks, and the practical use of
needs appears to be possible (Friedmann 1979; Ignatieff 1985; Braybrooke
1987).
Such externally defined needs provide a guidance system both for a
research program and for the design of policy. They replace the free-wheeling
crafting forces of money-backed preferences registered by the market as a list
of priorities to be met at a minimum standard before preferences are allowed
to have their way. To allow needs to be satisfied, policy instruments and
institutions have to be set up, for there is a presumption that the market will
not do the job automatically in a satisfactory manner (Willson 1980; Robinson
1982).
A common data set (from Friedmann and Abonyi's [1976] block A) can
yield quite different political strategies (block C) and programs (block D) if
interpreted through different value filters (block B).
It has been argued that, in a northern climate, within a balkanized polity
where many governments have explicit development strategies and in a society
that has a strong taste for security, there are energy needs that should be
considered as a priority. This is tantamount to calling for meta-rules of a
distributional sort when scarcity occurs. Because the energy-producing endow-
ment is spread over the territory in a whimsical manner, and the energy needs
(not only for immediate consumption but also for economic development) are
located very differently, reallocation and redistribution are necessary.
The dominant value frameworks call for a broadening of the concept of
property rights: from rights to material things (that markets handle well) to
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rights to "a certain quality of life, certain liberties to develop and enjoy the use
of our capacities" (Macpherson 1985). The research program would originate
with a clarification of the dominant values that are to act as guiding forces.
This can be achieved first through some historical analyses illustrating the way
in which Canadians have chosen to socialize risk, how the sense of shared
parsimony and mutual obligation within the Canadian community has been
instituted (Hardin 1974). Second, one might also identify values revealed to
be important to Canadians by some mental experiments that have received
wide public support like the conserver society or the sustainable development
programs (Science Council of Canada 1977; Clark and Munn 1986; Robinson
1987). These values (environmental protection, increased wisdom in resource
use, socioenvironmental diversity/flexibility/responsibility, importance of so-
ciopolitical values as equity, cooperation, participation, etc.) could be the
starting point for developing scenarios to be evaluated for acceptability.
Such a research program would have a long-run bias. Block B variables
(social values) would play the leading role: in the final analysis, markets would
be allowed to operate only to the extent that they would serve the genesis of
some fair outcome, however defined. Yet, intolerably expensive values would
have to be discarded because of the constraints they would impose on any
feasible scheme.
Gaming Frameworks
Another family of frameworks focus on the political choice processes of
stakeholders, the design of the mechanisms for dialogue or struggle. Even in
the simplest case, when it is assumed by all that government should manage
the "commons" — however defined — to meet certain needs and that regu-
lated markets should take care of the rest, a key question remains: how should
the design for state institutions (to perform these jobs) be arrived at? Such
frameworks focus on process, on the definition of the public administra-
tion/regulation schemes and the design of feasible regulatory forms (Mitnick
1980).
In such schemes, energy is identified as "something" that cannot be
entrusted fully to the unregulated market because sociopolitical groups have
said so: unlike the dominant value frameworks where energy is singled out
because of its social importance, here it is singled out because of its political
features. A research program based on such frameworks starts with the pre-
vailing rules of the politico-administrative game to understand who the
stakeholders are, what form of pluralist political choice mechanism is viable,
and what administrative arrangements are likely to get the agreement of the
community. These arrangements define a "collective game which exists inde-
pendently of the individual games played by each of the organizations"
(Crozier and Thoenig 1976).
This administrative game is not contractual, democratic, or simply hier-
archical. It is a political/bureaucratic game built on simplified notions of
efficiency and effectiveness and on the very sketchy account of basic social
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values recorded by the political/bureaucratic agents. It is not geared to pursue
objectives or purposes, but rather to accommodate all forces into a game of
dispute settlement or spoils-sharing. This regulatory game is played at many
levels. The gaming research framework focuses on ways to
...understand the games which are played at the bottom of the system. Then
it proceeds to discover and reconstruct the more general mode of regulation
through which these games are articulated to one another. Finally, it tries to
ascertain the basic mode of government and the values that make it possible
for the system to exist by legitimizing these rules. [Crozier and Thoenig
1976]
These frameworks are rooted in block C variables, i.e., the family of
interacting public agencies harmonizing variables of blocks A and B: from
international and interprovincial accords to regulate transborder flows of
energy and ensure security of supply; to rules on the ownership or manage-
ment of the energy resources; to rent-sharing, symmetric obligation, and
equalization rules between the federal and provincial governments and other
stakeholders; to energy conservation programs.
The overall energy game (with its cross-controls and exceptions) acquires
a momentum of its own that has little bearing on or connection with what is
physically at stake. This is the world of lobbying. Energy is no longer seen as
just a resource: it is an entitlement, an idea — both in the sense of a futurible,
like the development of oil sands, and in the sense of a lottery prize. The game
becomes a game of bluff— very much like some operations on futures markets.
A research program focused only on fiscal principles, studies of concepts like
level-playing-field, models of rent-sharing, etc., would allow political/admin-
istrative gimmickry to take precedence over substantial issues. The discussion
would degenerate into plumbing, albeit plumbing of a more complex variety
than the sort highlighted by efficiency frameworks.
Collective Action Frameworks
Although political strategies and stratagems are elaborated from above or from
the centre, much is happening at the periphery. Individuals, groups, and clubs
experiment with ways to cope with their natural and manufactured environ-
ment. The logic of this experimentation is learning, and its outcome is
collective action, i.e., purposive action by groups.
These groups may be large or small, woven by meaningful dialogues or by
the challenge of common struggles. They make up the fabric of civil society.
This multicentric or reticular social fabric is occluded in the stylizations
proposed by administrative or market-centred models: life at the periphery is
branded marginal or christened "alternative life style" to be conveniently
written off the main record. These conceptual and political blinders have been
exposed (Ramos 1981), but few social scientists have paid any attention to the
critiques.
In the energy world, this peripheral reality is extraordinarily rich: ecolo-
gists, sustainable development specialists, those interested in community
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development, survival, convivial relations, grants economy theorists, etc. For
those defending the conventional wisdom, these groups represent a "lunatic
fringe" to the "real" political economy. The revival of wood stoves, wind power,
and solar energy, experiments with less energy-intensive life styles, etc., are
phenomena that do not find their way into the mainstream of the process of
social learning.
The differences between political/administrative gaming frameworks and
collective action frameworks are important. The output of the former is a
policy or plan fanned out from the centre and armed with monitoring devices
and enforcement mechanisms. The latter's output is experimentation through
"a network of related processes of local public learning" and the derivation of
policy themes by induction. In the political/administrative framework, per-
formance is measured by the degree of conformity of the periphery; the
collective action scheme is built on local knowledge, public learning, and the
diffusion of innovation (Schon 1971; Geertz 1983).
An Integrated Framework
These four families of frameworks are partial maps of the world of interest to
policy analysts. If a research exercise is to be a form of social action or social
learning, it has to ensure that its research framework casts a very wide net over
the whole terrain des operations. It is the only way in which the research program
can produce a sense of direction (Gastil 1972). This comprehensive program
must take fully into account allocative efficiency, social values, political strata-
gems, and collective action in a general integrative scheme if an energy system
with a high degree of goodness of fit with its circumstances is to ensue.
Policy analysts should not embalm or mummify the problem at hand
through an orgy of unrealistic assumptions. Policy research in the social
learning paradigm is reflection-in-action (Schon 1983), its intent is to invent
the right institutional form by eliminating incongruities between institution
and circumstances. This is the way the potter crafts his work, the way medical
doctors pursue negatively the maintenance of health through elimination of
illnesses (Alexander 1964). Policy is very much in the nature of design: in the
words of Christopher Alexander (1964: 26-27),
We are searching for some kind of harmony between two intangibles: a form
which we have not yet designed, and a context which we cannot properly
describe. The only reason we have for thinking that there must be some kind
of fit to be achieved between them is that we can detect incongruities, or
negative instances of it.
Policy research, like design research, is intent on producing a different kind
of knowledge — delta knowledge — the sort of knowledge acquired through
learning by doing (Gilles and Paquet 1991).
Henry Mintzberg (1987) has borrowed from potters the apt metaphor
"crafting strategy." "Formulation and implementation merge into a fluid
process of learning": the need to maintain a continuous feedback between
analysis and problem-formulation is central in both design and policy work.
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This sort of social experimentation is not a new outillage mental; it was pro-
pounded by John Dewey (1935) under the general labels of "experimental
intelligence" and "socially organized intelligence." Others have referred to this
learning process as transduction (Lefebvre 1961). Still others propose such an
approach to deal with ill-structured problems (Ansoff 1960; Paquet 1971). But
it was a path abandoned by social scientists when they became totally seduced
by positivism.
THE ENERGY OPTIONS PROCESS
An initiative like the energy options process (EOF) was not a sui generis
phenomenon. It followed an era of centralization of the design of energy policy
under the Trudeau government (Doern and Toner 1985) and corresponded
to the philosophy of openness and consultation propounded by the Mulroney
government after the 1984 election and evidenced by the process that led to
the three accords (the Atlantic Accord, the Western Accord and the Agreement
on Natural Gas Markets and Prices in 1985). This Tory energy program had
clearly indicated a commitment to nonintervention in the market — a central
feature of the Western Accord (Toner 1986). Moreover, in 1987, there was a
clear sense that consultation could be carried out without major risks — that
it was a controllable process — after the "happy policy" of 1985.
Yet, much in the design of the EOF held the promise of introducing a new
style of policy research and national dialogue akin to the social learning
approach. The advisory committee and the advisory groups selected for the
EOF were not made up entirely of narrow specialists on physical energy
questions; environmental groups, interest groups, and critical individuals were
offered an opportunity to air their views, and the process of consultation was
orchestrated in such a way as to allow a major forum for interaction among all
the stakeholders in December 1987 in Montreal. Even the final report could
have broken new ground: it was structured on the basis of an explicit energy
policy framework that, we were told, had effectively been used to frame the
recommendations.
Yet, the final report leaves any reader who expected a major policy
breakthrough with a sense of disappointment. The EOF was a controlled
exercise in policy that was unwilling to delve much beyond block A issues, to
be attentive to local knowledge, to listen carefully enough to what Canadians
said and to draw inferences from it. Indeed the central weakness of the report
was a refusal to acknowledge the fundamental contradiction between the
commitment to the market and the commitment to sustainable development.
For this latter commitment can only translate into an expanded role for the
state.
The final report developed a framework of principles that represents a
sanitized version of the discourse of Canadians: it ensured the hegemony of
efficiency considerations. Cognitive dissonance loomed large. People not only
have preferences but beliefs, and preferences about their beliefs. Consequently,
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they are often led to choose their beliefs subconsciously (despite evidence
suggesting that the contrary view is warranted) by choosing sources of infor-
mation likely to confirm their "desired" beliefs and shutting out information
challenging these beliefs (Akerlof and Dickens 1982). In a way, the EOF has
"chosen to believe" that efficiency considerations were the hegemonic ones.
The EOF report was dominated by efficiency considerations to the point
of occluding other perspectives or of minimizing unduly the importance of the
concerns they raised. The broader integrated policy research framework that
one had hoped might be used has not been, and the interactive planning that
one might legitimately have expected to emerge from this experiment, has not
materialized. Finally, the proposed meta-rules turned out not to provide the
sort of guidance system likely to be of use in meeting the challenges of the next
"energy crisis."
Eliciting Inadequate Meta-rules
The EOF was meant to be an "opportunity for a dialogue," for a multilogue,
"among Canadians about our common energy future" (Kierans et al. 1988: 1).
Indeed, "A Canadian Dialogue" was the subtitle of the whole EOF. So, from
the very first page of the report, there was an effort to summarize what
Canadians said (WCS). This can be synthesized as follows:
• WCS 1: Energy "cannot be treated just like any other market commodity"
(p. 1).
• WCS 2: "Energy policy must be founded on Canadian values" (p. 2).
• WCS 3: Energy efficiency is important and markets are "invaluable instru-
ments" to achieve efficiency and "governments should intervene in the
allocation process only to correct serious market imperfections or failures"
(p. 6).
• WCS 4: Instruments used to achieve an appropriate degree of equity or
fairness in income distribution should be developed but they should be
as nondiscriminatory as possible, be based on federal-provincial cooper-
ation, and be such as to keep as much as possible the rules of the game
stable (pp. 7-8).
• WCS 5: Energy policy should be developed on the basis of the general
objective of "sustainable development" (pp. 8-9).
• WCS 6: Development and implementation of new technologies should be
factored in (pp. 9-10).
As the report itself acknowledges (p. 10), such a summary of views cannot
do justice to the wealth of information presented to the EOF. Yet, on what basis
can one challenge the validity of this sort of perilous exercise? Would it be
warranted to do so on the basis of one's impression of the cathartic December
1987 synthesis meeting? Yet, this is the ground on which my counter-impres-
sions are based: the official summary of "what Canadians said" does not convey
as fully as one might have wished the array of concerns heard at the final
Montreal meeting.
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Concerns over energy needs, over redistribution rules in times of crisis,
and over security of supply were prominent; debates over notions of fairness,
over acceptable forms of regulation, and over an acceptable degree of sociali-
zation of risks were very much present. Conservation as a supply option ("a
unit of energy saved is a unit of energy found") and the need to mobilize the
population to conserve were important messages conveyed in December 1987.
The "time myopia of the price mechanism" and "free trade as a blind tyrant"
were also central concerns. Little of this can be found in the summary of what
Canadians said. Cognitive dissonance has been at work.
From this partly muted message from Canadians, the EOF attempted to
construct "a report on the direction of future energy policy in Canada that
would reflect the best of all that had been written and said throughout the
Energy Options Process" (p. 10). This is the source of the seven principles or
meta-rules (MRs), each one being the central topic of a subsequent chapter in
the report. It is worth restating these seven principles:
• MR 1: "Canada's energy should be developed and used to its economic
potential to provide growth and prosperity for Canadians today and in the
future."
• MR 2: "Energy security is best sought in ways that increase energy choices
and enhance adaptability to change rather than by hoarding or by gov-
ernment forcing uneconomic development. At the same time, Canada
should cooperate internationally and maintain domestic emergency meas-
ures against possible oil supply disruptions."
• MR 3: "Environmental goals should be accorded the same importance as
other economic and social goals in the planning, development and use of
energy."
• MR 4: "To achieve efficient allocation of energy resources, market mecha-
nisms should be relied upon wherever possible and enhanced where
necessary."
• MR 5: "The fiscal system, as it applied to energy, should raise and spend
revenues in ways that are nondiscriminatory, neutral, stable and predict-
able, and that promote harmony among governments."
• MR 6: "Enhancing the economic efficiency with which energy is used
should be an essential component of energy policy, both to make the best
use of energy and to reduce environmental impact."
• MR 7: "Commitment to research and development and management of
technology is critical to enhancing Canada's energy choices and environ-
mental quality into the 21st century."
One cannot fail to detect a narrowing of perspective when the meta-rules
are compared with "what Canadians said." In the meta-rules list,
• The efficiency framework is raised to a higher level of prominence.
• Concern for relevant dominant values is almost exclusively limited to the
recognition of environmental values on a par with other economic and
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social values; yet the extent to which such other values would appear to
raise fundamental questions for the proposed market solution is occluded.
• The political gaming and public administration aspects of energy policy
are handled without much depth: government intervention in general is
played down; moreover, a technical rationality model of policy (from the
centre down) appears to prevail if and when state activities are allowed.
• Concerns about local knowledge, learning, collective action, and imple-
mentation are virtually obliterated; the dialogue stops short of the imple-
mentation phase.
The overriding concern for efficiency, and the consequent reliance on
markets as the main instrument to ensure efficiency, are the foundation of these
meta-rules. This raises serious questions. It is difficult to see how these
meta-rules could be of use as a project manual in times of crisis: nowhere does
one get a sense that they could guide an effective dynamic monitoring or
provide anything but rather inert leadership in times of crisis.
Four Components Out of Kilter
Why have block A (theory of reality) issues come to dominate the scene so
completely? Fundamentally, because of the fact that the EOF did not emerge
from a policy vacuum. It was constrained by the Tory policy framework. As a
result, the EOF has refused to accept WCS 1 as a meaningful statement;
whatever the rhetoric, the EOF regards energy as a market commodity like any
other. Consequently, markets are seen as well adjusted to handling it, and the
burden of proof is shifted entirely onto those who claim that the market is
unlikely to do an adequate job overall.
Dominant values are almost completely overshadowed by the many refer-
ences to choice. The word "choice" is used, throughout the report (Kierans et
al. 1988), both as a dominant value — let people choose — and as a synonym
for "market" (p. 43), for markets are seen as the best way, if not the only way,
to operationalize choice. Moreover, "market" and "economy" become almost
interchangeable notions and "non-market economy" appears somewhat sus-
pect: MRs 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 end up hinting at the market institution as the
solution. This is not only the case for "normal times": little emphasis is put on
emergency preparedness and vigilance, environmental concerns, research
needs. These are mentioned, but they are handled by marginal exhortations
in the whole script. These exhortations are made in connection with elusive
times of crisis, improbable eventualities when market mechanisms might lead
to excessive exports, cases where markets might be blind to environmental
points-of-no-return or to research needs.
What emerges is a sense that social values and collective action are bound
to be handled adequately by the market and that there is simply a need for
minimal and nondisturbing government intervention of a traditional market-
failure variety. Such action is, in any case, seen as a lower priority adequately
dealt with by a refurbished National Energy Board.
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The little time spent on spelling out exactly what a refurbished National
Energy Board might be asked to do is symptomatic of the philosophy under-
pinning the EOF report. There is little in the report that would appear to
indicate what new role the board might undertake, no hint that such a role
might entail a radically different type of regulatory operation. There is no
indication of any awareness in the report that regulation has taken a new turn
over the last decades and that a refurbished energy board might have to
become a negotiating tribunal not simply an administrative ruler (Paquet
1978b). There is also little sensitivity to the central role of norms and values
in this new sort of gaming: no awareness that the negotiating will have to be
conducted over more than efficiency concerns, that it will have to be done over
values and not only environmental values.
Finally, there is no effort to root any of this process in basic local knowledge
and civil society; no need is felt for anything but the market as an institutional
contraption to gather information and coordinate activities at the periphery.
The market model flattens this rich underlying social reality. There is no need
to encourage local experimentation as the market mops up all the information
worth having in this commodity world. Indeed, the most depressing aspect of
the EOF report is that, after having posited in the very first pages the necessity
of building an energy policy on Canadian values and a Canadian dialogue (p.
2), the outcome might be said to have evacuated concern for values and
dialogue.
Much of the reductionism of the EOF is ascribable to an emphasis on
energy output. A focus on production processes (exploration, transformation),
which have multiphase and multidimensional impacts, would have led to a
shift away from the fixation on choice to a larger concern for design intervention.
Moreover, there seems to be little awareness in the report, as it espouses
economic deregulation, of the interplay between economic and social regula-
tory dynamics: as economic deregulation proceeds, there is a strong push for
some social regulation to ensure that the social costs of the market coordinating
mechanism are prevented from growing unduly (Doern 1989).
Implementation Vacuum
The poor coverage of blocks B, C, and D issues — or rather the virtual
suppression of these dimensions in the EOF report — sanctions the hegem-
ony of the market as the response to the energy issue. This explains the lack
of emphasis on implementation: there is no need to worry about implemen-
tation as there is no policy to be implemented. Quasi-laissez-faire has become
the norm and it absolves the policy research scheme from any responsibility
in attending to the implementation agenda, because the automatic pilot will
take care of most of the problems, and the rest of the agenda, to which
government must attend, is so dramatically reduced that no extensive discus-
sion is necessary.
This is an energy policy by immaculate conception and one that requests
little in the form of fanning from the centre. The reciprocal is also true: because
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the market mechanism adequately takes into account the wishes, desires, wants,
and values of citizens, there is no need to experiment, to design mechanisms
to promote learning from local experiments, or to organize public learning.
The EOF has not sketched a process of dynamic interaction between the
stakeholders (and between planners and plannees) likely to continue the
dialogue it was meant to initiate, and it has not suggested a mechanism for
such a dialogue. Neither do the recommendations propose a process of
dynamic monitoring allowing strong feedback from the periphery. Yet, without
a strong feedback mechanism, there is little possibility of learning or of ever
dealing reasonably with wicked problems: social experimentation is stunted
and, if and when it does occur, there is little chance of fanning its results over
the system. There is no socially organized intelligence to guide the process of
norm holding and implementation (Paquet 1971).
A Provisional Evaluation
A standard way of looking at policymaking has identified four areas of concern:
goal setting, control, innovation, and intelligence (Wilensky 1967). The tradi-
tional approach to policymaking has largely emphasized the first two compo-
nents because the problems being dealt with were rather well-structured: goals
could be defined and means—ends relationships ascertained. In dealing with
ill-structured or wicked problems, an alternative approach is called for — one
that puts the emphasis on the last two components: intelligence as the basis
for an innovative learning process.
Those promoting the EOF knew that they were tackling a wicked problem
and that such problems cannot be effectively addressed using a traditional
approach. One might reasonably expect that an alternative approach would
have been used:
Since the problem formulation itself is open, the evaluative function involves
designing an information system to provide the medium for effective feed-
back between analysis and problem formulation. The interplay between
norm-setting, goal-setting, course-holding, control on functioning, and or-
ganizational and institutional innovations becomes fundamentally depend-
ent on organizational intelligence. [Paquet 1971: 54]
The EOF has produced an incomplete statement on energy issues. It has
done much to launch a process of policymaking by defining guiding principles
— and for this EOF must be praised — but those principles have been too
narrowly defined to provide adequate guidance for navigation in turbulent
times. Moreover, little has been done to ensure that the sort of dialogue that
EOF has originated will continue. As a result, it is unlikely that this report will
have much impact. Cut from an implementation phase likely to bring with it
new learning, it will dry up very much like any tree cut off from its roots.
EOF has failed. It has not set up the organizational intelligence likely to
generate a genuine learning process. It may have held hopes that it would do
so, but it has not delivered the goods. A wicked problem has been approached
as if it were a well-structured problem: simple norms have been declared goals
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and a simple control mechanism — the market — (sometime aided by the
National Energy Board) has been declared sufficient to guide the policy in the
right direction. This choice of research strategy may be regarded as hardly
surprising by some cynics: it was predictable given the thrust of the Tory energy
policy. But because of great early expectations that EOF might adopt an
alternative approach and set up the basis for a continuous dialogue with
Canadians, disappointment has been all the greater in the end.
Some have suggested that, through the dual channels of ongoing consul-
tation among federal and provincial energy ministers and a follow-up on the
EOF report by the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Energy,
Mines and Resources, the EOF might get its second wind. This is unduly
optimistic. The EOF report is unlikely to fuel a sustained and fruitful debate
in either forum for the very reasons we mention above.
CONCLUSION
It is not sufficient for the wise owl to tell the grasshopper that to avoid the
severe pains of winter, he simply has to turn himself into a cricket and
hibernate. The client might legitimately ask how one goes about performing
that metamorphosis (Bennis et al. 1961). Thus, one might ask about the likely
contours of a research program and of an energy policy designed along the
lines suggested above. On the other hand, as social learning can only come
with practice and action, it is not possible to spell out completely ex ante a
design for policy-in-the-making.
Therefore, we cannot sketch what problem formulation might have been
generated by a learning process that has not been set in motion nor what policy
outcome might have ensued. The history of most policies over time is a sort
of ongoing dialogue between planners and plannees. The great limitation of
a policy framework that does not build on this and provide a forum for such
exchanges is that it is bound to become dated very quickly and that the best
features of this arrested plan are likely to be lost in the process of evolution.
Some of the great successes in policymaking have come out of a liberation
from the fixation on goals and controls and from a gamble on process and a
well-managed forum. Geoffrey Vickers (1965) has taken the lead in the analysis
of policymaking in this way, but there have also been interesting initiatives in
Canada (Law Reform Commission). However, this view is not yet widely held.
Problems are often wicked, and the design of a learning system is the only
way to break the artificial barrier between problem formulation and the process
of implementation. In the alternative approach, both components merge
smoothly into each other and an evolutionary way of handling issues becomes
the norm. The same process has been shown to work in private decision-mak-
ing (Schon 1983). It may not be as tidy as dogma or mathematics would edict,
but it has the definite advantage of dealing with actual phenomena.
CHAPTER 6
THE ENVIRONMENT-ENERGY INTERFACE:
SOCIAL LEARNING VERSUS
THE INVISIBLE FOOT*
Despite all the pleasant rhetoric at the last Houston Summit and the formal
negotiations between the United States and Canada regarding acid rain,
neither government is resolved to taking a strong stand on the energy and
environment issues they face. Both governments welcome additional studies,
and negotiated agreements between the two countries are welcome as a
progressive approach to the solution of current environmental problems —
mainly in response to the intense public concern and media attention — but
these issues are not very high on the political agenda of either government.
The lack of congruence between rhetoric and action is attributable to the
acute economic problems experienced by both countries and, in particular, to
the shadow their huge budget deficits cast on any initiative likely to be costly
in terms of public funds. In addition, there is still an immense amount of
ignorance and uncertainty about both the real energy challenges facing North
America and the real costs of "green-type" initiatives suggested by environmen-
talists. Not only is there no precise measure of the price Canadians and
Americans are willing to pay to achieve energy sovereignty and to meet the
environmental standards they purport to defend, but there has also been little
evidence to indicate that they are willing to accept important sacrifices. Finally,
much of the inertia on the policy front is also a result of the extraordinary
tension between the natural myopia of politicians (whose time horizon rarely
extends beyond four years) and corporate leaders (whose loyalty is to quarterly
earnings and sound bottom lines) and the essentially long-term nature of
energy and environment issues.
The recent period of intense negotiations between Canada and the United
States leading to the Free Trade Agreement has focused the attention of
officials of both countries on the long term and on strategies for sharing their
energy and environmental resources. This continental solidarity might be
expected to increase concern over the prudent use of resources, but this has
proved too optimistic a forecast. The only commitments emanating from the
* This paper also appeared inj. Lemco (editor). The Canada-United States Relationship. Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1992, pp. 129-151.
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Free Trade Agreement discussions on the energy/environment front pertain to
a continental sharing of energy in what is still regarded by both parties as the
unlikely event of a crisis (risk-sharing amounting to little more than a minimal
insurance policy) and to a continuing interest in educating their citizens about
the realities and costs of environmental problems.
While policy discussions flounder, political choices are still being made
daily by governments, corporations, and citizens to effectively craft an overall
policy stance. This de facto policy on both sides of the border puts priority on
market mechanisms as the appropriate means for handling energy production
and for ensuring viable environmental quality. Experts have argued repeatedly
that national policies of a more ambitious sort are unwarranted and would be
counterproductive for the problems are ill-structured, the policy goals are
unclear, the technological future is less than transparent, and governments in
both countries are still too ignorant about energy and environmental issues to
experiment effectively with various policies. Only a substantial deterioration
in environmental quality or an increase in energy prices appears likely to force
both countries to question their total reliance on markets and lead them to
craft the necessary international and intersectoral arrangements capable of
reflecting critical trade-offs on the energy/environment front. In the meantime,
there is a policy vacuum.
A POLICY VACUUM
Despite the lack of explicit environment/energy policies on both sides of the
border, the casual reader of the popular press probably has the impression that
the United States did not craft an energy policy in the 1980s while Canada did.
This is a result of the attention that accompanied Canada's National Energy
Program (NEP) in 1980. In fact, after the world oil price shock of 1973-74,
both the United States and Canada developed temporary policies to cushion
their citizens from spiraling prices. Only in 1981 did the United States move
away from such arrangements toward deregulation; Canada did not follow suit
until 1985 when a change in government occurred (Watkins 1987). On the
environmental policy front, the two countries have been somewhat out of sync,
but they are drifting in the same general direction. In the United States, a
concerted effort to promote environmental policy strategies was developed in
the 1970s, but was relaxed in the 1980s. In Canada, the policy thrust was much
weaker in the 1970s and today remains largely unfocused.
There are many reasons for these choices and the same underlying forces
are likely to continue to influence policies in the 1990s. Taking them into
account is crucial if one is to attempt to gauge future policy trends.
Energy
There are a number of reasons why the United States has no effective energy
policy: the lack of a stable focus for energy concerns in the American legislative
system; the sharp ideological infighting between advocates of public power
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and the free marketeers; the absence of a strong, coordinated leadership on
the issues; and so on. But perhaps the most convincing explanation is that
throughout the 1970s and 80s, there was a lack of consensus among the
American population as to "what ought to be done on energy" (Uslaner 1987).
In the absence of government intervention in the pursuit of explicit goals,
officials have simply allowed the market to become the main referee. Thus, a
de facto market-based energy policy evolved in the United States.
In Canada, the NEP was crafted in 1980 following decades of explicit
government intervention on the energy front (Doern and Phidd 1983). Energy
had become a vital issue to government officials during the 1980 election, and,
from that campaign, one could infer the existence of a clear "national division"
on this issue. The newly elected Trudeau government, which received almost
all of its support from the eastern and central provinces, imposed a number
of important constraints on energy producers in the western provinces (Doern
and Toner 1985). This policy was not the result of a national consensus, but
rather of a coup de force by one of the two national coalitions of interests.
However, when Jean Chretien replaced Marc Lalonde as minister of energy in
1983, the policy climate had shifted as a result of the disastrous consequences
of the NEP on investment in the energy sector. A greater willingness to consult
and bargain with western energy interests evolved. By the time the Mulroney
government ended its first term of office in 1988, any lingering effect of the
NEP had evaporated.
In fact, by 1988, government officials in both Canada and the United
States had built up a rationale for nonintervention in the energy field. In the
spring of 1987, Canada's federal minister of energy, mines, and resources,
Marcel Masse, all but admitted that there was a policy void when he charged
a special committee with responsibility for consulting the Canadian population
to determine appropriate directions for Canadian energy policy. This task
force, under the stewardship of Thomas Kierans, submitted its report in 1988
(Kierans et al. 1988; Paquet, this volume, Chapter 5). The report urged, in a
general way, the adoption of a market approach and the continuation of a
policy of nonintervention. There was understandably no follow-up to the
Kierans report, for it called for no real public action. "No explicit policy" had
become the policy on the energy front in both Canada and the United States.
It would be hard, therefore, to predict what strategies Canada or the
United States would adopt in the event of a new energy crunch, especially given
the fact that their recent Free Trade Agreement has further reduced the real
possibility and, therefore, the likelihood of unilateral efforts to promote a
national energy policy on either side of the border.
Environment
Officials in Canada and the United States, as in many other countries, have
been conscious of environmental issues for quite a long time. Between 1968
and 1978, some 150 governments created departments of the environment or
their equivalent (Roots 1988). Canada and the United States were leaders in
112 GOVERNANCE THROUGH SOCIAL LEARNING
this pack: the United States created the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in 1970 and Canada created its Department of Environment (DOE) the
following year.
This early interest did not fare well through the second oil price shock and
the recession of the early 1980s which influenced a systematic decrease in
spending on environmental protection (Regens and Rycroft 1989). However,
environmental issues have become prominent again since 1987, due mainly to
increased awareness generated by the report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission), which out-
lined the necessary steps to environmentally sustainable economic develop-
ment for the planet by the year 2000 and beyond (Brundtland 1987). However,
this awareness has not yet been translated into meaningful policy proposals.
The reasons for such inertia are simple: there is a substantial amount of
soft grassroots support for environmental policies, but the political costs of
action in the face of much ignorance and great uncertainty appear to be much
higher than the economic costs of inaction. Political decision-making is con-
cerned with short-term cost-benefit analysis, and, in the short term, tough
environmental regulation is bound to hurt many polluting industries and,
therefore, to affect the employment and income of voters. Yet in the longer
haul, the losses attributable to environment degradation affecting crops, soils,
aquatic ecosystems, forests, and human and animal life are seemingly cata-
strophic. At this point, the short-term time horizon of politicians has stacked
the deck against longer-term environmental policies.
In Canada, the creation of a department of environment could be regarded
as a package of "positional policies" to "signal to affected groups and the
attentive public that emerging problems have been recognized and are being
dealt with" (Adie and Thomas 1982). But during the subsequent periods of
economic difficulties, environmental concerns were displaced by priorities
such as budget deficit cutting and international competitiveness imperatives.
Although the DOE retains its symbolic value, there is little room for substantial
and meaningful action in the current system despite the strong statements of
Lucien Bouchard, who was minister of the environment until his resignation
in 1990.
Indeed, the fact that the environment portfolio has been handed, albeit
temporarily, to the minister responsible for the Treasury Board, Robert de
Cotret, appears to confirm that it no longer represents an autonomous
generative policy locus. A "framework for discussion on the environment" has
been issued — the so-called Green Plan (Bouchard 1990) — and a truncated
and unsatisfactory national consultation has been hurried through the govern-
ment. Yet the political and economic resources allocated to environmental
protection continue to diminish, and whatever momentum might have been
injected into the policymaking process by the former minister has all but
evaporated with his departure.
In the United States, the terms of the environmental debate have been
more explicit as the confrontation between ecologists and certain environmen-
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tally-unfriendly industries developed earlier. A measure of ethical environmen-
talism has even emerged (Schwartz 1989) as well as a widespread belief that
citizen action should be the primary force in the protection of the environment.
It has also become clear that it will not be acceptable to rely almost exclusively
on bureaucratic efforts to solve environmental problems. This dual approach
of public and private action has evolved slowly, but in the 1980s there was a
shift toward a greater reliance on private protection of the environment as
government-initiated environmental protection measures proved less effective
than expected. Public sector policies were sharply criticized as being often
motivated more by populist sentiment and pork-barrel politics than by actual
environmental concern (Caldwell 1988; Fraas and Munley 1989; Stroup and
Shaw 1989). As a result, "the new breeze blowing in Washington" has tended
to promote a myriad of market-based mechanisms to supplement the existing
policy framework (Stavins 1989).
THREE ISSUES
These energy and environment dossiers raise complex questions; uncertainty
and potential surprises become possible. The issues are not dealt with ade-
quately by economic theory, for they include the complexity of economy-soci-
ety-environment interactions where resources are not divisible, property rights
are nonexistent, market failures are prevalent, and other problems such as
uncertainty, public goods, external effects, and irreversibility are omnipresent
(Paquet 1990d).
Charles Perrings (1987) has shown that because of the complexity of
ill-understood direct and indirect interdependencies, external effects in the
socioeconomy are neither anticipated nor taken into account by the price
mechanism. This incompleteness of the price mechanism results in the market
not being able to detect intertemporal environmental deterioration even
though it is physically observable. A great potential for surprises ensues.
Without a time perspective that perfectly discounts these surprises or a price
mechanism that anticipates them perfectly, the efficiency of the market mecha-
nism in solving environmental problems is suspect.
Three issues are central to the current problems in effectively addressing
environmental concerns: a lack of appreciation of the complexities underpin-
ning the notion of sustainable development, a fundamental myopia about the
politico-economic system in dealing with energy and environment issues, and
the need for some innovative theory-building if appropriate institutions are to
be established.
Sustainability as Resilience
Sustainable development is a difficult concept for economists to deal with. It
amounts to development with nondeclining natural wealth (Pearce et al. 1989).
This concept is not a static notion: it is not only a process of natural capital
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conservation and of maintenance of productivity, but also a matter of main-
taining the stability (a certain constancy) and the resilience (a capacity for the
system to maintain its integrity) of the overall ecological system. Both energy and
environment issues challenge the stability and the resilience of the system.
Market-based strategies cannot deal effectively with certain irreversible
problems. As a result, even though market-type approaches may serve to
improve the incentive-reward system in some ways and, thereby, extend the
time horizon of economic agents somewhat, it is unlikely that this will suffice
to ensure resilience.
Research by animal ecologists has shed some light on the strategies
developed by animals for acquiring system resilience. Vertinsky (1987) has
noted the uncanny parallel between the successful behaviour of animals in the
face of uncertainty (the balance and capacity to switch during crisis between a
competitive myopic individual search for efficiency and a collective search for
resilience) and the behaviour of Japanese companies that are operating in an
environment where the market prevails, but are capable of subjecting them-
selves to a cooperative framework (through radical state intervention) in a crisis
"to secure the collective survival." This duality of private competition in
general, coupled with the possibility of switching to cooperation and guidance
by collective norms during a crisis, ensures resilience.
This model can also be applied on the environmental front. The source
of system resilience may be manifold. A variety of sources may elicit coop-
eration in crisis — ethics, "deep ecology," hierarchies of rights and obliga-
tions in the context of social norms, and conventions are all more or less
effective ways to trigger a switch to different sets of rules during a crisis. But
successful switches require a well-developed and operating sociocultural
underground within which the market mechanism is nested. Some sort of
"social capital" that supports individual actions at normal times but con-
strains them in critical circumstances is necessary (Coleman 1987). But one
cannot expect such social capital to emerge organically, and resilience is
unlikely to crystallize without the institutional prerequisites for a smooth
co-evolution of the economic, social, and environmental systems being put
into place (Norgaard and Dixon 1986).
Discounting the Future
The myopia of the price mechanism condemns all evaluations of energy and
environment dimensions as somewhat truncated. Energy and environment
issues raise questions of long-run collective needs, whereas the market mech-
anism effectively monitors only short-run individual preferences. Moreover,
sustainable development, i.e., development with nondeclining natural wealth,
raises questions about intergenerational comparisons: how should the fate of
future generations be factored in when we make current decisions?
Questions of intergenerational equity are bothersome for economists, for
they expose incontrovertibly the fundamental incompatibility between inter-
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generational equality as an objective and any positive rate of discount that
dramatically shrinks the present value of future flows of benefits and costs
(Diamond 1965). As soon as the rate of discount is positive, this entails a certain
myopia and a bias against the future state of the ecological system. This has led
many to point to the social discount rate — the socially agreed on positive rate
of discount — as the culprit, because it enforces a certain degree of myopia.
A suggested solution has been to reduce the rate of discount and, thereby,
increase the time horizon of decision-makers. This may not be the right
approach. Artificially reducing the discount rate can only introduce yet more
distortions as the new rate would ignore time preference and opportunity costs.
It would most certainly extend the time horizon and force decision-makers to
take into account more fully some long-run environmental costs, but it would
also modify the rate of harvesting of renewable resources and of depletion of
nonrenewable resources in ways that may turn out to be both surprising and
deplorable.
Tinkering with the discount rate is hardly sufficient. A lower discount rate
would not only make long-run costs more relevant to current decisions, but it
would also give more valence to future benefits in present decisions. Conse-
quently, it is not clear in what way the energy/environment interface would be
modified. A more reasonable way to respond to the concerns raised by high
social discount rates is to work harder at identifying all the costs and benefits
in matters dealing with energy and environmental resources (Pearce et al. 1989).
Institutional Carpentry
In both the United States and Canada, the tools used to identify costs and
benefits have mainly been of two sorts: impact analysis and market tests.
Environmental impact analysis is now used worldwide. It requires agencies
to take into account the effects of their policy decisions on the quality of the
environment in the hope that assessing even nonquantified damage before the
fact will lead to a change in values and generate more attention to environ-
mental costs even though they may be external to the agency. The concept has
now been accepted in more than 30 countries including Canada and the
United States. These analyses have served as "an informing and testing of
policy," but it is fair to say that it has been much more effective and pervasive
in the United States where it is more firmly, if imperfectly, embedded in the
normal process of planning and decision-making (Caldwell 1988). However,
recent judicial decisions in Canada (in the case of huge dams in Saskatchewan
and Alberta) indicate that this is becoming a more potent tool in Canada.
This being said, the main tendency in both Canada and the United States
has been to rely more and more on market-based environmental policies, even
if the pace at which both countries have proceeded is quite different. In the
United States, the actions of citizen-enforcers have created enough pressure
(even though they were not always productive in environmental terms) to allow
questions to emerge concerning the best mix of permissible "bounty hunting"
116 GOVERNANCE THROUGH SOCIAL LEARNING
and tolerable bureaucratic foot dragging (Greve 1989). In Canada, the move
toward market-based environmental policies was much slower: it has been
defended on intellectual grounds since the 1960s (Dales 1968), but much of
the Canadian economic decision-making structure maintains a preference for
public enterprise in these matters (Hardin 1974), and the present government
has had to proceed more carefully. But there has been a recent wave of
publications in Canada emphasizing the importance of understanding the
environment in the economy, i.e., the centrality of market-oriented approaches
to environmental problems (Block 1990; Doern 1990). This would appear to
indicate that Canada is now rapidly catching up with the United States on this
front.
Still the following cautious statement by the Canadian minister of the
environment to a Standing Committee on Environment of the Canadian
House of Commons (Bouchard 1989: 18-12) indicates that indecisiveness and
prudence are still prevalent:
Energy is a big industry in Canada; energy is almost Canada. It is almost in
terms of energy that this country has been built. The modern country of
Canada is so blended with energy preoccupations that it is very difficult for
us when the time comes to establish a plan for environment, because environ-
ment could be perceived as the enemy of energy programs. It is not, and the
Minister of Environment is not the arch-enemy of the Minister of Energy. We
are not, because we know now that energy consumption must be renewable,
sustainable, and protect the atmosphere.
Despite much agitation at the task force and committee level, vahe-hesita-
tion is the style of the day in government and there remains a policy void in
both countries. Not much work has been done on the construction of either
an alternative paradigm to look at energy and environment or refurbished
institutions and attitudinal changes that are likely to foster the needed adjust-
ments to policymaking on these fronts (Daly and Cobb 1989).
In the meantime, citizens in the United States and Canada, indecisive as
they may be, have become restive. Although, in early 1988, only 4% of
Canadians thought of environment as the country's highest priority, by mid
1989, 94% placed the environment at or near the top of their list of concerns
(Dyer 1990). The impatience of some Canadians was also evident in the
emergence of Earth First members who were willing to use civil disobedience
and even ecological terrorism in pursuit of their environmental goals. In the
United States the same tendencies on the environmental front are present, but
with a higher degree of impatience and radicalism emanating from deep-
rooted environmental ethics. In Canada, frustration is still in the incubation
phase, but growing quickly.
THE INVISIBLE FOOT AT WORK
Although Canadians and Americans may share a soft consensus in favour of
effective environmental protection, there is no agreement on how to construct
the appropriate private-public action mix to create the sort of resilient system
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that is desired. There is a great cacophony of voices of various groups and
factions on both sides of the border. However, each of these coalitions is slowly
being transformed into an action group expending much time and resources
to ensure that its point of view is registered. On the energy front, one notes an
even higher level of rent-seeking activity in Canada than in the United States.
It is ascribable to the greater dependence on energy in Canada's northern
climate, but also to the relative importance of energy-related activities — both
economic and symbolic — for regions of the country (Hydro Quebec, for
instance) (Paquet 1989e).
On both the energy and environment fronts, the voices are as volatile as
they are vehement. One is not sure that either government has fairly repre-
sented the points of view of its constituents. In many cases, governments have
added to the already high degree of false consciousness and anomie. For
instance, at the beginning of the 1980s, Canadians regarded energy as a very
special commodity and supported a national policy for the sector. By the end
of the decade, officials wanted to believe that such a policy was no longer
necessary and that the market could be relied on to alleviate all problems on
this front. This "new" Canadian view was promulgated in the final report of
the Energy Options Process (Kierans et al. 1988) and embraced by the
Mulroney government officials.
But what was said to the Kierans task force by Canadians and what was
finally reported was not the same thing. Much cognitive dissonance was injected
in the task force process. Canadians still do not feel that energy is a commodity
like others and the "new" Canadian view propounded by the Mulroney
government — that there is no need for a national policy — is not widely
shared by the citizenry. Polls indicate that Canadian citizens have a much
greater concern for conservation and for environmental issues than does their
government. They are not necessarily swayed by government officials in the
energy field in Ottawa who repeat constantly that "hoarding is not good
economics" or that conservation is not critical. For the Canadian public,
"energy saved is energy found." Consequently, there has been concern over
the fact that government-initiated energy conservation projects have all but
disappeared and it has become apparent that Canada's energy policy is not to
have a policy at all (see Chapter 5).
Indeed, the same sort of concern about "officials" misreading the concerns
of the population may be seen in the United States where, despite the fact that
one high-efficiency light bulb over its lifetime eliminates the need for nearly
one barrel of oil, energy efficiency and conservation programs continue to be
canceled or downsized (Hirst 1990).
Because of energy misinformation disseminated in Canada and the United
States, there have been negative consequences of environmental action. A
hands-off policy on energy limits the possibility of public involvement in
environmental policies that might constrain the energy industry. Government
policymaking on both sides of the border is fragmented. In the United States,
cohesive pressure groups already best articulate what environmental policy
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should be. Yet such groups have not been powerful enough to reinvigorate the
conservation movement that would lead North Americans to consume 30% less
energy than they now do (Stobaugh and Yergin 1983). Nor have they been able
to reverse the environmentally malignant energy strategy based on fossil fuels.
However, the progress made on the acid rain front in 1990 suggests that
one should not discount too readily the power of environmental groups in the
United States: at times, the EPA has been the largest regulatory agency both
in terms of budget and personnel (Rosenbaum 1985). After a period of
softening environmental drive, Canada may also give encouraging signs of
some strengthening of the tonus of environmental policy in spite of all the
equivocation and federal-provincial squabbles.
The popular attention focused on, and the extent of the litigation associ-
ated with, environmentalism does not provide the best conditions for energy
competition and cooperation (Vertinsky 1987). There is much waste of re-
sources in the energy and environment fields (Buchanan et al. 1980). The
invisible foot marches in.
Adam Smith's invisible hand symbolizes the unseen benefits that economic
competition confers on the coordination of economic activity. The 'invisible
foot'... symbolizes the unseen costs... the negative welfare effects of competi-
tion over distributive shares. [Magee et al. 1989]
The important lobbying activities of sectors threatened by environmental
policies have led to an increased politicization of the EPA context in the United
States and of the DOE in Canada. This has had a great impact on the
effectiveness of these agencies. Current efforts to neutralize the emergence of
a strong environmental policy in Canada owe much to the lessons that energy
producers have learned from the United States record over the last decade.
Energy-related projects create jobs, regional development, and growth-
producing megaprojects within relatively short periods. These features imply
a focus on well-identified beneficiaries. On the other hand, environmental
losses are diffuse and likely to hurt only in the long run. It is not difficult to
see why the "invisible foot" may operate effectively: redistributing from envi-
ronment to energy may not be right in terms of long-term societal opportunity
cost, but it is quite attractive in the short run.
In the United States, the energy and energy-related sectors took some time
to realize the dangers presented by developing environmental concerns: the
energy crisis blinded them in the 1970s. In Canada, the energy players are
intent on ensuring that current environmental policymaking is not defined in
threatening terms. The present reactive approach of the DOE — emphasizing
the broad responsibility of all citizens for pollution control — is bound to
generate more paralysis than progress in government policymaking in Can-
ada. As Lucien Bouchard (1989: 18) insisted before the Standing Committee
on Environment, environmental questions challenge "the current life style of
our society.... We must tap the creativity of Canadians in designing acceptable
solutions. Better informed and educated citizens will be better able to make
intelligent decisions."
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Such cautiousness does not reveal a weakness of will on the part of the
Canadian government, but rather the depth of the issues raised by the
energy/environment interface. The Canadian government does not feel either
compelled or able to propose a proactive environmental policy that would
amount to a modification of Canadian life style.
The continental integration of economic forces in terms of energy-based
resources leads one to believe that there will be coordinated efforts on both sides
of the border to neutralize attempts to promote environmental policies likely
to impose high costs on the energy and energy-related sectors. Consequently,
one should not be too optimistic in examining the environmental agenda for
the next decade. There have been many promises made by many countries.
Scenarios call for 20% and 50% reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005
and by 2025, respectively. But this will not be possible without massive progress
in energy efficiency and, perhaps, without greater reliance on nuclear energy.
Yet neither front is very promising at this time in view of the withdrawal of
resources from both. Moreover, as energy prices will continue to rise and energy
crunches will thus become more probable, energy lobbies will likely grow in both
power and persuasiveness. When faced with a trade-off between energy and
environmental concerns, the Canadian and American public and politicians will
probably choose to support the energy sector.
SOCIAL LEARNING
An alternative to the litigious chaos of the rent-seeking society is the design of
a democratically rooted policy capable of effecting the necessary switch from
competition to cooperation when necessary. This is possible only if govern-
ments become learning organizations and if policymaking is reframed in terms
of social learning.
Governments as Learning Organizations
Defining a policy requires establishing the basis for selecting certain proce-
dures or adopting certain strategies in the face of different plausible sets of
circumstances. This cannot be done by presuming that experts already have
all the necessary information, and that it is only a matter of negotiating the
technically adapted policy. The information is widely spread through the
population and scattered among many expert subgroups. A reasonable poli-
cymaking process must be based on social learning — on mutual learning by
experts and clients, on interaction likely to generate a more complete picture
of what measures are feasible, acceptable, and implementable.
Attempting to solve the energy/environment problems by using a research
organization (Garratt 1987) might appear to be a roundabout and ineffective
strategy, but this is not so. The development of a policy stance in the environ-
ment/energy field requires policymakers and policy analysts to recognize a
central problem: the goals of the policy are either unknown or very ambiguous
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and the means-ends relationships are highly uncertain and poorly understood
(Rittel and Webber 1973; Paquet, this volume, Chapter 5).
As we saw in Chapter 5, a standard way of looking at policymaking a la
Wilensky (1967) is based on four elements: goal setting, control, innovation,
and intelligence. When the problem is well-structured, policymaking empha-
sizing the first two elements is quite adequate. But when dealing with ill-struc-
tured and elusive problems, one must use an alternative approach that focuses
on innovation and intelligence.
Friedmann and Abonyi's (1976) approach to such problems is again
applicable in the energy/environment context (see Figure 5 and discussion in
Chapter 2). Social values (block B) provide normative guidance in either the
transformation of reality or the selection of strategies for action; they define
what is acceptable. Theory of reality (block A) is a symbolic representation and
explanation of the policy environment; it depicts what is feasible. Political
strategy (block C) refers to the political action chosen; it identifies the stable
and implementable options. Social action (block D) deals with the practical
measures taken to ensure an effective policy outcome.
A Joint North American Task Force
The long-term costs of the scenario of the invisible foot are very high, but there
is no hope that social learning will proceed unless one can force the debate
outside the present framework, which emphasizes short-run technical and
economic efficiency while excluding other considerations. The time may be
ripe for a first Joint North American Task Force on Environmental and Energy
Resources to reframe the basic questions. If the Free Trade Agreement has
made clear that the United States and Canada are now to share energy and
environmental resources to a greater degree than in the past, a coordinated
policy on such matters as environment and energy should be sought.
This sort of new regional learning organization is akin to what was
recommended by the Advisory Panel on Energy of the Brundtland Commis-
sion in 1986 (Iglesias 1987). Such agencies were meant to provide:
Needed capability to identify and seize opportunities for regional coopera-
tion in financing, developing and exploiting new technologies for energy
supply, energy saving, and environmental regeneration.
Both Canada and the United States appear to be converging toward
related environmental policies, yet in neither country is there a crisis of great
immediacy. Therefore, current conditions provide an opportunity to create a
North American forum to discuss issues that are continental in scope. Presum-
ably, the presence of both Canadian and American environmentalists and
energy industry representatives on this task force would ensure that the right
questions would be asked and that various aspects of the issue would be
explored. Moreover, one might count on such a first continental effort to
ensure a degree of social learning for all interested parties and the public in
general, and for the effort to have enough moral authority — as a result of the
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wide coverage of its surveying and the extensive amount of knowledge con-
tributed by all the stakeholders to its ultimate recommendations — to be
considered seriously by the governments on both sides of the border. Such an
initiative would echo the separate initiatives of the Resources for the Future
(United States) and Resources for Tomorrow (Canada) undertaken some 30
years ago as major efforts at stock-taking on the state of national resources and
to develop natural resources policies.
A Joint North American Task Force on Environmental and Energy Re-
sources would provide the basis for some harmonization of policies at the
continent level on issues that are already commanding some world-level
attention. Such an initiative would not only foster a higher degree of North
American awareness and due concern in the aftermath of the Brundtland
report but might also enable much of the good work that has begun in Canada
and in the United States to find an outlet likely to result in refurbished rules
of the game on both sides of the border. For instance, much use might be made
of the work done for the National Task Force on Environment and Economy
(Canada) — made up of ministers from seven governments, federal and
provincial, and the CEOs of seven of Canada's top corporations — in adapting
the Brundtland report to the Canadian arena. This has already generated a
landmark report (National Task Force on Environment and Economy 1987).
In the same spirit, United States senators John Heinz (Republican, Penn-
sylvania) and Timothy Wirth (Democrat, Colorado) initiated and sponsored
Project 88, "a bipartisan effort to find innovative solutions to major environ-
mental and natural resources problems." Also in the United States, 50 people
from industry, government, academia, and the environmental community
worked on the final report Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environment—
Initiatives for the New President produced in 1988 (Stavins 1989). Indeed, if a
meeting of some 100 senior representatives of corporate and political strate-
gists from both Canada and the United States in New York in December 1989
is a harbinger of things possible, battles of words may be soon replaced by calls
to link arms at the North American level (Howard 1989).
POSSIBLE STEPS
Social learning cannot occur ex nihilo. It must evolve from a set of basic
principles and build on bets on certain promising directions. In the energy/en-
vironment world, certain key principles have been put forward as guidelines
for any exercise in social architecture (Perrings 1987): the principle of inter-
generational equity, the principle of collective property, and the principle of
individual accountability. These may serve as prime movers in the learning
process.
Three Principles
The principle of intergenerational equity points to the contradiction between
the criteria of intergenerational egalitarianism and a positive social rate of
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discount. It forces the debate onto a field where means have to be found to
extend the time horizon of the present generation if the common inheritance
is to be preserved.
A small step in this general direction might be taken through the collective
property of natural resources — energy and environment — and through the
astute use of contracts governing such resources. This has been accomplished
effectively in the world of mines and forestry. Such contracts could prohibit
practices with proven deleterious effects and institute mechanisms resembling
both royalties on depletable resources and taxes on polluters.
To enforce such contracts, individual accountability would need to become
an effective norm and mechanisms would need to be designed to ensure that
those not meeting contractual obligations would be effectively charged for the
damage they have caused. Given the possibility of escaping such charges
through bankruptcy or the like, the idea of natural resources bonds — reim-
bursable deposits equal to the maximum possible damage in the event of
violation of the rules of the contract — might be used (Solow 1971). The
conjectured value of the bond could always be revised upward or downward as
experience reveals that more or less destructive methods have been used.
New Norms
These three principles may be put into effect in a variety of ways depending
on basic current values. To the extent that intergenerational solidarity prevails,
there may be little cause for the establishment of priorities within the present
generation to emphasize the importance of longer-term objectives like the
resilience of the system. Some (Daly and Cobb 1989) have chosen to bet on
the construction of new solidarities. Others, who are either more cynical or
averse to risks, would prefer the state to accept responsibility for sanctioning
some priorities in the choices made by the present generation: the precedence
of needs over preferences for instance (Frankfurt 1984a). Such norms or rules
would direct traffic in the forum and ensure, like traffic lights in large cities, a
way to orchestrate the actions of all agents. (Who would claim that the market
would do this job better than coercive traffic lights?)
Such norms or rules may vary with normal or abnormal times, very much
as instinct guides animals to changes in the rules in critical times. Conventions
may be changed according to certain meta-rules, and one of the central roles
of the Joint North American Task Force would be to hammer out such
meta-rules (Orgogozo and Serieyx 1989; Paquet, this volume, Chapter 5).
However, there is little hope that such developments will occur organically
in Canada or the United States on the environment and energy fronts. A
reframing of the issues is necessary. This, in turn, requires a revolution in the
mind of the citizens of both countries. This new consciousness might begin in
the year of the 200th anniversary of the death of Adam Smith with a recogni-
tion of a forgotten portion of his message: competition and markets cannot do
everything, and governments should provide "certain public works and certain
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public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or
small number of individuals, to erect and maintain" (Smith 1776). The world
of energy and environment calls for such public institutions, and until such a
time as this is widely recognized, there is little hope that the requisite social
architecture and carpentry will be allowed to proceed.
CONCLUSION
Canada and the United States have been groping for market-oriented energy
and environmental policies. Recent reports may serve as a basis for a promising
process of social learning on this front (Stavins 1989). However, the market
cannot be a panacea. To political and economic actors who focus on energy
and environment policy, public goods loom large and, unfortunately, market-
place decisions and calculations do not take into account public goods to an
appropriate extent (Kash and Rycroft 1984). Social learning will have to lead
both governments to return somewhat to some interventionist form of policy-
making.
Moreover, what is acceptable, what is feasible, what is stability-generating,
and what is effectively implementable need not be the same all across North
America. Much of the existing diversity may not be rooted so much in
fundamental differences or in poor understanding of the issues as in historical
circumstances and differing values. An occasion to take stock of the knowledge
and values of the energy/environment players in Canada and the United
States may be useful even if it does not lead to a unified policy, but only to
critical appraisal of current policies and to the elaboration of different but
coherent strategies. For example, there may be advantages for both Canada
and the United States in developing joint policies on matters of binational
concern such as acid rain, where the spillover effects from one country to the
other are important, but this need not be the case across the board. It should
become clearer to each nation (as social learning proceeds) why and to what
extent values and priorities differ and why explicitly different policies may be
desirable.
Some may regard the social learning approach as futile or at least as likely
to generate more heat than light. F. Scott Fitzgerald (1945) may have been
right in saying that no grand idea was ever born in a conference, but "a lot of
foolish ideas have died there" (Fitzgerald 1945). A Joint North American Task
Force might be expected to slaughter foolish ideas in good currency. While the
United States and Canada determine their own policy options, such a task force
could effectively evaluate their potential for success. As Canadian humorist
Stephen Leacock has reminded us, Canadians can only be passionate about
moderation, one may reckon that any slaughter of foolish ideas and sacred
cows at such a conference would likely be civil and humane.
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CHAPTER 7
MULTICULTURALISM
AS NATIONAL POLICY*
Valorisons les obstacles entre les hommes...
non pour qu'ils communiquent moins, mais
pour qu'ils communiquent mieux.
- Jean-Pierre Dupuy
Multiculturalism is a label for many things in Canada: our multi-ethnic cultural
mosaic, a policy of the federal government, and an ideology of cultural
pluralism (Kallen 1982a). As a Canadian policy, it is one of the most daring
initiatives of the last 25 years, but it has been assessed in varying ways, ranging
from "enlightened" (Jaenen 1986), to a "manipulative device used to perpetu-
ate control over ethnic groups" (DeFaveri 1986), to a policy that "undermines
the foundation for national unity" (Kallen 1982a). These differences of opinion
stem, to a large extent, from the vagueness of the language in good currency,
and the Rorschach-type interpretations this vagueness nurtures, but also from
the difficulty inherent in the assessment of such a bold policy move.
Our purpose is to deal with this complex question from the point of view
of policy research and cultural economics: what is sought is some clarification
of the underlying issues, for there is much confusion about this policy domain
and some provisional conjectural evaluation of the Canadian multiculturalism
policy of the last two decades. We have to be satisfied with conjectures because
such a policy may not be amenable to meaningful evaluation except in the very
long run.
Our approach emphasizes two major points. First, multiculturalism poses
an ill-structured problem to policy analysts, a wicked problem (see Chapter 2) —
the goals are not known or are ambiguous and the means-ends relationships
are highly uncertain and poorly understood. Second, the central feature of the
multiculturalism policy has to do with symbolic resources and the reallocation of
those sorts of resources with a view to generating equality of recognition and
status; economists have little experience with the analysis of the economics of
symbols and of the sociocultural underground — truth, trust, acceptance,
restraint, obligation — social virtues that are the underground of the economic
* This chapter is based on a paper with the same title which appeared in the Journal of Cultural
Economics (1989,13(1), 17-34). The help of A. Burgess and M. Racette is gratefully acknowledged.
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game (Hirsch 1976). We will argue that multiculturalism as an exercise in
production and redistribution of symbolic resources may have had positive
impacts on ethnocultural pride (and, therefore, on the efficiency of the
economic system), but such a policy has also a dark side that has been occluded
and may be of importance.
Consequently, any provisional and conjectural evaluation of this policy
must be prudent because of the wickedness of the problem and somewhat
inconclusive because of the limited development of the economics of symbolic
resources. When dealing with such issues, one finds oneself in what might have
been the predicament of Alfred Marshall (1907) when he was presenting his
disquisition on the social possibilities of economic chivalry.
Traditional approaches to policy research focus on attempts to falsify
hypotheses about an objective reality. This is too narrow a focus for policy
research when the ground is in motion. This is the reason why the social
learning model is helpful. It focuses on learning on the job about both the
configuration of facts and the configuration of values, but it emphasizes also
the importance of learning from the stakeholders in the policy game and from
the many groups at the periphery who are in possession of important local
knowledge. In this transactive style of planning action, hypotheses are verified
as "correct" only in the process of creating a new reality. This approach a la
Friedmann-Abonyi (1976) — more fully described in chapters 2 and 5 — is
based on a sharp awareness of the limits of our policy research tools: one cannot
hope to produce anything more than incomplete answers.
In this chapter, we present two major characterizations of the policy of
multiculturalism in Canada — as containment policy and as symbolic policy; look
at the dynamic this policy has triggered; give some reasons for the necessary
unfmishedness of the current policy; and mention some of the pitfalls and
challenges lying ahead.
The rationale for initiating such a policy thrust may have been narrowly
electoralist, as some cynics claim, but an evolutionary process has been un-
leashed that will not be easily reversed or slowed down. Given the very limited
knowledge base on which such a policy initiative is based, unintended conse-
quences will loom large in a final evaluation. This explains why we have allowed
our preliminary evaluation to be somewhat speculative; because we are in the
process of learning how to be multicultural, concerns about possible perverse
consequences should not be ignored even though hard evidence may still be
slim or lacking. Indeed, as Schumacher (1977) wisely suggests, even though
the prevailing philosophy of cartography is "if in doubt, leave it out," naviga-
tion is much safer in these turbulent times if we adopt the opposite approach
"if in doubt, show it prominently."
MULTICULTURALISM: A CONTAINMENT POLICY
The social fabric of Canada has been polyethnic and multicultural since the
very beginnings of the country. The native population was displaced by French
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and English invasions, and the new ethnic groups occupied the whole of the
territory. Despite efforts in the 19th century to stimulate immigration from
other countries, in 1881 the population of non-British, non-French extraction
was a shade less than half a million and represented only about 11% of the
Canadian population. After the 1967 change in the Canadian immigration
laws, the process of visible multiculturalization accelerated: before 1970,
12-13% of immigrants were Asian; now the figure is 50%. In 1981, more than
8 million people or 31% of the population were members of non-British,
non-French ethnic groups (Sheridan 1987), and by 1986, the proportion was
38% (Cardozo 1988).
But multiculturalism is more than a reality in Canada. It is a set of social
values, an ideal type. It has been said of Canadians in the 19th century that
they only had "limited identities," i.e., that they did not define themselves
entirely or even primarily as Canadians. Rather, they identified first with their
region or province, and only in a limited way with the nation (Paquet and
Wallot 1987). This reality of "limited identities" has made it easier to accept
and even to promote the legitimization of multiple identities: from a country
lacking a global identity and being loyal first and foremost to regions or
sections of the country, we have drifted toward a celebration of ethnocentrism
and to the development of a mosaic model of Canada, in which distinctive
ethnic collectivities make up the country. Collective cultural rights making all
of us hyphenated Canadians, with "equal weights on each side of the hyphen"
would ensue (Kallen 1982a). The positive valuation of ethnic segmentation,
which necessarily follows from these assumptions, is not shared by all Cana-
dians. But it is most certainly defended with lesser or greater vehemence by
many stakeholders.
A soft version of this mosaic model became government policy in the early
1970s. Faced with a growing electorate from ethnic communities that were
neither French nor British, the Trudeau strategy was to recognize symbolically
both the right of ethnic groups to choose to maintain their distinctiveness, and
a protection of individual rights of members of ethnic groups to choose
whether to maintain their ties and loyalties to their ethnic community.
The objectives of the 1971 policy were fourfold: (1) support of ethnocul-
tural diversity for cultural communities that choose this option; (2) assistance
to people to overcome cultural barriers; (3) promotion of creative interchanges
between ethnic groups; and (4) assistance to immigrants in acquiring one of
Canada's official languages. On items (2) and (3), there was little disagreement.
On item (1) — the encouragement of cultural diversity — there were two
schools of thought: some supporting the promotion of ethnic identity as of
value per se (Burnet 1976), and others suggesting that this would make Canada
into "some kind of ethnic zoo" (Brotz 1980). There was also strong disagree-
ment on item (4) between those for whom living cultures and languages are
"inextricably linked," who argued that linguistic rights of ethnic communities
and immigrants should also be recognized and guaranteed, and those for
whom assimilation into one of the two official language groups was essential
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and the egalitarian mosaic model on this front had to be subjected to the
overriding official languages constraint.
If one had to find a label for this Canadian model, an apt description might
be "contained pluralism" (Arnal 1986), for our pluralism is constrained in a
variety of ways by a number of core Canadian values (bilingualism, democracy,
nonviolence, etc.). Multiculturalism is only one of many core values and one
that is limited by all the others.
Such important constraints imposed on the pure mosaic model have led
many to argue that the policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework
is nothing but a policy of appeasement and containment designed to accom-
modate the demands of non-French/non-British groups and those of French
and English Canadians (Peter 1978). The limited efforts to implement this new
policy in the 1970s lent some support to this view (Lupul 1982). In 1972, a
minister of state for multiculturalism was appointed and, in 1973, an advisory
body was established (later to become the Canadian Multiculturalism Council)
to help the minister implement the policy.
It was only in the 1980s that institutionalization of this policy began: in
1982, multiculturalism was mentioned in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms; in 1985, a Standing Committee of the House of Commons on
Multiculturalism was created. In its June 1987 report (Mitges 1987), it recom-
mended the creation of a separate department. In 1988, new legislation — The
Multicultural Act — was passed, and a full-fledged ministry to deal with mul-
ticulturalism was created. Recently, efforts to help fund nonofficial-language
training have been acknowledged, and some work has been done on the issue
of confronting racism (Stasiulis 1988). If the total budget of this sector remains
minuscule — approximately $ 1 per Canadian per year — there are clear signs
that additional financial resources will be forthcoming. The construction of
new infrastructure (ministry, research institute) is bound to make multicultural
issues more visible and create a channel through which interest groups might
be able to communicate their concerns.
If progress has been slow and no all-out effort to move Canadian society
toward the ideal cultural mosaic template has been attempted, this is due to a
situation in which power and opportunities are still largely shared by the two
founding nations. However, opposition is not restricted to this group; Canadi-
ans as a whole are only "mildly positive toward the idea of cultural diversity"
(Berry 1977). The political strategy of containment and accommodation by
Canadian governments through most of the period since 1971 appears to
reflect fairly accurately the state of mind of the nation.
Some cynics would go so far as to say that the objective of the multicul-
turalism policy has always been for the state to regulate the collective interests
and goals of minority groups. In this sense, the political strategy may be said
to have worked rather well (Stasiulis 1980) and, if this is correct, one might
regard it as unlikely that the institutionalization of the department will do
much in material terms to effect dramatic changes under the circumstances.
But this conclusion stems from an interpretation of multiculturalism that is
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too narrowly focused on the concept as a social policy designed to eliminate
discrimination and reduce income and employment inequities in a social
system that is not free of cultural barriers. Progress on these fronts has clearly
been very slow, even though this was most certainly one of the objectives of
the 1971 policy. But it would be unwise to reduce multiculturalism policy to
this dimension.
MULTICULTURALISM: A SYMBOLIC POLICY
The true significance of the multiculturalism policy is to be found at another
level, and at that level it is truly revolutionary for it corresponds to some of the
new roles of the state in the affairs of the mind in modern society (Tussman
1977; Lowi 1975). It is a contribution "to the reconstruction of the symbolic
system and to the redistribution of social status among linguistic and ethnocul-
tural groups in Canadian society" (Breton 1984). As Breton has shown rather
well, multiculturalism is "largely an instrument for re-structuring society's
identity system and for managing cultural tensions that arise in the process,"
for it may be hypothesized that people are less interested in their ethnic
cultures and organizations than in maintaining their ethnic identity, finding
ways to express it in suitable ways, and gaining recognition for their status
(Breton 1984; Cans 1979).
Multiculturalism is an effort "to regenerate the cultural-symbolic capital
of society: to restructure the collective identity and the associated symbolic
contents," and such efforts may be analyzed in terms of production and
distribution of symbolic resources (Breton 1984).
The Canadian policy on multiculturalism has been interpreted in many
ways: (1) as a social policy, designed to eliminate inequalities between ethnic
groups and remove barriers to entry into the mainstream of Canadian life; (2)
as the purposeful construction of a mosaic of institutionally complete ethnic
communities; (3) as an effort to produce "symbolic ethnicity" as a psychological
benefit. On the whole, reactions to these partial versions of the multicultural
policy have been skeptical. If the first objective is sought, this policy was
unnecessary, for the Charter of Rights and other instruments could well take care
of the problem. In terms of the second objective, the policy is simply an
unrealistic exercise in social architecture. If "symbolic ethnicity" is the name of
the game, some have argued that it is an unwarranted activity on the part of
the state, for the state has no business in the affairs of the mind nor in the
symbolic order.
These partial characterizations have not fully captured the import of the
Canadian multiculturalism policy and most certainly have not recognized the
central importance of symbolic ethnicity. This is much more than simple psycho-
logical gratification. Changes in the symbolic order often have fundamental
impacts on the framing of decisions and on the dynamics of society; the slow
process of status-enhancing of ethnic minorities in Canada has acquired a logic
of its own which has blown away the containment of the 1970s.
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Culture is a "shared symbolic blueprint which guides action on an ideal
course or gives life meaning" (Roberts and Clifton 1982). Cultural identity
formation is the result of a progressive crystallization of a new ethos: the sum
of characteristic usages, ideas, norms, standards, and codes by which a group
is differentiated and individualized in character from other groups (Banfield
1958). In a sense, identity formation occurs very much like capital formation:
only if a new social contrivance proves to be "profitable" for some will it emerge
and persist.
It would be naive to expect a cultural identity to evolve in a vacuum: there
are public goods and social overhead capital attached to this production
process, as there are in other sectors. One cannot expect that such overhead
capital (meta-rules) will evolve organically: the state may have a role to play,
and the optimal amount of coercion may not be zero. In the same way that the
state is seen as legitimately involved in the creation and sustenance of a
monetary system and a political order, it is quite legitimate for the state to
"sustain the appropriate state of mind" (Tussman 1977), and in fact the state
is involved in many ways in shaping the institutions of awareness, in politics of
cognition, and in managing the forum — "the whole range of institutions and
situations of public communication."
Breton (1984) has argued that public policy in our socioeconomies
attempts to shape or modify the symbolic order — "the shaping and protect-
ing of awareness" (Tussman 1977)—by producing and allocating symbolic
resources. These interventions amount to a bricolage of the underlying ethos
and translate into the reranking of status groups and the redistribution of
recognition.
Multiculturalism as a national policy is such a granting of status and
recognition to various ethnic communities. Although this production and
redistribution of symbolic resources may not translate into big budgets, one
would be unwise to presume that they are unimportant. Multiculturalism is
redrawing mental maps and redefining levels of aspirations. This in turn
modifies the frame of mind of those groups, but not always in a positive way.
It is true that status enhancement through multiculturalism might be
presumed to have a positive impact. By providing primary securities for the
ethnic communities and by helping to develop collective pride and redefining
higher levels of aspiration, multiculturalism might be expected to modify the
framing of decisions by members of those communities and to engender an
outburst of entrepreneurship (Light 1972; Paquet 1986, 1989f). This is a process
that has been noted elsewhere. Some have even argued that the ethnocultural
communities might take advantage of their intimate awareness and apprecia-
tion of cultural nuances to become go-betweens with our foreign trading
partners and thus enhance Canada's trade potential (Passaris 1985).
But there is also the possibility that the multiculturalism policy might have
the opposite effect. For this form of psychological self-poisoning is maximal
in societies where more-or-less egalitarian rights coexist with considerable
differences in the power, wealth, culture, etc., of the various groups (Scheler
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1958). It was Nietzsche who understood the importance of spite and rancor in
modern societies. Multiculturalism policy may generate ressentiment in the very
population it was meant to upgrade. A French word is necessary here as
Ressentiment is to resentment what climate is to weather... ressentiment is a
free-floating disposition to visit upon others the bitterness that accumulates
from one's own subordination and existential guilt at allowing oneself to be
used by other people for their own purposes, while one's life rusts away
unnoticed. [Friedenberg 1975]
Canadian multicultural policy has had an impact of this sort. An illustra-
tion of this outcome is provided by Bharati Mukherjee (1985) in the introduc-
tion to Darkness. Mukherjee, who was born in Calcutta, lived in Toronto and
Montreal, and became a writer here before moving to the United States. Her
words are rather harsh.
In the years that I spent in Canada — 1966 to 1980 — I discovered that the
country is hostile to its citizens who had been born in hot, moist continents
like Asia, that the country proudly boasts of its opposition to the whole concept
of cultural assimilation.... With the act of immigration to the United States,
suddenly I was no longer aggrieved, except as an habit of mind. I had moved
from being a Visible minority,' against whom the nation had officially incited
its less-visible citizens to react, to being just another immigrant.... For me, it
is a movement away from the aloofness of expatriation, to the exuberance of
immigration. I have joined imaginative forces with an anonymous, driven,
underclass of semi-assimilated Indians with sentimental attachments to a
distant homeland but no real desire for permanent return... instead of seeing
my Indianness as a fragile identity to be preserved against obliteration (or
worse, a Visible' disfigurement to be hidden), I see it now as a set of fluid
identities to be celebrated.... Indianness is now a metaphor.
Mukherjee has not found in the celebration of a fragile cultural identity a
basis for cultural equality; yet one of the objectives of the multicultural policy
was to respond to the status anxieties that had been voiced. Far from breaking
down "cultural jealousies" as the prime minister announced in 1971, the policy
of multiculturalism has led to some dissatisfaction in the ethnocultural com-
munities, to interethnic competition, and to heightened demands for more
symbolic capital (Breton 1986). Moreover, given the expectations created by
the policy, there has been much frustration at the slowness of the process of
"realization" of the cultural equality that had been promised. Political leaders
responded to these growing pressures, especially in the 1980s, by legislating
ethnicity as a feature of Canadian life and by raising again the level of
multicultural promises: from the preservation of cultural heritage to the
enhancement of ethnocultural communities.
THE DYNAMICS OF MULTICULTURALISM
One cannot predict unambiguously the future of the daring multicultural
experiment Canada has embarked on. Nothing less than a research program
paralleling this experiment, tapping continually into the local knowledge at
the periphery — in the ethnocultural communities — taking fully into account
the values of the stakeholders, their Weltanschauungen or theories of reality, and
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the dynamics of political gaming can offer any hope of leading to a plausible
scenario. But even in these quasi-ideal circumstances, the amount of ignorance
would remain great: the action hypothesis on which the multicultural gambit
is based can only be verified in the course of its unfolding.
Yet, a few unintended consequences are emerging from the experiment
and might be worth noting if only to ensure vigilance. As we said earlier, our
norm is if in doubt, show it prominently.
The first of these consequences is a growth ofethnocentrism in Canada. Some
have referred to it as a tribalization of Canadian society (Spicer 1988). As
Claude Levi-Strauss has put it, "loyalty to a certain set of values inevitably
makes people partially or totally insensitive to other values... a profound
indifference to other cultures [is]... a guarantee that they would exist in their
own manner and on their own terms" (quoted in Geertz 1986). Such imper-
meabilite does not authorize the oppression of anyone, but it leads to a. growing
segmentation and to a drift away from unhyphenated Canadianism into ethnic
bloc-action. This has already led to the ugly confrontations noted in recent
nomination meetings (Spicer 1988). For even if segmentation is somewhat
idealized in the mosaic model, most experts would agree that it leads to ethnic
particularism and impedes national unity (Kallen 1982a).
The second notable factor is a resurgence of racism under a different name. As
a result of the growth ofethnocentrism, a new rhetoric, based on the right for
each culture or ethnoculture to be different > has emerged. This rhetoric has led in
turn to a sort of juxtaposition of ethnocultures, each claiming its right to be
different but also to be equal. This claim that groups can be equal but different
is an illusion: a whole literature from de Tocqueville to Louis Dumont (1983)
has clearly shown that in any society, a difference can only mean a value
difference, i.e., some explicit or implicit hierarchy (Taguieff 1987). In Canada,
"intentionally or not, the multicultural policy preserves the reality of Canadian
ethnic hierarchy" (Kallen 1982b). A new differentialist neo-racism is germinat-
ing here, as it flourishes in other polyethnic societies that have consecrated
this illusory search for equality/difference (Taguieff 1987).
The third negative force at work is the permeating influence of envy in
inter-ethnic relations. It is well known since de Tocqueville that egalitarian
societies, or societies claiming to decree equality are more prone to envy. The
equality among ethnocultural groups decreed by multiculturalism has pro-
voked a heightened degree of inter-ethnic group competition and animosity.
Indeed, the sort of ressentiment described above by Mukherjee is at the very
root of envy as symbolic behaviour (Foster 1972). This in turn poisons
inter-ethnic relations, as the success of group A is perceived by group B as a
sign that the latter group has been injured or maligned. The zero-sum
syndrome looms large.
Multiculturalism may claim to try to break down cultural jealousies (a
rather innocuous zeal in the preservation of something possessed — as any
dictionary indicates) but it has been the source of envy (displeasure and ill-will
at the superiority of another person in happiness, success, reputation, or the
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possession of anything desirable) (Foster 1972). In his study of envy as symbolic
behaviour, Foster examines the socioeconomic and psychological conditions
that breed envy and the cultural forms used by those who fear the envy of
others (concealment, denial, symbolic sharing, and true sharing) and the
institutional forms used to reduce envy. One of the latter is a system of
encapsulation — a device making use of the egalitarian principle to produce
subsocieties "marked off from each other by social, psychological, cultural and
at times geographical boundaries" (Foster 1972: 185). However, the balancing
act between ethnocentrism/encapsulation as institutional forms and envy/re-
sentment as a state of mind may become a vicious circle with a violent outcome,
if they were ever to begin reinforcing each other in our society (Dumouchel
and Dupuy 1979).
In parallel, one might tally growing evidence of tolerance, of a shift from
juxtaposition to integration, and some signs of the emergence of a new modern
concept of citizenship to replace old nationalities. But, at this time, one can see
only the harbingers of this new citizenship based on collaboration and achieve-
ment rather than status. In any case, these features do not appear to have been
fostered by Canada's multiculturalism policy. Proximity and closer personal
contacts have eroded barriers as they do in the melting pot world and have led
to some appreciation of other ethnocultures. Although it is difficult to appor-
tion success or failure to the restructuring of the symbolic order undertaken
by the multiculturalism policy as such, some have argued that, if anything, this
policy might have generated on balance more emotionally-charged conflicts
ascribable to status anxieties for those at the top of the vertical mosaic and to
rising expectations and relative deprivation at the bottom.
CONCLUSION
Canada has faced the challenge of its polyethnic society by defining a multicul-
tural philosophy within a bilingual framework. The national policy of multicul-
turalism that has ensued has been translated slowly, but more and more
importantly, it has developed into a set of institutions that have performed two
very different sets of functions.
On one hand, these institutions and policies have helped cultural groups
to overcome cultural barriers, and they have promoted some interchange
between cultural groups. But these efforts have been much less important than
those that fostered, on the other hand, their ethnocultural consciousness and
encouraged institutions and organizations that appeal to such consciousness.
As a result, it cannot be said that the multicultural policy has done as much
as it might have to nurture an ethnic or race-relations policy in Canada. Rather,
it has emphasized ethnocentrism and segmentation with unintended conse-
quences of some import.
At this point, when important new resources appear to be likely to be
channeled toward the implementation of the policy on multiculturalism, it
might be useful to repeat a statement often made by Jean Burnet (1976) —
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one of the pioneers in ethnic studies in Canada — about the need for more
research (research of a different sort, i.e., action research) likely to help in the
redefinition of our multicultural policy in line with directions that are feasible,
acceptable, implementable, and effective. Such directions cannot be elicited
from the centre, but need to tap into local knowledge. There is little point in
encouraging specific consciousness among groups who have seemed dormant
or largely assimilated for the sole reason that they are there.
Continuing redefinition of policy directions is essential in any ongoing
policy domain, but if this bold gamble of Canada on multiculturalism is to
succeed, such a refocusing is essential now.
And if in the midst of this complex investigation, policy analysts were
ever in need of a sextant to guide them toward what might be a sense of
Canadian identity in the making, they could do worse than to reread an old
classic — a book of essays edited by Malcolm Ross (1954) — for Ross' intro-
duction is a gem.
We kick against the pricks of our necessity. Yet strangely, we are in love with
this necessity. Our natural mode is not compromise but 'irony' — the ines-
capable response to the presence and pressures of opposites in tension. Irony
is the key to our identity.... Our Canadianism, from the very moment of its
real birth, is a baffling, illogical but compulsive athleticism — a fence-leaping
which is also, and necessarily, a fence-keeping.... Ours is not, can never be,
the 'one hundred per cent' kind of nationalism. We have always had to think
in terms of 50-50. No 'melting pot.' Rather the open irony of the multi-di-
mensional structure, an openness to the 'larger mosaic'... we can see vividly
the actual movement from the dual irony to the multiple irony, from the
expansive open thrust of the French-English tension to the many-coloured
but miraculously coherent, if restless, pattern of the authentically Canadian
nationhood.
As a popular philosopher used to say, "It is that simple, and that complex."
Some might be tempted to reject outright these conjectures in the name
of the old cartographic orthodoxy — if in doubt, leave it out. To them, I can
only suggest a rereading of lonesco's Rhinoceros, in which the characters are
turned into rhinoceroses for mysterious reasons. Yet, there is always an unmis-
takable clue that a character is about to be transformed into a rhinoceros: this
character has just stated that he or she feels completely immune.
CHAPTER 8
LIBERAL EDUCATION AS SYNECDOCHE*
May God us keep from single vision
and Newton's sleep.
- William Blake
The conference "Who's Afraid of Liberal Education?"** was inspired by a wave
of concern in Canada and the United States about the decay of cultural literacy,
the suggestion that a change in postsecondary curricula might be the answer,
and some recognition that the postsecondary enterprise was not doing much
to address the problem. It was natural, under the circumstances, to inquire
about the occult forces that might stand in the way of the implementation of
a curative program; for there is some agreement on the seriousness of the
concern, even though there is no agreement about the sort of liberal education
curriculum, if any, capable of dealing with the problem.
There is a danger that the current crusade for a new classicism, if defined
too narrowly, might lead well-intentioned higher education reformers in the
wrong direction, and allow the real challenges facing higher education to be
occluded. There is undoubtedly a case for curriculum reform, but it must be
approached from a broader and more global perspective than it has been by
some defenders of the new classicism.
A FEW SIGNPOSTS
The Saskatoon Forum
In October 1987, the National Forum on Post Secondary Education staged true
etats-generaux on higher education in Canada. One would have expected from
these a comprehensive cahier de doleances. It did not materialize. A careful
reading of the Forum Papers (NFPE 1987a), the Proceedings (NFPE 1987b), the
workshop reports, and the final recommendations reveals that the sensitivities
* This chapter is taken from Who's Afraid of Liberal Education? edited by C. Andrew and S.B.
Esbensen (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1989, pp. 1-20).
** Organized by the Social Science Federation of Canada in Ottawa, 30 September to 1 October
1988.
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of all parties in this first national chautauqua on higher education have stood
in the way of fruitful discussion. Debates were rendered aseptic by an excessive
civility in the dialogue between lay persons and academics, and by the chronic
Canadian obsession with federal-provincial sensitivities.
An unfortunate consequence has been the level of generality of the
discussions and the weasel nature of the consensus arrived at. It was hoped
that I'esprit de Saskatoon would guide educational reforms in Canada, but it
was too feeble-hearted to do the job: it could not march on, it had to tiptoe
all the time.
As a result, most of the contentious issues: the crisis of confidence in higher
education, the management of postsecondary, the inadequacy of the curricula,
and the need for a national strategy — all issues that had been well docu-
mented in the Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance
(Leblanc 1987) — were carefully avoided. On the other hand, noncontentious
issues, like promoting accessibility for marginal groups and providing addi-
tional public financial resources to the postsecondary enterprise, became the
foci of discussion.
The very generality of the discussions and recommendations allowed
observers to use them as a Rorschach test, and to extract for special attention
idiosyncratic themes — however fleetingly recurring. At the midpoint of the
National Forum, Lise Bissonnette (1987: 81-82) took advantage of her break-
fast address to underline what she saw as "a renaissance of the concept of
general education... a yearning for a new kind of classicism." This perception
caught on. Given the fact that there was little of real substance on which the
participants had developed a consensual view; that Bloom's (1987) The Closing
of the American Mind was a best-seller at the time (as was Hirsch's [ 1987] Cultural
Literacy), liberal education became a safe discussion item because it allowed
everyone to address a truly academic issue, without the need for close scrutiny
of the performance of the higher education enterprise.
It is important to note that this "yearning" did not find a place in the
concluding remarks of the chairperson of the National Forum. Flexibility,
adaptability, accessibility, federal-provincial cooperation, a better statistical
database, and a call for leadership were les cris de ralliement supposed to give a
momentum to these etats generaux and ensure that I'esprit de Saskatoon would
live on. For obvious reasons, it did not.
Le Non-dit a Saskatoon et a Ottawa
The most surprising feature of the Saskatoon meeting was the implicit
agreement of participants to exclude a variety of central institutional issues
already well documented in an extensive literature on the crisis in Canadian
higher education: excessive provincialization, the rigidity and protected
nature of higher education institutions, and the poverty of their management
had been singled out repeatedly. Epistemological entrapments that stood in
the way of reform were also ignored: the so-called (and so mistakenly labeled)
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Rousseau-Dewey type of perception of education as content-free; the
disciplinarization of knowledge production that triggered the emergence
of methodism; a naive characterization of the way in which knowledge is
acquired; the dominion of technical rationality, etc. (Emery 1980; Schon
1983; Neilson and Gaffield 1986; Hirsch 1987; Paquet and von Zur-Muehlen
1987; Watson 1987; Laplante 1988).
These issues might have been raised in the follow-up that many anticipated
after the National Forum, but that now seems unlikely. They were also excluded
from the subsequent Ottawa conference, and this was especially true for the
epistemological issues. Yet the epistemological questions are the truly revolu-
tionary ones, because they are about fundamental aspects of knowledge
acquisition and can threaten existing arrangements more dramatically than
mere institutional tinkering. It is understandable, therefore, that the vested
interests in the postsecondary enterprise have ensured that they would not be
raised in an open forum.
Liberal education is such an epistemological issue: it has to do with the
sort of knowledge that needs to be acquired, given certain educational goals,
and how it should be acquired. It represents a stratagem recommended by
some educational reformers to accomplish objectives they regard as fundamen-
tal, yet the desirability of such a strategy can only be gauged by showing how
it would make the postsecondary system more effective. This in turn requires
that the whole process of education and education policy be clearly under-
stood. This nexus of issues was hardly discussed.
Entrapments Highlighted
Lise Bissonnette (1989) indicates clearly that she is very pessimistic about the
implementation of this "new classicism" curriculum for which there was
supposedly such a "yearning" in Saskatoon. She ascribes this phenomenon to
institutional obstacles standing in the way of the new curriculum (organiza-
tional sclerosis, pedagogical incapabilities, diversity of the clienteles, demands
from the marketplace, and strong differences of opinion about the content of
this new classicism).
Howard Clark (1989) of Dalhousie University appears to support Bisson-
nette's diagnosis: there is at present both a phenomenal pressure to promote
specialization at the postsecondary level, and an equally phenomenal incapac-
ity in the universities to do more than just cope. For Clark, the debate on
curriculum is a symptom of the fundamental problems that postsecondary
education institutions face.
Among other things, Grant's (1989) puzzling testimony in response to
Bissonnette's paper urges postsecondary institutions to resist private-sector
pressures to educate for utilitarian ends. But, more important, he reveals the
basic puzzlement of the business community when dealing with the higher
education issue. As George Bernard Shaw diagnosed a long time ago, "every
profession is a conspiracy against the laity"; so it is hardly surprising that lay
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people find it so difficult to come to terms with the crisis facing universities.
In this case, both institutional and epistemological entrapments are ignored
and simplistic suggestions ensue.
Karelis's (1989) analysis of the American scene helps to put things in
perspective. The central question, he states, is "about the ends of general
education and about the kind and type of general education that will best serve
those ends." Karelis refers to studies identifying many different purposes for
education, all equally valid. From there, one may derive a wide range of recipes
to reach these different sets of objectives, yet none of these broad goals
commands a core curriculum as a sine qua non. Indeed, experiments at Harvard
and Miami show a high degree of dissonance about these issues in the higher
education system. Some have even argued that an enlightened education in a
small number of typical concrete instances might provide an opportunity for
a wide-ranging appreciation of historical, technological, and social concerns.
What is striking in Karelis's paper is evidence that the "public" and the
"academy" appear to be at odds. Some parents in the United States want their
children to be taught the traditional content or knowledge base they them-
selves were exposed to in their youth, while the academy would appear willing
to supply only what its professoriate knows, i.e., disciplinary knowledge. The
romantically nostalgic public or the self-interested professoriate: who should
decide what is needed?
Experiments: A Very Small Sample
Canadians have performed only a few experiments in search of a third way
with the result that the variety of available programs is much narrower in
Canada than in the United States. One such experiment sketches a strategy
that is both timid and successful: the Arts One curriculum of the University of
British Columbia — 60% of the freshman year is especially designed. It has
worked well for over 20 years for a very small cadre of students.
The second strategy is broader in scope: the liberal arts program proposed
by the University of Toronto. This Unity of Knowledge program is intriguing;
perhaps for that reason, it has not yet been implemented.
The third summarizes a more ambitious strategy. It does not deal with
liberal education directly; rather, it is an attempt to break down the monolithic
structure of the university and to create a quasi-market within the university: a
separate entity — le module — (including professors, students, and socioeco-
nomic agents) responsible for assessing the demand for courses making up
programs and another — lafamille — (made up of the professoriate) respon-
sible for supplying the courses. This is the system in place at the Universite du
Quebec.
The first two strategies address the narrow question of what a liberal
education curriculum might look like; the third is a strategy designed to shake
loose the producer-dominated structure of universities, a factor that many
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observers believe is responsible for the rigidity and inadequacy of university
programs.
Although other examples exist, by and large, epistemological issues are
not high on the agenda, and the range of institutional variables remains
relatively narrow. This stems from two sets of implicit premises:
• The equation between cultural literacy as needed currency and liberal
education as the only way to provide it. In fact, one might defend the
importance of cultural literacy without any commitment to core curricu-
lum or other paraphernalia of liberal education as a strategy (Hirsch
1987).
• The presumed existence of a strong demand for liberal education. In fact,
evidence for such a demand is difficult to gauge and largely anecdotal. On
the other hand, there is strong evidence of a growing demand for training
and personal development activities, and massive sums of money have
been spent on such activities by the public and private sectors. In Canada,
we spend some $9 billion dollars for postsecondary education through our
universities and colleges, but at least another $3 billion is spent by business,
trade associations, and public and private agencies to produce postsecon-
dary education privately. Indeed, some have argued, on the basis of
extensive interviews with firms and public agencies, that a much higher
proportion of postsecondary education is produced by this shadow higher
education system. To a certain extent, these activities are complementary
to the postsecondary education publicly produced, but much of it is a
substitute — a focused, practical, vocationally-oriented substitute for what
the public regards as unsatisfactory output by postsecondary educational
institutions (Paquet 1988c). This sort of massive investment raises ques-
tions about the view that postsecondary education should drift toward a
new classicism.
EDUCATION POLICY: A WICKED PROBLEM
Education has always had a variety of functions in society: to produce literate,
responsible citizens; to acculturate a heterogeneous citizenry; to develop the
human capital necessary for the maintenance and improvement of economic
growth, competitiveness, and living standards; to allow individuals to develop
character, self-awareness, interpersonal communication capabilities, and com-
petence; to develop mind and ability to reason (Peterfreund 1976). This is a
complex task, and over time a variety of groups have crafted different strategies
to realize diverse parts of this ambitious agenda.
Yet there is no indisputable notion of what the goals should be in a
pluralistic society. Education policy poses an ill-structured problem to policy
analysts, what Rittel and Webber have labeled a wicked problem (Rittel and
Webber 1973). As we saw in Chapter 2, such problems have two characteristics:
the goals are not known or are very ambiguous and the means-ends relation-
ships are highly uncertain and poorly understood. Rittel and Webber (1973)
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have spelled out some basic characteristics of wicked problems: they lack
definitive formulation and a stopping rule as in a chess problem. In addition,
solutions are not true-or-false but good-or-bad; every attempt at solving the
problem counts significantly; and the planner has no right to be wrong.
Problematique
Educators, trainers, and developers defend different approaches. For educators,
operating in the mislabeled "Rousseau-Dewey tradition," the shaping of the
mind and the ability to reason is somewhat content-neutral and focused on
general principles, on general knowledge; this is the way to learn how to think
critically. For trainers, knowledge is skill and skill is knowledge, and there is no
way to develop general transferable abilities without focusing on procedural
and substantive schemata that are highly specific to the task at hand. For
developers, the cornerstone might be loosely called an anthropological theory
of education: knowledge and skills can be developed only on the basis of a
capacity to grow as a human being within a human community to which one
is acculturated (Hirsch 1987).
These three notions are ideals in most discussions. In fact, much of what
is done under any of these labels turns out to have educational, training, and
developmental components. Any curriculum, course, or seminar may be
represented as existing somewhere within a triangle of human capital forma-
tion (Figure 6), where each apex is an ideal representation of each of these
valuable types of human capital formation (Paquet 1988c).
The centre of gravity of the traditional Canadian postsecondary enterprise
(PSE) — and of any other national system for that matter — should be map-
pable as a point or as a zone within this triangle. It is the result of a variety of
private and public initiatives and policies that have favoured one or another
component. Moreover, all such systems have evolved through time, and their
drift should be traceable within the triangle. Indeed, ideally any PSE should,
through a diversity of institutions, cater to the diversity of private demands
and public needs, for there are important differences in the strategies pro-
Figure 6. The Human Capital Formation Triangle.
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posed by educators, trainers, and developers: educators bet on C as the
baseline, trainers on B, and developers on A.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries in Canada, the mix of education,
training, and development in traditional postsecondary education was prob-
ably more balanced than it is now. Much importance was given to each
component of human capital formation, through a diversity of institutions and
arrangements. During the first half of the 20th century, however, a formal
philosophy of education, mistakenly ascribed to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
John Dewey, came to be in good currency. This so-called Rousseau-Dewey
tradition emphasized education as a formal process, shaping mind and reason,
that could be effected through content-neutral curricula. Education, as apex
C, became the linchpin of the PSE. Segments of the PSE became more
specialized, and a division of labour crystallized more sharply between the
different institutions — universities, colleges, technical schools, etc. — with a
higher or lower status depending on the mix of components they provided.
Personal development ceased to be a central variable in the PSE.
Technical schools, colleges, and polytechnics developed a different brand
of curriculum (more practical and more training intensive) but the social status
of these programs remained relatively low, and the training they purported to
give became more and more "tainted" by the ruling educational philosophy.
Within universities, training-intensive activities have also been given lower
status and are starved for resources. A recent report by the Canadian Chamber
of Commerce was quite harsh in evaluating these institutions: the students are
being trained on outdated equipment, and the quality of instruction is so low
that "students graduate without sufficient skills or ability to pursue their chosen
careers effectively" (Basken et al. 1988). Frank Stronach of Magna Corporation
(in a personal interview) offered this very rationale for setting up his own
training school.
Goals Not Known or Ambiguous
This problematique does not suggest that postsecondary education should
adopt a particular contour or should emphasize, as a matter of course, one of
the three components. The education system must fit within the broader
appreciative system that a society elects. Particular societies with quite different
appreciative systems and norms may select quite different patterns of educa-
tional institutions located in different portions of the triangle of human capital
formation. Identifying the underlying norms and specifying the required
directions for curriculum reform are very difficult tasks, for the basic goals are
not agreed on or even unambiguous in a pluralistic society.
For instance, the directions of curriculum policy will be quite different if
postsecondary education is considered as closed (i.e., independent of its social
context) as opposed to seeing its survival as dependent on its capacity to adapt.
In the same way, policy directions will be quite different if the postsecondary
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institution perceives its main goal as training individuals as opposed to educating
them or to developing them into better human beings.
This leads to six quite different philosophies of postsecondary education
as can be seen in Table 2 (Paquet and von Zur-Muehlen 1987: Chapter VI).
Table 2. Six Philosophies of Postsecondary Education.
...depending on whether they are:
CLOSED OPEN
SYSTEMS °r SYSTEMS
with
the main
objective
of
TRAINING
EDUCATION
DEVELOPING
A
science
C
tradition
E
perception
B
technology
D
culture
F
creativity
Institutions in position A wish to train people in the scientific method.
Position C corresponds to institutions whose vocation is to train students to act
in life in the light of a tradition used as an instrument to decode and make
sense of the world. Position E institutions start from the individual and provide
opportunities for fulfillment and self-improvement through improved percep-
tion. Those in position B train individuals in a way best suited to economic
development. In this case science is no longer sufficient; the institution must
also take into account the technical needs of society, and the institution
becomes a location for the development of highly skilled manpower. Position
D corresponds to a situation where it is felt that specialized and technical
training does not suffice to ensure that individuals adapt well to an ever-chang-
ing scene: the institution then attempts to be the locus for the production of
culture in the sense of Clifford Geertz (1965) — a set of control mechanisms,
of approaches and ways of defining problems, of "programs" in the sense that
the computer scientist uses the term. Position F institutions emphasize crea-
tivity and the development of innovative power as a way to cope with a
changing environment.
This is only a preliminary and somewhat simplistic stylization of possible
goals and environmental conditions, but it illustrates how the general strategy
of postsecondary institutions depends fundamentally on the definition of such
parameters.
Institutional Entrapments
The history of educational reform is replete with failed attempts to direct the
education system in different directions by means of institutional repairs.
Traditional educational practice has accommodated these innovations easily,
particularly in times of affluence, when efficiency mattered little or when
educational goals were overridden by other purposes: for example, keeping
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the baby boomers off the street and out of the job market. When resources
became scarce, postsecondary education institutions felt threatened and re-
acted to pressure for change by making use of defense mechanisms to protect
existing ways. They evolved into a dynamically conservative system, i.e., the
system as a whole developed a tendency to remain the same and a capacity to
resist change through a variety of means like unionization (Paquet 1988a). At
present, the PSE is not unlike the building industry — "a coalition of shared
interests built on prevailing technologies" (Schon 1971).
For education is a social system and, as with all social systems, it contains
a structure, a technology, and a theory. "The structure is a set of roles and relations
among individual members. The theory consists of the views held within the
social system about its purposes, its operations, its environment, and its future.
Both reflect, and in turn influence, the prevailing technology of the system"
(Schon 1971). The best way to initiate change is to create a disequilibrium
among these three components.
Changes in technology and structure are easily neutralized by the existing
institutions' "dynamic conservatism"; viz. the numerous attempts to change
the PSE by computerizing it or by imposing standardized curricula. The PSE
has a capacity to repress such threats in much the same manner as bees in a
beehive neutralize the danger when a mouse invades the beehive in winter.
The bees sting the mouse to death, then encapsulate it in wax; it looks alive,
but it has become innocuous. The PSE finds it easy to prevent change by
opposing or delaying it, or through continuous chanting that there is no
existing problem in the PSE that more public money could not cure. On the
other hand, it finds it difficult to initiate real change because of the fact that
the very technical and structural devices it might mobilize for change in its
so-called collegial way are easily frustrated by internal systems (guilds, etc.)
with their traditional conservatism.
It can be argued that it is quite different in the case of theory. Tampering
with the way in which educationists perceive the world and themselves and the
way in which they answer the question — what should we be doing? — is very
potent. It may appear more difficult to effect, but the likelihood of generating
a truly creative disequilibrium and cumulative causation is much higher from
that angle. Although it is true that theorizing may be a tool for rationalizing
away any alternative procedure as unsound, it is also a most powerful channel
of attack when it can be shown that the whole knowledge production operation
is wrongheaded.
Epistemology as Lever
The positivist revolution, together with the so-called Rousseau-Dewey tradi-
tion, shifted the centre of gravity of the PSE by imposing a certain formalism
on it: there was more and more emphasis on theory, general principles, and
"methodism" and less and less on matters pertaining to the "oral," the
"particular," the "local," and the "timely" (Paquet 1988a; Toulmin 1988). What
has evolved in universities is a curriculum made up of a variety of general
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principles and broad surveys, providing the necessary elements for the edu-
cated person to learn to think critically. The idea of a true vocationally-oriented
higher education system has disappeared (Gunderson 1978) and the ruling
philosophy of education has percolated down to the secondary level: even
there, the skill component has dwindled and general content-free curricula
prospered (Adams 1980).
But there has been a revival of practical philosophy in recent years
(Toulmin 1988), and the ruling philosophy of education has been challenged
by recent work on cognition. Critical thinking, it would appear, evolves not
from general content-free principles or methodologies, but from schemata that
are highly specific to the task at hand and that are not easily transferable from
one task to the next. Developing a human being is, therefore, ensuring that
he or she acquires a fair number of such schemata, shared by others in the
community, so as to be able to communicate competently and effectively with
them — providing the person with a sort of "cultural currency" in the sense
that economists give to existing national currencies (Hirsch 1987).
The development of this basic currency — capacious and vague, but
fundamental to communicative competence and competitiveness — cannot be
ensured either through general disembodied principles, in the manner of the
traditional curricula, or simply through skill-building, in the manner one
proceeds to coach an athlete to success. Facts and skills are inseparable and
background knowledge — even that which is specific culturally and nationally —
is of great import in the development of critical reason, skills, and personal
growth as a competent citizen. Traditionally, universities and colleges have
provided through their core curriculum some smattering of background
knowledge, but most often this has degenerated into formal general principles
built into rigid curricula rather than being closely related to the national
community, to the personal circumstances of students, and to schemata likely
to be of use.
A revolution at the epistemological level is raising questions about existing
structures and technologies in the PSE and is, therefore, creating pressure for
change. Indeed, it may be said that one of the reasons why the PSE has chosen
to insulate itself from the teachings of its own schools of education or to belittle
considerably the significance of what might be learned from them is that such
insulation constitutes an apt defense mechanism.
A different image of educating, i.e., of imparting knowledge, flows from
the work of Schon (1983) on the epistemology of practice. Schon shows that
the dominant model of technical rationality wrongly presumes that knowledge
flows from underlying disciplines (basic science) to applied science to actual
performance of services to clients and society. For this narrow view of knowl-
edge flow — a sort of one-way street — he substitutes a two-way approach,
emphasizing knowing-in-action/reflection-in-action, where knowledge emer-
ges equally well from groping with situations and from surprises leading to
on-the-spot experiments and knowledge creation.
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The implications of this different approach to the professional education
process are significant: an emphasis on the development of skills and a capacity
for conversation with the situation though reflective practicum. It translates
into a different curriculum (Schon 1987).
How Do We Learn?
One should not presume that there is unanimity on the epistemological front.
Research on cognitive skills is buzzing with competing paradigms and is
characterized by strong disagreements among critics of the current conven-
tional wisdom.
Herbert Simon and others (Larkin et al. 1980) have been arguing that
cognitive skills "depend on procedural and substantive schemata that are
highly specific to the task at hand" and cast doubt on the idea that there are
general or transferable cognitive skills and on the so-called Rousseau-Dewey
tradition that has led us to believe that if students look at a few cases, they will
understand general principles and learn how to think critically (Hirsch 1987).
This work maintains that much of education is the imparting of a large number
of schemata, and that this requires "extensive knowledge of specifics."
In this system, the process of abstraction provides bridges from sensations
to higher levels of thought. The ladder of abstraction begins with sensory data
from repeated observations; from these, observed replicated associations
emerge and are memorized; the knowledge gained by association is general-
ized by inference to classes of objects and associations between classes of
objects, such as those of cause and effect. Knowledge is thus the accumulation
of these tried and true associations, and education becomes the distribution
of accumulated knowledge (Emery 1980).
This approach departs from tradition and re-introduces specifics (the
local, the timely, the oral, the particular) into the process of knowledge
acquisition. However, many observers would say that it does not go far enough
because this approach remains based on a theory of perception that leaves
much to be desired: "to perceive the world one must already have ideas about
it. Knowledge of the world is explained by assuming that knowledge of the
world exists. Whether the ideas are learned or innate makes no difference; the
fallacy lies in circular reasoning" (Gibson 1979: 304).
An alternative paradigm starts from a different theory of perception, a
theory of direct perception that has no need for a ladder of abstraction. This
Gibsonian (1979) approach may be summarized as follows:
• The act of picking up information is continuous — an activity that is
ceaseless and unbroken.
• What is perceived are places, attached objects, detached objects, and
substances, together with events that are modifications of these things.
• Information is the specification of the observer's environment.
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• The perceptual system is a mode of overt attention: it can explore,
investigate, adjust, optimize, extract.
• The perceptual system registers persistence and change.
• The process of information pick-up is susceptible to development and
learning: better extracting, exploring, etc.
This new theory of active perception has important educational implica-
tions (Emery 1980):
• Because limitless information is available in the environment, access is
restricted only by habits of perception.
• The perceptual systems can be improved: this is "an education in searching
with our own perceptual systems, not an education in how to someday
research in the cumulated pile of so-called social knowledge" (Emery
1980:29).
• Education is "learning to learn" from our own perceptions.
This foray into cognitive psychology is not an aside: it is central to the main
theme of education reform. For these shifts from general principles to sche-
mata, and from schemata to direct perception suggest different conceptions
of knowledge and, consequently, different notions of education. The further
one moves away from a view of knowledge attributed to Rousseau-Dewey
toward a view of knowledge a la Gibson (with the Simon-Hirsch view standing
somewhat in the middle), the less persuasive is the case for a standard
liberal-education core curriculum.
In place of an educational system based on the accumulation of proven
knowledge by memorization of established associations, rules of classification,
and logical inference and based on students being taught to distrust their
personal experience as a guide to knowledge (the goal is to produce a critical,
disciplined, and literate mind), one is led to suggest one starting with the
perception and experience of the individual, regarding education as the
training of attention and higher studies as providing aided modes of appre-
hension or extraction of information (by means of instruments to allow metric
knowledge; by means of language to make knowing explicit instead of tacit;
and by means of pictures to extend perceiving and consolidate the gains of
perceiving) (Gibson 1979; Emery 1980).
If one accepts a Gibsonian view of the world, knowledge is only restricted
by our habits of perception, and one may and must educate one's perceptual
systems. This entails recentring education on the process of searching, on
learning to explore and learn, for the weight of evidence is that even literate
adults find it difficult to use their own perceptions.
This revolution, in turn, calls for an education process that puts much more
emphasis on exploration and playfulness than is usually accepted in the PSE,
for this is the way to enhance the capability to extract information from our
worlds (March 1976). The usual university insists above all that it must produce
"disciplined intelligence... that is trained in logic and logical analysis" (Ross
1961). What is emerging from the new epistemology is a much broader
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approach that covers a variety of types of thinking — mathematical, logical,
lateral, etc. (De Bono 1969) and this does not mesh well with the way in which
the PSE perceives its vocation and its task (Paquet 1985b).
Education Reform as Social Learning
At a time when the possibility of designing a liberal education curriculum is
examined, it is essential to ascertain in some way what the ends of general
education are and what kind or type of curriculum design is likely to lead in
this direction in the light of what is known about cognition and learning.
On these questions, there is no clear a priori choice one can offer from the
policymaker's point of view among mixes of goals, or among theories of
knowledge acquisition, or among institutional/curricular arrangements likely
to accomplish certain ends. This is the nature of a wicked problem. Policy
analysts faced with ill-structured problems must learn on the job about both the
configuration of facts, and the configuration of values, but they must also
manage to learn from the stakeholders in the policy game and from the many
groups at the periphery who are in possession of important local knowledge, for
without their participation no effective policy can be implemented.
Friedmann and Abonyi's (1976) social learning model of policy research is a
way to deal with these wicked problems (see Chapter 2). In Figure 5, "cognition
is linked to the world of events via social action and the result of that action.
The adequacy of a theory of reality, and/or the political strategy is therefore
dependent on the results of action and the extent to which these results satisfy
the given social values" (Friedmann 1978).
CONCLUSION
The challenge put to the PSE by the epistemological revolution underway is
bound to entail much more than the reshuffling of a few courses, the develop-
ment of a core curriculum, or the insertion in the curricula — one way or
another — of the 5000 essential names, phrases, dates, and concepts to ensure
"cultural literacy," the Hirsch (1987) middle-of-the road solution. It forces a
serious rethinking of what education is all about and it emphasizes the need
to launch a social learning experiment to learn how "to learn how to learn."
The debate on liberal education has posed the problem of "the ends of
general education and about the kind and type of general education that will
best serve those ends" (Karelis 1989). In that sense, it has put on the front
burner an issue that the PSE has been refusing to face for some time.
Those arguing for liberal education must establish why such a strategy
would improve whatever postsecondary education wants to do; and we are back
to the more general questions raised above. These more general questions
have to be probed if one is to be able to put forward a strategy likely to be
effective. Yet, there is noway to learn about these issues except through action
hypotheses.
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The challenge put forward by the liberal education debate cannot, there-
fore, be resolved a priori. It cannot be resolved in isolation either. What is
required is a broad-based social inquiry into the problems of higher education
very much on the model of the Energy Options Process launched in 1987 to
provide an opportunity for a dialogue among Canadians about the common
energy future (see Chapter 5). The resulting report (Kierans et al. 1988),
although somewhat biased and unsatisfactory, showed that much had been
learned within one year through a process of wide consultation with all
interested parties and groups throughout the country.
It may well be that nothing less than such a process can clarify the
objectives of our education system and answer questions about the kind of
postsecondary education we should design for our grandchildren. The process
is difficult to manage and does not always generate unambiguous or satisfac-
tory answers (see Chapter 5); moreover, it is not likely that such a broad
consultation can be engineered easily given the federal-provincial quagmire
surrounding all issues educational in Canada. But such an inquiry may be the
only vehicle likely to generate the sort of debate on postsecondary education
that is so urgently needed. The problem of higher education is no easier to
tackle than biculturalism or transportation; so, there is no reason to believe
that anything short of an inquiry of the sort suggested is likely to bring forth
the feasible, acceptable, and implementable solutions we are looking for.
Some may argue that we have shifted the debate from a simple question
about liberal education to the broad question of higher education in general.
This is undoubtedly true. One of the characteristics of wicked problems is that
they are often a symptom of a "higher-order problem." Thus, crime in the
street may be a symptom of general moral decay, lack of opportunity, poverty,
etc. (Rittel and Webber 1973). In the same manner, the liberal education
debate is an echo of a higher-order malaise in the postsecondary education
system. The malaise in education may also reflect some still higher-order
malaise in our society. The best way to deal with lower-order issues is not to
deal with them in a restrictive way if they are only symptoms. One might be
more effective by tackling the problem on as high a level as possible.
PART II
SOCIAL LEARNING IN ACTION:
D-ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVES
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CHAPTER 9
HOW TO SCHEME VIRTUOUSLY: THE
ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS
IN MEETING THE NEEDS OF CHANGING
SOCIETIES*
There is only one excuse for a lecture:
to challenge.
- Karl Popper
It is presumptuous for a career academic to address practical men and women
holding important responsibilities in human affairs on the role of their
agencies in meeting the needs of changing societies. This borders on temerity
when the group of experts represents a wide array of cultural and national
circumstances, especially when the academic in question is known to have
traveled widely only in Ottawa. It becomes daredeviltry to do so at a time when
the ground is in motion.
Yet there is some merit in listening to the interrogations of a lay person:
much merit for le profane — a dangerous word used in French to refer to the
uninitiated. There is much to be learned by the lay person in the process of
tackling such a task; there is also some merit for the initiated to hear the lay
person, if only to understand better what lies behind the puzzlement and
criticism they face in their rapports with the public.
My only credentials for this task, besides a quarter of a century of casual
public service watching, stem from some adventurous comments I made on
the Canadian Public Service Commission (Paquet 1985c). The paper was
published, but I was also relieved, as a result, of civic duty as a member of the
Auditor General's Comprehensive Auditing Task Force charged with an assess-
ment of the PSC. I learned first-hand that criticizing the PSC can be perilous.
I hope that, in this second round of critical discussion of the roles of public
service commissions (PSCs) and kindred institutions, I will succeed in airing
my interrogations, and even in making some suggestions, without encounter-
ing the anger of the experts.
* Parts of this material appeared in "Virtuous Scheming." Policy Options, 1989, 10(6), 8-12. The
assistance of Jeffrey Holmes and Marc Racette is gratefully acknowledged.
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Let me start with a few basic propositions:
• despite the contemporary rhetoric about the demise of the state and the
downsizing of governments everywhere, the state will not play a lesser role
in our socioeconomies in the future;
• the role of the state, however, will be quite different; there will be a shift
from a regulatory to a strategic function (Paquet 1978b; Navarre 1986);
• human resource management is likely to be much more complex in this
new setting;
• PSCs are bound to be key players in the strategic management of the public
household;
• to play this role PSCs will need to be proactive and become more experi-
mental instead of focusing on their traditional functions.
THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE
Canada is relatively young as a modern administrative entity. Yet, paradoxi-
cally, like many other young Commonwealth countries, it is also an aging
socioeconomy. The last 30 years of relentless rule-making and institution-build-
ing have developed in our economies some incapacity to adapt and transform
easily. There are only a few prognoses and therapies for such socioeconomies
(Kindleberger 1978):
• building up protective barriers against foreign competition and bundling
up in blankets;
• searching for a Fountain of Youth under the guidance of an economic
Ponce de Leon; or
• inventing ways to dissolve the social arteriosclerotic structures in the body
politic.
This painful third way is unfortunately the only reasonable one to follow.
Many countries have crafted a strategy of this sort over the last decade. But,
because much of this sclerosis has also been diagnosed as being of the
iatrogenetic variety (i.e., generated by ill-inspired policies), many have seized
on a philosophy of downsizing the public sector as the only way to make our
socioeconomies less sclerotic. This, in turn, has triggered the recent efforts to
reverse the vast transfer of material, human, and financial resources from
society to state that occurred in the post-World War II period — to replace state
regulation by self-regulation in a civil society equipped with a strengthened
legal framework (Cohen-Tanugi 1985). These dual objectives (to rejuvenate
the socioeconomy and to downsize the public sector) have become con-
founded.
Those bold enough to attempt to refurbish the state apparatus to invest it
with a renewed capacity to deal effectively with the changing needs of society
have had to face striking challenges. The first major challenge was that whatever
might be accomplished would have to be done with fewer rather than more
resources.
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS 155
The second challenge has come from growth: from the world population
increase and from the new form of knowledge-based development of our
socioeconomies. Demographic growth has meant a larger demand for public
service, with geometrically expanded personnel management problems,
whereas the development of knowledge-based economies has entailed the
demand for services that were not necessarily those provided by the state in
the heyday of industrial growth. Because information and knowledge are not
handled as well by markets as simple commodities, the need for nonmarket
coordination has grown considerably with the development of the information
economy. Indeed, the very notion of state intervention has experienced a
fundamental transformation: in the world of the mass economy, governments
built their legitimacy on their roles as agents of protection, stabilization, and
redistribution; in the information economy, governments have to become
agents of integration, coordination, and networking (Paquet 1985c).
The third challenge has come from the growing involvement of states and
governments in matters of culture and values. Formerly, governments and their
public services were not asked to act as regularly as they are now as referees
between stakeholders in these realms. But the growing importance of affairs
of the mind in the information economy has led governments to become more
and more involved in adjudicating matters of values. This is not only of
consequence in the rapports between government and the population, but it
is a matter that has become very important internally, in the operations of
government, as new norms of equitable treatment of employees and different
types of affirmative action in dealing with racial, linguistic, or gender groups,
etc., have arisen. These have created new constraints on the mode of delivery
of public service. Administration has become philosophy-in-action and is
becoming more so all the time (Dlugos and Weiermair 1981; Hodgkinson
1983; Mitroff 1983).
The fourth challenge is the world scale of many of the new problems facing
public servants: from environmental issues, to urbanization processes, to
technological change — issues that cannot either be abandoned to the market
forces or be controlled by any national government in isolation, even under
the most auspicious circumstances. This calls for new forms of collaboration
between national organizations and going concerns, which have traditionally
perceived themselves as in conflict but whose fates have become positively
correlated in these turbulent times.
Finally, all our public administration apparatuses are frightfully deficient
in the face of these new challenges. At the very moment when problems are
becoming more difficult to solve, the public bureaucracies are under attack for
their inadequacy. Although this is true to different degrees as one roams the
continents, the style and procedures of public administration have been, and
remain to a great extent
Legalistic, formalistic, inelastic and authoritarian, with almost unassailable
status arrangements... corruption is pervasive; there is no orientation to-
wards goal setting and individual initiative is strangled. Functions are
restricted to control and regulation plus a few limited services, with a marked
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bias in the direction of overcentralization. There is what amounts to a
continuous administrative crisis. [Goldstaub 1981]
This general diagnosis applies to developed and developing countries: the
key difference is that the problems do not appear insoluble when resources are
abundant; in less wealthy countries, the disproportion between the scale of the
problems and the resources available to deal with them is awesome. But this is
a difference in scale not in kind.
The situation is clear: more public service of a more complex sort has to
be performed with fewer resources by public-sector organizations and person-
nel who do not appear to be capable of delivering the goods.
THE TASKS GOVERNMENT SHOULD/
SHOULD NOT TAKE ON
The growing complexity, turbulence, and interdependence in the global
socioeconomic environment have led to a loss of the stable state and to an
evolution in government functions. It is no longer possible to regard the state
as a simple policeman enforcing certain rules, acting as protector and provider
in a placid environment. Those functions persist but they are no longer the
only responsibilities of the state. Governments have had to develop capacities
to act as animateurs, facilitators, and negotiators, as accelerating change and
growing related uncertainty create circumstances where no simple rules will
do, where judgment is called for (Vickers 1965).
The hierarchy of layers of public administration — ranging through poli-
tics, policymaking, implementation, administration, operations — still exists,
but the need to attend to each of these with sensitivity to their novel particular
constraints has been heightened. Over the last 20 years, both industrial
countries and underdeveloped economies have seen a dramatic change in the
nature of the perception of government and in the way in which government
is expected to carry out its duties (Solo 1975; Islam and Renault 1979): a shift
from a Taylorian view of public administration to an interactive perception of
the process of public management (Friedmann and Abonyi 1976; see also
Chapter 5, this volume).
In the Taylorian model, the different layers of the hierarchy are presumed
to trigger a cascading of decisions from top to bottom: the political body
determining the goals, and the implementation process apparently occurring
mechanically through controlled activities of functionaries. In the interactive
model, this one-way process of goal-setting-cum-control is replaced by a
two-way process putting greater emphasis on different areas of concern —
intelligence (i.e., gathering, processing, and interpreting the information
needed for policy decisions) and innovation (i.e., changes in the design of
administrative arrangements). In this context, the problem to be solved is
regarded from the start as ill-structured, i.e., the goals are not spelled out and
the means-end relationship is blurred. Consequently, the process of public
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administration and government becomes a learning process (Wilensky 1967;
Paquet 1971; Schon 1971).
Government is hesitant to accept this second mode of operation and the
new sort of policy research it entails. Despite the rhetoric and the language of
experimentation that is in good currency, government continues to perceive
itself as the centre and to view society as the periphery. Much of what passes
for policy and administration are efforts by governments to induce groups at
the periphery to conform to central policy. By contrast, social learning entails
listening to the periphery, interacting with the periphery in such a way that
the centre becomes a party (but only one of many) in identifying, analyzing,
and solving society's problems. This in turn calls for policy research, policy-
making, and administration to take on a cybernetic flavour: it is no longer a
simple delivery system but a continuing process of information-gathering and
organization redesign leading to a continuing redefinition of the goals and
reassessment of the directions of policy (Paquet 1971).
Such a need for local participation in the design and implementation of
policy and for participation in the minding of the public household is a central
feature of the public philosophy required to reform the administrative process.
It postulates that local knowledge is crucially important in the crafting of policy.
Administration becomes a process of mutual education. This mutual education
leads first to a recognition that the state does not necessarily belong in every
aspect of the life of citizens. Second, learning must also reveal where the state
needs to play a role as animateur and what structures will be necessary for it
to play such a role effectively. Third, learning must show what sort of areas
should simply be abandoned to private activities or to community work and
what sort of structures might be useful to ensure that such activities will be
conducted according to acceptable norms of efficiency and fairness.
PSCs must play a key role in shaping this broad process of mutual learning.
Not to do so would be tantamount to allowing the system to evolve as if public
services were unconcerned, and accepting a limited technical staffing manage-
ment role. This would almost condemn PSCs to ineffectiveness. Ignoring its
design role would be akin to a central bank being unconcerned about the
nature of financial institutions and their regulation.
The allocation of functions (among the private, public, and civic sectors
and within the public sector among the local, provincial, regional, and national
levels) is not an easy task, and it is unlikely that PSCs will have a final say on
such matters. However, as central agencies equipped with a fair sense of what
is feasible and implementable, public services might benefit immensely from
getting involved in the design of the institutions they will have to staff.
Otherwise, they might find themselves relegated to an ex post role, on the
personnel front, not dissimilar to the one played by the Auditor General on
the financial side, while they should legitimately expect to play also an ex ante
role, very much akin to the role of a Comptroller General on the human
resources front.
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Each country must design its own brand of allocation of functions among
the public, private, and civic households and within the public household. In
each case, it will be inspired by ideology and culture, effectiveness concerns,
political and sociocultural circumstances. Yet within these country-specific
constraints, a few general principles might be used as a basic sextant in
designing a starting point for the process of social learning (Kirby 1980; Paquet
1988d):
• the principle of government exiting from routine management of nones-
sential or nonstrategic sectors;
• the principle of decentralization and devolution and of strengthening or
creating intermediary organizations capable of acting as relay stations in
this process of mutual education;
• the principle of full costing of public service;
• the principle of revenue dependency for all units where the services have
the potential of being marketed;
• the principle of encouraging direct private-public competition;
• the principle that, if a subsidy must be given, it should be given to the
consumers;
• the principle of a necessary culture of public service through mission
statements, corporate plans, and a legitimate system of status and rewards.
This would amount to a philosophy of public service that might dramati-
cally transform the contours of public service: not less government but a
different form of government.
These principles of organization or institution design are meant to be only
a starting point in discussions likely to lead to a set of meta-rules in the
management of the public household. Most project managers define such
meta-rules in their project manuals. What is necessary for PSCs is a project
manual adapted to their own circumstances.
Completely abandoning these broad concerns to political leaders may be
disastrous for PSCs. Given the constraints of values and circumstances, not all
possible allocations of tasks between sectors are equally feasible, implement-
able, and manageable. If PSCs are to ensure that they will be able to do the
best they can with reduced resources, it may not be unimportant for them to
have a say in shaping the tasks devolved to them. This clearly means a
redefinition of the central functions of PSCs: abandoning the security-gener-
ating in-basket/out-basket routine management and contracting-out of such
services (Kemball 1984), but allocating more of the reduced resources to the
intelligence, innovation, and design functions.
These are important new roles for PSCs in increasingly organizational states
(Laumann and Knoke 1988), roles of an entrepreneurial sort (Giersch 1984).
PSCs have neglected this side of their work in the past: as a result, in most
countries, policy reviews or royal commissions have been struck, from time to
time, reminding them that these concerns would not go away.
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS AS DESIGNERS
Once it is decided that an activity should fall under the responsibility of the
state in some way and that PSCs will have to overview its organization and
staffing, the key job is to determine how this task will be despatched. These
decisions are rarely made once and for all. The form of the required organi-
zation and institution often evolve in unexpected ways. But there is still a need
to work at the architecture of the organization and institution from the start to
achieve effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and equity: doing the right thing, doing
the thing right, doing it cheaply, and doing it fairly.
Organizations and institutions are the tools that refurbished PSCs have to
design. These are quite different creatures: an organization is, more or less, a
technical instrument, an expendable tool; whereas an institution is related to
society's requirements, it embodies its norms and values. An institution may
be said to be viable if it "creates conditions in which the competencies of its
personnel are well utilized, and the positive values applied to structures related
to its clients are also applied to structures related to its members" (Perlmutter
1965). In many ways, PSCs as designers must get away from the job of
organization-building (which is obviously temp ting because it is easier) and get
involved in the construction of viable institutions. This in turn requires a good
understanding of institution-building taking into account people, values, and
environments.
Because these parameters are quite different from country to country, one
cannot expect to be able to transplant institutions from one setting to another
without major adaptations.
This is hardly the place to develop a primer on social architecture but it
might be useful to summarize basic principles of institution-building before
proceeding to specific recommendations about the way PSCs might design new
institutions. Perlmutter (1965) has prepared a textbook for social architects. It
both sketches the conceptual requirements and provides a step-by-step de-
scription of the working relationship between social architects and their clients
in the institution-building process. (A statement of the seven conceptual
components of a theory of social architecture as seen by Perlmutter is presented
in the appendix at the end of this chapter.)
Conceptually, institution-building is the outcome of mutual education of the
architect and of the clients and it is based on a sort of intercreation process
leading both parties to develop jointly a structure that takes as fully as possible
into account the human and technical criteria of effectiveness in a global sense
(including positive values such as health, respect for the individual, and
acquisition of skills — technical and interpersonal).
But there is more to building an institution than simply the conceptual
basis. The practice of institution-building must proceed on the basis of a set of
clear assumptions that one must fully realize and steps one must go through.
Again Perlmutter (1965) spells this out clearly:
• preliminary mutual exploration of the clients' commitment to build;
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• mission of the institution and central objectives of the clients;
• alternative routes to building objectives;
• choice and commitment to a specific strategy;
• implementation process;
• validation and stabilization.
PSCs, as designers of institutions, have to acquire a research capability if
they are to perform this sort of task. At present, it is fair to say that, in most
countries, no central agency is charged with organizational and institutional
design. As a result, much of it is improvised at the local level and PSCs are,
then, asked to staff organizations and institutions that often turn out to be
unworkable.
This research requirement has to go much beyond the usual studies of
remuneration, evaluation, training, and classification which have used much
of the time of PSCs in the past. It is not that these requirements have to be
ignored or their importance downplayed. But effectiveness cannot be achieved
by concentrating on such plumbing issues. The whole process of personnel
management has to be put in broader perspective and the PSCs have to be
able to contribute in a meaningful way to this broader perspective through an
alternative approach to public policy. PSCs would fill a vacuum in so doing and
might succeed in developing a higher status within the government apparatus
if they were to become not only the locus of expertise on remuneration and
classification, but also the place where expertise on organizational and institu-
tional design resides.
The social learning framework suggested by Friedmann and Abonyi (1976)
might be an interesting policy framework to help the PSCs develop this new
role as designers (Figure 5). It calls for a new sort of policy research developed
not on the sole basis of analysis of technical data, but on the basis of a full
exploration of values, political gaming and collective action as it evolves in the
civil society (see Chapters 2 and 5).
On the basis of such policy research — done nowhere in governments
except sometimes through task forces and royal commissions — PSCs might
be in a position to suggest organizational/institutional designs that will not only
be efficient, but will also likely provide the ongoing intelligence, the innovative
capability, the political viability, the sensitivity to evolving values, and the
mobilization and commitment necessary for the public organizations/institu-
tions to perform well.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS AS ANIMATEURS
The research function necessary for the PSCs to become effective designers is
also necessary if they are to become effective animateurs. The PSCs have to
develop a theory of human behaviour if they are to have any impact on the
ethos of the public household and the organizational culture of the public
service. Professionalism, collective pride, and a sense of civic responsibility
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have disappeared to a great extent from the public service. In its place, one
finds anomie, alienation, corruption, and a fundamental lack of commitment
to the organization/institution.
A recent study in Canada has shown that loyalty and commitment in the
public service is much lower than in the private sector (Zussman and Jabes
1987). This has been interpreted as resulting from a variety of causes. However,
the root cause of this disenchantment is easily summarized under two head-
ings: flawed organization/institution designs and poor understanding of the
motivation of public servants.
I suggested above that the flawed designs could be resolved by some
architectural repairs or through preventive architecture according to certain
principles, and that experimentation with new structures would be a central
outcome of new policy research culminating in social learning. But institu-
tional architecture will not suffice. Nothing less than a new concept of
citizenship needs to be developed and, concomitantly, a new concept of the
appropriate way for public servants to deal with the new citizens inside and
outside the civil service (see Chapter 7, this volume). Private firms have
learned to deal with their employees and customers in new ways over the last
few years: the manager in both the private and the public sectors has to
become an anthropologist (Boisot 1987).
Managing an organization/institution requires a capacity to understand
the sociocultural circumstances of the employees. If the employees are not
properly trained, if their social responsibilities outpace their income, or if their
remuneration is whimsically defined, it is hardly surprising that motivation
and competence are wanting. Before one is tempted to engage in elaborate
efforts to provide leadership and to stimulate entrepreneurship in the public
service, one has to ensure that the basics are there. These basic components are
somewhat trivial but fundamental:
• a well-established recruitment and selection capability;
• a sound classification/evaluation/compensation system;
• a fair remuneration policy;
• a good performance evaluation scheme;
• a clearly stated human resource development policy;
• good training arrangements and facilities.
None of these basic features can be imported ready-made from other
countries: they depend on the dominant values and the sociocultural under-
ground. Some organizational features may be importable, but many institutional
features have to be learned locally and must fit local circumstances. For example,
in societies where the central institution is the family, any tacked-on adminis-
trative organization is simply going to be milked in the name of family
priorities, and no "sermon on the Mount" will do any good.
The role of PSCs as animateurs entails balancing coercion (i.e., external
pressure) with effective stimulation (i.e., internal pressure). The simplest
way to apply coercion is still competition: it provides a decentralized and
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omnipresent external pressure to perform according to certain standards. The
best way to generate internal pressure is to develop an organizational culture
likely to reduce shirking and corruption.
There has been undue reliance on competition as the guiding force. Peter
Drucker (1988) has reminded managers that organizations of the year 2000
will look much more like symphony orchestras, hospitals, and universities than
like the typical manufacturing concerns of the 1950s. Much of Drucker's
argument indicates that private concerns will look more and more like public
concerns in the year 2000 and that there will then be a need for mechanisms
of motivation more sophisticated than those emanating from simple market
competition: new sociocultural institutions creating a unified vision, develop-
ing collective pride, building an esprit de clan, and getting professionalism to
act as a moral bond to complement the commercial and utilitarian pressures
(Haworth 1977).
The importance of professionalism as a bond and of professional identi-
fication as a way to bring "commitment to assure that action is characterized
by excellence" (Haworth 1977) has been underestimated, very much like
clan-type relationships within organizations (Ouchi 1980). Indeed the extraor-
dinary wealth of motivational forces contained in the pursuit of excitement
and novelty has hardly been tapped (Scitovsky 1976; Servan-Schreiber 1986).
Yet these represent a promising basis on which to build commitment, loyalty,
creativity.
There has been a grand malaise in public services everywhere and the
fundamental questions of values, leadership, morale, and motivation have now
been put on the agenda. It has reached such a critical level that even the media
are taking notice. Yet little has been done to probe these dimensions because
the social sciences as currently practised are ill-equipped to deal with them
(Paquet 1988a).
It is not clear that the industrialized countries have performed any better
than developing socioeconomies in tackling this task: the lack of concern for
values and related dimensions in the large bureaucracies of industrialized
nations has become so ingrained that it may be even more difficult to get their
PSCs to acknowledge the existence of such problems. On the Canadian scene,
it is not unfair to say that the artillery of defense mechanisms deployed in
response to studies, such as those of Nicole Morgan (1981, 1985) and the
Zussman/Jabes (1987) team has been impressive, and the degree of cognitive
dissonance that has marred the interpretation of their results extremely high.
However, built into the social learning paradigm (sketched in Chapter 2
and mentioned above), there is the capacity to bring the social sciences back
to their original questions, back to mixed positive/normative concerns. Such
an approach might entail a long overdue remise en question of the methodologi-
cal naivete and pretensions of the social sciences (Schrag 1980). The roots of
this crisis of the social sciences can be traced back to the 17th century
philosophers who have set the research agenda in a theory-centred style bent
on framing solutions in timeless universal terms. As a result there has been an
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unholy shift of what is regarded as interesting from the oral to the written, from
the particular to the universal, from the local to the general, and from the
timely to the timeless (Toulmin 1988). Yet the practical questions are calling
for timely, local, and particular answers.
The social learning paradigm is only one of many new approaches signal-
ing a move back to those very things that made social sciences and philosophy
"practical," and case studies and case ethics (casuistry) are not maligned as
much and as openly as they used to be. There has been a growing concern over
the moral dimensions of statecraft in the recent past (Waldo 1980; Dwivedi
1987). The refurbished social sciences that one hopes will ensue from this
renewed concern for practical affairs and normative values may pave the way
to new policy research into the central issues mentioned above.
IN PRAISE OF SHORTCUTS
The time may be long before PSCs are allowed to transform themselves into
the informed and competent designers and animateurs we might wish them
to be. In the meantime, there is room for experimentation based on a sound
appraisal of where each PSC starts from: a point that is quite different
(culturally and administratively) for each. The basic features of any legitimate
public service (listed in the previous section) must be in place: for no
meaningful reform movement can be built on whimsical remuneration,
classification, and evaluation. One must also realize that only 5% of public
administrators advise ministers on policy issues, while 95% are involved in
routine work. Both groups cannot be motivated by the same techniques: a
two-track system will have to be put in place. Studies have already shown
where the crucial points are in each case (Montgomery 1986; Glaser 1988).
Betting on New Organizational/Institutional Forms
One of the central weaknesses of public bureaucracies is the overcentralized
nature of their operations. Much can be said, therefore, in favour of experi-
menting with techniques of decentralization of decision-making. This has been a
common feature of the newly industrializing countries: they have allowed "key
state actors and bureaucracies to perform as economic entrepreneurs" (Luke
1986). This sort of flexibility and freedom cannot be exercised without the
appropriate framework of participation and accountability, but there have
been many proposals that look promising.
One approach is to experiment on a small scale with intrapreneurship, i.e.,
the development of "profit centres" within larger bureaucracies (Macrae
1982). The decision to separate some portion of the work in public bureauc-
racies and to subcontract it to interested groups of employees may appear
far-fetched at this time, but it amounts to nothing more than the simple
decision to make-or-buy that bureaucracies all around the world are forced
to make. The question is simply that what is made internally by a bureaucracy
might be produced more efficiently by a "minifirm," either inside or outside
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the bureaucracy. Peter Kemball (1984) has shown how this can be done quite
simply, and he has worked out a scheme through which a standing offer might
be extended: anyone inside or outside the bureaucracy "who can deliver a
service currently being offered by government at the current quality level and
at a saving of 50 percent of current costs will be awarded a multi-year franchise
or license to do so, upon submission of a credible plan of action."
Another approach is to go directly to the concept affranchising and to carve
out of the existing bureaucratic work some portion that could, experimentally
but legitimately, be contracted out. On matters like training and auditing, this
is already done. The solution is all the more appealing if one is willing to
consider the possibility of allowing some local concern to bid on a franchise
from a well-organized international network providing instant know-how and
quality control. There is no reason to believe that there would be adverse
reactions to such experiments any more than there has been when local
governments have begun to contract out services like sweeping hospitals or
collecting rubbish. One advantage of franchising is that it might provide an
ideal vehicle for technology transfer: if an advanced country like Canada that
has developed expertise in services like classification were to develop a fran-
chise system open to groups capable of serving other PSCs in the developing
world, one might be able to ensure high-quality service by nationals under
stringent franchise rules (quality control, standards, etc.) at much lower costs
than at present (Bettinger 1978).
Crafting New Public Service Cultures
Tinkering experimentally with institutional forms will not suffice. It might, at
best, inspire the top quartile of a bureaucracy to become intrapreneurs or
project leaders. To reach down into the other levels, it will be necessary to create
a new public service culture: as new norms come to be in good currency in public
institutions and organizations, rules will become less important. However, the
new norms will not be developed without an acculturation mechanism. This
mechanism is training and development. Private firms have used it extremely
well, and there is no reason to believe that public bureaucracies could not do
the same.
Training and development are the ideal vehicles in which to send through-
out the organization the philosophy, norms, and cultural distinctiveness one
wishes to develop and to show how the reward system is linked to this
philosophy. Dissemination of information about the goals, strategies, and
tactics of the government apparatus may be effected this way, and this message
is often much more important that the so-called technical know-how imparted.
Yet, it is surprising to find that this is not done by public service training
agencies (Dwivedi and Engelbert 1981). Training and development is also the
channel through which professional standards and professionalism maybe best
inculcated. With professionalism comes the basis for the development of
self-enforced norms, collective self-reliance, and a lessening of corruption.
Nothing less than a mafia can be developed in this way: a group having
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attended the same courses, speaking the same "language," and consequently
communicating more effectively across departments (Carmichael 1986; McAl-
lister 1987).
As for the morale and motivation of public servants, there can be no instant
fix. A renewed PSC would do much toward solving the morale and motivation
problem. Under the present arrangements, with their byzantine rules and
regulations, civil servants are becoming impersonal and irresponsible (i.e.,
incapable of responding effectively) because it is no longer clear to whom they
should respond and to whose needs they should attend. Much depends on the
development of a home-grown management culture in the public sector. This,
in turn, depends much on the role that the PSCs appropriate. Much could be
accomplished if PSCs could recast their role away from an ever-interfering hand
between management and staff toward a three-pronged function: (1) a recruit-
ment service at the lower level (where large numbers trigger economies of scale),
(2) an audit/certifying agent to ensure that proper procedures have been
followed in the case of higher appointments, classification, promotion, etc., and
(3) an agency of designers and animateurs along the lines suggested above.
One cannot hope to develop an "esprit de corps" (Fayol 1949) and
eliminate "soldiering" (Taylor 1911) — a work phenomenon whereby average
productivity approximates that of the least productive worker — without at-
tacking the principal cause of "soldiering" and low productivity, i.e., the system
of compensation. One might experiment with decentralization of fiscal author-
ity at the departmental level and with discretionary authority for unit managers
to "increase salaries of their subordinates but only as a group and only if the unit
meets a predetermined output" (Halpern et al. 1988). This would reintroduce
the principle of merit into public service compensation on a broader scale: not
at the level of the individual but of the unit. This sort of compensation, based
on a consensus or negotiated agreement about fair and meaningful work goals,
would encourage functional cooperation and maximum employee input,
eliminate soldiering, take full advantage of the informal organization, and help
develop "esprit de corps." This sort of system is implementable even in public
sector departments providing "complex services to the public requiring inter-
pretation and professional judgment in their normal course of business"
(Halpern et al. 1988).
This sort of initiative would encourage participative management and
eliminate another major source of morale problems in public bureaucracies —
the whimsicality factor in dealing with subordinates in the absence of clear and
fair work goals. Managerial accountability, efficiency in the use of resources,
and better programs would ensue from joint clarification of work goals and
from the reduction of whimsicality in compensation.
CONCLUSION
To propose a social learning framework is to suggest that learning is essential.
The necessary unfinishedness of such ex ante analysis is one of the costs of the
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strategy we propose: social learning can only come with practice and action,
it is not possible to spell out ex ante the design of policy-in-the-making. The
problem formulation will evolve with the learning process.
At this point, PSCs everywhere are torn between neo-Taylorian imperatives
and the dominant values in their societies, and everywhere rules and regula-
tions are in the end perverted to fit dominant values. The only recourse of
political masters, who are anxious about having lost control over the public
bureaucracies and are searching for ways to discipline the elusive mass of civil
servants, is to decree drastic cuts: if one cannot control the civil service process,
one may always scale it down.
The only meaningful response of PSCs wishing to escape the trappings of
local dominant sociocultural values is to initiate a social learning process likely
to lead to a reasonable balance between what is feasible, acceptable, imple-
mentable, and effective. This cannot be done from the centre but requires
action hypotheses and interactive planning.
In each country's design of its own brand of PSC, some international
collaborative work might be fruitful. It might take the form of franchise-type
links or less-formal networking on issues of common concern. It might even
be possible to develop better liaison through dissemination of the results of
applied research. A good example is the replication in a number of countries
of the Zussman and Jabes (1987) study. This would both serve the community
of PSCs and be a much-needed basis for the revaluation of the importance of
research capabilities within the PSCs. Indeed, the devaluation of the status of
research within PSCs is as dangerous and fundamentally wrong-headed as the
devaluation of the status of training and development in ministries and
departments.
Finally, there may be a case for PSCs that elect, as a matter of strategy, to
exit with fanfare the monitoring of a multitude of routine transactions between
managers and employees in the public sector, to enter forcefully into activities
of organization/institution design, even if it means temporarily scaling down
the size of the agency. This might be an astute tactic for PSCs in their efforts
to move the public household into a new style of public administration, by
showing the way.
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APPENDIX: CONCEPTUAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR A THEORY OF SOCIAL ARCHITECTURE
Concepts concerned with the human dimension of institution-building: at
the level of individual personality, interpersonal relations, group behav-
iour, intergroup behaviour, the total organization, and the social, eco-
nomic, cultural, and political systems that constitute the environment in
which the organization exists.
Concepts dealing with the objective-reaching process, whereby the mission
of an institution is formulated and translated into structural, i.e., sociotech-
nical and performance objectives; the strategy for reaching these objec-
tives is devised on the basis of alternatives that are realistic in terms of an
analysis of the consequences, e.g., to resources, payoffs, and risks; the
choice of alternatives leads to implementation; and implementation in
turn leads to validation, when the objectives actually reached are tested
against desired results, and structures considered necessary for further
growth and survival are stabilized (Simon 1960).
Concepts relating the institution to its environment, especially sponsoring
institutions and special interest groups:
- how the institution being built influences and alters the environment;
- what the environment in its political, economic, social, and technolo-
gical aspects seems to demand of the institution;
- how the institution responds to changing environmental conditions,
political instability, prosperity and economic depression, war and
peace.
Concepts relating to the creation of essential organizational structures,
either formal or informal: work-process systems, patterns of authority,
of reward and punishment, evaluation, communication, identification,
perpetuation.
Concepts that concern the realization of positive values: respect for
individual dignity, for physical and mental health, justice, freedom,
human growth, authentic relationships, technical excellence, service,
productivity, profitability, distribution of wealth and power, and efficiency.
Concepts regarding changes of feeling, anxieties, and emotions; dealing
especially with the reduction of persecutor^ and depressive anxieties and
the promotion of more constructive emotions.
Concepts related to a general-systems model of the organization; in
particular the transformation of inputs, resources (both human and non-
human) into results and outputs or performances.
Source: Perlmutter (1965: 17-18).
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CHAPTER 10
GRANTING COUNCILS IN SEARCH OF
EXCELLENCE: DYNAMIC CONSERVATISM
VERSUS SOCIAL LEARNING*
Precisons de plus que le homard n'aboie pas
et qu'il a 1'experience de 1'abime des mers,
ce qui le rend tres superieur au chien.
-Alexandre Vialatte
The great buzzword of the 1980s was excellence. Through a perversion
ascribable to illiteracy and self-interest, a comparative — excellent — has been
transformed into a superlative and used to confer some nee plus ultra status on
virtuosity in certain types of activities. This idea of excellence is a modern
concept; it was foreign to the Greeks (Dumezil 1987).
The word has been used recently in a flurry of policy initiatives designed
to create Centres of Excellence: the federal Secretary of State developed such
a program in the early 1980s; Quebec has had a similar program; the same
approach was used more recently in Ontario; and a major round of competition
for Centres of Excellence was carried out by the federal government in 1989.
There are two separate components in the term "centre of excellence" as
used in the current debates. The term "centre" refers to a form of organization
of research built on synergies and a crossing of disciplinary bounds; "excel-
lence" is based on a rationale for constructing some centres instead of others,
i.e., usually the comparative quality of a group of researchers measured in a
particular way. Although I have argued forcefully for the creation of a national
network of research centres in the humanities and the social sciences in Canada
as a strategy of great promise (Paquet 1987c), one does not necessarily have to
argue in the same breath for the funding of "centres of excellence," especially
if excellence is defined in narrow academic disciplinary terms.
This may appear to be an untenable position: how can one disagree with
excellence as a criterion for selecting among potential candidates in a competi-
tion for funding for research centres? Clearly, there is nothing wrong with this
* This chapter also appeared in Preston, R.J. (editor). Centres of Excellence: The Potential for Social
Sciences and Humanities, Hamilton: McMaster University, 1992, pp. 113-129. The assistance of A.
Burgess is gratefully acknowledged.
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criterion per se, as long as one realizes that excellence is a weasel word and
that behind this label lies a complex scheme for evaluating competing pro-
jects — a scheme that may or may not be reasonable depending on what
evaluative social system underpins it.
THE MISGUIDED SEARCH FOR ACADEMIC
EXCELLENCE
Human beings have an unlimited capacity for distinguishing and classifying,
especially when this serves their interests (Perrenoud 1987). For any strategy
of classification corresponds to the fabrication of a hierarchy, and the logics
underpinning these ways of classifying are many, often contradictory, and
always contentious: it depends fundamentally on what is the norm, the crite-
rion on which the hierarchy is based.
Asking a group to assess excellence is tantamount to authorizing some
classification. Any useful debate about choice centres on the legitimacy of the
institution charged with the job. On the occasion of recent competitions in
Canada, there has been much argument in favour of a classification scheme
defined under the agency of the professional academic disciplines. Others have
argued that such a classification scheme would produce a hierarchy that is
irrelevant to today's context, that professional academics are the worst possible
group for such a job as the professionalization of academe has led to a
perversion of its notion of excellence.
A Sociology of the Academic Profession
Katouzian (1980) has provided a vivid sketch of the way in which profession-
alization has transformed scholars into full-time academic mental workers and
has led to the emergence of the professional academic, "a complete layman
outside his own discipline and a narrow specialist within it." These professional
academics are members of narrow disciplines; they communicate through
specialized journals, and the more integrated the disciplinary profession, the
greater the constraint on intellectual activities. The greater the control over
the means of publication and propagation of ideas, the less tolerant the official
journals are of ideas that threaten established views. Because promotions and
academic reputations are linked to publication in these journals, this becomes
the overriding objective of the professional academic, which, in turn, dictates
academic cautiousness and a high degree of specialization.
As a result of this sort of development, the following pattern has emerged
(Katouzian 1980, Paquet 1988a):
• a tendency to concentrate on the solution of "puzzles" instead of attacking
substantial problems;
• a proliferation of printed material that adds comparatively little to knowl-
edge;
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• a research agenda for academic work that is set by fashion and the whims
of the "invisible college."
This pointed characterization is not unwarranted. The power of the
academic professions has grown to the point where they have become a
determining force in the allocation of financial support for research through
granting councils and such agencies. Professional academics are the driving
force in panels defining the priorities and standards in funding agencies. This
explains the high degree of cognitive dissonance of these agencies, even when
the public communicates its discontent.
For as soon as the notion of excellence is mentioned, professional academ-
ics are quick to point out that they are uniquely equipped to determine what
is and is not excellent through the social organization of peer evaluation that
they have in place, and through certain measures like citation indexes — the
number of times a paper or an author has been quoted or cited in journals
regarded as appropriately disciplinary. Indeed, a recent appeal in a competi-
tion for the funding of centres of excellence at the federal level has been based,
in part, on the unsuitability of a peer reviewer because his citation index was
not as robust as the pedigree of some of the people whose projects he was
evaluating.
Politics of Confirmation
The social organization of the production of academic knowledge has come to
be regarded in certain circles as the only source of meaningful standards by
which intellectual worth can be measured. Standardized international criteria
like citation indexes and peer review by foreign members of the "invisible
college" have become the standard ways to confirm the judgment of the local
branch.
The fragility of these approaches has been amply documented (Cole et al.
1981), but this has not weakened the imperium of the dogma in academe.
Academics continue to reaffirm that these are the only acceptable and reason-
able ways to carry out the classification of research projects, programs, and
teams.
The invisible college has thus acquired almost a monopoly on the legiti-
mate gauging of the quality of research and knowledge production, and on the
right to argue that only certain types of knowledge meeting its standards
should be publicly funded. The classification recognized by the academic
community is based on virtuosity in puzzle-solving favoured by certain affili-
ated journals. These standards may bear little relationship to the substantive
questions raised in civil society, as there has been a gradual displacement of
content by process in the practice of social sciences and humanities. A certain
fixation on methodology has generated a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"
and methodological canons have become the common denominator around
which the academic community congregates in lieu of former concern over the
fundamental problems of the day.
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The process of self-selection hidden behind confirmation by peers is not
always transparent, but there have been claims that there is a poor match
between the academic classification and what a socioeconomic classification would
rank as excellent in competitions for public funding, in the same sense that a
scheme using places to explain French wines is irrelevant on the California
scene where the kind of grape is the key variable (Douglas 1986).
In the recent past, connoisseurship has developed outside academe, and
there have been challenges to the monopoly claimed by academics on granting
seals-of-approval to intellectual endeavours (Paquet and von Zur-Muehlen
1989). But academics have continued to use the granting councils as a bulwark
in their defense of the perenniality of academic values: the granting councils
have been the terrain on which the strategies of dynamic conservatism (selec-
tive inattention, containment, least change tactics, etc.) have been most fully
deployed (Schon 1971).
Illegitimacy of Delta Knowledge
In classifying, individuals have a certain degree of autonomy, but public
classifications derive from communal or social institutions that do the class-
ifying and "the instituted community blocks personal curiosity, organizes
public memory, and heroically imposes certainty upon uncertainty. In marking
its own boundaries, it affects all lower levels of thinking, so that persons realize
their own identities and classify each other through community affiliation"
(Douglas 1986). This public production of labels has a significant impact on
human beings: it is "making up people," the new labels engender new kinds
of people and ensure that they will behave differently (Hacking 1985).
What is left out in academic classification is what academics block out, i.e.,
what does not fall into the realm of academic disciplines. We have shown
elsewhere the extent of the damage done by this reductionism (Paquet 1988e).
The tradition originating with Rene Descartes put the emphasis on a theory-
centred style of argument; this has had deleterious effects. There has been a
shift from a language of life to general ideas, abstract principles, instrumental
reason, and a fixation on methods. This sort of "methodism" has contributed
to a reshaping of the notion of interesting knowledge into a new notion of
standard output. As a result, work on local, timely, and particular issues has
been demoted to the level of uninteresting questions (Toulmin 1988).
The semi-unconscious conspiracy of the academic community against
practical knowledge has reached a phase where, in the last half century, an
ever narrower range of stylized classes of knowledge has come to be recog-
nized as legitimate by universities. The present social system of production
of knowledge has ruled whole categories of useful and usable knowledge —
in particular much of what is learned by doing — as mundane, unwholesome,
unwanted, illusive, confusing, etc., and discarded it as socially irrelevant
(Gilles and Paquet 1989).
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We have labeled this "delta knowledge": a broad category of useful and
usable knowledge generated by wroughting and wrighting, by practical phi-
losophy and reflection in action (Schon 1983). This delta world has been
rejected by academics, rendered illegitimate, and it has consequently been
underfunded. There are important costs to these censures: gaping holes in the
knowledge base; and distortions in the process of production of delta knowl-
edge (in management or design for example) forced upon it by the mold in
good currency in alpha (humanities), beta (physical sciences), and gamma
(social sciences) knowledge production. A further cost is attached to this
ideological censure: when the occasion arises for the creation of centres to
bolster the production of new knowledge, any academic classification scheme
likely to be used by public authorities in search of legitimacy is bound to be
blind to excellence if it takes a delta form.
GRANTING COUNCIL AS STALLED OMNIBUS**
Some observers have argued that it is the role of granting councils to serve as
brokers and innovators in this context. Because these institutions are in
principle mixed public/academic agencies, they should be able to strike the
right balance between the academic imperatives of quality and other socio-
political criteria. The fact that such institutions have to secure budget alloca-
tions from their public-sector masters in a politically competitive context has
also been seen as making them particularly sensitive to all the relevant
socio-politico-cultural dimensions.
Yet most governments have chosen to set up ad hoc institutions to handle
the selection of centres of excellence when they have had the opportunity to
do so. Implicitly, it may be argued that governments have decided that one
cannot count on granting councils as they now stand to perform this brokerage
function effectively. This decision stems undoubtedly in part from an evalu-
ation of the composition and the power structure of such councils, but more
** I did not feel that I had to modify any of the papers published in this book for the analysis
would appear to have sustained well the passage of time. I must make an exception for this
particular section of this particular paper. Since the paper was written, some ten years ago, there
has been a significant effort made by granting councils to shake off the dominium of disciplinarian
academics. Through a new brand of leadership, a membership more broadly representative of
the meaningful groups of users of research, and the design of innovative joint ventures with the
private, public, and civic sectors, the granting councils have been made much more sensitive to
society's demands.
Granting councils have also shown signs of being able to correct the biases of academic
evaluation and to allow research demands and social needs to be echoed more fully in the
allocation of research resources.
But these changes are not yet part of the ethos of granting councils, as has been clearly revealed
by some changes in the leadership in some of the granting councils that have generated important
volte-faces. Any of the transformations noted above can still be easily reversed. Consequently, one
should not underestimate the powers of the Republic of Science and its capacity to re-establish
the hegemony of the Republic of Science rules. The idea of the language of needs taking
precedence over (or even being considered on a par with) the language of disciplinary worth is
still not in good currency.
So my complaints and forebodings may require some sharps and flats, but they are not out
of order.
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fundamentally from a recognition of the lack of depth of their roots in civil
society, of their poor record at gauging the dual constraints of clients' demands
and field requirements, and their lack of any mechanism to evaluate priority
needs.
Producers' Dominance and Lack of Roots in Civil Society
As they now stand, the granting councils in Canada are institutions that have
been all but completely captured by academics. Although academics and
nonacademics are appointed by the government, most are chosen from the
ranks of professional academics — not so much because of their enlightened
view about the place of science in society, but mostly because of some narrow
accomplishment in academic disciplines. As for the lay appointees, until
recently most were not very knowledgeable in science policy matters, and,
consequently, they have been neither vocal nor capable of articulating a
coherent philosophy as an alternative to the academic perspective. From time
to time, some of the appointees — academic or not — have taken a broader
view of the mandate given to granting councils and have been instrumental in
triggering some reflection on their social role, but it is fair to say that granting
councils have remained largely entrapped by the academic interest groups.
This explains why such limited powers and resources have been granted to
research councils.
Thus, when governments have felt that they had to address some socio-
economic need through an investment in research, they have not found it wise
to entrust the decision as to what should be done and by whom to producer-
dominated agencies. They felt it wise to set up ad hoc structures. The rationale
was that the granting councils did not provide a sufficiently reliable coverage
of the diversity of interests in the socioeconomy at large. If granting councils
were the classifying institution, major groups of clients and users of research
would be disenfranchised and would have little or no opportunity to be heard.
The granting councils are neither perceived as capable of acting as surrogates
for the forum (Tussman 1977) nor of becoming major players in science policy
design.
Client Demands and Field Requirements
Even if better representation on granting councils could be achieved, this
would still not make them into sufficiently sensitive instruments to ensure
monitoring of the changing constraints imposed by the demands of research
clients and by the nature of the field requirements. The academic evaluation
process is likely to remain their guiding light, for it is unlikely that any
consensus on an alternative will develop. Consequently, the logic of the
academic evaluation — which puts little value on the research demands of
clients and is more than likely to interpret the field constraints in self-serving
ways — is bound to remain dominant.
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Indeed, the continuous evolution of fields and the changing priorities of
clients have led academics to argue that the best research strategy is to allow
the producer to proceed independently on the dual assumptions that (1)
whatever the researcher might do will turn out to be most helpful in some way
and at some time, and that no useful guidance can be expected from unin-
formed clients; and (2) whatever the researcher chooses to do has a greater
chance of being the right thing to do because he/she is best informed about
the texture of the field and the optimal path to new knowledge.
Without the inward biases introduced by the disciplinary framework and
self-regulation of the field by professional academics, this approach might be
defensible as a viable strategy. It would represent a bet on the free flow of
competing ideas in the marketplace, generating, through the workings of the
invisible hand, the selection of the best research strategies and the generation
of the best complement of usable knowledge. However, this bet on the market
as the organizing principle is most problematic. First, knowledge as a com-
modity has a number of characteristics that make it rather special — a public
good component, acute uncertainty, etc. — and as a consequence, much waste
is generated by simple competitive systems in the world of knowledge produc-
tion (see Chapter 4). Second, competition is highly imperfect in this knowledge
production market cartelized by the "invisible college." The "invisible foot"
marches in, and the rent-seeking activities of academics over distributive shares
is likely to generate much waste (Brock and Magee 1984).
No Machinery to Evaluate Needs
Even with additional sensitivity to clients and sounder evaluation of field
requirements, granting councils, within their interpretation of their current
mandate, are unlikely to develop a list of research needs to be addressed as a
matter of priority. This is not part of their ethos.
The members of granting councils perceive themselves as experts asked
to define a technically superior method of adjudication between competing
applicants. They perceive their role in a technical mode, not in apolitical mode.
At the core of the problem is a misconception about the political process at
work in choosing centres of excellence. Academics do not understand that the
issue is not to arrive at a technical optimum, but at a political optimum
(Trebilcock et al. 1982). This outcome depends on the interrelated games of
politicians, media, bureaucrats, the electorate, and special interest groups —
of which academics are but one.
It is unlikely that granting councils as presently constituted can arrive at
meaningful answers to national priorities. The cause of this marginalization is
that the very idea of a language of needs taking precedence over the language
of disciplinary worth is so foreign to granting councils that, were they offered
the possibility of managing the whole process of selection of centres of excel-
lence and of identifying national needs, they would probably refuse the job.
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USING THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECEDENCE
The decisions made over the last few years about the creation of centres of
excellence have reflected a lack of appropriate mechanisms for collective
choice. As a result, ad-hocery was instituted as a guiding principle, and the
allocation of important sums of money can be defended on the basis of neither
academic excellence nor as an echo of socioeconomic priority. We have had
the worst of both worlds.
The root cause of this failure has been a false assumption about the whole
process: it was assumed that the creation of centres of excellence was a simple
technical matter. Expert academics and expert politicians agreed that their
standards were different, prepared an ordering and compared their classifica-
tions and hierarchies, normalized them over territory and hard disciplines,
and tried to arrive at a single ordering. This ordering can in no way be
defended as resulting in public expenditures that will ensure the greatest
happiness of the greatest number. In most cases, the result is the unintended
consequence of three intersecting processes: a self-selection of groups attempt-
ing to express their preferences in a manner likely to fit into the announced
criteria of the competition, an academic classification according to the profes-
sional code, and a superficial political adjudication. There is nothing to
establish that the groups that came forward are the ones who are best able to
contribute to the welfare of the nation, that the groups selected were evaluated
with criteria broad enough to ensure that the most urgent national research
priorities would be fostered, and that the political authorities would do more
than marginal tinkering over the final determination.
As it is likely that there will be other competitions for centres of excellence,
one might usefully speculate about alternative ways to do the job.
Needs and Desires
The point of departure is a distinction between needs and preferences. For if
the national collectivity, through its governments, wishes to use resources to
promote research, can a general principle help define some national classifi-
cation of priorities on the basis of needs. David Braybrooke and Harry
Frankfurt have developed, independently, what they call a "principle of
precedence" (Braybrooke and Schotch 1981; Frankfurt 1984b; Braybrooke
1987). This principle suggests that there is widespread acceptance of the
precedence of needs over desires. Even John Crosbie — a key minister in the
Mulroney government — was quoted in The Financial Post as being in favour
of reallocating government resources on the basis of needs rather than wants
if cutbacks in government expenditures were necessary (cited in Braybrooke
1987).
Braybrooke and Schotch (1981) have proposed a simple classification that
is usable in cost-benefit analysis: first, proposed policies may be subjected to
peremptory considerations (rights, honour, standing obligation, respect of life,
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etc.); second, policies may be gauged in terms of their impact on minimum
standards of provision for needs; third, attention might be given to preferences. This
set of categories subjects public decisions to the principle of precedence; the
optimization process is subjected to the constraint of peremptory considera-
tions and of meeting basic needs first: no harm should be done, and this takes
precedence over the fulfilling of volitional wants.
In the allocation of public monies to centres of excellence, one might,
therefore, start with projects one cannot do without, a norm that gets to the needs
level and would require that a language of needs be used by the agency in
charge of the adjudication process. To the extent that the number and scope
of peremptory considerations is kept in check, the list of needs stays manage-
ably small, and the minimum standards remain manageably low, this is a viable
procedure. However, how can one find a way to articulate these needs and to
elicit them?
A Language of Needs
A language of needs is necessary to articulate these priorities. Such a language
is rooted in what humans need to be human; it is a language that allows us to
identify what we are and what we cannot do without if we wish to remain who
we are (Ignatieff 1985). In the debate about centres of excellence, it would be
useful to start with a classification of what we cannot do without. This might
suggest the creation of centres in fields that are strategically important because
of the particular circumstances of Canada. For instance, the MacDonald
Commission (1985) complained that, even though the Canadian socioecon-
omy is fundamentally dependent on natural resources and on its relationship
with the United States, it had been unable to find the necessary Canadian
expertise in those two areas.
To ascertain what we cannot do without, a forum is needed in which
individuals and groups can meet and discuss the main threats and challenges
to Canadian society today. Such a forum — be it a Council of Social Values or
a Committee on the Long Run to be added to the Senate and the House of
Commons (Paquet 1968; Braybrooke and Paquet 1987) —would provide the
vehicle for arriving at some notion of a list of course-of-life needs, the
minimum standards to be maintained, and the elements to be regarded as
categorical needs. For the time being, streams of legislation andjurisprudential
decisions more or less define the basis for a language of rights. What we need
is some thinking about needs to make these categorical need constraints more
explicit.
It would be silly to presume that a list of needs and a definition of minimum
standards would provide a simple mechanical answer to the question of what
research centres should be created; but it would be equally unreasonable to
presume that it cannot be done. However, it cannot be done using a top-down
procedure. The language of need has to evolve from a multilogue involving
all the stakeholders, more or less on the model of any meaningful national
consultation carried out to elicit what the priorities of Canadians are. Such a
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bottom-up approach was used recently in the case of energy (see Chapter 5)
but also in numerous forums on entrepreneur ship, on employment, etc.
Social Learning
This approach via a broad participative consultation would require a learning
organization (Garratt 1987). It may appear to be somewhat roundabout, but
it is not. Creating centres of excellence poses a wicked problem to policymakers
and policy analysts (see Chapter 2): the goals are either not known or very
ambiguous and the means-ends relationships are highly uncertain and poorly
understood (Rittel and Webber 1973). Friedmann and Abonyi's (1976) ap-
proach is applicable in this context (see Figure 5 and the discussion in
Chapter 2).
One way to effect such learning about needs and national priorities is
through search conferences (Emery 1982; Williams 1982). Search conferences
are designed with the general purpose of engaging participants "in exploring
how wider change is affecting them all, developing shared images of a desirable
future, examining present resources and constraints with respect to pursuing
desired directions, and planning innovative strategies to enhance mutual
prospects" (Williams 1982: 179).
There have been interesting experiments in Canada along these lines: the
series of national economic conferences organized by the Economic Council
of Canada, where stakeholders from all over the country were grouped in
sectoral units to prepare the national overall meeting; the various regional
summits and the 1989 Forum pour I'emploi in Quebec. But there has been very
little instituted continuity and, as a result, very little accumulation of knowledge
about priorities. Indeed, much of the evolution of perceptions, attitudes, and
values are registered only by private survey firms for their corporate clients
without the benefit of feedback to those surveyed so that public learning can
be accelerated. Governments use polls for policymaking, but they are not
actively engaged in seeking the participation of the citizenry in experimenta-
tion, public learning, and priority definition. This is ascribable to the bureau-
cratic view that reduces citizens to the role of beneficiaries and resists their
promotion to the role of clients (Godbout 1987).
To the extent that citizens are invited to become active, they will. They will
articulate their needs in the forum in the same manner as they express their
preferences in the market, and in so doing will indicate the directions in which
investment of public resources should be made. Moreover, the new shared
understanding of change acquired through interactive searching and learning
should result in joint commitment to active adaptive strategies, such as joint
ventures. A good way to ensure that research programs are conducted effec-
tively and the results disseminated widely is to ensure that there is a commit-
ment by other parties to work in concert with the chosen research teams.
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CONCLUSION
There is little hope that granting councils will become active in the ways
suggested above unless they begin to interpret their mandate much more
broadly. This will require not only a dramatic change in the personnel making
up these granting councils — to represent all segments of Canadian society —
but also attention to the portion of their mandate that requires them to develop
policies that reflect the needs and expectations of Canadian society, govern-
ment and the research community.
In the past, granting councils have been satisfied to cater mainly to the
needs and expectations of the research community, and any consultation they
have carried out has been focused on that community. This is no longer
acceptable. Mechanisms have to be designed to obtain a better view of the
needs and expectations of Canadians if granting councils are to perform their
job appropriately.
Because they have not set up appropriate mechanisms to articulate these
needs, the granting councils have become minor players in the construction
of a national network of research centres. Whether there are signs that granting
councils are taking sufficient steps toward a refurbishment of their personnel
and a redefinition of their role to warrant optimism is a matter of much debate.
But before governments can assign them an expanded role and additional
financial resources, it will have to be clearly established whether they are still
hostages of the academic community and agents of dynamic conservatism or
whether they have become agencies of social learning and a locus where
Canadian needs and expectations are meaningfully recorded.
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CHAPTER 11
THE STRATEGIC STATE*
Government is the most precious of human possessions; and no care
can be too great to be spent in enabling it to do its work in the best way:
a chief condition of which is that it should not be set to work for which
it is not specifically qualified, under conditions of time and place.
- Alfred Marshall
Our politics are Greek, but our administration is Roman.
- Dwight Waldo
The Canadian state is in crisis — at a point of decision. On the external front,
the ground is in motion. Canada lives in an environment where knowledge-
and time-based competition have become the determining sources of competi-
tive advantage; the mortgage of geography has waned and a dematerialization
of economic activity and a deterritorialization of the economic process have
ensued; a new regionalization of trading blocks has emerged in which cross-
border partnering and new forms of government-business collaboration ap-
pear to be required strategies; and growing interdependencies within this
transnational world have made the notions of "domestic firm" and "national
economy" rather fiizzy (Paquet 1990a, 1991).
External pressures from this global knowledge-based economy have trans-
lated into greater demands on the state to provide standards, a sense of political
and social identity, and new forms of public-private risk-sharing arrange-
ments. These demands have come at a time when the ligatures pulling society
together have been loosened, old solidarities have been eroded, and Canada's
sociocultural support for the state has weakened in subtle but important ways.
The public realm has come to be governed by warring private interests that
are either paralyzed by conflicting tensions or swayed by decisions appearing
to most citizens as increasingly arbitrary or capricious. And the polity has
imploded after the demise of the Westminster model of "club government"
(based on parliamentary sovereignty and the public service acting as a passive
executant) in the face of internal pressures for accommodation that call for
* Previously published in three parts in Ciencia Ergo Sum, 1996, 3(3), 257-261; Ciencia Ergo Sum,
1997, 4(1), 28-34; and Ciencia Ergo Sum, 1997, 4(2), 148-154. Extracts are from Chretien, J.
(editor). Finding Common Ground. Hull: Voyageur Publishing, 1992, pp. 85-101. Jakjabes made
most helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The assistance of Anne Burgess and
Chantal Roy is also gratefully acknowledged.
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power-sharing and negotiated adjustments within an increasingly heterogene-
ous and diverse society (Dahrendorf 1988; Marquand 1988; Reich 1991).
The tensions between the new demands for strategic state intervention
and the old political apparatus have triggered many reactions. One has been
an argument for the deliberate downsizing of the state and a plea in favour of
the market as the only mechanism capable of constructing a meaningful order
in this maelstrom. This has been articulated by a neoliberal ideology that has
brought about a vacuum at the heart of the political economy: the public
purpose has come to be seen as the sum of private purposes. Another reaction
has been an obstinate defense of the old Keynesian state with all its parapher-
nalia, even after it has become clear that it is ineffective and that it can be
maintained only by saddling the country with unprecedented debt. These are
the neoconservative and the neosocialist routes, respectively. There must be a
third way.
To discover what this third way might look like, one must go back to first
principles: to prospect anew the boundaries of private and public matters and
understand the co-evolutionary nature of the public and private realms; to
gauge the extent to which the public infrastructure has become inadequate
and why; to identify some of the foundational values and the design principles
in the construction of the new state and the process of accommodation required
from society, polity, and economy; and to examine some of the features of the
new state and the sort of leadership it demands.
THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS
The boundaries between the private and the public spheres are neither
well-defined conceptually nor well-delineated statistically. This is because they
do not correspond to a rigid frontier, but rather to a wavering and evolving
fracture zone.
Yet whenever the scope of government activities is debated, there is a
frantic search for "technical" characteristics decreeing that an activity should
fall in the private or in the public sector. These attempts to propose more or
less "objective" criteria of "publicness" or "privateness," to apportion respon-
sibilities between spheres have foundered. The degree of publicness is funda-
mentally as dependent on values and political choices as it is on technical
characteristics of goods and services, and any change in prevailing values or
any reorientation of public organizations may redefine the boundaries between
the public and the private spheres without much reference to the technical
features of the particular activities (Pelletiere 1989).
In the language of Karl Popper (1972), the boundaries between the public
and the private spheres are evolving as a result of the interaction between the
forces of World 1 (the world of material and geotechnical realities) and the
forces of World 2 (the subjective world of values, mind, preferences, plans, and
intentions); this constructed boundary zone constitutes a part of World 3 (the
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world of objective structures — organizations, laws, institutions, rights, etc.)
produced wittingly or not by human beings.
The most insightful x-ray of this fuzzy boundary zone has been proposed
by Francois Perroux (and developed independently by Kenneth Boulding a
decade later) at a time when humanistic social sciences were still in good
currency (Perroux 1960; Boulding 1970). Both identified three generic ensem-
bles of organizations more or less dominated by a different mechanism of
integration: quid pro quo exchange, coercion, and gift or solidarity. These mechan-
isms were explored by Karl Polanyi (1968) in the 1940s as dominant features
of the concrete socioeconomies of the past. To map out this terrain, Boulding
used a simple triangle with each of these mechanisms in its purest form at one
of the apexes: the inner territory represents organizations and institutions
embodying different mixes of these integrative mechanisms (Figure 1, see
Introduction).
This approach provides a rough cartography of the organizational terrain
into three domains where the rules, arrangements, or mechanisms of coordi-
nation are based on different principles: the economic/market domain (B)
where supply and demand forces, the price mechanism, and efficient resources
allocation are the norms; the state domain (C) where coercion and redistribu-
tion are the rules; the civil society domain (A) where cooperation, reciprocity,
and solidarity are the integrating principles. This corresponds roughly to the
standard partitioning of human organizations into economy, polity, and society
(Wolfe 1989).
A careful survey of the Canadian organizational terrain reveals that society,
economy, and polity each occupy roughly one-third of the organizational
territory, and we sit at about the centre of gravity of the organizational triangle.
This does not correspond to the statistical portrait emerging from official
agencies, mainly because zone A activities are underreported, and little effort
has been made to measure them better. Activities in the home, within not-for-
profit associations, and in general beyond the market and the state are poorly
recorded and remain largely underground (Paquet 1989a).
A century ago, the state portion of the terrain was quite limited and the
Canadian scene was dominated by the other two sets of organizations. From
the late 19th century to the 1970s, government grew in importance to the point
where probably half of measured activities were state and state-related. More
recently, there has been a vigorous countermovement of privatization and
deregulation that has reduced the state sector and shifted the boundaries
again.
CO-EVOLUTION:
RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL LEARNING
Governments are one of the instruments through which collective concerns
are addressed in human societies and governments may choose to exert
different degrees of coercion: to enforce changes in the behaviour of private
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agents and in the structure of the economy or society; at least to resist private
demands but be unwilling to enforce changes in behaviours of private actors;
or simply to be the instrument of pressure groups. Such a choice may have a
determining impact on the fate and evolution of the overall socioeconomic
organization. In the same manner, the institutions of civil society (family,
associations, etc.) may be more or less developed and accordingly more or less
of the collective concerns may be addressed through the mobilization of
interpersonal and particularistic resources like status, love, and community
(Foa 1971; Bruyn and Meehan 1987; Marquand 1988).
One can identify many mixes of political, social, and economic mechan-
isms (and different modes of interaction among government, business, and
society) in different portions of the world. The Anglo-American system tends
to emphasize the market mechanism to the point of belittling the scope of state
and civil society. But this sort of system represents no more than 25% of the
world trade, and a lesser percentage of socioeconomic transactions. Other
parts of the world (Western Europe, Japan, etc.) have chosen to assign a much
greater role to the state in their national fabric (and to community, culture,
citizenship) and unarguably their own brand of mixed organization appears
to have generated a much more impressive socioeconomic performance than
our own, greater resilience, and faster organizational learning (Choate and
Linger 1988).
This resilience has been achieved through a capacity to maintain the right
balance between an emphasis on competition and cooperation in the govern-
ing appreciative system, on one hand, and on a learned readiness to adjust the
governance of the human organization accordingly and, therefore, to change
the structures, technologies, and theories in good currency in the economy,
society, and polity, on the other. Because these, in turn, echo more or less
accurately the basic underlying values of the members and organizations, their
information processing and computing capacities, and their ability to learn
and adapt quickly, learning echoes value changes and leads to value changes
(Mesthene 1970).
The state has an important role in maintaining healthy communication
in the forum and workable competition in the market. The state must
maintain an important intelligence function if it is to act as catalyst in an
innovative learning process (Wilensky 1967). As we saw in Chapter 2, the four
subprocesses in social learning are: the construction of appropriate theories
of reality, the formation of social values, the design of political strategies, and
the carrying out of collective action (Figure 5). Social values define what is
acceptable; theories of reality depict what is technically feasible; political strate-
gies refer to what will ensure a stable situation, what is politically feasible; and
social action identifies what is implementable. Together these subprocesses pose
the four questions that are basic to the requisite social learning by the state
(Friedmann and Abonyi 1976).
The basic challenge in organizational learning is to develop innovative
competence, for the ability to improve and to innovate is a skill that is vital for
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survival and resilience (Rugman and D'Cruz 1991). But organizational learn-
ing requires the discipline of team learning, a capacity for the different stake-
holders to engage in dialogues, in conversations that begin to have a life of
their own, to take all parties in directions that could not have been planned in
advance. This sort of conversation enables the stakeholders to discover what
is acceptable, technically and politically feasible, and implementable. However,
such a conversation requires a facilitator capable of carrying the partners
beyond the defensive routines (based on presumptions that are supposedly
undiscussable and, therefore, preventing learning) toward a willingness to raise
the most difficult, subtle, and conflictual issues. This leadership is essential if
dialogue is to lead to the collective suspending of assumptions (Senge 1990).
Vertinsky (1987) has analyzed the internal decision processes in Japanese
companies, the way intercompany interactions proceed, and the structure of
the government decision process and its role in guiding the economy. He has
discovered the many ways in which the process of dialogue is being actively
promoted at all levels and the manner in which organizational learning
appears to proceed effectively. Vertinsky describes in the following terms the
situation he has observed in Japan:
While swift and radical intervention is taken in a crisis to secure the collective
survival, it is the market which ultimately prevails. When a crisis dissolves and
market forces dominate, government policy retreats to a subsidiary role of
keeping options open, disseminating information, and ensuring a smoother
transition to the new state dictated by the market.
How is this balance maintained between collective control and cooperation
and individual competition? And how is the switching mechanism operated?
These are central questions. In animal collectivities (slugs) and in sophisticated
social organizations (Japan), it would appear that the secret is not size but
flexibility: adjustment is effected through
Flexible behavioral mechanisms rather than expensive investment in physi-
ological or morphological adaptations... [in the first case] — and through
flexible exercise of controls and influences upon the private sector, rather
than the strengthening of a permanent public sector infrastructure and its
share in the economy [in the second case]. [Vertinsky 1987]
Co-evolution of polity, society, and economy calls for this sort of flexibility
and this depends much on an ongoing multilogue among partners. This, in
turn, requires a facilitator, a leader capable of acting as a quarterback in the
process of organizational learning, in the balancing of the short-term competi-
tive forces and of the long-term cooperative forces, and in ensuring a smooth
transition from one regime to the next. Organizational learning is, therefore,
not only adaptive learning, i.e., about coping, it is also generative learning, i.e.,
about creating, adjusting goals, norms, and assumptions as required. In this
context, the state itself has to become a learning organization and the leader
has to develop new skills and abandon moral agnosticism to be effective, for
the leader's new work is building learning organizations, and this is not
value-free (Senge 1990).
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THE PRESENT FLAWED SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY
The present social technology of the Canadian state does not manage resil-
ience and learning well. The state would even appear to have chosen the wrong
strategy: heavy investment in physiological and morphological modifications,
and a bulky, centralized state system geared to producing centralized techni-
cal answers to public management problems. This bulky apparatus has had
very limited success in designing flexible controls and influences on the
private sector: it has generated little resilience and not much learning
(Grimond 1991).
The main critiques of the brand of the Keynesian state in good currency
in Canada and in many other advanced socioeconomies have been well
documented. They may be subsumed under a few headings (Duncan 1985):
• overgovernment and government overload: the state is presented as "a kind of
arthritic octopus, an inept leviathan" unable, despite massive growth, to
do much to meet the demands of the citizenry; as a result, it has triggered
weakened citizen compliance, growing civic indifference and much disil-
lusionment (King 1975);
• a legitimation deficit: the depoliticized public has by now ceased to believe
that the state has any moral authority or technical ability to deal with the
issues at hand; this would explain the disaffection and the withdrawal of
support by the citizenry (Habermas 1973);
• a fiscal crisis: revealing the incapacity of the state to reconcile its dual
obligation to attenuate social difficulties and to foster the process of capital
accumulation without generating fiscal deficits that are in the long run
unbearable (O'Connor 1973);
• social limits to growth: the three crucial dimensions of our social organization
(liberal capitalism, mass democracy, and a very unequal distribution of
both material and symbolic resources) cannot coexist easily: democratic
egalitarianism (in society) generates compulsive centralism (in the polity)
to redistribute more and more resources with little success in reducing
inequality, but growing shackles on the productive capacity of the eco-
nomic system (Hirsch 1976).
Modern democratic capitalist states face... a crisis, because they
appear incapable of carrying out established and expected tasks,
tasks which they have over the years accepted, because of the absence
of necessary resources, both financial and civic, or because they cannot
meet claims and expectations fostered by the economic and social
systems themselves. [Duncan 1985: 274]
This overall crisis of the state has been analyzed historically as a two-stage
process. First, it evolved as a crisis in the economic realm: coordination failures
became more and more important in advanced market-type economies,
thereby creating a demand for intervention and regulation by the state (the
economic crisis was, therefore, shifted to the state). Second, the state crisis
developed as the legitimation deficit grew: the state was failing to mobilize
the requisite commitment of citizens to be able to do the job; out of despair
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the state made an attempt to effect an "epistemological coup," to obtain a
"blank cheque" from the citizenry. The argument was that because manage-
ment problems were so technically complex, the citizenry should pay its taxes
and demand no accountability from the professional experts. This coup has
failed, and "cognitive despotism" has not succeeded in suppressing the
autonomous power of the community to grant or withhold legitimacy (Haber-
mas 1973; Wiley 1977; Paquet 1977). The polls have recorded this story line.
Why has such a situation developed? The central reason would appear to
be that the public institutional framework built after the Second World War
was presented to the citizenry as designed for instrumental purposes: to combat
a depression, raise standards of living, provide public goods not otherwise
produced, assist the needy, etc. As a result, citizens have come to define the
state in terms of claims they could make on it: "claimant politics began to
overshadow civic politics." By comparison, "the activities of the private sphere
were seen as ends pursued for their own sake." It is hardly surprising that the
instrumental goods of the public sphere were regarded as subordinate to the
intrinsic goods of private life (Bellah et al. 1991).
Even though governments were major flinders, underwriters, and regula-
tors and, therefore, the fundamental bedrock on which the economy and
society prospered from the 1940s to the 70s, Canadians have continued to
occlude the importance of the state: "the dominant strains in our culture...
[remained] a vigorous individualism, a suspicion of interest groups as self-serv-
ing and subversive of democracy, and a skepticism about pervasive social and
economic planning by the state" (Fournier in Banting 1986). This ideology of
Lockean individualism has continued to prevail despite the fact that govern-
ment activities had grown so much by 1980 that very little remained absolutely
private in a meaningful sense.
In a more and more global context, the private sector made ever greater
demands on public institutions at a time when the capacity to supply services
from the public sphere could not expand further. This was due to the fact that
participation, trust, and creative interaction (on which politics and the public
sphere are built) had all but disappeared, as had the sense of community that
underpinned civil society and the collective/private ways of meeting the needs
of strangers.
In this world of rugged individualism where most citizens are strangely
unaware that the government has been the prime mover in the postwar period
of prosperity, private enterprise at public expense has become the rule. The lack of
commitment of emotional, intellectual, and financial resources to refurbish the
public infrastructure could only lead to demand overload, and the frustration
generated by the policy failures of the 1970s set the stage for citizens to suggest
that the best way to strengthen democracy and the economy was to weaken
government.
Jacques Parizeau saw through this charade:
It is one thing to be convinced that the policies of yesterday have produced a
number of unwanted results, that governments have become inefficient,
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wasteful and slow; it is quite another thing to accept that in a number of areas,
government responsibility should be suppressed. [Parizeau 1988]
In a world of ever-growing interdependence on a world scale, the need for
collective decision-making is growing. The solution, therefore, is not less govern-
ment or a weaker government, but a different sort of government. There is a need
for a new framework, for a transformation in our democracy (Dahl 1989), but
this new framework for social and economic policies, capable of guiding
nations in the years ahead, has not yet been articulated in Canada.
FOUNDATIONAL VALUES AND DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Much of what David Marquand (1988) has said about Britain also applies to
Canada and to some other advanced socioeconomies: at the core of our
difficulties is a moral vacuum. The notion of public purpose is alien to us. We
need first and foremost ^philosophy of public intervention, ̂ philosophy of the public
realm.
First, one must recognize the need to fill that moral vacuum with a
"national ethic" (Grimond 1991), then fill it before getting too far into the
design of the new state. To proceed otherwise is to presume wrongly that we
already know what the public institutions to be constructed are to be in aid of.
Second, one must be able to sketch briefly the sort of design principles that
are likely to underpin the social architecture of the new strategic and learning
state. The leader must be in a position to identify and promote the institutional
setting capable of ensuring the requisite amount of social learning in the
Canadian system.
Guiding Values
One fundamental element in the definition of the new state is the recognition
that, despite statements from social scientists and the fact that it is not
fashionable to say so, the state is a moral agent, not a morally neutral adminis-
trative instrument. Both on the left and on the right, there is a longing for civil
society to provide the well-defined codes of moral obligations that underpin
the realization of the good society. However, the "built-in restraint derived from
morals, religion, custom, and education" that were considered by Adam Smith
as a prerequisite before one could safely trust men to "their own self-interest
without undue harm to the community" are no longer there (Hirsch 1976).
The disappearance of this sociocultural foundation has been noted and
deplored, and much has been written about the need to rebuild it. But it has
also become clear that it is futile to hope for some replacement for these values
to come about by "immaculate conception" in civil society. So many have called
on the state and on political leaders to accept their responsibility as second-best
moral agents (Mead 1986; Wolfe 1989). This does not mean that political
leaders should impose values on a community; they should provide a vision,
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propose a sense of direction, a commitment to ideals, together with the public
philosophy to realize them.
There are many plausible public philosophies (some based on sheer
individual hedonism, others on different degrees of commitment to cater to
the needs of others both directly through philanthropy and indirectly through
the agency of the state), and they should be confronted and compared in
public arenas. The citizenry is entitled to ask that its political leaders declare
their public philosophy: what are their ideals, their ethics. Such a public
philosophy is both constraining (in the sense that it echoes some fundamental
choices and, therefore, excludes many possibilities) and enabling (in the sense
that it provides a foundation on which to build a coherent pattern of institu-
tions and decisions in the public realm).
The choice of a public philosophy must be rooted in the basic values of
civil society, and on enlightened understanding. This calls not for the least
constraining public philosophy, but for one recognizing that the optimal
amount of coercion is not zero. Such a position would be the choice of citizens
if they had "the fullest attainable understanding of the experience resulting
from that choice and its most relevant alternatives" (Dahl 1989). The challenge
is to bring about that sort of "fullest understanding" in the population. It means
that government can no longer operate in a top-down mode, but has a duty
to institute a continuing dialogue with the citizenry.
This will require a language of common citizenship, deeply rooted in civil
society: citizens have goals, commitment, and values that the state must take
into account. But citizens must also insist that they want an active role in the
formation of these values, goals, and commitments, and in the making of
policies supposedly generated to respond to their presumed needs (Sen 1987).
Only through a rich forum and institutions that enhance citizens' communi-
cation competence is an enlightened understanding likely to prevail — both as a
result of, and as the basis for, a reasonable armistice between the state and the
people.
In the past, the state has played housekeeping roles and offsetting func-
tions, but these functions require minimal input from the citizenry. In complex
advanced capitalist socioeconomies, the state must now play new central roles
that go far beyond these mechanical interventions. It must become involved
as a broker, as an animateur, and as a partner in participatory planning if the
requisite amount of organizational learning, co-evolution, and cooperation with
economy and society is to materialize.
To be able to learn, the state must develop a new interactive regime with
the citizenry to promote the emergence of a participation society (where free-
dom and efficacy come from the fact that the individual has a recognized voice
in the forum on matters of substance and procedures in the public realm and,
more important, an obligation to participate in the definition of such matters).
The citizen should not be confined to living in a rights society where the
dignity of individuals resides exclusively in the fact that they have claims.
(Taylor 1985).
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Design Principles
The design principles for a social architecture in keeping with the guiding
values mentioned above are clear. First is the principle of subsidiarity, according
to which "power should devolve on the lowest, most local level at which
decisions can reasonably be made, with the function of the larger unit being
to support and assist the local body in carrying out its tasks" (Bellah et al. 1991:
135-136). This applies in the three realms, and the level of empowerment and
decentralization may call for the individual or the family or a minute constitu-
ency in the market, the society, or the polity to take charge. This empowerment
would not translate, for instance, into paralyzing rules that prevent welfare
recipients from supplementing their income, but rather into strategies to help
them help themselves (Jencks and Edin 1990).
The rationale for this principle is that the institutions closest to the citizen
are those most likely to be organic institutions, i.e., institutions that are likely
to emerge "undesigned" from the sheer pressure of well-articulated needs and
to require minimal yearly redesigning. Although subsidiarity reduces the
vertical hierarchical power, it increases, in a meaningful way, the potential for
participation.
This is not the death of central government, but the demise of big
government as the morphological assurance of resilience. When the ground is
in motion, the bulkier and the more centralized the government, the more it
will flounder. The lean new central strategic state must deal with norms,
standards, general directions, and values. The process of ministering to the
public and delivering a service well-adapted to its needs must be devolved to
the local level. Such a government would provide services within a framework
agreed to nationally.
The second design principle is that of effective citizen-based evaluation
feedback to ensure that the services produced, financed, or regulated by the
public realm meet with the required standards of efficiency, economy, and
effectiveness and are consonant with the spirit of the agreed standards or
norms. This is a central cybernetic loop feature in the refurbished state. It is
essential if organizational learning is to proceed as quickly as possible (Crozier
1987).
This sort of evaluation ensures that the process of participation is signifi-
cantly strengthened. It provides, partially, some content to the silent relation or
implicit contract that prevails between the state and its citizenry. This sort of
feedback cannot be presumed to materialize organically. Its objective would be
to ensure that state activities, standards, and rules have legitimacy in the
beneficiaries' eyes and that they are compatible with everyday morality, rather
than incentives to lie or misrepresent their situations. In a way, it would allow
the ordinary citizen to be heard better, for "politics is not only the art of
representing the needs of strangers; it is also the perilous business of speaking
on behalf of needs which strangers have had no chance to articulate on their
own" (Ignatieff 1985).
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If government is to become a learning organization, then ensuring a
continuous dialogue with the citizenry and improving the competence of its
citizens to communicate will require some organizational development and
institution-building: one cannot rely exclusively on organic feedback. If a
capacity to learn at the centre (from the citizen and from the agency delivering
the service) and a capacity for quick feedback and instantaneous action when
government does not appear to do the right thing are to materialize, then
new instruments are necessary.
The role of the leader is crucial in this process: producing a language
adequate for our times, a language of belonging and common citizenship, a
language of problem definition that provides the citizen with translation of his
needs, usually expressed in unspecialized language, into categories that are
both relevant and inspiring. This would be a language of human good that
would serve as an arena "in which citizens can learn from each other and
discover an 'enlightened self-interest' in common" (Dionne 1991).
MESO-FORUMS AND THE UNWRITTEN PLAN
These guiding values and design principles, and the language to articulate
them, are not cast in stone. Any ideal can be dropped as learning proceeds:
our desires and ideals "are not like our limbs: they are not a fixed part of us"
(Schick 1984). But the sensible principles developed in the last section entail
a somewhat decoupled organizational form of social architecture. Because the
centre focuses on norms and the periphery on delivery, there is the serious
possibility of lack of coordination unless a clear sense of public purpose
materializes and new partnerships, new skills (strategic management, consult-
ancy and advice, evaluation, etc.), along with new moral contracts binding the
partners are developed to weave this whole enterprise together.
There is no good reason to believe that a central government would be
unable to maintain effective control of the direction of the socioeconomy, even
if much of the operations were decentralized, as long as it kept some key levers
at the norms, standards, and general policy direction levels, and it ensured
quick action to modify the current governance regime when special circum-
stances call for such moves. This has been the logic behind the governance
model in vogue in Sweden for the last few centuries. It is also the basic logic
behind some of the refurbishment of the state in the United Kingdom in the
1980s (Fudge and Gustafsson 1989).
One might venture a sketch of what is aimed at: a small number of central
intelligence units, representing maybe 5% of the civil service (small units
concerned with future-oriented and longer-term policy issues, i.e., laws, regu-
lations, appeals, etc.) quarterbacking all sorts of administrative agencies (rep-
resenting the other 95% of the public service). These agencies would not be
given a simplistic role of enforcement of exogenously-generated higher-order
government norms, but would be granted the necessary powers to organize
activities in a way consonant with the principle of subsidiarity. These agencies
194 GOVERNANCE THROUGH SOCIAL LEARNING
must be learning organizations and, therefore, also interactive. They must be
negotiating arenas in which there is significant space for interaction between the
agency and the citizens; scope for defining and redefining activities, and for
re-orienting them "under conditions of time and place"; and ample provision
for dynamic monitoring from above and for continuous feedback from below.
The central challenge posed by this sort of post-modern state "with a weak
centre acting as a kind of holding company" (Grimond 1991) is obviously the
need to maintain the capacity for social learning and for strategic intervention
in the underlying network. This, in turn, cannot be effected either through the
old hierarchical method of command or through simple sermons. What has
to be found is a way to build institutions likely to restore some bonds of community
in a fragmented society and modularized polity, both permeated by possessive
individualism. The required institutions must be neither built on command
(like regiments) or on exchange (like bazaars), but on communication and
learning (like a debating chamber) (Marquand 1988).
Preceptoral Politics, Meso-forums, and the Unwritten Plan
Centrally important in this context is what Charles Lindblom has labeled
"preceptoral politics": leaders become educators, animateurs, people called
upon to reframe our views of the public realm, to design the organization of
mutual education, and to "set off the learning process" necessary to elicit, if
possible, a latent consensus (Marquand 1988). Such learning is unlikely to
occur easily and well in a post-modern society through a forum organized
exclusively through national institutions. The requisite institutions will have to
be middle-range or meso institutions, networks designed to promote communi-
cation and cooperation on a scale of issues that mobilizes existing communities,
and meso-forums (regional and sectional) likely to ensure the commitment of
the citizenry to organizations "a leur mesure."
The strategic state must bet on flexible control and on extremely effective
organizational learning through such meso-forums. Their triple role — medi-
ating, setting patterns for the provision of services, and educating individuals
in their mutual and civil commitments — needs to be revitalized accordingly
(Etzioni 1983).
However, this fluid and seemingly scattered system of governance in the
post-modern strategic state must be anchored in a clear sense of direction.
There must be apian. Most state leaders in advanced socioeconomies outside
North America have such a plan, a direction for strategic intervention and a
public philosophy that will articulate and rationalize it.
They do not publish their plan because it would never gain consent. Yet it is
not what one ought to call a conspiracy.... The plan is not entirely conscious
or systematic, and it cannot be as long as it is not written, published, debated,
revised and so on. But it is not what you could call a secret. [Lowi 1975]
The importance of this unwritten plan is that it underpins the state's
strategic action and serves as a gyroscope in the definition of actions taken by
the personnel of agencies and ministries. It serves as the basis for a double-looped
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learning process, as organizational learning must be — not only finding better
means of learning to do what we do better, but also, and more important,
finding the right goals and learning whether the objectives we pursue are the
right ones (Argyris and Schon 1974).
Such learning cannot be accomplished by elected officials alone. Elected
officials and bureaucrats must work symbiotically, and elected officials must
learn to devolve a greater amount of discretion to bureaucrats, not only in the
delivery process, but in terms of feedback from the citizens. Some officials have
complained bitterly about the improper devolution of authority from elected
officials to bureaucrats (Schaffer 1988; Auditor General of Canada 1991). Such
complaints are ill-founded. The bureaucracy's exercise of power is not im-
proper, illegitimate, or inefficient. In fact, cumulative decision-making by
bureaucrats, working within and with a public philosophy appropriately defined,
enables the post-modern state to learn faster through decisions based on the
particulars of the case, while maintaining basic standards. Clinging rigidly to
the old "parliamentary control framework" of the Westminster model is not
necessarily enlightened. What is essential is the development of a modified
framework, better adapted to the needs of a strategic state.
In that context, the Foreign Investment Review Agency and the voluntary
compliance program of the Bureau of Competition Policy represent the new
kinds of institutions a strategic state requires. In both cases, the government
has been satisfied with providing a problem setting, to frame the context of
the situation and the boundaries of public attention, while allowing the
bureaucrats to use their tacit knowledge and connoisseurship to deal with
specific situations, and to arrive at decisions on the basis of a "reflective
conversation with the situation" (Schon 1983; Argyris et al. 1985).
New Partnerships and Moral Contracts
Institutionalizing greater discretion for bureaucrats will mean creating some
sort of negotiating tribunal, geared to "ex ante harmonization of public and
private interests through the guiding conciliation of bureaucrats" (Paquet
1978b). If the governing principles embodied in the unwritten plan become a
diffuse but omnipresent public philosophy, the learning process is likely to be
accelerated and, therefore, these structures would quickly acquire legitimacy
(Paquet 1971).
The meso-networks so generated are the basis on which one may hope to
construct new bonds or moral contracts that ensure tighter ethical linkages
between the citizenry and public servants and more responsible professional
linkages among the many echelons of the public management structure
(Paquet 1991-92a).
Because policymakers in the post-modern state face more and more ill-
structured or wicked problems (where the goals are unclear, and the means-ends
relationships are uncertain), elected officials and bureaucrats are ill-equipped
to manage in the usual hierarchical, goal-setting, and control mode (Rittel and
Webber 1973). The best one can hope for is some norm-holding, and a process
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of policymaking based on intelligence and innovation: a dynamic monitoring
by those closer to the issues, which feeds an innovative learning process. But
this new form of public management, based on continuous feedback and
constant problem reformulation as experiences accumulate, requires, over and
beyond a guiding philosophy, new partnerships between the public and the
private realms, between elected officials and bureaucrats, etc.
These new partnerships must overcome the important problems of mutual
distrust that exist at the moment: prisoner's dilemma problems. A prisoner's
dilemma is a dilemma of mutual distrust. It is best exemplified by a situation
in which two people are arrested for a crime they have committed jointly, but
for which the Crown has no definite evidence. Each is urged to "squeal" on the
other in return for a light sentence. If neither of them informs, both get
intermediate sentences. If both inform, both get harsh sentences; given their
mutual distrust, in the absence of a strict moral code about informing, the
likelihood of both doing so is high. When such a moral code is adhered to (as
in the case of the Mafia code of omerta which promises extraordinarily nasty
retribution to anyone who squeals) such problems disappear (Leibenstein
1987). The way out of prisoners' dilemmas is the hammering out of conven-
tions or moral contracts.
A prisoner's dilemma exists between employers and employees: unless
there is a moral code in the relationship, both will be tempted to shirk, i.e., to
work less or to pay less than they should. As a result, a vicious circle is set into
motion: the less productive the work, the less pay, and the less pay, the less
productive the work. The result is general unproductivity. The same type of
problem exists between the citizenry and the state, between government and
business, in the federal-provincial arena, and between elected officials and
bureaucrats. Mutual distrust leads one partner to shortchange the other, with
the result that the other follows suit, and all the benefits of cooperation vanish.
All this can be resolved through conventions or negotiated moral contracts
among partners. But these contracts must obviously be inspired and molded
by the general guiding philosophy contained in the "unwritten plan," and by
the modicum of trust injected by the leader.
The new strategic state will be forced to manage, much more than
previously, through the values and norms embodied in such moral contracts.
These negotiated norms are much less rigid and less likely to foster adversarial
relations than if the work is done through formal regulations and rules. "The
general idea is that if it is possible to agree on the broad principles that
particular sets of regulations strive to achieve, it should be possible to produce
a flexible set of arrangements that satisfy the interested parties without
hamstringing operations" (Morgan 1988: 163).
LEADERSHIP IN A POST-MODERN STATE
Some may argue that this is not a program for a political party, but, at best, a
somewhat different way of thinking about realities and, as such, it is not very
useful for a political leader. Others may suggest that such an approach is most
THE STRATEGIC STATE 197
unrealistic, inasmuch as it presumes that trust and the bonds of community
can be recreated. Finally, some may say that it considerably belittles the stature
of political leadership. We disagree on all counts.
Reframing as Lever
In response to the first argument, we believe that there is a fundamental need
for a guiding public philosophy as a loose "projet de societe" and that a refraining
of Canadians' vision of the world through such a framework is necessary
before one proceeds to develop the electoral platform of a future government.
Without such a framework, the program likely to be constructed will be
fraught with disjointedness, and the related constitutional, institutional, and
organizational plumbing found to be unsafe. The leader of a political party
must put forward a modest but clear public philosophy as the general "projet
de societe" underpinning the "unwritten plan": this is a sine qua non in the
politics of the 1990s.
In answer to the second argument, we suggest that this approach may not
be as unrealistic as it first appears. Three recent events illustrate the power of
this way of thinking, and hint at the feasibility of the proposed strategy. The
first is the impact of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's expression of concern
about the state of Canada's educational systems (directly, in the summer of
1989, then indirectly through the Prosperity Forum documents in 1991) and
his plea for "a new public consensus on learning goals." This triggered a wave
of soul-searching and questioning at all levels, and it is likely that what will
come out of it is an agreement on national educational standards that should go
a long way toward resolving the structural, organizational, and technological
problems plaguing our educational systems.
The second example is the impact created by Gerald Tremblay (1991), the
Quebec minister of trade, industry, and technology, in his September 1991
diagnosis of Quebec's socioeconomic malaise. Within days, this had height-
ened Quebeckers' consciousness and made him a catalyst for all sorts of
cooperative arrangements, including multiyear, no-strike collective agree-
ments, and a different way of crafting Quebec's industrial strategy as a
partnership of government, business, and labour.
A third example of the progress of this way of thinking is the emergence
of a new partnership between Canadian environmentalists and polluting
chemical and forestry companies to hammer out acceptable environmental
standards that they might jointly propose to governments (Geddes 1991).
Leader as Animateur
In answer to the third argument, one must emphasize that far from dwarfing
the notion of political leadership, this approach underlines the new realities
of leadership in a post-modern state.
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Post-modernism is a way of summing up major changes in the socio
political and intellectual scene. It connotes four major phenomena: an increa-
sing incredulity toward the broad ideological interpretive schemes of the last
century, a new awareness of the dangers of societal rationalization, a concern
about the dangers and possibilities of the new information technologies, and
a recognition of the new post-materialist values and social movements (femi-
nism, environmentalism, etc.) underpinning local resistance to any broad
normalizing force (White 1991). This has led to a fundamental rethinking of
public discourse and political theory.
In this fractured and highly uncertain world, nothing seems linear and
easily predictable any longer. The leader is no longer able to neatly separate
appreciation and policymaking, on one hand, from executive decisions, on the
other. All those who are involved must have a shared appreciative system to take
an active and effective part in this process. The leader cannot exert authority
through command in this network, but has to acquire this authority through,
first, the setting and promotion of certain governing relations or norms embod-
ied in the unwritten plan — those "relations" that the state wishes either to
maintain or to bring to "some level more acceptable to those concerned than
the inherent logic of the situation would otherwise have provided" — and,
second, the negotiating of a true moral contract or pact between the leader and
the led that is likely to inspire the led, to mobilize them to work within this
shared appreciative system, to generate enthusiasm, to bring them beyond the
limits of sheer executants to become creative and imaginative intervenants. All
this is to be done in a manner not much different from the creative animation
of musicians by the orchestra leader (Vickers 1965; Paquet 1978b).
The heart of the matter is not goal-seeking and control, but intelligence
and innovation — the definition of standards and norms and the negotiation
of a moral, intellectual, and emotional norm-holding pact built on a multilevel
dialogue in which leaders and constituents are in some measure the shaper
and the shaped, and the whole institutional process becomes the learning
process and the source of the redefinition of norms and standards as a result
of experience (Zaleznik 1991).
Leadership is no longer a matter of personal charisma. It has become a
complex phenomenon in which the leader as animateur is literally a kind of
soul of the body politic. Affirming values, motivating, achieving a workable
level of unity, explaining, serving as symbol, representing the group externally,
and being the continuous source of renewal are only a few of the leader's tasks
in this new context. Fundamentally, there is a necessary sharing of these
leadership tasks: if the heart of leadership is the taking of responsibility,
empowerment of the led by the leader means that leadership tasks are shared
and, therefore, responsibility is shared as well (Gardner 1986: 12).
Governing Relations
Whatever the arrangement arrived at, all human systems are subject to
deterioration. Consequently, leaders must first and foremost be capable of
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setting in motion and maintaining the processes of renewal around some
guiding public philosophy.
For John W. Gardner (1988: 12), the role of the leader is clearly defined:
(1) To renew and re-interpret values that have been incrusted with hypocrisy,
smothered by cynicism or simply abandoned; (2) to liberate energies that have
been imprisoned by outmoded procedures and habits of thought; (3) to
re-energize forgotten goals or to generate new goals appropriate to new
circumstances; (4) to achieve, through science and other modes of explora-
tion, new understandings leading to new solutions; (5) to foster the release of
human possibilities through education and lifelong growth.
A former president of the Carnegie Corporation (and secretary of health,
education, and welfare in the United States in the mid-1960s), John W.
Gardner puts the values component of leadership at the heart of the matter
and relegates debates about plumbing to a subsidiary role, unless they have a
contribution to make to the greater efficiency of the learning organization.
What is required at this time is a clearer definition of the governing relations
and a strengthening of the leader-led pact to mobilize this dispersed leader-
ship. From those aspiring to define a third way between neoconservatism and
neosocialism, this in turn requires reasserting their conviction that there is an
important role for the strategic state and being able to say what it is; and finding
away of renewing the conversation between political parties and citizens of the
broad and all-encompassing middle class on the strategic action of the state.
This cannot be accomplished in Canada or in the United States unless and
until some limits are imposed on the "moral agnosticism" of political parties.
Comments on the fate of the Democrats in the United States have suggested
that
Progressives and Democrats have failed to defend the liberal state because
Republicans have successfully narrowed the scope for legitimate political
action. In that constricted space, from which the middle class feels excluded,
and where the government concentrates solely on the fate of the "have-nots"
and on the state as safety net for them, the initial support for government
initiatives — for acting collectively — quickly dissolves into skepticism and
cynicism. [Greenberg 1991]
Politics and the Middle Class
Some forty years ago, the liberal state embarked on an ambitious program of
social reform. Beginning in the 1960s, there was some effort to promote the
values that the program was trying to defend. Those were the days of the "just
society," with which the majority of Canadians could identify. But as time
passed, both in Canada and in the United States, the fixation on "have-nots"
and the underclass (almost exclusively) and futile attempts to rescue people
from poverty have led politics to abandon the working middle class. This
explains why they hate politics: politics has abandoned them (Dionne 1991).
Families have worked harder, and yet they are losing ground. These people
are not against specific broad-based programs, they are against a government
that has failed to represent them, that does not seem to address their concerns,
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that has failed to "articulate a rationale for the government's role in society"
(Greenberg 1991).
It is some thirty years ago that political leaders (Lyndon Johnson in the
USA and Pierre Elliott Trudeau in Canada) articulated a vision of a "broad-
based state." It is hardly surprising that the middle class has lost a sense of its
ability to attack problems collectively, as the state has made no effort to
communicate a message they can understand or that appears relevant to them.
Social programs are in danger because most Canadians are only aware of some
of their abuses (although these may turn out to be fiscally trivial); they are not
aware of what the public sector does for them every day, of the extent to which their
standard of living and economic security depend on public policies, of what
government is there for. There has been a disconnection between the taxes
they pay and the services they are not aware they are getting.
A Language of Common Citizenship
There is a tacit demand for a language ofcitizenship that would echo the concerns
and values of the middle class and help it become articulate about politics. In
the post-modern context, political leadership no longer consists of charisma
and pirouettes — it amounts to providing a philosophy of the public house-
hold capable of mobilizing a dispersed citizenry. A case could be made for a
renewed notion ofcitizenship (spelling out individual and collective rights and
obligations of Canadians, and the exact role of the state in it) as a promising
arena where the Canadian identity might be forged, but also where the
mandate of the strategic state might be articulated in conversations between
the leader and active citizens (Paquet 1989g; Oldfield 1990).
In Canada, these discussions at the federal level (the definition of both the
governing relations in the unwritten plan, and the moral pact of the leader
with the constituents) call for a gamble on a substantial amount of decentrali-
zation. This is a mortgage of the recent past: the echo effect of the federal
government's compulsive centralism after the Second World War, and its
reluctance to return to the provinces the fiscal and regulatory powers borrowed
in a situation of emergency. It is also the result of some unwise "coups deforce"
(especially in the early 1980s) that still linger in provincial memories: the
National Energy Program of 1980 for Alberta, and Bill S-31 in 1982 for
Quebec.
One cannot proceed as if these circumstances did not exist. Consequently,
the degree of political "roundaboutedness" called for is much greater at
present than it technically needs to be, or than it would have been one decade
ago. But one can accomplish little if one ignores these constraints.
I believe that, despite these circumstances, discussion on a renewed notion
ofcitizenship can serve as a way to jump-start a genuine renewal of politics in
Canada. This was envisaged, in a timid way, in the first portion of the Clark
proposals for shaping Canada's future, in September 1991. It should be
regarded as a good omen that there has been almost no disagreement about
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this portion of the document. Indeed, some may even suggest that the whole
constitutional debate, if reframed as a way to define the rights and obligations
of Canadian citizens, might allow the leaders to initiate the sort of creative
dialogue that is needed.
CONCLUSION
This overall approach to the scope of government has the merit of re-estab-
lishing the centrality of state institutions and exorcizing the various theories
of the withering of the state. Economy, society, and polity must share the
organizational task of redefining the human political socioeconomy.
The leader of a political party has to jump-start and steer a process of social
learning to ensure that the state plays its role as fully as it must, while allowing
the other two domains to occupy their own terrains as fully as possible. There
are two broad avenues the leader might follow right from the start: one that is
modest and one that is more ambitious.
In the modest agenda, the strategic state does not aim at the optimum
optimorum. Instead, the leader only strives for ways of avoiding excesses, for a
loose codifying of a sense of limits. This modesty stems from the fact that very
few political questions can be handled by simple rules. Therefore, even a wise
public philosophy and an efficient process of organizational learning are
regarded, at best, as capable of nothing more than establishing agreement on
what is not moral, what is not acceptable. Because we intuitively understand
what is unjust more easily than what is just, the challenge is to find the path of
minimum regret, for that corresponds to the only hope a leader might
reasonably entertain in a post-modern state (Shklar 1989).
In the more ambitious agenda, the challenge is a bit more daunting: the
objective is not to seek the Utopian just society of yesteryear, but to develop an
active leadership role that would promote active citizenship. This agenda is
built on the following premises (Buckley 1990):
• the Tocqueville lament about the peril of democracy: "not only does democ-
racy induce to make every man forget his ancestors, it hides his descen-
dants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back
forever upon himself alone, and threatens in the end to confine him utterly
within the solitude of his own heart"; and
• the John Stuart Mill statement about social obligations: "every one who
receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit."
From these premises, three sets of actions follow:
• The leader must frame a public philosophy aiming at nothing less than a
change in the national ethos.
• The leader must become an "official," i.e., "a person with duties and
obligations," not only of foregoing private interests in the name of public
duty, but also being capable of "getting the ruled to do what they don't
want to do" because what the public wants, or thinks it wants, or thinks is
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good for it, may not be what the public good requires. This entails a "devoir
d'ingerence"
• The citizen needs to be persuaded that he has an active burden of office,
that a citizen may act unjustly, not only by breaking a law, but also by
remaining passive in the face of a public wrong. This means that the citizen
has to be educated into an active citizenship that entails a "devoir de solidarite"
(Tussman 1977, 1989).
These agendas are rooted in the development of "a national ethic," but
demand different degrees of dynamism on the part of the leader as moral
agent. The modest agenda is a backhanded moral approach: a public house-
hold that would ensure this sense of limits would already have done much to
recreate the civil politics that is so badly needed. The more ambitious agenda
would attempt to reframe the national ethos as a way to guide the debate
around the size and scope of the state in the year 2000. Such refraining is
regarded by all political parties as the central challenge they are facing today.
The public philosophy in good currency suggests that the modest agenda
is the only viable one. Dwight Waldo (1985), one of the foremost observers of
the public administration scene over the last 40 years, reminds us that "we
simply do not know how to solve some of the problems government has been
asked to solve." For Waldo, the central feature in the discussion of the
boundaries between the private and public spheres is the "growth of the 'gray
area'... the fading distinction between public and private, caused and accom-
panied by increasing complexity of organizational arrangements where what
is — or was — government meets and interacts with what is — or was —
private, usually but by no means exclusively 'business.'" And Waldo adds
somewhat sharply that any person who claims to have clear ideas about this
"gray area" is "suspect as ideologue, scenario writer, or a con artist."
Yet the times may call for leaders capable of envisaging a real attempt at
a somewhat immodest agenda. Enlightened pragmatism, an emphasis on
practice guided by a modest public philosophy, an ongoing and somewhat
directed conversation with the situation, "under conditions of time and place,"
are the bedrock of the new modern and modest strategic state. But this
enlightened pragmatism need not be amnesic and myopic; it must forge new
concepts and new symbols, new options and, as "options are thus changed or
expanded, it is to be expected that choice behavior will change too, and
changed choice behavior can in turn be expected, given appropriate time lags,
to be conceptualized or 'habitualized' into a changed set of values" (Mesthene
1970).
This hemi/semi/quasi immodest agenda is not echoed in the triumphant
politics of principle developed by supposedly great political leaders, and likely
to convulse society, but in the solution of particular cases in an innovative way.
Already, there is agreement on the profile of the new type of leader that the
times call for. The key features are a capacity to listen, to learn and to entice
others to learn, to change and adapt to change, and to inform the public clearly
and serenely about the general orientation of the guiding public philosophy;
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the courage to change one's mind when circumstances and problems demand
it; but centrally, an "ethical attitude" acting as a gyroscope and permitting no
concession to opportunism (King and Schneider 1991).
It is not clear whether what is needed to kick-start this transformation is a
fully worked out "projet de societe" an awentura comune, or nothing more than
what Aristotle identified as "concord" ("homonoia," "a relationship between
people who... are not strangers, between whom goodwill is possible, but not
friendship... a relationship based on respect for... differences" [Oldfield 1990]).
What is clear is that the leader of the strategic state needs to find a way to
energize the nervous system of the economy, society, and polity, for, as Joseph
Tussman (1989: 11) would put it, a modern democracy is committed to
"governance not by the best among all of us but by the best within each of us."
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CHAPTER 12
BETTING ON MORAL CONTRACTS*
We need a new "declaration of interdependence."...
- Warren Bennis
We already know much about the most important challenges that public
management in Canada is likely to face over the next decade. Further, we have
good reason to believe that administrative restructuring, technological fixes
or gadgets, and soft-headed sloganeering about total quality or client-orien-
tation will not provide an adequate answer, but, at the same time, we appear
to be unwilling to engage in the difficult task of engineering the "mores
revolution" that might hold the key to our difficulties. I believe that we should
and can effect that revolution.
Mores are defined either as "the established, traditional customs or folk-
ways regarded by a social group as essential to its preservation and welfare" or
as "the accepted conventions of a group or community" (Funk & Wagnall's
Standard College Dictionary [Canadian ed.]. 1976, p. 981).
Although the diagnosis is unlikely to prove controversial, the proposed
cure may be discarded offhandedly because it entails nothing less than a
cultural revolution. Yet, the proposal should at least be debated in the public
forum. This is especially important because two major Canadian public insti-
tutions — the Office of the Auditor General and the Public Service Commis-
sion — could effectively kick-start the whole process of change if they were
swayed by the argument.
THE CHALLENGES
There are two major families of challenges facing public management in the
1990s. First, modern societies like Canada are becoming more plural, open,
and liberal. Most people now strongly assert their right to be in the know. It is
no longer easy to ensure that only the centrally interested stakeholders are
informed; public managers live in a goldfish bowl. As a result, it is all but
* This chapter first appeared in Optimum 1991-92; 22(3): 45-53. The critical comments of Jak
Jabes have been very helpful, and the challenging questions and probing of many participants in
the October 1991 meeting of the Ottawa Chapter of the Planning Forum helped sharpen the
argument.
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impossible to avoid procedural complications in almost every area of public
management, as the most powerful resource is public attention and any well-or-
ganized minority can more or less define the public agenda.
This development has been perceived as a tragedy by old-style public
servants for whom "a duty of complete disclosure would render impossible the
effective operation of government" (Bennis 1976). But this is only the second
part of the well-known pronouncement of Edward Levi (former dean of the
Chicago Law School and former attorney general of the United States): the
first and complementary part of the statement is that "a right of complete
confidentiality in government could not only produce a dangerous ignorance
but also destroy the basic representative function of government" (Bennis
1976). Obviously, one has to strike a balance between these two evils of excessive
disclosure and excessive confidentiality.
Governments still operate with undue confidentiality. This has under-
mined their legitimacy and authority and, as a result, they are almost para-
lyzed. The state cannot command; nobody feels that they have to obey; it
cannot persuade or organize; preaching does not work; and even sophisticated
structures cannot maintain order for the uninformed citizens put all their
energy into trying to circumvent what they regard as unwarranted constraints
placed on them. As a result, at a time when there is a need for more collective
decisions in our information society (for markets do not always handle infor-
mation very effectively [Paquet 1987a]), it has become more and more difficult
to effect them.
One important consequence is the omnipresent temptation of bureaucrats
to use shortcuts: the public servant condemned to be a frustrated public
educator and animateur is often unwittingly led to become a son of homo
manipulator. As a result, ethical issues become the new daily bread of the public
manager in Canada and almost everywhere else in democratic societies.
Second, in Canada, but also in many other countries, this new liberal
pluralism has become a greater challenge, because of a particular malaise that
may be ascribed to what one might call the collapse of the social consensus.
From the 1950s to the 1970s, one cannot but notice an extraordinary decay
of the degree of solidarity in Britain and in Canada, to mention only two
well-documented cases (Marquand 1988; Paquet 1991). In Canada, for exam-
ple, the 1950s were the era when equalization payments policy (an echo of
interregional solidarity) and many welfare programs (an echo of intersocial
group solidarity) were created. In the 1970s, this sense of interregional
solidarity had all but disappeared: this was the era of the Alberta bumper
sticker that read, "Let those eastern bastards freeze in the dark." There have
also been signs of a weakening of intergroup, intergenerational, and even
interethnic solidarity that have translated into an erosion of welfare programs
and heightened intergroup tensions.
This collapse of social consensus since the Great Depression and the
Second World War has had an impact on the governance of the country. The
public service, as an institution, can only reflect and echo the malaise of the
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broader society in which it is embedded and which it serves. A quantum leap
in anomie has been noted in Canada (Bibby 1990). As a result, it has become
even more difficult to manage the public household in this country (and a
number of others), and the tension and frustrations of public servants have
been heightened accordingly.
THE IMPACT
The result of this sociopolitical degradation has been a particularly debilitating
disease for the public service in Canada. Using the language of Robert Pirsig
in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, I would call it loss of gumption.
Gumption is defined by Funk and Wagnall as "bold energetic initiative, courage
to act, shrewd common sense" — from the Middle English "gome" meaning
"care." This illness originated as a result of the forces described in the last
section, but these have been catalyzed by two additional major factors that have
hit the Canadian scene particularly hard.
The first one is demographic in nature. Canada had a most extraordinary
population explosion between 1951 and 1966: some seven million Canadians
were born during this period. This cohort generated a phenomenal growth in
the demand for governmental services (health, education, etc.), but it also
produced what John Kettle (1980) has called "a new kind of people." On one
hand, this cohort was overprotected and "cajoled with promises of a bright
future," but, on the other hand, it has been provoked and made more and
more frustrated as overcrowding generated alienation and violence, and as
their naive "me-generation" expectations have been put to a terrible test.
By now, this generation has come to be well represented, mostly in the
lower and middle echelons of the Canadian public service. These "Baby
Boomers" are a new kind of people with new attitudes to work: more question-
ing; less confidence in authority figures; more valorization of family and
community than their elders; frustration, as their probability of promotion is
much lower than the previous cohort; and so forth.
The oldest members of this cohort are now in their 40s, the 35 to 49 age
group will continue to grow dramatically during much of the 1990s. This is
the very age group most likely to be hit by an identity crisis and a midlife
crisis, with its characteristic vulnerability and equivocation. This is the time
when gumption traps like anxiety, boredom, and impatience are most dam-
aging (Scrosone 1990).
The second factor is organizational in nature. The massive demands for
government services from this me-generation have brought a lot of pressure
to bear on the public service. The old-style senior public servants, mostly born
before the Second World War, were forced by such external circumstances to
deal with the new pluralist reality in a very direct way. Moreover, given the new
values of the day, they had to attend to these demands in a sensitive way.
Consequently, they developed an explicit language of care — the vision state-
ments and the slogans they have hammered out to expound their commitment
are all about client-orientation and quality of service to client publics.
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But, internally, the old Taylorian logic of the feudal hierarchical system
was still in place. Both at the federal and provincial levels (but also in many
large private bureaucracies administering companies that have been in place
for quite a while), there is ample evidence that the bunker mentality is not
dead. Dissent is still not in good currency, and scapegoating is still a way of
conducting business. Indeed, given the increased external vulnerability of the
public service bureaucracy in this fish-bowl world, scapegoating (from its
radical version, firing, to its softer version, shelving) is increasingly a tool of
management.
In this somewhat schizophrenic world, junior civil servants try their sanity
as they are squeezed between the explicit rhetoric of client service uttered by
their superiors for external consumption and the Taylorian language and
practices experienced internally. Without the benefit of an inclusive public
philosophy or guiding professional culture to help these junior civil servants
interpret and reconcile both types of utterances and guide them in adapting
creatively to ever-changing circumstances, this situation generates extraordi-
nary existential strains.
Kets de Vries and Miller (1985) have psychoanalyzed the sort of neurotic
organization that results. It appears that the current scene in Canada corre-
sponds closely to what they identify as one type of dysfunctional organization
— the paranoid organization. The paranoid organization is marred by suspicion
and mistrust of others. The result is a "desire for perpetual vigilance and
preparedness for emergencies" through a centralization of power in the hands
of the top executives. The strategies of such organizations are essentially
reactive, with a sizable element of conservatism, and a "loss of capacity for
spontaneous action because of defensive attitudes."
DEFENSE MECHANISMS
This world of contradictory signals is a great source of double binds. In town
hall-type meetings, senior bureaucrats use language that encourages subor-
dinates to feel empowered, but then do not hesitate to accuse them of
incompetence, disloyalty, and disobedience when they take initiatives and the
outcome is not entirely "politically correct." This is a typical Catch-22 situ-
ation in which conflicts are suppressed and an atmosphere of false consensus
is encouraged. Such confused interpersonal and superior-subordinate inter-
actions generate all sorts of tensions, insecurity, disenchantment, and resent-
ment among second-tier managers and their subordinates. And the situation
is yet more serious when the lower and middle echelons are "the new kind of
people" generated by the Big Generation.
The situation is so tense that public servants in the middle echelons are
led either to internalize these tensions — "some conscious pretense, emotional
suppression, or cognitive unawareness concerning the factors that induce
fear... in a crisis situation" (Kets de Vries and Miller 1985: 136) — or to design
escape routes — "cooperation with all its half-measures and half-satisfactions
is no longer enough. I want it all. I want out" (Scorsone 1990).
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The internalization route may take one of the many forms well-known to
psychoanalysts and management specialists like Kets de Vries and Miller
(1985)—repression of desires, emotions, and thoughts, regression to passive,
child-like behaviour, projection (creating distortions of representations designed
to attribute to persons and circumstances all responsibility for the uneasy
situation), or identification (leading one to adopt values and patterns of
behaviour of those in power. And, finally, a way out of this uncomfortable pew
is reaction formation (internalizing one's deeply felt sentiments and external-
izing exactly the reverse).
Through this internalization process, personnel acquire a capacity to
cope and muddle through one day at a time, but, in the long run, it is rather
debilitating and counterproductive. The neurosis that has hit a portion of the
middle-rank public service has translated into disenchantment, and public
servants have been shown to lack commitment to their superiors (Zussman
andjabes 1990).
As for the escape route, it can also take many forms. Some have simply
migrated within and withdrawn into a mercenary role, belittling, by example if
not always by formal utterances, the importance of both ethics in relations with
the clientele and a professional culture of solidarity within the organization.
Others have effectively opted out, sometimes by leaving the public service
altogether, which is an unfortunate but easy-to-defend action under the
circumstances. But others have opted out while staying in, either by submerging
themselves in some form of nirvana (which is another way to suppress emo-
tions) or by arguing openly in favour of massive privatization of the public
service, as a way out of their quandary and misery.
The adoption of a mercenary role is a betrayal of public trust. Public servants
are not meant to be robots, but rather important elements within government
as a learning organization. Their multiple roles vis-a-vis their client publics and
their colleagues in the rest of the organization are pregnant with positive
freedoms, that is, obligations and duties that go much beyond the mechanical
despatch of orders received from above. Public servants have ruling work to do.
Withdrawing into a passive role amounts to not meeting these obligations
and failing to provide clients and colleagues with what they are in a position
to demand as a matter of right. At best, it reveals weakness of will; at worst, it
generates what Warren Bennis (1976) has labeled "petit Eichmannism."
This opting out by middle-echelon public servants, and even, at times, by
younger or relatively senior bureaucrats into a blind espousal of deregula-
tion/privatization (as away to cleanse the system by making public management
more like private management) is also a dereliction of duty. Many activities may
effectively be shifted from the public to the private sector, with some efficiency
gains and no meaningful loss on other fronts. And, indeed, these should be so
shifted. In the same way, activities currently under the authority of the federal
public management system might be allocated to provincial or local authorities
as a matter of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. However, the nature of the
activities that can be shifted this way can only be ascertained on the basis of a
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reasoned discussion of what the market can and cannot handle appropriately
and of what different levels of government can deliver. It is the responsibility of
public servants to understand and explain to the citizenry and the politicians
the porous, but fundamental, border between public and private matters and
between federal, provincial, and local matters.
Allowing ideological sloganeering to sway a debate, or to carry a decision
without the key decision-makers being fully briefed on all its implications,
represent failure by public servants to live up to the "obligation de diligence" and
the "devoir de diligence" that are part and parcel of their positive freedoms. The
famous "obligation de reserve" should never translate into an "obligation de
mutisme" Bureaucrats who do not accept these obligations are less an aid to
enlightened public decision-making than a hindrance to governments as
learning organizations. The inescapable and changing responsibilities of active
citizens and public servants, even when these are unpleasant, are to make full
use of their positive freedoms, that is, of their obligation to participate
(Tussman 1989; see also Chapter 5). This is the sense in which it is said that
public servants, like citizens, have ruling work to do.
THE WAY OUT
Senior bureaucrats have a central responsibility in the design of a solution:
ethical standards begin at the top. Given their important brokerage function
between the public service and its clientele, and their complementary tutelage
function vis-a-vis public servants within the organization, one has to recognize
first and foremost that they face a prisoner's dilemma on both fronts.
A prisoner's dilemma is one of mutual distrust (see New partnerships and
moral contracts in Chapter 11). Although there is an incentive to betray one's
partner in crime, if both partners inform on each other, the penalty is the
maximum. The same type of problem exists between the citizenry and the state
or in the federal-provincial arena: mutual distrust leads one partner to
short-change the other, with the result that the other follows suit and all the
benefits of cooperation vanish.
All this can be resolved by negotiating moral contracts. Ideally, our senior
bureaucrats would be the key designers in the development of new conven-
tions/moral contracts, both within (in their dealings with the different layers of
the bureaucracy) and without (that is, in their dealings with client publics) as a
way out of their dilemmas. For all kinds of reasons, they have not performed
this task to the necessary degree. However, it is quite possible to remind them
of this central responsibility and to provide incentives for them to engage in
moral contract activities.
What conventions might constitute a way out in the circumstances we have
described? Our labels for the internal moral contracts that need to be ham-
mered out between high and low fonctionnaires, and for the external moral
contracts between public servants and the general public are rather simple:
professionalism and ethics. And, they are closely interrelated.
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Professionalism
A moral contract between senior and junior civil servants must be based not
only on a sense of respected identity, but also on rules of mutual obligation
and a sense ofquidpro quo. Professionalism refers to both "practical knowledge
and social skills that are conducive to savvy functioning within the social and
political context of an organization or field" (Messick 1988). It also refers to a
culture — "a set of intellectual glasses to interpret reality with," as R.M. Pirsig
(1991) puts it — the ensemble of values underpinning this culture and the
unwritten agreement in which the mutual obligations these entail are recorded.
As it stands these days, no one is a civil servant first, not in Canada nor in
most of the countries Canada usually associates with (Crozier 1987). People
are accountants, economists, plumbers, animateurs, engineers, or oenologists
first: they identify with their craft rather than with their metier (from the Latin
ministerium), which is to serve the public. This primary identification refers to
a bond, an esprit de corps that binds as much as it empowers. It often carries
with it not only a sense of pride, but also a code of ethics.
People can be public servants first; indeed, there are important models of
people who have celebrated that profession as their primary self-label (Bloch-
Laine 1976). However, for such self-identification to prevail, the metier of public
servants must be refurbished and repromoted to the rank of "honorable
profession." This, in turn, calls for a milieu in which openness, candour, and
deliberation (i.e., a true, open, internal forum) exist and there is respect for
responsibility.
Such professionalism could be the basis of a new strategic state — one that
would do things better with fewer resources because of the new possibilities
opened by networks of mutual trust within the organization. This is a funda-
mental requirement if one is to experiment with institutional design along the
lines suggested by the strategy of special operating agencies or by the more
ambitious Swedish model, in which 5% of public servants deal with policy and
legislation and 95% deal with management in relatively autonomous agencies.
In such contexts, the existence of a common philosophy of public service is
essential; the organizational culture ensures some cohesion in decision-mak-
ing, along with much cooperation and networking, with the result that the
principle of subsidiarity can be fully applied without the usual ailments that
flow from decentralization in a paranoid organization.
Ethics
A new moral contract with the citizenry must be based not only on great respect
for citizens' right to know, but also on client publics' right to be involved in the
evaluation of the public service. This is much more than client-orientation
rhetoric: it is a sort of quid pro quo involving the protection of public servants
from abuse and harassment by clients, and the protection of citizens from the
arbitrariness and negligence of public servants.
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For the time being, there is a fixation on quality of service in the rhetoric of
client-orientation. There is a danger that such a phrase can mislead more than
it enlightens, for in matters of quality of service in the public sector (at least in
the absence of any user fees), the optimum is not, in all likelihood, the
maximum. Indeed the notion of "total quality" may be quite misleading.
Quality of service in the absence of any price rationing is a bottomless pit. Why
should the citizen not demand more if it is free? There develops a logic of
entitlements in the clientele to which the public servant responds with a liturgy
of service: both parties pretend to be acting in good faith while knowing full
well they are not (Paquet 1985d).
By establishing more clearly, via a moral contract, both the entitlements
of citizens (within limits) and the obligations of public servants (but also the
limitations that might reasonably apply), and having a transparent evaluation
process for public service based on the participation of citizens, one might
expect the establishment of a different rapport between public servants and
clients and an enforcement mechanism limiting encroachment on both sides.
For the time being, the two sets of moral contracts linking headquarters
to the field and both of them to the citizenry have not been developed into a
proud and integrated culture of professional public service. As a result, "la
fonction publique manque de patrons" (Crozier 1987) in the two senses of the term:
leaders and models. Senior headquarters managers, whatever their zeal or
good intentions, cannot avoid sending dual messages: the words (that is, the
rhetoric of client-service, openness, etc.) do not always jibe with the music (the
old arrogant logic of the internal administration of yesteryear), and the
rapport between civil servants and the citizenry is based on misunderstanding,
because of the indeterminate nature of the moral contract binding the parties.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The content of these moral contracts must be explicitly and openly negotiated.
But, because the sort of moral agreements that are likely to ensue are to be
designed as away of avoiding excesses and of codifying, somewhat, a sense of
limits, it may be helpful to go back to the four cardinal virtues (sometimes called
natural virtues) proposed by Plato as primary guiding values. They are temper-
entia (the sense of limits, of not going too £a.r),justitia (a sense of what is good),
fortitudo (a capacity to take into account context and the longer time horizon)
and prudentia (the sense of pursuing reasonable and practical objectives).
Schumacher (1973) could not find any better set of principles when he was
searching for values likely to guide modern choices at the end of Small Is
Beautiful.
These principles may not hold the key to the question of what is moral,
but they are most helpful in establishing by negotiation what is not moral.
Indeed, this is exactly the plausible framework suggested for "locating and
developing post-modern insights in relation to justice," according to Stephen
White (1991). We often intuitively know better what is unjust than what is just.
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Judith Shklar (1991) goes even further and revives an old distinction of Cicero
between passive and active injustice to remind her readers that a citizen may
act unjustly not only by breaking a law, but also by remaining passive in the
face of a public wrong.
This is a backhanded approach, but one that is likely to define the bounds
within which the moral contracts might be kept by convention of all stakehold-
ers, that is, the tolerable and intolerable bounds of active and passive immor-
ality within which the parties will agree to stay.
WHO SHOULD KICK-START THE NEGOTIATION
PROCESS?
For the process of negotiation of moral contracts to proceed quickly, at least
two agencies should be involved, thereby triggering the sound emulation and
the requisite competition likely to produce results in short order. Two federal
agencies stand above all others, in terms of independence and mandate and,
therefore, might be considered as extraordinarily well-suited to kick-start the
process: the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and the Public Service
Commission (PSC).
The PSC might be charged with the primary responsibility of negotiating
the professionalism contract. A redefinition of the role of the PSC is already
in progress, not only as a result of internal restructuring, but also as a result
of a process of critical thinking in the whole Commonwealth about the roles
of PSCs (see Chapter 9). In addition, the Auditor General's (1990) annual
report for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1990 began a critical examination
of the underlying issues at stake in the definition of such a contract. This
might provide many insights into how to do the job.
The OAG might take primary responsibility for negotiating the ethics
contract. It has already gone quite a distance toward comprehensive auditing,
i.e., asking not only if public service is provided economically and efficiently,
but also asking if it is done effectively. However, it has done this work timidly,
without much explicit government support and almost entirely without direct,
explicit, or powerful involvement of citizens. Professional experts are acting
on behalf of the public: this is not good enough. Even in the private sector,
where one has the benefit of a market discipline, the lags involved in waiting
for the market test are too long, and potential mistakes too costly for one to
rely entirely on this feedback mechanism. Private firms now use real customers
as focus groups, to evaluate how well they are doing and to determine in what
way their product should be improved. An extension of the auditing function
to cover effectiveness, and a direct involvement of client publics in the
evaluation of effectiveness, would extend the role of the OAG considerably and
provide a basis for negotiation of the moral contract between the public service
and the citizenry.
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CONCLUSION
A strategy based on the definition of moral contracts would contribute much
to solving the prisoner's dilemma that plagues public management in Canada
and elsewhere. It would define, as clearly as possible, the mutual expectations
of both parties, the legitimate entitlements and obligations they might have,
and the corridor or boundary limits within which it is imperative or less
imperative to effect these entitlements and to honour these obligations.
First, it would rebuild the trust of client publics in the public service
community and redefine the centrality of the positive freedoms of public
servants in dealing with the public. A greater possibility of cooperation between
the citizenry and the state would ensue, and the resulting empowerment of the
intellectual resources of the bureaucracy would allow public servants not only
to serve the public better, but also to be an integral part of the co-evolution of
government, society, and business that is the key to international competitive-
ness (Archibald et al. 1990).
Second, it would provide the basis for refurbishing the collective decision-
making capability within government at a time when it is badly needed and
for rebuilding a proud culture of public service within governmental circles
with loyalties and commitments attached to it. Further, it would contribute, in
no minor way, to eliminating the schizophrenia that plagues public manage-
ment and prevents it from delivering public services economically, efficiently,
and effectively.
In a sense, these new instruments within the public administration appa-
ratus are nothing more than a concretization and an extension of what has
already begun to evolve in the relationships between the state and civil society
on the broader political scene.
Over the last half century, the role of the state has changed considerably
in advanced, modern capitalist economics. From simple housekeeping func-
tions, the state has graduated to Keynesian, off-setting functions as a result of
the great instability that used to plague advanced industrial economies and
paralyze their effectiveness. Lately, it has become clear that off-setting will no
longer suffice. We are now entering an era where cooperation between gov-
ernment, business, and civil society is becoming a basic ingredient of national
competitiveness and prosperity. As a result, all advanced industrial countries
have reworked, more or less explicitly, their participatory/planning functions,
and it may be said that they all have a "plan." As Theodore Lowi (1975) put
it, "they do not publish their plan because it would never gain consent. Yet, it
is not what one would call a conspiracy.... The plan is not entirely conscious or
systematic, and it cannot be as long as it is not written, published, debated,
revised and so on. But, it is not what you could call a secret." Lowi has called
on political science "to discover what the plan is and, in discovering it, stopping
it or improving it as the case may be."
The same sort of agenda is now facing specialists in public administration
when it comes to the moral contracts we have referred to earlier. There are
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important new instrumentalities in the realization of the "plan." Public man-
agers will not only have to continue to deliver their usual services, but they will
also have to take part in some social architecture to design the moral contracts
likely to create the best structure of public management. The challenge for
senior public servants can be likened to the one facing an orchestra leader
trying to restructure the orchestra while conducting the concert — shrieks and
other ungodly noises can be expected!
Yet, only through joint pressures generated by an informational age
requiring a much larger and very different public sector output and by an era
of legitimate fiscal restraint where public-sector deficits command that re-
sources be rationed to the public household can a public strategy of working
smarter and cooperatively be given a real chance to come into being.
No simple rules will do: nothing is black or white — all is grey. This is the
area where evolving negotiated moral contracts are going to work best, and
this is why they will be the new tool of public management in the 1990s.
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CHAPTER 13
DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE AND
TRANSVERSAL LEADERSHIP*
The obverse of hope is trust.
-James O'Toole
Quebec-Canada constitutional carpentering has become a national cottage
industry. For years now, aficionados have met in different forums in different
weeks of the year to debate slightly different versions of the same basic
scenarios. After a while, these ballet-like exchanges have ceased to generate
excitement because they are the re-enactment of the same constitutional
charades. Yet failure at this game is exacting a heavy toll on the country, and
there is a danger of fatigue syndrome among the citizenry.
For the sovereignist camp, the way out of this stalemate is through hope.
The separatist movement, however flimsy the basis on which it is constructing
such hope, is providing permission to dream. For a large number of Quebeck-
ers living in regions where the unemployment rate is oscillating around 30%,
the dream of a future where things might not be as bad, of a future that will
materialize magically the day Quebec is free from the bondage of Canada, is
an attractive proposition. This is not unlike a modern version of the "cult of
the cargo" or "some day my prince will come." Passively and effortlessly, the
present dreadful state of affairs will be cured by separation.
So far, the federalist camp has either fantasized about instant constitutional
reform or been satisfied to try to puncture separatists' hope. It should be clear
by now that no magic constitutional refurbishment will materialize and that
one cannot expect to win over the hearts and souls of Quebeckers by dashing
their hopes. Nor can one expect to win them with promotional brochures about
how good Quebeckers have had it within Canada over the last 130 years.
The only way out for the federalist camp is to find ways to rebuild trust.
This calls for refocusing the debates on the best use of the nonconstitutional
route and for new, principled but pragmatic leadership along that road. This,
in turn, requires a refurbished notion of governance and a renewed notion of
* This chapter also appeared in Trent, J.E., Young, R., Lachapelle, G. (editors). Quebec-Canada,:
What Is the Path Ahead?/Nouveaux sentiers vers I'avenir. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1996,
pp. 317-332.
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leadership rooted in earned confidence based on the accomplishments of the
leader as servant. This sort of governance and leadership is feared not so much
by the have-nots (who are often uninvolved and passively hopeful), but by the
haves who have invested so much in the status quo (status, beliefs, values,
power) that they are unlikely to allow change to perturb their comfort and
security.
Challenging this collective myopia of the haves and their "somnambulistic
certainty" about the rectitude of the existing governance process and the sort
of leadership in good currency is the task facing those who want to earn trust
(Mannheim 1936; O'Toole 1995).
FROM CENTRALIZED TO DISTRIBUTED
GOVERNANCE
Governance is about guiding: it is the process through which an organization
is steered. Fifty years ago, in Canada, governance was debated in the language
of management science. It was presumed that public, private, and social
organizations were strongly directed by leaders who had a good understanding
of their environment, of the future trends in the environment if nothing were
done to modify it, of the inexorable rules of the game they had to put up with,
and of the goals pursued by their own organization. Those were the days when
social sciences were still Newtonian: a world of deterministic, well-behaved
mechanical processes where causality was simple because the whole was the
sum of the parts. The challenge was relatively simple: building on the well-de-
fined goals of the organization to design the control mechanisms likely to get
the organization where it wanted to be.
Many issues were clearly amenable to this approach, but as the pace of
change accelerated and the issues grew more complex, private, public, and
social organizations became confronted more and more with "wicked prob-
lems" (Rittel and Webber 1973; see Chapter 2) requiring a new way of thinking.
The governance system evolved accordingly, and rather smoothly over the last
decades. However, what is not always understood is that it has been trans-
formed as a result of a number of rounds of adaptation to provide the requisite
flexibility and suppleness of action. The ultimate result of these changes is a
composite governance system built on unreliable control mechanisms in
pursuit of ill-defined goals in a universe that is chronically in a state of flux.
This composite governance process has emerged in four stages of increasing
complexity (Boisot 1987; Paquet 1994b).
At first, when organizations were relatively small and under the direction
of autocratic leaders, governance had a fiefdom quality: information flows were
very informal, and they were strongly focused on a small group around the
leader. But as problems grew more complex, this pattern of governance faltered.
More elaborate structures and more formal rules had to evolve to meet the
organization's changing needs, but these formal rules remained the preserve of
those at the top of the hierarchies. From these emerged the more-or-less
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standard bureaucratic forms of organization that played an important role
during "les trentes glorieuses annees" between the 1940s and the 1970s.
As the pace of change accelerated, problems became ever more complex,
less easily structured and ever-changing, and the bureaucratic system, with its
inability to transform quickly enough, began to show signs of dysfunction. This
led to efforts to partition private, public, and social bureaucracies into smaller
self-contained and more flexible units that were likely to be more responsive
to clients. This market-type governance, built on the price system, had the
benefit of being more inclusive, for price information is widely shared. In the
private sector, large companies began a process of segmentation, creating a
multiplicity of relatively independent profit-centred organizations likely to be
more attentive to the changing needs of the clients and to be more adaptable
to evolving circumstances. After a lag time, public bureaucracies went the same
route with, for instance, the creation of executive agencies in the United
Kingdom and special operating agencies in Canada. Organizations came to
be governed — to a much greater extent than before — by the "invisible hand"
of the market.
But information flows in market-type organizations are anonymous and
highly stylized; thus, the price-driven steering mechanism often proved to be
less than perfect. For instance, it was insensitive to third-party effects and
external economies and incapable of appreciating either synergies within the
organization or the various forces at work in the external environment. More
important, the myopia of the market led to short-term opportunistic competi-
tive behaviour that proved disastrous for organizations. As a result, an effort
was made to establish or re-establish, within the decentralized units, the
informal cooperative links — les liens moraux — that might give an organiza-
tion a sense of shared values and commitments. Corporate culture acquired a
new importance as the sort of social glue that enabled organizations to steer
themselves better through better use of informal moral contracts based on
shared values.
Although private-sector organizations were quick to develop these new
informal channels of communication, public organizations were much slower
to recognize the central importance of these clan-type relations. In Canada,
the Public Service 2000 exercise was perhaps one of the first occasions when
these issues gained prominence.
This shift in the centre of gravity of the governance system is captured well
in Max Boisot's (1987) information space in which he identifies the different
types of governance schemes that correspond to more or less codified and
more or less diffused information flows (Figure 4 in Chapter 1). Although
earlier forms of governance continue to persist and endure, the whole organ-
izational architecture has come to be dominated less and less by the sort of
centralized formal decision-making and hierarchical control that characterize
the governance of fiefdoms and bureaucracies, and more and more by informal
and distributed governance systems like those of markets and clans. Within a
complex and multifaceted governance process, the center of gravity of Boisot's
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information space has been shifting broadly from a bureaucratic focus to a
market-cum-clan focus over the last decades.
When the ground is in motion, organizations can only govern themselves
by becoming capable of learning both their goals and the means to reach them
as they proceed, by tapping the knowledge and information in the possession of
active citizens and getting them to invent ways out of the predicaments they
are in. This more decentralized governance intervenes strategically as an
animateur and a catalyst. Such a governance system deprives the leader of his
or her monopoly on the governing of the organization. For the organization
to learn quickly, everyone must take part in the conversation and bring forward
each bit of knowledge and wisdom he or she has that has a bearing on the issue
(Webber 1993; Piore 1995; see also Chapter 11).
The new governance structures (more modular, network-like, and inte-
grated either by the invisible hand of the market or by informal moral
contracts) are only one half of the learning process. The other half is the work
of the leader as animateur. Instead of building on the assumption that the
leader is omniscient and guiding autocratically, a distributed governance
process builds on social learning and on the capacity of the leader to listen and
to lead through a critical dialogue with the stakeholders to ensure that everyone
learns about the nature of the problem and about the consequences of various
possible alternatives.
In this manner, the citizenry and clienteles learn to limit unreasonable
demands, managers and administrators learn to listen and consult, and other
stakeholders learn enough about one another's views and interests to gauge
the range of compromise solutions that are likely to prove acceptable. As a
result, the distributed governance process predicated on social learning builds
on the answers to four questions posed to all stakeholders in this variety of
meso-forum: Is it feasible? Is it socially acceptable? Is it too destabilizing? Can
it be implemented? (Friedmann and Abonyi 1976).
A THREE-PRONGED STRATEGY
In a context of rapid change, the best learning experience can be effected
through decentralized and flexible teams woven by moral contracts and
reciprocal obligations negotiated in the context of evolving partnerships
(Nohria and Eccles 1992; de la Mothe and Paquet 1994). According to this
gauge, the Canadian governance system would appear to suffer from learning
disabilities. There seems to be a strong institutional residue from the fiefdom
and bureaucratic eras. Indeed, some might suggest that those elements still
dominate much of the Canadian governance landscape.
For the federal government, the challenge of distributed governance is
important. It calls for the definition of a new role for the central government,
one that depends to a great extent on its capacity to earn the trust of Canadians
and to explain the manner in which it can play its role of animateur and leader
within the new governance system.
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To effect a transition in our governance system likely to rekindle the
commitment of the citizenry and to regenerate trust in the federal government
by the population of all regions, three major and difficult tasks must be
undertaken: a reframing exercise, a retooling exercise, and a mobilization
exercise.
Reframing: The reframing effort entails a shift from debates on govern-
ment to debates on governance. This will refocus discussions away from the
fight between coalitions trying to seize power and establish their hegemony
toward an examination of the best way to design the system so that it learns
faster and more effectively. Our socio-politico-economic system is like our
immune system: it is bombarded with new bacteria and viruses continually and
it has to learn, develop, and transform to cope effectively with them. Focusing
on governance requires that we reflect on the required changes in our govern-
ance system. This raises a meta-problem: the question of the rules that are to
be used when changing rules.
Some of this reframing has already been initiated at the federal cabinet
level. It has been suggested that a meta-rule could be provided by the principle of
subsidiarity (Burelle 1995; Janigan and Fulton 1996). Such a principle or
philosophy of governance leaves completely open the precise allocation of
responsibilities; it simply suggests a set of principles to help decide who should
do what.
It is difficult to imagine any party refusing ex ante to enter a debate on
governance based on this principle. Indeed we have reason to believe from
statements of endorsement from such staunch sovereignists as J.F. Lizee (on
the back cover of Andre Burelle's [1995] book) that such an approach would
even be acceptable to Quebec. This approach also has the merit of putting the
responsible citizen at centre stage; underpinning a division of labour not only
between Quebec and the rest of Canada but among the private, not-for-profit,
and public sectors based on efficiency and proximity; and undergirding a
distributed notion of governance and a transverse notion of leadership.
Retooling: The retooling effort needed to support the reframing strategy
sketched above entails the development of political and administrative instru-
ments to ensure that the transformation of the governance system is effected
in an orderly manner. First, at the symbolic level, one requires a sketch of an
inspiring political vision of where the governance system might be heading if a
subsidiarity strategy were adopted. A plausible beacon might be Switzerland,
but there might be other models. Although such a broad fuzzy objective is
vague and most certainly not meant to be binding in any way, it would have
the advantage of providing the citizenry with a reference point. It is very
difficult to understand how trust could be regained by the federalist camp
without such a vision. Yet, there seems to be quite a bit of diffidence on the
part of federal public officials in providing any vision of where their strategy
might lead.
Second, at the realities level, one requires a sketch of the administrative
means through which the reallocation of responsibilities will proceed. The
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obvious administrative routes might well be Program Review (in a refurbished
format) and the Efficiency of the Federation Initiative (in a rekindled form) as
leading instruments to establish beyond reasonable doubt the degree of
seriousness of the federal government in proceeding with a streamlining of its
own operations in keeping with the philosophy of subsidiarity. This would
entail massive devolution with compensation.
Mobilizing: The mobilization exercise calls for a proactive strategy to
neutralize the dynamic conservatism of those in power and to expose the
various stratagems to derail the process of change. But one must also find ways
to elicit a strong commitment to the new philosophy of governance. Education,
information, and communication must play an important role in this effort.
Central to this process is the recognition of the power of the ideology of comfort
and the importance of a new form of values-based leadership mobilizing the
positive freedom of the citizenry.
SOCIAL LEARNING AND
TRANSVERSAL LEADERSHIP
At the core of this mobilization process, one finds social learning and transverse
leadership. To cope with a turbulent environment, organizations must use the
environment strategically, the way a surfer uses a wave, to learn faster, to adapt
more quickly. This calls for expropriation of the steering power from the top
managers. There must be constant negotiation and bargaining with partners.
Managers must exploit all favourable environmental circumstances and the
full complement of imagination and resourcefulness in the heart and mind of
each player. They must become team leaders in task force-type projects,
quasi-entrepreneurs capable of cautious suboptimizing in the face of a turbu-
lent environment (Leblond and Paquet 1988).
This sort of strategy calls for lighter, more horizontal and modular
structures, networks and informal clan-like rapports (Bressand et al. 1990) in
units that are freer from procedural morass, empowered to define their mission
and clienteles more precisely, and to invent different performance indicators.
Not only in the public sector, but also in the private sector, the "virtual
corporation" and the "modular corporation" are the new models (Business
Week 1993; Tully 1993).
These new modularized private and public organizations cannot impose
their views on clients or citizens. Like the state, the firm must consult.
Deliberation and negotiation are everywhere: away from goals and controls,
deep into intelligence and innovation. A society based on participation,
negotiation, and bargaining is replacing one based on universal rights. The
strategic organization has to become a broker, a negotiator, an animateur: in
this network socioeconomy, the firm and the state are always in a consultative
and participative mode (Paquet 1992a).
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In these forums that cut across bureaucratic hierarchies and vertical lines
of power, fraught with overlapping memberships, personal ties, temporary
coalitions, special-task organizations, "the organizational structure of the
future is already being created by the most as well as the least powerful" within
the new paradigm (Hine 1977). Indeed, to the extent that middle-range
regional and transnational networks and forums are cutting across usual
structures, the interactions distill in an evolutionary way an always imperfectly
bounded network.
The new competencies that are going to be essential in this world have not
been fully documented yet, and there would be much disagreement in any
discussion about what should be on any priority list. But one may draw a
provisional list from the work of Donald Michael (1980, 1988a,b) and Gareth
Morgan (1988). These new competencies fall into four general groups: con-
textual competencies, interpersonal and enactment skills, creating an effective
corporate climate, and systems values. This last group is particularly important
as it draws attention to the new ethic driven by interconnectedness and
interdependence: "our values still emphasize rights and autonomy while the
actual circumstances of life make imperative the acceptance of obligations and
interdependence" (Michael 1988a). This ethic is one that forces a redefinition
of leadership: away from leaders as generals to leaders as leaders of leaders —
those removing obstacles that prevent followers from making creative and
effective decisions themselves (O'Toole and Bennis 1992).
For the social system to adapt (i.e., to learn) as much and as fast as possible,
some basic conditions must be realized: the conversation between leaders and
followers must be conducted with tact and civility; and within a context where
the ethos is sufficiently rich and supportive to make possible the awentura
comune. These are conditions for transversal leadership.
Tact would appear to be a very limited requirement for the conversation
to yield social learning. Indeed, many have felt that it cannot be a sufficient
condition. Yet, Gadamer (Kingwell 1995) defines tact as "a particular sensitivity
to situations, and how to behave in them, for which we cannot find any
knowledge from general principles." This is a screening not at the level of the
types of problems or issues to tackle, but at the level of permissible arguments.
It embodies the basic condition for the conversation to continue — a dual
requirement of not saying just anything that comes to mind and of keeping a
certain openness vis-a-vis the arguments of others.
With regard to the sort of "communautarian" fabric likely to support a
fruitful conversation, it is also difficult to establish precise conditions for its
emergence. It may originate in various ways and be woven according to quite
different logics. It is clear, however, that the conversation is much more fruitful
in a "contextualist" world of multiplexed relations of mutual interdependence
and caretaking, of group-oriented social relations. In a network society like
Japan, the contextualist culture has been shown to facilitate greatly conversa-
tion and social learning on a large scale (Kumon 1992).
224 GOVERNANCE THROUGH SOCIAL LEARNING
Leadership is the leavening force that is required to ensure effective social
learning. Effective leaders lead change by reflecting the values of their follow-
ers after having done much listening. For effective leaders are principled but
also pragmatic. They tend to bring their followers beyond their limits, but not
unreasonably fast and not unreasonably beyond such limits.
To be followers, team members must first respect their leader and be
persuaded that their welfare is the leader's objective. The burden of office for
a leader is, therefore, first a requirement to listen and to "refine the public
views in a way that transcends the surface noise of pettiness, contradiction and
self-interest" (O'Toole 1995:10-12). The leader must earn the trust of the
followers by persuading them that he or she has their needs and aspirations
at heart. The leader's ability to lead is a by-product of the trust he or she has
earned by serving the followers (O'Toole 1995: 28).
Transversal leadership cannot function unless the leader and the followers
develop a capacity to appreciate the limits imposed by their mutual obligations.
This form of leadership does not depend on a matrix where vertical-functional
and horizontal-process rapports are supposedly keeping one another in check.
Rather, processes are dominating and the reaction to external challenges is for
the different stakeholders to coalesce laterally to create informal links and
multifunctional teams capable of promoting faster and more effective learning
(Tarondeau and Wright 1995).
Transversality is built on a multifunctional esprit de corps that provides
fertile ground for social learning. It is based on the existence of a social capital
of trust, reasonableness, and mutual understanding that facilitates debate and
generates a sort of basic pragmatic ethic likely to promote interaction and
synergies among the many partners in the organization. Transversal leader-
ship is based on the ligatures among functions effected by individuals or groups
that have accepted the distributed nature of governance and are building on
new modes of cross-functional coordination. Although much of this new
coordination is fuzzy and built on moral contracts, it must be clear that it
represents the only effective way to guide the organization and nudge it in
different directions (Putnam 1995).
What is at stake in leadership is "the ability to stay the course while 'rocking
the boat' to enhance organizational readiness and competitiveness in an
unpredictable environment" (Vicere 1992). This ability cannot be imparted
effectively except through experiential and action learning.
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
Leadership is first and foremost a moral issue. It is based fundamentally on a
conversation between leader and followers in which the burden of office of the
leader entails listening carefully and taking responsibility. In that sense, the
leader is a servant. The official is
A person with duties and obligations, not merely an insatiable center of
gigantic appetites, a person with things to do that may be the death of his
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private self, that may make the office seem less an opportunity than a burden.
And sometimes, even without the aid of flaws, a tragic burden. In fact, if we
do not understand the office and its burdens we may not understand about
tragedy. [Tussman 1989: 15]
The nature of the burden of office of the transversal leader is best
illustrated by Jan Carlzon (1987), the CEO of Scandinavian Airlines and author
of Moments of Truth. When he had occasion to explain how he had chosen to
empower his employees and to make them totally responsible for the 50 million
"moments of truth" that occur annually when an employee of the company
has a direct one-on-one contact with a customer, he was often asked how many
of these moments of truth had gone sour. Carlson always readily confessed that
there had been half a dozen serious instances of costly errors in approximately
six years. When asked how the employees responsible for costly errors had
been punished, he would answer,
Punish them? Why should we have punished them when it was our fault? We
believe the task of leaders... is to articulate the values of the organization, to
create a system in which people can be productive, and to explain the goals
that the system was established to achieve.... If we in top management had
done those jobs properly... those few errors would not have occurred. That is
why we went back to evaluate our own communication skills. [O'Toole
1995: 59]
When a group is demoralized, when junior officials have lost their trust in
their leaders, as is the case in Canada now, we are faced with a form of vertical
solitude. In the case of the Canadian public service, this phenomenon has been
gauged very precisely through surveys (Zussman and Jabes 1990), but the
phenomenon goes much beyond this group. In most cases, surveys reveal the
lack of trust of citizens and junior officials in their leaders, but the leaders are
quite satisfied to ascribe such results to extraneous circumstances, to the flaws
of their subordinates, or to the ignorance of the citizenry.
Our experience suggests that there are systemic reasons for the lack of
trust and for the political stalemate in Canada. These reasons fall into three
general categories: the existence of a centralized mindset, the development of
the adversarial syndrome, and the burden of envy and resentment inherited
from our egalitarian tradition of the last 50 years.
A Centralized Mindset
Over the last 125 years, circumstances have often endangered Canadian
prosperity. Canada has had to learn ways and means to cope with these
challenges in a manner that reconciled the geotechnical and sociopolitical
constraints it operated under with the values, plans, and idiosyncrasies its
diverse population had given priority to at the time. A habitus has evolved: a
system of habitualized dispositions and inclinations to use certain institutional
devices or stratagems that appear to do the job of reconciling all those
constraints most effectively.
The economic culture that has evolved in this fashion has underpinned the
governance of the Canadian economy over the last century and has been based
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on two fundamental elements: the extensive use of public enterprise and interre-
gional redistribution of the economic surpluses (Hardin 1974). These two root
stratagems have been used repeatedly from the very early days of the federa-
tion and at most stages in the country's first century of evolution.
Recently, both these tenets of the Canadian economic culture have come
under attack. There has been a massive disengagement by the federal govern-
ment from its public enterprises, and large-scale interregional redistribution
of resources has been questioned. This has come about for many reasons.
Disenchantment with guidance from the centre has led to decentralization.
Many public enterprises have been privatized or have ceased to play a central
policy role, and the weakening of the central government's financial capacity
has eroded its ability to make massive interregional transfers.
But this has in no way diminished the extraordinary propensity to central-
ize that has come to characterize Canada. This is not only a Canadian trait; it
is a widely shared bias. Mitchel Resnick (1994) has analyzed the bizarre travers
that explains that, in an era of decentralization in every domain, centralized
thinking is remaining prevalent in our theories of knowledge, in our ways of
analyzing problems, and in our search for policy responses. "Politicians,
managers and scientists are working with blinders on, focusing on centralized
solutions even when decentralized approaches might be more appropriate,
robust, or reliable" (Resnick 1994: 36).
This centralized mindset appears to be stronger in Canada than elsewhere,
and the strategies to immunize the traditional centralized mindset from
challenges and erosion have been very sophisticated. These have gone through
many phases. First, there was the denial posture. Using public spending patterns
as benchmarks, many have argued that Canada is one of the most decentralized
countries in the world. The fact that spending at the subnational level was
commanded by conditional transfers appears to have been ignored.
A second line of defense suggests that further devolution might well
balkanize the country, which would be disastrous (McCallum in McKenna
1995). But Migue (1994) has shown rather persuasively that centralization —
and not decentralization — is the source of balkanization in Canada.
A third defense is that the glue that binds this country together is the
egalitarian economic culture of redistribution. National standards are the
fabric of this country, so central control cannot be reduced. Moreover, the
central government must retain the role of enforcer because of international
agreements that Canada is party to (Banting 1996; Leslie in McKenna 1995).
This would appear to be the Queen's defense, and we have shown elsewhere
that it is not very potent (Paquet 1996c).
A fourth argument is that decentralization is necessary, but it must be
postponed until we have uncovered "Canadian core values" that might be used
in determining the nature, extent, and character of "acceptable" decentraliza-
tion (Maxwell 1995).
These arguments are often mere sophistry when they are not explicit devices
to slow down the process of change, but they constitute in toto a most effective
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strategy for resisting change, and this sort of strategy is explicitly propagated by
those officials who have most to fear from massive decentralization.
The Adversarial Syndrome
The conflict between the centralized mindset of Canadian leaders and the
forces underpinning the dispersive revolution has directly generated some
resistance to change, but it has also catalyzed the coalescence of a national
adversarial system in Canada (Valaskakis 1990). This regime has developed
less as a matter of design than as a result of (1) adversarial relations becoming
the modus operandi and the new underlying philosophy and (2) conflictive
equilibria (situations where nothing can be resolved except by cooperation, but
collaboration appears extremely difficult if not impossible) in government-
business-society relations, in the labour-management world, but also within
each sector (private, public, and social) as between large and small firms,
between the federal and provincial levels, or between various environmental
groups.
One should not unduly malign competition nor excessively lionize deci-
sion-making by consensus, but it seems that Canada is fractured by those
re-enforcing adversarial systems to the point where the public policy forum
has not hesitated to blame them for much of the erosion of Canada's competi-
tiveness. The adversarial syndrome has undoubtedly been the source of some
paralysis in Canada's wealth-creation process as a result of the multiple
stalemates it has engendered, but it has also contributed significantly to the
reduction of the surplus potentially available for redistribution.
This adversarial syndrome corresponds to the strong taste for competition
in the Anglo-American space (Choate and Linger 1988), but it also echoes a
profound social decapitalization in North America (Putnam 1995, 1996). It
has thrived on the loss of civic engagement based on networks, norms, and
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, but
it has also accelerated the process of social decapitalization.
According to Hollingsworth (1993), this civic disengagement has triggered
a weakening of the sociocultural underground on which cooperation is built
for firms and public and social organizations. It has also contaminated the core
of the basic values on which our sociopolitical system has been built. This
explains the difficulties in generating the requisite processes to solve the
challenging problems of coordination created by the new world of distributed
governance.
Egalitarianism, Envy, and Resentment
A third general set of forces has contributed to a "climate of unreasonableness"
and a sociocultural underground that has proved more likely to generate
division than cohesion. It has its roots in the promotion of egalitarianism as a
basic value and a democratic dogma in a world more and more segmented
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along ethnocultural lines. This has generated a heightened degree of tension
and envy at the intercultural interface (Laurent and Paquet 1991).
The nature of these jealousies and the deep resentment created by the
propaganda about egalitarianism in a world where differences are omnipresent
have been suppressed, but the profound public sentiment that one cannot be
"equal and different" has prevailed and remains prevalent in all recent inter-
provincial deliberations and all constitutional forums throughout the country.
It may well be that nothing less than a new social contract built on the
principle "different but united" can accommodate the requisite separateness,
complementarities, and hierarchies and reduce envy and contain violence. But
we are still far from willing to confront the demons of egalitarianism and the
social capital of envy and resentment that has been accumulated by top-down
efforts to force acceptance of terms that seem to attempt to square the circle
of "equal and different." They have not only generated much social anomie,
but they are also responsible for the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlotte-
town accords. Moreover, they still represent fundamental mental blocks to
much-needed discussion about the possibility of any viable asymmetric regime.
This has fueled much social decapitalization and reinforced the intransi-
gence of egalitarians demanding a new drive for centralization capable of
guaranteeing the necessary renewed powers of redistribution to ensure stand-
ardization. Although the likelihood of a "different but united" social contract
may appear Utopian, the proposed alternatives for managing this intercultural
interface (separateness and encapsulation) appear unpalatable (Laurent and
Paquet 1991: 177-178).
THE LONG ADMINISTRATIVE ROUTE AS
A SHORTCUT
The bells and whistles of constitutional conferencing usually overshadow the
more pedestrian way of addressing difficult issues using the administrative
state, i.e., the decisions of public officials. A most divisive and explosive issue
like universality has been handled in this manner in Canada. Canadians knew
very well that addressing this issue head-on would be too politically destabiliz-
ing, so it was adroitly handled by the administrative state. Universality has now
all but disappeared, and new arrangements have come to take its place without
a major national confrontation.
Many of the real concerns (as opposed to the symbolic ones) over which
the various parties agonize could be handled in this manner. Indeed, no less
than 70% of what Charlottetown and Meech were trying to achieve could be
accomplished through administrative rearrangements. The Efficiency of the
Federation Initiative, introduced late in 1993, and Program Review in 1994
were promising instruments to effect much of that work. Their minimal success
so far should not be interpreted as an indication of a congenital flaw in these
processes. Their failures are ascribable much more to the centralized mindset
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of the government in power than to any other force (Paquet 1996b, Paquet and
Shepherd 1996).
Social Learning
Most of the high-level constitutional debates get bogged down in posturing,
in negotiation through the media, in extraordinarily intricate and unfortunate
wording that proves to be cast in stone as soon as it hits the street. This
generates important learning disabilities. It is much less difficult to proceed
through a major reframing of issues or to negotiate important compromises
when one is not in Macy's window. This is the reason why we have had such a
long tradition of successes using the administrative route.
One can point to the social learning by all parties that has marked decades
of negotiations of the Tax Structure Committee or generations of anonymous
committees of public officials who have been particularly effective at reframing
issues and have allowed the federation to evolve quickly and fruitfully over the
last century.
Social learning may materialize in the constitutional debate, although
there are reasons to feel pessimistic, as any group of malcontents may cause
the whole process to crash. In dealing with high-profile, symbolic issues, no
other channel can provide an easy resolution of disputes at this level. The
"distinct society" conundrum is a good example of such issues. But, for most
substantive issues, the administrative route is much more promising because
of its capacity to generate faster learning and its greater probability of being
successful in reframing issues. This road holds the promise of rapid progress,
whereas the constitutional route appears to be paved with bad intentions.
Social Learning Through Panic
There has been a slow, but irreversible, awakening to the new realities as a
result of the October 30th (1995) referendum. This has triggered new thinking
at the federal cabinet level, if one is to believe the revelations about the famous
"master plan" calling for devolution of 25% or more of federal program
activities in the very near future (Janigan and Fulton 1996). But, given the
schizophrenic mind of the federal cabinet on this front, time is of the essence.
The panic effect might easily fade away and the original good intentions may
be squashed and derailed by the not inconsiderable group of federal public
officials who still adhere to the view that nothing would be more disastrous for
Canada than the erosion of Ottawa's power.**
Not all social learning is a feed forward process. One might suspect that
those most opposed to a transformation of the Canadian governance system
also feel a sense of urgency. Their rear-guard action will not take the form of
** As of early 1999, as we are going to press, the federal-provincial social union discussions are
embroiled in controversies, and it would appear clear that the federal government is intent on
reconditionalizing federal-provincial transfers for medicare. The panic effect has faded away, the
centralized mindset looms large, and social learning has gone awry.
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counterproductive inflammatory denunciations of the devolution process. In
all likelihood, it will consist of a broad focus on alternative program delivery
and a quality service-centred federalism. Such a strategy might be a genuine
way out of the constitutional conundrum, but it can equally well be a decoy and
a thwarting maneuver designed to give the appearance of transformation of
federal governance without any substantial reduction of the federal hegemony.
In this dark scenario, a multitude of federal special operating agencies and a
focus on quality of service might even succeed in getting Ottawa's central
agencies to increase their power base.
On the other hand, a more optimistic scenario of a rekindled administra-
tive route to change in the governance system might help the parallel work
along the constitutional highway. Such a scenario would call for a reframing
of perspectives along the lines suggested by Burelle (1995) and others: a vision
of Canada that would proceed comfortably toward decentralization a la Swit-
zerland, a general philosophy of governance based on subsidiarity (i.e., a
strong push toward the responsibilization of the citizen and a recognition that
one can best attend to citizens' needs at the level closest to the citizens), a
renewal of the notion of citizenship replacing the entitlement mentality with
a sense of mutual obligation, and a move away from the state's heavy top-down
omnipresence toward a light-handed strategic state ensuring bottom-up and
more distributed governance (Paquet 1994b; Burelle 1995).
Toward a New Deal
If the federal "master plan" is to be carried out at all, it must be implemented
quickly. It would call for a rejuvenation of the Efficiency of the Federation
Initiative and for a refurbishment of the Program Review. The explicit objective
should be to achieve, through administrative negotiation over the next six
months, so much progress toward the reallocation of responsibilities among
the federal government, the provinces, the not-for-profit sector, and the
private sector, that it would be impossible for the crusaders on the high stage
of constitutional talks not to acknowledge that there has been a reframing of
the central issues.
Then one might be able to focus on some fundamentals that are, for the
moment, drowned by ideologic harangues. These fundamentals are (1) the
extraordinary interregional economic interdependence that still exists in
Canada and that one would not wish to destroy lightly (Helliwell and McCallum
1995), but also (2) the recognition that Canada is, fundamentally, a "commu-
nity of communities" much like Switzerland and that attempts to homogenize
it unduly and to thrust national standards on these diverse communities can,
at best, balkanize the country and, at worst, fracture it (Migue 1994).
Decentralization does not entail breaking the economic union or balkaniz-
ing the social union: it simply means forcing local and provincial governments
to provide the level of services they can afford. If anything, by foisting onto
provinces standards they could not afford, past efforts at decentralization have,
in fact, distorted prices, diminished provincial responsibility, and prevented
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interregional adjustments of human and financial resources. Indeed with the
dead weight impact of equalization payments, the provinces are put in an
ignominious position: "the more inefficient the provinces are, the more they
are compensated by the central authority" (Migue 1994: 117).
CONCLUSION
There is no hope of our getting out of our present stalemate by focusing
all our efforts on the constitution. We must be ready to recognize that, to cut
through this mess, our political scissors need two blades: a constitutional one
to deal with symbolic issues and an administrative one to deal with substantive
issues. Moreover, it is only when the second blade is sharp that the first can
really come into play.
There has been much skepticism about the effectiveness of the adminis-
trative route. Public officials in Ottawa have feared that route from the very
beginning; so much so, that they have successfully derailed many genuine
efforts to make good use of it (Paquet and Roy 1995; Paquet and Shepherd
1996).
The panic social learning triggered by the referendum results provides a
unique window of opportunity to revive the administrative strategy before it
becomes re-encapsulated by the forces of dynamic conservatism.***
* ** The ethnographic evidence available would appear to show that while much pessimism is in
order at the level of political negotiations, much optimism is permissible when one focuses on the
federal-provincial discussions at the bureaucratic level.
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CONCLUSION
THE BURDEN OF OFFICE, ETHICS, AND
CONNOISSEURSHIP*
Civilization is an achievement in the face of difficulties,
a precarious achievement. It is the state of mind of the magician
who tremblingly invokes the powers he would use, knowing that
if he gets the ceremony wrong what he invokes will destroy him.
-Joseph Tussman (1989)
The notions of accountability and ethics are poorly understood, and the adequacy
of existing frameworks for analyzing them may be responsible for much of our
inability to contribute to more effective institutions of public policy (Uhr 1992;
Dubnick 1996). Although both terms are used freely by public administrators,
academics, and ordinary citizens, they are often used inappropriately.
At a time when there is so much public outcry over our society having lost
its moral anchor and its sense of responsibility, carelessness in the use of these
words has become even more costly. In fact, the misuse of these concepts by
legal, political, and managerial authorities has been denounced as deceit that
is no less damaging than if the Bank of Canada were to issue counterfeit
currency. This explains the quest for precise rules, standards, and norms to
serve as guidelines and benchmarks for what constitutes responsible, account-
able, and ethical behaviour under various circumstances. This is a futile quest.
This does not mean that one cannot ground these concepts somewhat
better in a reality capable of illuminating them. But, the degree of precision
one can hope for in this venture is quite limited: accountability and ethics are
fundamentally contentious because of the fact that the notion of the burden
of office, on which they are built, is an essentially contested concept.
THE BURDEN OF OFFICE AS A CONTESTED
CONCEPT
In a democracy, each citizen is an official, a person with duties and obligations.
He or she has ruling work to do and is not simply a consumer of governance
but also a producer. Indeed, it is only because citizens as citizens have duties
* This chapter first appeared in Canadian Public Administration 1997, 40( 1), 55-71.
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and obligations that they are entitled to civil rights that ensure they are fully
equipped with the power to meet their obligations. But there is not much
meaningful debate about the nature of this burden of office; when there is,
agreement does not necessarily ensue (Tussman 1989).
The same fuzziness holds for more "important" officials, i.e., those holding
higher office, be they prime minister, chief of defense staff, etc. They are
persons with higher obligations and duties that are often rather ill-defined in
our complex world. This vagueness is unfortunately unavoidable. It is a
consequence of the fact that the concept of burden of office is socially based;
it is based on "a shared set of expectations and a common currency of
justifications" (Day and Klein 1987) that are quite difficult to define consen-
sually. We underline this state of affairs when we say that the burden of office
is an essentially contested concept.
Gallic (1964: 158) identified a whole range of concepts as essentially
contested, i.e., concepts "the proper use of which inevitably involves endless
disputes about their proper uses on the part of the users." He has identified
five conditions for a concept to be essentially contested: it must be (1) ap-
praisive, in the sense that it accredits some kind of valued achievement; (2) this
achievement must be complex in character and its worth attributed to the
achievement as a whole; but (3) variously describable in its parts, with the
possibility of various components being assigned more or less importance, and
(4) open in character to the extent that it admits considerable modification in
the light of changing circumstances. Moreover, to qualify as an essentially
contested concept, (5) each party must recognize that its own use of the concept
is contested by other parties (Gallic 1964: 161). A good example of such a
concept may be "championship" in a sport like figure skating, which can be
judged in a number of different ways, with differential attention being paid to
method, strategy, style, etc.
My argument is that the notion of burden of office (like the concepts of
democracy and social justice [Gallic 1964: 178-182]) is an essentially contested
concept, and it is quite impossible to find a general principle to determine
which party is using the concept best.
It came to my attention after this paper was written that there is another
way of stating the problem. Michael Harmon (1995: 5) has sharply criticized
the rationalist discourse on government by arguing that the notion of respon-
sibility with "ethical correctness and the conformity of action with authoritative
ends [is]... necessarily flawed in a fundamental way." Paradox is everywhere in
public administration.
BURDEN OF OFFICE, ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND ETHICS
If the burden of office is an essentially contested concept, the notions of
accountability and ethics are in some way infected. The fuzziness of the former
concept projects some haziness into the definition of the latter two.
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Accountability refers to the requirement to "answer for the discharge of a
duty or for conduct." This presupposed an agreement on what constitutes
acceptable performance and what constitutes an acceptable language of justi-
fication for actors defending their conduct (Day and Klein 1987). But, in the
complex world in which we now live, officials are confronted with many
interfaces with different stakeholders with different claims to authority (hier-
archical superior, professional colleagues, clients, etc.); demands for many
types of accounts (political, managerial, legal, professional, etc.); and much
complexity, heterogeneity, and uncertainty in the circumstances surrounding
the activities for which they are accountable. Thus, the very complexity of the
burden of office results in much fuzziness in the definition of accountability.
Ethics is a form of goodness-of-fit that evolves in and from reflection in
action, deliberation, or "argumentation — among particular people, in spe-
cific situations, dealing with concrete things, with different things at stake"
(Toulmin 1988). Judgement is embodied in action. A reflective conversation with
the situation resolves moral issues in the same manner that it resolves the
problem faced by an industrial designer: in both cases, the challenge is to find
a form that fits the circumstance, given the constraints. When a designer
interacts with a situation, the interactive triggers the generation of a goodness-
of-fit between two intangibles: a form that has not yet been designed and a
context that cannot be properly and fully described, because it is still evolving
(Alexander 1964; Cloutier and Paquet 1988; Paquet 1991-92b, 1997f). This is
the way of the "reflective practitioner" (Schon 1983). The notion of ethical
fitness calls for the same fit between the standard defined by the burden of
office and those that take into account the circumstance. And again, the
essentially contested nature of the notion of burden of office makes it impos-
sible for ethical conduct to escape a degree of fuzziness.
The fact that the notion of burden of office is essentially contested will not
prevent contestants from claiming that their use of the concept is "the only
one that can command honest and informed approval" (Gallic 1964: 189).
Consequently, there will be different views about accountability and ethical
behaviour. This is not without danger, for, as the essential contestedness of the
concept transpires, there is always a real danger that those in authority may
grow impatient with trying to persuade and be led to "a ruthless decision to
cut the cackle, to damn the heretics and to exterminate the unwanted" (Gallic
1964). The conversation and the deliberation are interrupted, and democracy
is in danger.
DEALING WITH INCOMMENSURABIES
But even when the conversation does not stop, there is a tendency to deny the
essential contestedness of the concept and to search for ways to simplify the
notion of burden of office to ensure well-behaved trade-offs among the various
interfaces with stakeholders. In fact, what many refuse to accept is that the
burden of an official in a multidimensional world of hierarchical superiors,
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professional colleagues, clients, etc., amounts to choices among incommensur-
ables. The search for simple rules can only result in formulas that claim to
reduce incommensurables to commensurability. For that reason, it is hardly
surprising that this approach fails.
Defining accountability in a single direction, with reference to only one
stakeholder, or without taking account of the context is extremely dangerous.
It would amount to assuming that only one dimension is important and
presuming that all other forms of accountabilities can be regarded as irrele-
vant or secondary in some sense. The famous 1919 case between the Dodge
brothers and Ford is a case in point. At the time, the court chastised Ford's
corporate board for not paying exclusive attention to the interests of the
shareholders in their decisions. This considerably limited their burden of
office. This situation has evolved over the last 80 years, and the burden of
office of corporate directors has now changed and become much more
complex. Currently, a few dozen U.S. states have legislation that clearly
establishes that corporate boards may take into account other stakeholders'
interests (de la Mothe and Paquet 1996).
Even though the burden of office of corporate directors has been prudently
extended, the notion of accountability is still not widely regarded as a 360-de-
gree process, that is, as pertaining to all the stakeholders surrounding the
official. And yet, focus on a single dimension is likely to be fundamentally
contested. So, the only way to get agreement about what constitutes acceptable
performance and acceptable justification is through deliberation, not through the
unilateral imposition of one set of views.
The same may be said about ethics. Ethics is by definition "agonistic"—
from the Greek agon, meaning competition, rivalry, conflict of characters in
tragic dramas (Gray 1995: 1). One must make moral sense in the presence of
conflicting and incommensurable alternatives. Consequently, moral reasoning
cannot proceed on the basis of the comfort of universal ethical rules or codes.
Indeed, it cannot rely on any simplistic theory that purports to provide answers
to ethical dilemmas by pretending to gauge incommensurable situations with
a single measuring stick. Nontrivial ethical issues involve rival goods and evils
and dilemmas that cannot be solved or decided by rational reflection. The
rationalistic normative theories (utilitarianism, contractarianism, right-based
principles, etc.) are futile, because they are swayed by simplistic universalism
(i.e., the belief that there are universal rules that will arbitrate all moral
dilemmas) (Clarke and Simpson 1989).
In the name of utilitarianism, one falls into total disrespect for the
individual; right-based approaches condone the most awesome inequities. As
for the Rawlsian (1971) contractarian approach, it is silent on the nature of the
redistribution required to ensure satisfactory allocation of the so-called "pri-
mary" goods. Consequently, no clearly acceptable criteria for action can be
derived from these general principles, because they are all too completely
disconnected from a full appreciation of context and, therefore, are of no
practical use (Paquet 1994c, 1997f).
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Insistence on only one dimension of the burden of office or of the
accountability framework (legal, organizational, professional, or political) or a
lack of prudence in balancing the moral push (to live up to one's values) with
the moral pull (the need to respect the values of the other various stakeholders)
can only lead to abusive, dangerous, and truncated notions of burden of office,
accountability, and ethics (Dubnick 1996). There is no easy way out: there must
be discussion, dialogue, and deliberation leading to social learning and to an
always imperfect and incomplete reconciliation of these different dimensions.
Value relativism is often presented as the only alternative to universal
principle: it is the world of "anything goes." To most people, this appears
rather abhorrent, which is why pluralism that is regarded as a sort of halfway house
has acquired such a good press (Keyes 1993). Pluralism is first and foremost
against monism. Pluralists reject the view that there is only one system of values
leading to the good life. However, they must agree to find some grounds to
impose reasonable limits on what is acceptable and some justification for
imposing these limits on the possibilities that individuals may pursue. Al-
though relativists do not believe that any such limits can have an objective basis,
pluralists do. But how can this be done?
It can only materialize through social learning, through the erratic process
of bouncing off the limits of tacit convention and making the highest and best
use of scandals, because scandals are events pointing to unacceptable situations
or behaviours (Paquet 1994c). This is not likely to result in a high degree of
marksmanship. But it is only through an oblique process of this sort that the
limits of the unacceptable are defined and jurisprudence slowly redefines the
boundaries beyond which current convention does not hold. In the same way,
scandals act as revelateurs to signal that certain limits have been crossed, but
there is some randomness in the scandal-generating process. Learning is
recognizing the difference between what is expected and what happens, and
embracing this error as a way of evaluating and adjusting action (Michael
1993).
But this learning can only occur under some conditions: (1) if the conver-
sation with the situation is conducted within a context where the ethos is
sufficiently rich and supportive (i.e., the sum of characteristic usages, ideas,
and codes by which a group is differentiated is strong enough to allow a
meaningful conversation to be carried out); and (2) if the conversation,
deliberation, and accumulation of judgements is conducted with tact and
civility, with a capacity to span boundaries and to synthesize multiple logics.
Without a supportive "communautarian" fabric and a fruitful and open con-
versation, it is difficult to see how learning can occur effectively and how a
somewhat objective basis that might define the reasonable limits on which
pluralists need to agree can be determined (Schon 1983; Kingwell 1995;
Paquet and Pigeon 1995).
Even though Michael Harmon's (1995) work focuses on a general cartog-
raphy of the paradoxical world of responsibility rather than on ways to navigate
in this world of paradoxes, there is a certain family resemblance between my
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insistence on the essentially contested nature of the burden of office and his
insistence on the essentially paradoxical nature of responsibility. For Harmon,
responsibility is at best a paradox-ridden locus of creative tension among
freedom of will (agency), answerability to some institutional authority (account-
ability), and obligation to meet externally generated norms. This leads him to
search for a way out — not in unassailable criteria (together with their retinue
of obedience and "blameability"), but in a celebration of "practice" and
"dialogue." Thus, his philosophical analysis, conducted at a much more
abstract level than mine, converges with my celebration of the "reflective
practitioner" (Schon 1983).
MORAL REASONING AND INTERMEDIATE CASES
We are then confronted with two very different accounts of ethics and morality:
one that seeks "eternal, invariable principles, the practical applications of
which can be free of exceptions and qualifications, and the other, which pays
closest attention to the specific details of particular moral cases and circum-
stances" (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 2). The first is an absolutist version that
oversimplifies the discussion of moral issues; the dogmatism of codes and rules
does not allow any middle road between absolutism and relativism. But the
second, pluralist version also generates major challenges: it relies on human
perceptiveness, appreciation, and discernment; it does not prohibit rules, but
it condemns them to a limited and conditional role in moral reasoning.
This pluralist stand has been under attack by those who, from Pascal on,
have labeled it casuistry or case ethics and have denounced any moral reason-
ing based on "cases"or "circumstances" as "an invitation to excuse the inexcus-
able" (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 11).
Indeed, the pluralist position tries to avoid both absolutism and total value
relativism by a rehabilitation of casuistry as the practical resolution of particular
moral perplexities. It cannot ensure, however, that the conversation with the
situation carried out by the citizens and other officials in the forum and the
bearing of the burden of office working itself through in the context of habits,
patterns, and institutions (making up the appreciative system and the ethos)
will necessarily lead to effective social learning. But double-looped learning
(i.e., not only learning better ways to achieve given objectives, but also learning
new goals, values, and objectives as circumstances change) is possible.
Ensuring that conversation is conducted in a manner likely to foster social
learning requires a process of adaptation of values and an improvement of the
"goodness-of-fit" between values and context. For the social system to adapt
(i.e., to learn) as much and as fast as possible, some basic conditions must be
realized. Some pertain to process, some to new competences, and others have
to do with the robustness of the supportive moral contracts in the ethos.
In terms of process, Wittgenstein's (1953) Philosophical Investigations may
provide some cues. For Wittgenstein, understanding emerges from dialogue:
it is mutual understanding. It materializes by looking at a multiplicity of cases,
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describing examples, drawing analogies, and "drawing attention to the inter-
mediate cases so that one can pass easily from familiar cases to the unfamiliar
and see the relation between them" (Tully 1995: 108).
Tully notes that this practical form of reasoning is akin to the reasoning
in individual cases in common law. This common-law view is typical of the
Renaissance humanist culture. It is a commitment to conversation, to listening
to the other side, to accepting that the only way to develop reason as a practical
skill is to compare and contrast, to exchange and negotiate alternative
descriptions.
The sort of learning generated by dialogue does not necessarily congeal
in formalized conclusions. It remains very much tacit knowledge, a capacity to
deal effectively with matters of practice and to deal with such matters in a timely
manner and with a full appreciation of the local and particular context. Such
accumulated tacit knowledge is predicated on the fact that, through experience,
we learn much and that, at any time, we know more than we can tell (Polanyi
1996). This is the way knowledge evolves in common law: case by case and
often in a tacit way.
Through the assimilation of evidence, the individual's diagnostic capabil-
ity grows. The specific experience is the essence of connoisseurship; it is
developed by relating and comparing within a field of knowledge (Freedberg
1989). Connoisseurship, like skill, is communicated by experience and exam-
ples, not by precepts. One cannot develop an appreciation of human physiog-
nomies except through a long course of experience. The skill of a wine taster
or the capacity to swim or ride a bicycle is acquired this way (Polanyi 1958: 54).
There is no spontaneous emergence of connoisseurship. It arises out of a
combination of some basic capability and extensive exposure to a large number
of intermediate cases.
Connoisseurship can never be the application of simple explicit rules. It
is a tacit "savoir-faire" and "savoir-etre" and becomes part of the fabric of the
trainee. It generates instinctively a responsible decision in the face of complex
and uncertain circumstances, a response that appropriately balances agency,
accountability, and obligation hie et nunc.
Learning values is like learning how to swim: it is done by eliminating
misfits, by correcting errors, by continuous realignment to ensure goodness-
of-fit between elusive standards and circumstances. But there can be no
learning unless one recognizes and embraces error as a fundamental building
block in social learning, as a crucial way of fuelling fruitful deliberations. This
is true as much for the citizen or the simple soldier as it is for military leaders.
However, the new competences in such learning systems will develop only
under certain conditions. There must be an acknowledgment that the high
level of uncertainty is irreducible; an explicit will to embrace error as the
difference between what is expected and what happens; and a willingness to
span boundaries across perspectives (Michael 1993).
Harmon (1995) does not focus on connoisseurship. He spells out the
practical implications of viewing responsibility paradoxically, but he proffers
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no advice. Our focus on the "practitioner" rather that on "practice" forces us
to be bolder and to insist on the need, not only to recognize the practical
implication of viewing the notion of burden of office as essentially contested
in nature, but also to develop practical strategies and to reflect on the sort of
competencies likely to lead to workable notions of accountability and ethics.
A robust underlying ethos is also very important for effective social
learning. It is embodied in a number of more or less explicit moral contracts
linking the various stakeholders; for example, the moral contracts between the
citizenry and the bureaucracy, and between the bureaucrats and their leaders
(Paquet 1991-92b and Chapter 12). What we mean by a robust ethos is a
"contextualist" one in which there are vibrant multiplexed relations of mutual
interdependence and caretaking, a contextual fabric rich in networking and
in social capital (Putnam 1995). The more trust and esprit de corps, the more
effective the social learning.
We know from experience that sometimes faster learning is a matter of
survival. Our immune system is bombarded constantly by new viruses, and it
must learn and adapt quickly if we are to survive. At times, there is even the
possibility that our immune system may not learn fast enough, so it becomes
necessary to use a vaccine, a lever to help it learn faster about the best way to
fight a disease. The same can be said about any social system. And leadership
is the lever in this case.
If the conversation is to be carried on truthfully, the leader must earn the
trust of his followers by persuading them that he has their needs and
aspirations at heart. The leader's ability to lead and to foster effective social
learning is a by-product of the trust he has earned by serving his followers, as
well as the capacity of the existing ethos to generate such trust (O'Toole 1995;
Paquet 1997f).
For political leaders, the dual moral responsibility to both the citizenry
and their followers is quite daunting. For military leaders, because of the fact
that there is always a potential life-and-death dimension to their decisions, the
stakes are even higher. They must manage high-stakes moral contracts: the
citizenry must grant some latitude in the use of violence by armed personnel
against a guarantee of higher moral standards among them than what is
expected from the ordinary citizen; armed personnel must make a commit-
ment to selflessness in the face of difficult circumstances in exchange for a
guarantee of the appropriate level of financial, material, and symbolic re-
sources necessary to ensure minimal casualties.
If these moral contracts between citizens and armed forces, and between
leaders and followers within the military, are explained, they may prove less
difficult to implement than is generally perceived. For, as Akerlof (1984)
suggests, there may be advantages for a well-identified group like the armed
forces to instill in its members certain moral values and certain virtues that
limit the pursuit of individual personal interests but that significantly improve
the probability of promotion within the ranks. To the extent that this is the
case, one may see how the two moral contracts (between the military and the
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citizenry, and between leaders and followers within the military) are intercon-
nected: the military offers the citizenry a commitment to virtuous behaviour
as a quid pro quo for civilian support of the military, and military leaders offer
their followers progress through the ranks on the basis of those very virtues
that are important to the citizens (Ricks 1996).
CONNOISSEURSHIP, SOCIAL LEARNING,
AND "BLAMEABILITY"
To foster stronger accountability and ethical fabric, a three-pronged strategy
that can be built on the highest and best use of education, deliberation, and
social capitalization is necessary. Anything that provides greater moral con-
noisseurship and responsible behaviour or that fosters a wider use of moral
reasoning, facilitates a more open deliberation process in the forum, or
strengthens the ethos by endowing it with denser relations and a higher degree
of trust promotes more effective social learning and, therefore, the likelihood
of a more robust accountability and ethical fabric. Anything that generates
blockages in these three directions can only slow down social and moral
learning.
There are important impediments and stumbling blocks on these three
roads. They may vary in form and intensity, from time to time and place to
place. However, one major distortion deserves special attention. It is the sort
of "judicial usurpation of politics" that has distorted the whole social learning
process and the fluid common-law-type emergence of an effective evolving
accountability and ethical framework. This distortion is caused by the myopic
search for "blameability" that has become the trademark of the judiciary.
Politics consists of free people deliberating the question of how we ought
to order our life together. When questions that are properly political are unduly
narrowed, legalized, or "speciously constitutionalized," the conversation is
truncated and distorted and social learning falters (First Things 1996). It is an
even more dramatic distortion when morality is declared legally suspect and
a threat to the public order and when political deliberative institutions are
undermined by the arrogance of those who insist on redefining judicially the
political questions.
The main reason why judicial commissions of inquiry headed or fuelled
by the legal perspective have proved quite unsatisfactory has to do with the
tendency of such bodies to be mesmerized by experts in the business of
interrogating and punishing. Those people are neither trained to analyze nor
really prepared to handle issues of malfunctioning institutions or flawed
administrative systems. As a result of their narrow legalistic perspective, the
notions of burden of office, accountability, and ethics are redefined in a flawed
and reductive way.
For them, error is not a source of learning but rather a source of blame,
and it demands punishment. Consequently, years after some of these
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commissions have been appointed, it is still unclear what was flawed in the
system they were investigating. So, the citizen cannot be sure that this flaw has
been corrected. These commissions are in hot pursuit of culprits and people
to blame instead of trying to repair defective institutional architectures.
It is not clear whether one can easily eliminate such a massive source of
distortion in our political and administrative systems. Indeed, there are
instances abroad where the judicial usurpation of politics has progressed
beyond anything we have experienced in Canada. But it would be unwise to
develop a fixation on this sole blockage.
There are other impediments to moral and social learning: a diminished
role of moral connoisseurship in our education system, the presence of too
many taboo topics that cannot be openly discussed, the social decapitalization
denounced by Putnam (1995) and others. However, this should not lead one
to conclude that action to improve the moral fabric is not possible or is
condemned to be fruitless.
On the education front, the central concern is the explicit recognition that
connoisseurship is not necessarily an innate quality. It must be learned by
example as much as by training. It must also be reconciled with the rest of the
value system defined by the ethos.
It is as unfair to demand moral connoisseurship from public servants or
military personnel, without the appropriate moral apprenticeship, as it would
be to ask one to fly an F-18 without training. Consequently, unless the public
sector begins to spend as much money as Toyota in selecting suitable recruits
and in allocating throughout their training period as much time to developing
accountability and ethical skills as it does to technical skills, connoisseurship
will not materialize.
On the deliberation front, the process of democratic participation in the
production of governance has to be understood as a daunting task. When a
problem of some magnitude is revealed by scandal, it often cannot be under-
stood easily and repaired quickly. In the case of a malaise in the armed forces,
it may demand an overhauling of the corporate culture, a fundamental
rethinking of recruitment practices and nothing less than a sanitization of the
"traditional" way of life of the organization. Moreover, it may require no less
than a full generation (some 15 years) to "cleanse" the present ethos from its
bacteria.
It is only too understandable that in the face of such a mammoth task, the
tendency has been to turn one's attention to more tractable problems: for
instance, blameability. This is especially the case when acknowledging the
problem may lead to one's having to admit that one does not know what to do.
This explains why it becomes a taboo problem (Michael 1988b).
On the social recapitalization front, even if it is not clear what the contours
of the new institutional fabric will be, moral connoisseurship cannot simply be
transplanted to the existing ethos. It can be fitted within it only by making
major repairs to the ethos.
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An ethos is a permanent construction site. It is evolving constantly and
represents a complex set of social armistices between geotechnical constraints
and values and plans. A refurbished ethos may have to start with a few
reiterated points, as was done in the Magna Carta: primum non nocere as one of
the few absolutes; higher moral standards required from the public servant
than from the citizen; a greater awareness of the basic moral contracts making
up the ethos; the essentially contested nature of the burden of office and the
great limits it imposes on accountability and ethics consensus; the fundamental
importance of error-embracing and social learning; the connoisseurship na-
ture of moral reasoning; the recognition that social and moral learning is
bound to be a trial-and-error process.
All this is both extremely simple and extremely profound. It recognizes
that any social recapitalization is bound to take much time and to require long
and difficult deliberations. Although it is quite easy to destroy institutions, it
is difficult to construct an institutional order and it often requires both a major
reframing of perspective and much effort to reconfigure the ethos and even
to neutralize or displace the present politics of denial that prevent any
coordinated effort to mount a new construction site (Paquet 1995).
However, this major task of reframing cannot be undertaken unless it is
first recognized that the usual rationalist representation of accountability and
ethics is an "irresponsible masquerade"; it cannot escape the paradoxes it
attempts to abolish (Harmon 1995: 65). Only when the ground is clear, can
one hope to build a more practical and useful representation.
Even though Harmon (1995) refuses to be programmatic, he has identified
four major challenges that need to be met head on in the process of social
learning: the need to keep in mind and maintain balance (1) between personal
responsibility ancl commitment to others; (2) between freedom and responsi-
bility; (3) between individual and collective "answerability" and entitlement;
and (4) between political and professional responsibility.
The temptation in each case is to postulate a split between these different
poles and to assert the dominance of one over the other. This can only produce
pathologies through the atrophy of one of the constituent principles and an
undue simplification of the "fundamental, unresolved, and perhaps unresolv-
able tensions" that characterize human behaviour (Hirschman 1985).
But avoiding such pathologies cannot suffice. Reframing entails a trans-
formation of these treacherous dyads into creative dialectical relationships that
need tone worked out through deliberation at the practical level in a manner
that ensures that all the relevant stakeholders and all the constituent principles
are fully engaged in the creative dialogue and the creative practice from which
viable compromises emerge. This entails a 360-degree accountability and
ethics: a complicated conversation that is both inevitable and unlikely to yield
anything but an ongoing and unending multilogue.
Hirschman (1985) and Harmon (1995) might be rightly accused of having
contributed significantly to a complication of the social-science discourse.
Theirs have been pleas to recognize complexity where it exists instead of
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denying it. These complications may be troublesome, but they are not posing
unresolvable problems. They only force a reframing of our approach to social
phenomena that takes into account the basic tensions with which humanity
must live.
CONCLUSION
One of the fundamental reasons why the problem of inappropriate connois-
seurship has not been resolved is that leaders have been unwilling to acknow-
ledge it as a problem. The denial syndrome emerged from the fact that the
leaders have been regarding this issue as one with which they did not know
how to cope; so there was denial, and the real problem remained a taboo topic.
Consequently, scandals have been dealt with as anomalies, and bad apples have
been removed (or regiments disbanded), as if such actions resolved the issue.
This has been both futile and dangerous: futile, because the problem was
simply occluded; dangerous, because the suppressed problem was ever-present
like a denied generalized cancer.
For example, it is very difficult for civilians, who are not especially
well-informed, except through the popular press, to understand how the
violence-based apprenticeship of the Canadian Airborne Regiment could
not but lead to violence in a context requiring saintly tolerance, humanitar-
ian patience, and quiet diplomacy. Making scapegoats of the regiment or
some of its officers without raising questions about the ethos of their training
and the system of command that led the military to assign a group so
specialized in violence to such a delicate task, can only leave civilians
puzzled. Disbanding the regiment did not deal with the central issues; it
allowed everyone to avoid dealing with it.
Conferences and papers about ethics may be necessary and useful, but they
are hardly sufficient to deal with the systemic problem at hand. They are at
best a useful first step toward admitting that there is problem. In that sense,
they may foster courage, because it requires much courage to stop denying the
problem when one has no solution. This is the sort of courage that has been
witnessed recently in the military, but also in numerous other areas of the
private, public, and social domains. Now that it has become possible to talk
about these questions without being accused of treason, it is essential that the
conversation not be derailed into trivial pursuits. The central questions are not
the preparation of a compulsory three-hour course on ethics or the concoction
of a code of ethics engraved on a plasticized card. The central concerns have
to do with the burden of office of the various officials and with the account-
ability and ethical frameworks that are required if officials are to perform their
tasks in a manner that meets the expectations of the citizenry.
It may take 15 years of deliberation and clarification (of the moral contracts
between the citizenry and the military, and between the military leaders and
their followers, for instance) before the problem receives, not a solution, but a
workable response. As Nowlan (1968) remarked some 30 years ago, "puzzles
DDDDDDDDDDDDDhh
have solutions, problems don't; problems have responses and one man's
response will inevitably give rise to another man's objection." This is the world
of paradoxes and essentially contested concepts. No anodyne instrumental
logic will do.
But 15 years is only a shade more than 5000 days. This is the realistic
time-frame that the United States has accepted for transforming the ethos of
their military establishment, and there are reasons to believe that this approach
has proved effective (Ricks 1996).
Whether such a farsighted approach can be adopted by Canadian officials
in the military and elsewhere remains to be seen. However, there is growing
awareness that the problem is unlikely to go away and that an effective response
is unlikely to be of the Band-Aid variety. That is why one may feel that there
are reasons to hope — not to be optimistic but to hope (Michael 1988b).
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